IR 05000155/1992024

Insp Rept 50-155/92-24 on 921020-1123.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Maint & Surveillance Activities, Evaluation of Licensee self-assessment Capability & Cold Weather Preparations

ML20128B706
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	11/25/1992
From:	Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128B614	List: IR 05000155/1992024 ML20128B609
References
50-155-92-24, NUDOCS 9212040056
Download: ML20128B706 (16)

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U.S. NUC'. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Report N /92024(DRP)

Docket N iS5 License No. DPR-6 i.icensee: Co%umers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Juckson, MI 49201 facil ty Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant inspection At: Charlevoix, Michiyan Inspection Conducted: October 20 through November 23, 1992 Inspectors: E. A. Plettner R.J. Leemon T.M. Tongue y):{[hs.uum Approved By;,Ji P. Phil{ lips, Chief, I'//dghferrt. Iwr Reactor Projects Section 2B Date Ja5pffUgn Summary

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0 cot 19h November 23 _199L Ifi_epprllo. 50-LM]91024(DR_PH Areas _JM p n Led: A routine, unannounced, inspection by the senior resident inspector, resident inspector, and project engineer of operational safety verification; maintenance and surveillance activities; evaluation of licensee self-assessment capability; and cold weather preparation Relults: The surveillance, maintenance, operational safety, licensee self-assessment, and cold weather programs appeared to be implemented in a manner which ensures public health and safet No significant safety items were identified in this repor PDR ADOCK 05000155 G PDR

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DETAILS I

, Persons Ckntacted Consumert Power Cgnpany

• W. Beckman, Plant Manager

1. D. }lughes, Executive Engineer D. Turner, Maintenance Superintencent

1. • W. Trubilowicz, Operations Superintendent

• G. Withrow, Plant Engineering Superintendent

1. • R. Alexander Technical Engineer M. Beurassa, Senior Licensing Technologist i

• R. Scheels Planning and Scheduling Administrator

-* J. Heron, Jr., Relief Shift Supervisor

1. • ll. Pd itjsan, Nuclear Performance Specialist

• R. ll111, San.or Performance Assessor

• T. Popa, Acting Chemistr,v/ Health Physics Superintendent

• G. Boss, Reactor Engineer

• D. Kelly, Acting Maintenance Superintendent U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commil.liQD

1. G. Wright, Chief, Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

1. B. Burgess, Chief, Operatienal Programs Section, DRS

1. P. Rescheske, Reactor Inspector, Operational Programs Section, DRS

1. M. Leach, License Examiner, Operator Licensing Section, DRS

1. Denotes those attending the meeting between the licensee and DRS on October 22, 1992, to discuss E0P-relcted issues from Inspection Report 50-155/92013(DRS).

• Denotes those attending the resident inspector's exit meeting on November 23, 199 The inspector ai;.a contacted other licensee em)loyees including members of the technical and engineering staffs, and tie reactor and auxiliary operator . Manaaement Meetical (30703)

On October 22, 1992, a meeting was held between CPCo and NRC-representatives in the NRC Region !!! Office. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the licensee's proposed corrective actions t^ the-issues identified during the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) ,

followup Inspection conducted on June 15-19, 1S92, (Report No. 50-155/92013(DRS)). Specifically, the following three NRC Open items were discussed: Open Item 155/92013-01(DRS): Adequacy of the technical basis for parameters used in the E0Ps, and E0P conformance to the BWR owners

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group strategy. The three examples G i ven in the inspection report were discussed. The licensee provided documented justification for selecting the two E0P entry conditions in question, and these handouts are attached to this inspection repor . 03en Item 155/92013-03(DRS): Adequacy of the writers guide for  !

