IR 05000155/1998005
| ML20236U435 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236U432 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-98-05, 50-155-98-5, NUDOCS 9807300150 | |
| Download: ML20236U435 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION lli l
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Docket No:
50-155
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License No:
DPR-06 Report No:
50-155/98005(DNMS)
i Licensee:
Consumers Energy Company i
Facility:
Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant
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Location:
10269 U.S. 31 North Charlevoix, MI 49720
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Dates:
May 28 - July 15,1998 l
Inspectors:
R. J. Leemon, Senior Resident inspector P. W. Harris, License Project Manager D. W. Nelson, Radiation Specialist P. J. Lee, Radiation Specialist
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Approved By:
Bruce L. Jorgensen, Chief Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
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i 9807300150 980724
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PDR ADOCK 05000155 i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Big Rock Nuclear Power Plant '
NRC Inspection Report 50-155/98005(DNMS)
l This routine decommissioning inspection covered aspects of licensee management and control, j
decommissioning support activities, spent fuel safety, and radiological safety, i
e Overall, the licensee exercised effective management while extending the
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decommissioning schedule two years, with resulting staff and budget reductions, to ensure the decommissioning fund would not be prematurely depleted.
Facility Manaaement and Control i
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e The radiation protection and environmental services depastment reorganized into j
functional areas to provide the necessary support needed in continuing the
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decommissioning of Big Rock Point.
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The scope and completion status of monitored decommissioning activities were as planned.
- Plant housekeeping and fire protection were good and were being monitored by plant management.
Decommissioning Support Activities e
The station power regulator was successfully bypassed by correct performance of the special procedure prepared for the purpose.
Spent Fuel Safety e
The safety of the spent fuel in the spent fuel pool (SFP) was maintained.
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The siphon breaker holes were verified to be clear of dirt ensuring that the SFP would not drain by siphoning.
Radiolog6 cal Safety e
The licensee's employee concem program appears to be identifying issues.
The radioanalytical laboratory is processing samples adequately, e
e Liquid effluent releases are being properly monitored.
e-The lack of programmatic assessments in light of the identification of multiple deficiencies indicate weaknesses in programs designed to identify, assess and correct programmatic
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Report Details Summary of Plant Activities During the inspection period, equipment not necessary for the safe storage of spent fuel and potentially hazardous components and materials were removed from the facility. Also, additional plant systems were classified as not needed for safe storage of fuel. A two-year extension to the decommissioning schedule resulted in staff and budget reductions.
1.0 Facility Management and Control 1.1 General The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant activities and attended licensee meetings and reviews addressing these activities, in order to assess overall facility management and controls. Specific events and findings are detailed in the sections below.
1.2 Organization. Manaaement. and Cost Controls at Permanent!v Shut Down Reactors (36801)
1.2.1 General The inspector selectively reviewed the licensee's activities involving overall management and control of the decommissioning process. The effectiveness of the licensee's review of regulatory information applicable to the facility, was selectively examined.
1.2.2 Staff Reduction as a Result of Decommissioning Schedule Extension a.
Inspection Scope The inspector monitored schedule management to ensure appropriate resource adjustments were being made. A reduction in licensee personnel resulted from a two-year extension to the decommissioning schedule.
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b.
Observations and Findinas The Consumer Energy Company re-evaluated t$e possible length of time required for the licensing or certification of dry fuel storage units which are necessary for the unloading of the spent fuel pool (SFP). As a result, decommissioning of the plant was extended from the original plan of five years to seven years. The extension allows for the l
decommissioning work to be spread out over a longer period of time, and requires l
fewer workers to complete the work. In June the work force was reduced by 45 workers l
from all work groups. By the end of 1998, the reduction in work force will be approximately 100 workers. The reduction in work force will cut the annual budget from
$65 million a year to $48 million a year, c.
Conclusion The licensee exercised effective management while extending the decommissioning schedule two years, with resulting staff and budget reductions, to ensure the decommissioning fund would not be prematurely depleted. The staff reduction was executed in an orderly manner.
