IR 05000155/1985005

Insp Rept 50-155/85-05 on 850319-0429.No Noncompliance or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Maint Operation, Surveillance Operation & Reactor Trips

ML20128C451
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	05/13/1985
From:	Boyd D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128C414	List: IR 05000155/1985005 ML20128C411
References
50-155-85-05, 50-155-85-5, NUDOCS 8505280296
Download: ML20128C451 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

. Report No. 50-155/85005(DRP)

Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At: Charlevoix, MI 49720 Inspection Conducted: March 19,1985 - April 29,1985 Inspector: S. Guthrie

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Approved By: .D.C. Boyd, Chief 5-/3-66 Projects Section 18 Date Inspection Sumary Inspection on March 19, 1985 to April 29, 1985 (Report No. 50-155/85005(DRP))

' Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by the Senior Resident Inspector of Licensee Actions on previous Inspection Findings, Operational Safety, Maintenance Operation, Surveillance Operation, Reactor Trips, Licensee Event Report Followup, Headquarters Requests, and Spent Fuel Pool Modifications. The inspection involved a total of 103 inspector-hours by one NRC inspecto Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie ,

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DETAILS-

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' Persons Contacted

• D. Hoffman, Plant Superintendent

• G.L Pettfjean, Technical! Superintendent

, .*G. Withrow,~ Maintenance Superintendent

~ *R. Alexander, Technical Engineer.-

.A.- Sevener,- Operations Superintendent

• R.:Abel Operations and Maintenance Superintendent L.: Monshor, Quality Assurance. Superintendent R.'Barnhart, Senior Quality Assurance Administrator P.l Donnelly, Senior Review Supervisor, Nuclear Activities Dep J.-Lovell,-Quality Control Supervisor E. McNamara, Shift Supervisor

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'.C 'D. Swem,~ General Engineer

- _G. 'Sonnenberg, Shif t Supervisor -

DE Staton, Shift Supervisor-

• R. = Krchmar, Quality Assurance .

• R. Burdette,. Acting C/HP Superintendent M.- Acker, General Engineer-The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel .in the Operations, Maintenance, Radiation Protection and Technical Department * Denotes-those present at exit intervie L Licensee Action'on previous Inspection Findings (Closed)OpenItem(155/84017-04). This. item tracked the licensee's corrective action in response to a January 7,1985, scram on low-

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steam' drum level. Corrective actions'are detailed in section 7.b of L

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' ~0perational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations', reviewed applicable logs f and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. :The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency .

. systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of effected components. Tours of the containment sphere and turbine' .

building were conducted to' observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid. leaks, and excessive vibrations.and to L verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified

.that'tne physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the-station security' plan.

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-The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the

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r inspection period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of +

the Liquid Poison, Emergency Condenser, Reactor Depressurization Post P Incident, Core Spray and Containment Spray systems to verify operabilit %g

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On April 6 the licensee observed damage done by severe weather and M ice to the east wall of the screen house. The damaged area is in the d

[ concrete wall and is accessible by water via the discharge cana _]

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Further evaluation by the licensee on April 7 led to a decision to y post a security guard at the damaged location because of the remote 9

potential for unauthorized access to the protected area. On April 9 i

- the licensee welded a plate across the opening to prohibit acces g

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The potential breach of security was reported to NRC Headquarters -

' April 9, 198 No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are (

a s 4. Monthly Maintenance Observation {

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Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted

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. in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry a

{ , codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification E

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c The following items were considered during this review: the limiting i

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_ conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed j from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiatir.9 the work; a

. activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected q r as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior e t-

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to returning components or systems to service; quality control records ;

e were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; d

- parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls S i were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente "

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7 Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to 3 B- assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance !

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which may affect system performanc g b 2

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" On March 25-26 the inspector observed the modification to the interior 3 and exterior lever arm bolts controlling the mechanical interlock in g 5 the containment sphere personnel air lock. Bolts which had sheared g and rendered the interlock inoperable were replaced by larger bolts (q L .

of a different material. The modification was the corrective action -g g for the -loss of containment integrity event of July 31, 1984, the e g subject of LER 8401 ;

F w y f_ During the outage the licensee performed extensi.ve repairs on a E :^ Reactor Depressurization System (RDS) valves. Working with a G" E vendor representative, the licensee lapped all seats on the