tie E0Ps and resolution of human factor issue . Open item 155/92013-04(DRS): Adequacy of the Verification and Validation (V&V) program for the E0P The licensee planned te periodically provide updates to their response to the open items, dated September 16, 1992, to status their actions to resolve the concerns. The open items will remain open pending completion of licensee corrective actions and subsequent NRC revie On October 27, 1992, a meeting was held between CPCo and NRC representatives at the Big Rock Point Nuclear facilities. The purpose ,

of the meeting was to update senior NRC management on the progress made by the licensee to improve performance in the area of )lant maintenance and procedural adherence presented to the NRC during tie management meeting held in Region 111 on June 10, 1992, (see Inspection Report 155/92014(DRp)). The NRC noted that the programs did not appear to be implemented in a timely fashion, and the licensee needed to improve on prioritizing the programs for timely completion. The slides used by the licensee during the meeting are attached to this inspection repor . Plant Operations Doerational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspector verified that the iacility was being operated in conformance with the license and reguietory requirements and that the licensee's management t:as effectively implementing its responsibilities for safe operation of the facilit The inspector verified proper control room staffing and coordination of plant activities; verified operator adherence with '

procedures and Technical Specifications; monitored the control room for abnormalities; verified that electrical power was available; and observed the frequency of plant and control room-visits by station managers.

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The inspector also monitored various records, such as hold and secura card records, jumpers and bypasses, shift logs and surveillance, daily orders, and maintenance items.

! All operations were considered acceptable except as noted ,

elsewhere in tF's repor On October 29, 1992, at 11:12 a.m., the main transformer tripped due to a sensed differential current. As a result of the trip,  ;

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the generator output breakers opened and the turbine tripped. The reactor does not scram on turbine trip because steam bypass capacity is 100 percent. During the transfer to the alternate offsite power source, which takes about three seconds, both recirculation pumps tripped. Per procedures, operators initiated a manual scram on the loss of bott recirculation pumps. All rods inserted and systems responded as expected to the scram. The inspector observed the operators response to the event approximately five minutes after the manual scram. The operators entered Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP-1) and executed the steps as required. At 11:35 a.m. the shift supervisor declared a Notification of Unusual Event. The emergency action level used to +

declare the event was "other conditions existing which in the judgement of the Site Emergency Director (in this case the shift supervisor) warrant declaration of an unusual event." The declaration was appropriate given the electrical line-up and not knowing the reason for the loss. Notifications to the appropriate authorities were completed in a timely fashion. The licensee secured from the event at 2:26 p.m. when the cooldown of the reactor was stabilized. The operators handled the emergency condition in a competent manner, in addition, the running service water pump tripped during the power transfer. When power was restored after the three second delay, both service water pumps i started, causing a pressure spike which damaged some tubes in both pipeway coolers resulting in a 10 GPM (37.9 LPM) leak. The cause of the sensed differential current was due to increased internal resistance from corrosion buildup which caused melting of one of the high side current relay slide link connection On November 2 at approximately 8:29 p.m., the reactor was taken critical following repairs to slide linkage connection strip and pipeway cooler tubes. No discrepancies were noted during the startup which was monitored by she project enginee From November 2 until the end of the inspection period, the unit remained on line and operated at full powe No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance / Surveillance (61726 & 62703) Mprk Observations

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Station maintenance and surveillance activities were observed and/or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: Approvals were obtaineo prior to initiating work; test instrumentation was calibrated; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed

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prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; results were within specification and properly reviewed, and any deficiencies identified were properly resolved. The following maintenance and surveillance activities 3 were observed:

Maintenance MO 92 RDS 0029 Priority 5, "RDS/SCD Sensor Cabinet D ATO Block f3," Investigation of Problem and Repair. Replacement of a Power Supply, MO 92 TGS 0144 Priority 4. "TG 7 Governor and Controls,"

Investigate Oil Leak from Box Under the IP MO 92 SPS 0134 Priority 4. " Test Differential Relay CT and Repair Wiring. Investigate Operation of 199."

N0 92 SPS 0135 Priority 6. " Trouble Shoot (Main) Transformer to Determine Cause of 199 OCB Trip."