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1.2.3 Radiation Protection and Environmental Service Department Reoraanizatign i
On June 30,1998, the radiation protechon and environmental services department reorganized into functional areas. The functional areas are:
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Personal Safety and Environmental Services e
ALARA Planning j
e Radiation Protection
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e Assessment and Support The reorganization is expected to provide the necessary support needed in continuing the l
decommissioning of Big Rock Point.
1.3 Safety Reviews. Desian Chances. and Modifications at Permanentiv Shut Down Reactors (37801)
l 1.3.1 General l
l 1 The inspector examined the licensee's safety review program to ascertain that the program was effective at identifying potential unreviewed safety questions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The activities of the licensee's onsite and offsite safety review committees were evaluated to determine whether they were fulfilling their respective charters and the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) and the quality assurance o
plan.
Specific design changes or modifications were reviewed to assess program effectiveness in application. This included a review of written safety evaluations and other records. In addition, a sample of maintenance and repair activities was roviewed to ascertain
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~ whether the licensee had made changes to the facility without properly invoking their safety review process.
j 1.3.2 Monitored Decommissioning Activities The inspector attended licensee meetings where the planning, reviewing, assessing, and scheduling of decommissioning activities were observed. The inspector ascertained that activities were in accordance with licensed requirements and docketed commitments as stated in 10 CFR, TS, Final Hazards Summary Report, and Post-Shutdown l
Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR). Decommissioning activities monitored by l.
the inspector were as described in the following sections.
1.3.3 Plant Systems and Components Removed from Service Plant systems and components determined not needed for the safe storage of spent fuel and permanently removed from service during this inspection period were:
e control rod drive system o
reactor cleanup system o
shutdown cooling system e
core spray piping e
turt>ine tube oil system o
portions of instrument and service air system
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reactor coolant recirculation pump motors
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e feedwater pumps and piping 1.3.4 Plant Modifications Plant modifications that were in progress during the inspection period were:
Installation of a decommissioning power system. This project includes new e
substation and new electrical distribution system. The decommissioning power
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system will help in ensuring employee safety by making it more obvious if a plant system is energized or not. The new system will be marked with a yellow color, identifying it as live power, and it will replace all plant power. Installation of the decommissioning power was in Phase ll, installing cable trays and running cable.
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Designing an altemate radwaste demineralized and filter system. The resin l
retention element in the plant radwaste demineralized failed and was permanently out of service.
e Installing attemate air and nitrogen bottles to control air operated valves and dampers. This modification will allow removal of the station air system.
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Two major criteria used by the licensee for scoping decommissioning activities were annual budgeted money and budgeted person-rem exposure. The inspector had no i
concems with the scope and status of monitored decommissioning activities.
1.3.5 Manaaed Plant Hazard Reductio.ns Hazards removed from the plant during the inspection period were turbine lube oil (as a reduction to fire hazards) and approximately one-third of the asbestos on plant systems (as a reduction to biological hazards).
1.4 Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shut Down Reactors (71801)
1.4.1 General The status of decommissioning, and licensee and contracted workforce conduct of c' commissioning activities in accordance with licensed requirements and commitments were evaluated. Control and conduct of facility decommissioning were examined to verify the license and TS requirements and commitments described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (or equivalent), and PSDAR. Specific events and findings are detailed in the sec: ion below.
1.4.2 Plant Tours to Evaluate Material Conditions. Housekeeping and Fire Protection l
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Inspection Scope I
Plant tours were performed to evaluate the material integrity of structures, systems, and components necessary for the safe storage of spent fuel and conduct of safe decommissioning, and to evaluate plant housekeeping and fire protection.
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Observations and Findinas l
Observations made by the inspector on plant tours were:
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Strenaths j
e radioactive waste not accumulated - waste was either removed from the plant or i
stored in a proper container l
e plant cleanliness maintained portable cable and hoses properly routed to eliminate tripping hazards e
areas of the plant re-lamped to improve lighting e
i The inspector discussed tour observations with plant management. The inspector observed that plant management was actively monitoring plant housekeeping and fire.
l protection and Condition Reports (CRs) were written when issues arose. The issues,
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were then resolved.