. upstream isolation valves and machined the discs to provide for "

r ; a more uniform seating surface across the entire area of the disc 'l

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face. The licensee identified one cracked disc, and turned that ]

cracked face toward the higher pressure (reactor) side of the 1

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valve during reassembly. A replacement disc is on order for 3 another cracked disc previously identified, and repairs to the "

newly discovered cracked disc are being evaluate =

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The Target Rock depressurization valves received lapping work on the main seats and newly rebuilt top assemblies on all four valve ;

Three of the four tops had received the modification to the flow path -

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to the pilot valve that smoothed the passage and removed a ledge i where rust particles accumulate. The fourth top assembly did not -q receive the modification because of parts availability problems and =

is installed on the "D" train. A crack was discovered on the main seat of the "C" depressurization valve and an evaluation is underwa The startup on April 18 was the first with the procedure modified to keep CV-4184, RDS Bypass Valve, closed until plant pressure reached i

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1100 psi. The opening of CV-4184 is timed slowly to admit pressure through the RDS-101 valves to the spoolpiece between the upstream isolation valves and the depressurization valves. This change was 4=

intended to prevent accumulation of grit in the pilot valve during

the slow plant pressure buildup typical of a startup. Up to 1100 psi the upstream isolation valves held pressure. After opening CV-4184 1 at 1100 psi the pilot valves showed no evidence of leakage. At the g close of the inspection period the RDS system was operating with all  ;

101 valves open and no indicated pilot valve leakage. The licensee i continues to evaluate other long term actions, including new tops of 5'

corrosion resistant material, different methods of full stroke valve testing or bench testing, and reduced test frequenc c. During the outage the licensee reset the Limitorque switch settings J on M0-7066, Fire Main Water to Core Spray Heat exchangers, to values I provided by the vendor. The torque switch settings provided by the 1 vendor differed from the settings observed, giving the licensee ,

reason to believe the settings were in error even though no j operational problems had been evident. The licensee was inspecting :s M0-7066 and other valves as part of a program to verify. correct 1 torque switch settings on Limitorque actuators after incorrect switch j settings were discovcred in M0-7050, Main Steam Isolation Valve, and M0-7067, Turbine Bypass Isolation Valv j y

Following the M0-7066 switch resetting the valve was test operated, ]

but tripped the breaker on thermal over!oad before the torque switches y activated. While investigating the licensee identified differences a between the vendor's definition of " recommended setting" and " maximum g setting" and the licensee's understanding of the two terms. The  :

vendor definition of " maximum setting" is the point where the metal i limiter plate is installed on the actuator device and represents the j maximum torque allowed without damaging the actuator. The actuator  ;

vendor provides the valve manufacturer with " recommended settings" i for switch positions designed to correspond to the opening and 9 closing torque requirements for the individual valve applicatio i While no upward adjustment is pemitted with the " maximum" setting,  :

the "recomended" setting is adjustable to provide for changes in j

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4 torque requirements resulting from valve age, packing-adjustment, or

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other variable parameters. In the case of M0-7066, the licensee had used the_ maximum setting as the-recommended setting.The M0-7066

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. switches were returned to their original settings. .The licensee

had also reset to the maximum setting the switches on M0-7053 and MO-7063, Emergency Condenser Outlet Valves, but returned them'to-their original setting upon discovery of the problem with M0-706 '

. The licensee detemined that the torque switches found mispositioned -

on MO-7050 and M0-7067 were actually incorrectly set and were not L involved in the confusion over definitions that affected M0-7066, M0-7053, and M0-7063. The licensee is working with the actuator vendor and valve' manufacturers to compile an accurate list.of-torque

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settings. The licensee remains committed to verification of the g accuracy of torque switch settings on all 18 valves considered:to have safety significance.or. frequent operation by the. end of the 1985 refueling outag , No items .of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this this area.-

~ ' Surveillance Observation On April 2 the inspector observed the performance of T7-18, Bypass-Valve Test, with emphasis on the licensee's actions on concerns presented in section 5.b of Inspection Report No. 155/85002 (DRP)

that the characteristics of the bypass valve controller deviation alarm were such that the bypass valve could be inoperable without-the ~ operator's knowledge. The licensee has initiated repai activities to the controllers to be completed during an upcoming .

- outage period. A licensee investigation-~of deviation-alarm circuitry indicated that during normal plant operation the deviation alarm ~1s fully operable at an acceptable tolerance for controller failures in the open valve direction. However, during nomal conditions'it is not within the range of the electronic circuitry to produce the-Ldeviation alarm for controller failures in the close valve directio The operational consideration imposed by the limitations of the electronic circuitry is offset by the weekly test which verifies the

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operability of each controller. The licensee is revising ALP 1.5,

! Annunciator No. 50, to provide operators with a deviation alarm

! setpoint in pounds rather than percent. The licensee's determination-lH

, that operators do not have the deviation alarm available.during all

. plant conditions is'to be incorporated into the training program and ,

circulated as a memorandum to operator _

- On April 2 the inspector observed the performance of Surveillance T30-27, Shift Fire Drill, in the station power room. Fire brigade

. response was orderly and prompt.