MO 92 VAS 0115 and 0116 Priority 6, " Air Bypasses Pipeway Air Cooling Coil at the Ends of the Coil."

Surveillancs T-07-20 10/26/92 Diesel fire Pump Auto Start T-30-59 11/04/92 RDS Channel Test at Power IRDS-B 11/04/92 DC Power Supply Checks for Reactor Depressurization System Sensor and Actua+ ion Cabinet Power Supplies" for Sensor Cabinet D T-07-20 11/09/92 Diesel Fire Pump-Auto Start T-90-22 11/10/92 Plant Housekeeping and Cleanliness inspection No violations or deviations were identifie . Safety Assessment /0uality Verificatiqn Evaluation of i.icensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)

The objective of this inspection was to evaluate the effectiveness af the licensee's self-assessment programs. The inspection focused on determining whether the licensee's self-assessment programs contributed to the prevention of problems by monitoring and evaluating plant performance, providing assessments and findings, and communicating and following-up on corrective action recommendation ___ , , _ _ _ _ - , _ _ , _ _ _ ._ - _ _

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The Big Rock Point Plant has five groups that focus on the licensee's self-assessment programs. Two of these groups are required by Technical Specifications (TS), the Plant Review Comittee and the Nuclear Performance Assessment Departmen The three other plant review groups are: the Operating Experience Review Group, the Corrective Action Review Board, and the Technical Review Grou ) Plant Rev_iew Committee (PRC)

The inspector reviewed the TS requirements for the Plant Review Committee (PRC), including its composition, alternate members, meeting frequency, and quorum requirement The review revealed that the PRC was fulfilling all of its responsibilities. Special PRC meetings were held wh ,n required by )lant conditions. The inspector attended the PRC meeting 1 eld on October 16, 199 The review packages distributed prior to the monthly PRC meeting were found to be well assembled, with background material for review of the issues prior to the meetin The cover sheet listed items not completed during previous meetings and new items for discussion. A detailed review of the PRC meeting minutes indicated that the licensee had been adequate in initiating investigations and ensuring follow-up of corrective actions for previously identified violations, reportable events, and areas of weakness. The licensee's tracking system was used to track open items, and plant personnel reviewed the list periodically +.o ensure that open items were closed on schedule or updates were provided when the schedule date was change ) Muclear Performance Assessment Denartment (NPAD)

The NPAD is the off-site review group that provides an independent second level review of safety issues for Big Rock Point. The inspector and the Branch Chief of Projects Branch 2 attended a meeting of the NPAD on October 20, 199 During the meeting on October 20, the inspector noted that the backlog of-safety reviews had substantially increased-since the last meeting attended by the inspector on September 6, 199 The NPAD committee had the backlog issue as a discussion item on the agenda, and by the er.d of the meeting, had come up with some solutions to the proble The inspector will continue to monitor the committee actions. A second its of concern during the October 20 meeting was that one of the members did not appear to be well prepared to discuss items in his area of expertis This was the first time that such a condition.was observed by the inspector and is considered an isolated occurrence at

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the present time. The inspector attended a meeting of NPAD with the plant staff on November 12, 1992, when the semi-annual performance assessment report * SPAR) for Big Rock Point was presented and discussed. i. h' report concluded that the plant has been managed and operated in a safe manner during the assessment period of April 1, 1992, to September 30, 1992, with a noted decline in performanc The decline in performance and the means to correct the problem were the major topics of discussion. The inspector noted that much of the material that was presented and written in the report was a duplication of what had been documented in NRC inspection reports. This was a noted difference from the previously issued SPAR report. The plant manager voiced his ccncern to the committee about the same issue during the meetin The inspector also reviewed the TS requirement for the NPAD, which includes its composition, meeting frequency, and reporting requirements. The review and meeting attendance revealed that the NPAD was fulfilling all of its responsibilitie ) Operatina Experience Review Grouo (0ER)