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Conclusions The inspector concluded that the material integrity of structures, systems, and j
components necessary for the safe storage of spent fuel and conduct of safe i
decommissioning was being maintained. Plant housekeeping and fire protection were
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good and were being monitored by plant management.
1.5 Onsite Followuo. Written Reports of Non-routine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (92700)
i 1.5.1 (Closed) VIO 50-155/96002-07: Failure to ensure combustible materials were kept according to TS. The inspector reviewed corrective actions for Condition
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Report C-BRP-96-385, " inappropriate Storage of Consumables." The inspector also observed the welding and fire watches associated with installation of cable tray supports in the containment. The inspector concluded that corrective actions taken by the license j
were adequate and had no further concems. This violation is closed.
1.5.2 (Closed) VIO 50-155/97013-01: SFP rail span weight limit exceeded. The inspector reviewed corrective actions for condition Report C-BRP-97-534, * Exceeding 350 pounds
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on SFP Rail Span." The licensee weighed the items hanging from each rail span and
limited the weight on each span to less than the 350-pound limit. The inspector concluded that the corrective actions taken were adequate and had no further concems.
This violation is closed.
1.5.3 (Closed) IFl 50-155/97013-02: Engineering evaluation on SFP rail span weight limit being exceeded. The inspector reviewed the corrective actions for Condition
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Report C-BRP-97-534, " Exceeding 350 pounds on SFP Rail Span" and the engineering evaluation. The evaluation concluded that the 147-pound overload constituted a one time
"altemate loading condition" that did not exceed allowable stresses and did not reach levels which caused yielding; therefore, this loading condition did not impact on plant I
safety. The licensee weighed the items hanging from each rail span and limited the weight on each span to less than the 350-pound limit. The inspector concluded that the corrective actions were adequate and had no further concems. This inspector followup item is closed.
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1.5.4 (Closed) IFl 50-155/97015-01: Resolution of flow induced vibration on Damper VH 324.
I The problem of the damper becoming loose and changing position was solved by I
replacing the damper with a damper constructed of heavier metal, having better bearings, and having a more positive position retention mechanism. The replacement damper was installed on March 24,1998, and has maintained its set position since. An up-stream I
flow straightener was deemed unnecessary and was not installed as originally planned.
l This inspector followup item is closed.
2.0 Decommissioning Support Activities 2.1 Maintenance and Surveillance at Permanently Shut Down Reactors (62801)
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2.1.1 General The inspection evaluated maintenance and surveillance for structures, systems, and
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components potentially affecting the safe storage of spent fuel and reliable operation of l
radiation monitoring and effluent control equipment. Direct observations, reviews, and I
interviews of licensee personnel were conducted to assess whether maintenance and l
surveillance were performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and resulted in I
the safe storage of spent fuel and reliable operation of radiation monitoring and effluent control equipment. This included the proper implementation of TS and 10 CFR 50,
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Appendix B, requirements. An examination of planned or completed maintenance and l
surveillance activities was conducted to assess the maintenance and surveillance l
process from its inception to its completion.
2.1.2 Dismantlement Activities Removal of block walls commenced which will facilitate future system and component removal. Dismantlement activities observed by the inspector during the period were:
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e removal of condensate pump room block wall e
removal of turbine moisture separator o
removal of feedwater pumps and piping a
removal of core spray line The inspector observed that proper maintenance and HP survey practices were performed during these activities.
2.1.3 SFP Heatuo Test On June 20,1998, TV-59, " Fuel Pool Heatup Test," was completed with the heatup rate being 0.33' F/hr. The time for the SFP to heat from 80 F to 150 F was 8.84 days; greater than the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> assumed in the proposed defueled TS. The Daily Big Rock Point Nuclear Safety Summary now contains the time it would take for the SFP to heat up from the actual SFP temperature on each Monday to 150* F using the engineering predicted heatup rate obtained from the SFP decay heat curves, which is more conservative than the actual TV-59 SFP heatup rate. As of July 15,1998, the time was 10.73 days. As the decay heat in the fuel decays away, the amount of time for the
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I licensee to respond to loss of cooling in the SFP will be increased.
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2.2 Operational Safety Verification (71707)
2.2.1 General
- The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing decommissioning activities.