7 c.- On- April 2 the inspector observed portions of Survefilance T30-01,

-. Reactor Protection System monthly check. The test was conducted in

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-accordance with-procedural requirement i

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- Reactor Trips' A On April 14, while the reactor was shutdown with all rods inserted, a i Reactor Protection System (RPS) Upscale /Downscale trip occurred. The trip -

signal resulted from the susceptibility of the picoammeter to electrical '

noise at low neutron flux levels, a known operating characteristic of the f equipment. A spurious trip signal of this type has no impact on plant 3 safet No items of non compliance or deviations were identified in this are _ Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine q

that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had h been accomplished in accordance with technical specification (Closed) LER 84011, " Loss of Containment Integrity Through the Personnel Lock." This event resulted from a sheared bolt in one of two interior g lever arms controlling the mechanical interlock for the personnel air a lock. Corrective action included replacement with a larger bolt of a different materia =

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(Closed) LER 85002, " Manual Reactor Scram, Steam Drum Low Level." This -

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LER reported a reactor scram on January 27, 1985, resulting from failure to reset the feedwater regulating valve after air had been secured to the i valve, causing the valve to fail in the as-is position. The scram is h detailed in section 6.b of I.R. No. 84017(DRP). The licensee issued a y memorandum to operators describing the circumstances, and took other -

corrective action directed at correcting a procedural inadequacy. System j Operating Procedure (S0P) 27, " Instrument and Service Air System," was a changed to require the reset function when returning the air header to $

service. S0P 16, "Feedwater System," was changed to require visual il verification of stem movement as a test of valve operability prior to '

needing a feed pump during startup. The Master Check-Off Sheet, 0-TGS-1, _"

was revised to reflect the new S0P 16 requiremen fT (Closed) LER 85001 and 85001, Revision 1, " Reactor Trip, Upscale /Downscale." q This LER reported a reactor trip on January 1,1985, resulting from a picoameter circuit failure described in IR No. 84017(DRP). Revision 1 h q

corrected an error in the original submittal that incorrectly identified j Channel two as having upscaled rather than the correct Channel on (Closed) LER 81016 " Containment Pressurization." This LER addressed j an August 1981 event where reactor containment was pressurized while 1 containment isolation valves were closed for maintenance and testin F The source of pressure was detemined to be use and leakage of air h from the instrument and/or service air systems. Operator action for i any future occurrences of containment pressurization includes isolating 3 air to the sphere. In the past isolating air to the sphere would result j

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in operation of the Reactor Depressurization System (RDS) isolation valves which fail open on loss of air. A nitrogen backup system to provide pressure to the RDS isolation valves on loss of air was installed in January 1985. The licensee is factoring the new nitrogen backup system into the Big Rock Probablistic Risk Assessment (PRA).

(Closed) LER 85003, " Reactor Trip - Upscale /Downscale." This LER documents a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation on April -14,198 No control rod movement occurred since the reactor was shutdown with all rods fully inserted at the time of the event. The trip signal is-attributed to the susceptibility of the picoammeters to electrical noise at. low neutron flux levels. This type of spurious trip has no impact on plant safet . Headquarters Requests At the request of NRR the inspector reviewed Facility Change No. 573, which bypassed thermal overload protection on six motor operated valves. This modification was in response to Topic III - 10.A of the Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report (IPSAR), NUREG-082 The modification was completed during the 1984 refueling outag On April 4 the inspector evaluated the licensee's request to NRR to modify section 6.4.3.(f) of Technical Specifications to require calibration of high range gamma instruments every six months for scales greater than 20 R/hr. The licensee's operating experience indicates that because of instrument drift the present three month calibration . frequency is appropriate. The inspector reported to NRR

. that there was no apparent justification for changing the calibration frequency from three to six month . Spent Fuel Pool Modification At the close of the inspection period the licensee had installed all but one rack. The project has been delayed while the licensee obtains.new materials to use as pads beneath the rack to prevent galvanic corrosio The licensee has taken steps to process the five leaker cans which could not be decontaminated to less than 100 mr/h . Open Items

'Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the' part of the NRC or Licensee or both. No new open items disclosed during the inspectio . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and

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summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspectica report with regard to-

~ documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did n.;; identify any such documents or processes as-

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proprietary.

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