The OER is required to screen, review, evaluate, and disposition information from numerous sources on various industry issues for applicability to Big Rock Poin The sources included the following: NRC Notices, Bulletins, Generic Letters,-10 CFR Part 21 Notifications, Service Information Letters, and Service Event Reports. The inspectors reviewed completed OER reports to evaluate the OER program effectiveness on providing timely and adequate reviews to the PRC for discussion and disposition during monthly meeting The review revealed that the OER was fulfilling all of its responsibilitie ) fattqqtive Action Review Board (CARB)

The CARB is required to assure prompt and adequate attention on event and deviation reports that were significant to safety. The CARB is made up of individuals having multi-disciplinary training or skill The inspectors reviewed completed CARB reports to evaluate the CARB program effectiveness on issuer identified by the licensee's Corrective Action (tracking) Syste The review revealed that the CARB was fulfilling its responsibilities with one-observation. The observation was that some CARB documents lacked descriptive documentation in the root cause analysis are The inadequate documentation prevents the licensee from having a good data base from which to trend and make future decisions in-regards to additional corrective or preventive maintenance action This has been a long

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standing problem for the licensee with some progrm 4 being noted since the last inspection performed in 1991. The licensee conducted training in root cause analysis 'or the entire staff for the first time during this inspecti>n period. This weakness continues to need management attention but has no specific regulatory basi ) Technical Review Group (TRG)

The TRG is responsible for ranking engineering issues in priority sequence for completion based upon the importance of the issue to safety and overall plant operations. These include items like installation of CRD cooling water orifices, station air system upgrade, and an individual plant exam (IPE) progra The inspector reviewed the TRG re> orts and other documents such as the integrated living sc1edule and project status report to evaluate program effectiveness. The inspector identified no abnormalitie No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Cold Weather preparations (71714)

This inspection was perfortr7d to determine whether the licensee had effectively im)1emented its program of protective measures for extreme cold weather w11ch were committed to in response to IE Bulletin 79-2 The senior resident inspector, using Procedure 0-VAS-1, ' Cold / Warm Weather Checklists," Revision 9, dated October 8, 1992, performed a walkdown of the items listed in the cold weather portion of the procedur The licensee completed these items on October 21, 1992. No abnormalities were noted by the inspector. The licensee has experienced no problems with freezing in safety related systems for several year The program appeared adequate to address cold weather protective measure No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

et the conclusion of the inspection on November 23, 1992. The inspector summarized _the purpor.e and scope of the inspection and the findings.

7 The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the-inspection report, with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such doc'.ments or processes as proprietar

Attachment:

E0P Entry Conditions

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LOP-01 ENTRY CONDITION

REACTOR PRESSURE of 1435 PSIG vs 1265 PSIG 1 In general, the entry conaitions are typically one or more of the following:

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Scram setpoint NO YES- l

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Arnunciator alarm setecincs (ES YEe Trip Setpoints YEC NO Technical Specification values NO YES ECCE automatic initiaticn logic setcointt NO NO-i 2. Pressure setpoints and associated operation:

1335 DSIG Nominal-pr1 mary system operating value 1350 PSIG Turoine cypass automatic opening setpoint and " Turbine Bypass Valve Open* alarm

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1300 P5IG "Hign Reactor Pressure" alarm ,

1385 PSIG High Pressure Scram setpoint anc

" Reactor High Pressure Scram" alarm 1435 PSIG Emergency Condenser automatic act'uation,

" Reactor Very High Pressure" alarm _and ,

automatic tripping of one Recire Pump 1525 PSIG First steam drum RV-5046 cpening setpoint and " Steam urum RV Monitor" audible alarm 1545 PSIG Subsequent steam drum RV's opening setpoint tnru in 10 psig increments, eacn with " Steam Drum 1585 PSIG RV Monitor" audible alarm 3. Technical basis (Volume 27. Chapter 10) fer 2 1435 PSIG; ,.

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