Specific events and findings are detailed in the sections below.
2.2.2 Bvoass of Station Voltaae Reaulator a.
Inspection Scope The inspector attended meetings including the Procedure Review Committee meeting for approval of procedure Operations Station Power System (OSPS)-1, * Bypass Station Voltage Regulator When Not in Neutral," held discussions with the licensee to ensure that vital plant equipment would remain energized during performance of Procedure OSPS-1, and reviewed plant electrical drawings, b.
Observations and Findinas The station voltage regulator that adjusted the voltage of electrical power going into the plant failed and required bypassing. The emergency diesel generator (EDG) was started and vitalloads were placed on the EDG using Procedure OSPS-1. The incoming power
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to the plant was de-energized, the station posuer regulator was bypassed, and then, the i
incoming power to the plant was re-energized. Vital loads were transferred to station power and the EDG was shutdown, c.
Conclusion On June 12,1998, the station power regulator was successfully bypassed as a result of correct performance of the special procedure prepared for the purpose.
3.0 Spent Fuel Safety.
3.1 General The inspectors evaluated the performance or condition of stru;tures, systems or components associated with storage, control, and maintenance of spent fuel in a safe manner.
3.2 Spent Fuel Pool Safety at Permanentiv Shut Down Reactors (60801)
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Inspection Scope The inspection evaluated spent fuel and fuel pool safety. Factors considered in the evaluation included SFP heatup rate; SFP instrumentation, alarms, and leakage detection; SFP chemistry and cleanliness control; criticality controls; and SFP operation
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and power supply. The inspector reviewed station logs and held discussions with the l
licensee.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the Auxiliary Operator logs containing SFP parameters and locally monitored SFP temperature and level. The inspector verified that no leakage was coming from the SFP liner and that the SFP area criticality monitor was functioning. The inspector also observed that foreign material controls were being used in and around the SFP.
Previc.,usly, the inspector had questioned the operability of the SFP siphon breaker (reference Inspection Report 50-155/97015(DNMS), Section lil, Paragraph ll1.2). The only connection that could drain the SFP by siphoning was the cooling discharge pipe.
To prevent siphoning water out of the pool, the licensee had drilled three 7/16-inch holes in the pipe without having a surveillance procedure to document the condition of the holes. On June 9,1998, reactor deck workers verified that the holes were and had been clear of dirt by using a camera and then by placing a rod through the three siphon breaker holes on the discharge line, thus verifying that the siphon breaker was functional.
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Conclusion The inspector concluded that the safety of the fuel in the SFP was being maintained, and that the siphon breaker holes were and had been clear of dirt and the SFP would not drain by siphoning.
4.0 Radiological Safety 4.1 Occupational Radiation Exposure (83750)
4.1.1 General Numerous aspects of licensee processes to minimize occupational radiation exposure were selectively examined in order to evaluate overall radiation safety and to provide for early identification of potential problems. Areas examined included: audits and appraisals; planning and preparation; training and qualifications of personnel; extemal exposure control; intemal exposure control; control of radioactive materials and contamination; surveys and monitoring; and, maintaining occupational exposure ALARA.
Specific events and findings are detailed in the sections below.
4.1.2 Employee Concem Investigation a.
Inspection Scope The inspector used IP 83750 to review the report and the report summary of the investigation conducted to address concems raised by a former employee. The inspector also interviewed individuals from the radiation protection (RP) group, the Nuclear Performance Assessment Department (NPAD) and the plant management team.
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Observations and Findinas On March 16,1998, the Big Rock Point Employee Concems Advocate received a letter from a concemed former employee in which the employee detailed in prose form many perceived weaknesses in Big Rock Point's radiation protection program. Although the employee did not identify specific concems in the letter, approximately 61 separate potential concems were gleaned by the licensee from the document. Shortly after l
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receiving the letter, Consumers Energy assembled a investigation team to address the potential concems. The team was composed of six investigators, two administrative
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assistants and the former Chemical and Radiological Services department manager from the Palisades plant who led the team. On June 26,1998, the inspector was allowed to i
view the team's final full report and was provided with a copy of the report summary. The inspector was not given a copy of the full report, however, since Consumers Energy considered employee concems tc be confidential.
Based on reviews of field documents, procedures, CRs, nuclear pe:formance assessment audits, self assessments and 65 interviews, three of which were with the concemed former employee, the team concluded that there were numerous programmatic weaknesses in the radiation protection program and the program needed
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l overall improvement. The team also concluded that the weaknesses identified in the RP
. program were the direct result of managements decision to terminate operation of the Big Rock facility ahead of schedule and to proceed with immediate dismantlement while trying to maintain an operational radiation protection program. In addition, the organization established to support dismandement failed to recognize the impact that early dismantlement would have on the operational radiation protection program. As a result, day-to-day RP operations dominated resources. Therefore RP personnel had not been fully integrated into the planning for full dismantlement activities.
Weaknesses identified by the team in the radiation protection program included but were i
not limited to a lack of adequate procedures, the lack of clearty defined roles and
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responsibilities for RP technicians and management, the inconsistent use of deficiency reporting vehicles, and unprofessional / threatening management behavior. While none of these weaknesses represented an immediate safety hazard or concem, they did I
contribute to creating a poor work environment that may have led to procedural
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compliance deficiencies and poor radiation worker practices. The team did not, however,
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find that the RP technicians or managers were incapable or unwilling to perform theirjobs l
or that the technicians were unwilling to voice opinions or raise concems (chilled effect).
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In the report summary the team noted that the deficiencies identified during the l.
Investigation had been previously identilJ by NPAD or in self-initiated CRs. The team, l
however, did not determine why the deficiencies had not been assessed as a whole when first reported, that determination had not been within the scope of the investigation.
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There was evidence, however, that the lack of assessments may have been due, in part, l
to NPAD's failure to document their adverse findings in CRs and the failure of i
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management to address multiple individual adverse findings programmatically.
As reported in Inspection Report 98001, NPAD auditors had not initiated CRs to address
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multiple RP adverse findings (poor worker practices and inconsistent labeling and tagging l
of radioactive materials) identified during field monitoring. Since the threshold for conducting formal root cause analyses was based partly on the number of CRs initiated,
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root cause analyses had not been performed because the. threshold for conducting
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analyses had not been exceeded. In addition, NPAD procedures did not require that i
managers respond in writing to deficiencies identified in field monitor reports, nor were l
auditors required to document their followup activities. The NPAD auditors acknowledged that even though they had discussed their findings with plant management and had been monitoring management's progress in correcting those deficiencies, none of those
activities had been documented.
j During an interview the plant manager indicated that management had been aware of programmatic weaknesses in the RP program and actions had been taken to correct L
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those weaknesses. For example, RP managers had been shuffled or reassigned to other l
duties and RP personnel had been terminated for poor performance or for violating l
station procedures. The RP program had also been reorganized and an intemal assessment group had been established to assess RP programmatic performance. The plant manager acknowledged, however, that neither management's assessments of RP performance or the rationale that had been used to correct programmatic weaknesses in the RP program had been documented.
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The inspector reviewed the investigation report, the report summary and interviewed the team leader, the plant manager and various members of the NPAD and RP staff. Based
on those reviews and the interviews, the inspector concluded that the team had addressed the fonner employee's concems. The team had also identified several RP program deficier'cies and had taken steps to correct those deficiencies by documenting their findings in CRs. The inspector also noted that while deficiencies in the RP program had been identified and reported in proper instruments (Field Monitor Reports, CRs, etc.)
the facility had failed to either identify programmatic issues based on those findings or l
failed to document the assessments performed to address the findings.
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Conclusions The investigation team appeared to have addressed all of the concems raised by the former employee. The team identified weaknesses in the RP program and detailed those
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weaknesses in the full report as well as the report summary. The team did not, however,
investigate the facility's failure to address multiple individual findings as a whole.
4.2 RadWaste Treatment. and Effluent and Environmental Monitorina (84750)
4.2.1 General
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The inspection included an evaluation of various aspects of licensee activities in the
areas of waste treatment and effluent and environmental monitoring to ensure that radioactive waste treatment systems were being maintained and operated to keep onsite
and offsite doses ALARA; to ensure that the licensee effectively controlled, monitored,
and quantified releases of radioactive materials to the environment; and to ensure that
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required radiological environmental monitoting programs were effectively implemented.
4.2.2 Canal Liould Process Monitor
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the calibration procedure of the canal Liquid Process Monitor (LPM) to determine if the alarm set point was able to detect fractions of the release limit as specified in the Technical Specifications. The inspectors also toured the Pump House where the LPM was located and the Control Room where the LPM'S indicator was
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located.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the results of the calibration of the LPM and the alarm set point.
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The reviews indicated that the LPM was able to detect the effluent concentration as specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table ll, Column 2, and one-tenth of the limits as
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specified in the Technical Specifications.
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The inspectors reviewed the gamma spectrum analysis of the sampling of canal water and determined the release concentrations were well below the limits as specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table ll, Column 2.
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Conclusions Liquid effluent monitoring of Big Rock Point was in compliance with the Technical l
Specifications and regulatory requirements.
4.2.3 Tours a.
Inspection Scope
i The inspectors toured the turbine building and containment. The inspectors noted
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housekeeping practices, radiological postings and the maintenance of radiological I
controls.
b.
Observations and Findinos Housekeeping practices in the turbine building and containment were very good. The floors in both buildings were relatively debris free and the contaminated area access points were clean and well maintained. All radiologically controlled areas were properly p',sted and boundaries well maintained. Area survey maps were timely and posted in the proper locations.
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Conclusions l
No problems were noted with housekeeping, postings or radiological controls.
5.0 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 15,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee did not identify any of the documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors as proprietary.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED License _t L. Berry, Site Licensing Engineer
- M. Bourassa, Licensing Supervisor J. Corley, Nuclear Performance Assessment L Darrah, Operations Supentisor D. Debner, Nuclear Fuel Projects Manager -
G. Hausler, Work Control Supervisor
- D. Hice, Plant Manager
- C. Jurgens, Construction Manager K. Pallagi, Radiation Protection and Environmental Manager
. G. Petitjean, Senior Engineer (Altemate PRC Chairman)
L. Potter, Maintenance Supervisor-
- K. Powers, General Manager J. Rang, Business and Regulatory Services Manager G. Rowell, Corrective Action Supervisor
- W. Trubilowicz, Scheduling and Project Control Manager M. VanAlst, Security Manager -
- G. Withrow, Engineering Manager K. Wooster, Emergency Planning Manager E. Zienert, Human Resources Director
- Denotes those present at management exit meeting on July 15,1998.
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 36801:
Organization, Management, and Cost Controls at Permanently Shut Down l
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Reactors ;
i IP 37801:
Safety Review, Design Changes, and Modifications at Permanently Shut Down
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Reactors
' IP 60801:
Spent Fuel Pool Safety at Permanently Shut Down Reactors
IP 62801:
Maintenance and Surveillance at Permanently Shut Down Reactors IP 71707: 1 Operational Safety Verification IP 71801:
Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shut Down Reactors l
- IP 83750:
Occupational Radiation Exposure
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' RadWaste Treatment, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring IP 86750:
. Solid RadWaste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials IP 92700:
Onsite Followup, Written Reports or Non-routine Events at Power Reactor Facilities L
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Opened
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None
Closed 50-155/96002-07 VIO.
Failure to Ensure Combustible Material Kept According to TS
- 50-15S/97013-01'.
- VIO - SFP Rail Span Weight Limit Exceeded 50-155/97013-02 IFl Engineering Evaluation on SFP Rail Span Weight Limit Exceeded 50-155/97015-07 IFl Resolution of Flow induced Vibration on Damper VH 324 Discussed None UST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable
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CFR Code of Federal Regulations
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CRs Condition Reports
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NPAD
' Nuclear Performance Assessment Department-NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PSDAR.
' Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report RadWaste Radioactive Waste SFP
_ Spent Fuel Pool-TS'
Technical Specification UCENSEE DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
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- Licensee documents reviewed and utilized during the course of this inspection are specifically
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. identified in the " Report Details" above.
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