IR 05000309/1985030

Insp Rept 50-309/85-30 on 851005-31.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room,Plant Structures,Plant Operations,Radiation Protection,Physical Security,Fire Protection,Open Items & Records Maint

ML20137R175
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	11/19/1985
From:	Elsasser T, Holden C, Robertson J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137R128	List: IR 05000309/1985030 ML20137R122
References
50-309-85-30, NUDOCS 8512050442
Download: ML20137R175 (9)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Docket / Report: 50-309/85-30 License: DPR-36 Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Dates: October 5 to October 31, 1985 Submitted:

4 A l. /' % fA o o /is /Jr AN. Robertson, Resident Inspector dat'e

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fn C. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector date Approved:

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"T.C. Elsasser, Chief, Reactor da t'e Projects Section 3C Summary: Inspection on October 5 - October 31, 1985 (Report No. 50-309/85-30)

Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection (187 hours0.00216 days <br />0.0519 hours <br />3.091931e-4 weeks <br />7.11535e-5 months <br />) of the control room, accessible parts of plant structures, plant operations, radiation protection, physical security, fire protection, plant operating records, maintenance, surveillance, open items, and environmental qualificatio No violations were identified.

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8512050442 851122 PDR ADOCK 05000309 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including reactor operators, maintenance and surveillance technicians and the licensee's management staf . Summary of Facility Activities At the beginning of the report period the plant was in Cycle 8/9 refueling outage. On October 22, 1985 a plant startup was performed and low power physics testing was begu The inspectors observed the initial startup and verified that it was performed in accordance with approved procedures and that Technical Specification requirements were me At 8:40 p.m. on October 23, the reactor tripped from 4% power due to low level in steam generator #3. Level in #3 steam generator was being manually controlled at the time of the trip because of leakage past the feedwater regulating bypass valve. The reactor was taken critical at 2:09 a.m. on October 2 The reactor was manually shutdown at 11:02 a.m. on October 24 to remove the anti-rotation device from #2 reactor coolant pump. Upon completion of this work the reactor was made critical at 9:54 a.m. on October 2 At 5:24 p.m. on October 25 a reactor trip occurred from 25% power due to a variable overpower trip. This trip was caused by inadvertant closing

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of steam generator #1 excess flow check valve (EFCV). The EFCV closure was believed to have been. caused by.a failure of the air cylinder rupture disc. After replacing rupture discs in all three excess flow check valves, the reactor was made critical at 10:15 p.m. on October 2 At'11:02 p.m. on October 26 the reactor was manually tripped from 30%

power because of the inadvertant closure of #3 steam generator EFCV. The cause was again determined to be the failure of the rupture disc. The premature failures of the rupture discs was datermined to be due to inadequate torguing of the rupture disc flange bolts. A PORC meeting was convened by conference call and the plant.was made critical at 5:21 on October 2 The plant reached approxim'ately 90% power on October 31 when problems with the turbine governor valve EHC system caused a loss of load. The plant was stabilized at 83% power then further reduced to 77% and remained there while repairs were initiate .

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3. Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Follow up item (82-19-11) Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level switch drift. Due to problems with the RWST level switches drifting, the licenroe replaced the switches with level transmitters. An engineering lesign Change Request (EDCR) was initiated to accomplish this change. The inspector reviewed tne EDCR. This item is close (Closed) Bulletin (83-BU-04) and (Closed) Unresolved Item

_ (83-20-03). Bulletin followup and resolution of reactor trip breaker undervoltage device corrective action. The licensee implemented a comprehensive program of reactor trip breaker maintenance and testing. The inspector witnessed portions of both programs. Currently, the licensee employs eight Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs). All eight have been refurbushed (two need additional maintenance to change the grease in the three bearings associated with the trip shaft and trip latch). The time testing of the RTBs has shown consistant, reliable performance. The inspector had no further comment (Closed) Violation (83-06-02) Improper modification and review of procedure 1-12-5 in that the intent of the procedure was change The inspector reviewed licensee corrective action which included upgrading system drawings, review of containment integrity valve list, renewed emphasis during training of containment integrity requirements and changes to Technical Specifications. The inspector had no further question (Closed) Violation (84-02-02) Inadequate program to verify correct

performance of operating activities in accordance with NUREG-073 The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action including independent verification of yellow tags and tagging order Additionally, Maine Yankee tagging rules now require tagging of local control switches as well as equipment breakers for safety related equipment. The inspector also observed that these programs have been implemente (Closed) Violation (84-02-03) Failure to control Class A document The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action. The Electrical Distribution Book is now a controlled document which is reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC).

Additionally, the Technical Data Book has been reviewed and is now a PORC controlled document. The plant's control over procedures has been observed and no further problems were note (Closed) Violation (84-02-04) Certain memos sJperceded procedures without the same level of review. The licensee reviewed the Operating Memos and determined that some of the memos could be incorporated into procedures. Changes to the affected procedures

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were reviewed under existing controls. The Operating Memos were then cancelled. The Electrical Distribution book was changed to a controlled documen The inspector had no further question (Closed) Follow up Item (84-06-01) Two Safety Injection Actuation Signals (SIAS) were unexplained during Cycle 8 refueling. The inspector reviewed the licensee's troubleshooting of this problem including attempts to duplicate the conditions that existed when the two SIAS were initiated. The cause of these two SIAS was not determined. SIAS function was determined to be operable. The inspector had no further comment (Closed) Follow up Item (84-09-01) Resolution of noise problems with source range instrumentation. The licensee conducted extensive troubleshooting of the Wide Range Nuclear Instrumentation. The licensee discovered cable connector and detector problems that contributed to the noisy response of the Source Range Instrument New cable was routed, and corrective action was taken on the other deficiencies noted. A manufacturer's representative was onsite to assist in the corrective action. As observed during the plant startup from Cycle 9 refueling, all instruments appear to be functioning properly. Channel A still appears to exhibit some noise problem between 10 -5 percent power and 1 percent power. The licensee is studying this problem. The inspector had no further question . (Closed) Follow up Item (84-09-02) Compensatory measures to be taken for access control doors. The inspector held discussions with the Security Supervisor and reviewed the corrective actions that had been taken. The inspector had no further question (Closed) Violation (84-09-05) No audible neutron count rate in containment during core geometry changes. The inspector monitored cycle 9 refueling and verified that an audible count rate was functioning during core geometry change Plant procedures have been changed to verify the audible count rate once per shift. This item is close (Closed) Violation (84-09-06) Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) review of Source Range Instruments Modifications. PORC review of this item was conducted on June 18, 1984. The plant has instituted a process by which any member of the plant can direct an item of concern to PORC's attentio . Review of Plant Operations The inspector _ reviewed plant operation through direct observation throughout the reporting period. Conditions were found to be in '

compliance with the following licensee documents:

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Maine Yankee Technical' Specifications

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Maine Yankee Technical Data Book

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Maine Yankee Fire Protection Program

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Maine Yankee Radiation Protection Program

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Maine Yankee Tagging Rules

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Administrative and Operating Procedures Instrumentation Control room process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements. No unacceptable conditions in process instrumentation were identified, Annunciator Alarms The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledged. These conditions were discussed with shift personnel who were knowledgeable of the alarms and actions required. Operator response was verified to be in accordance with procedure 2-100-1, Response to Panalarms, Revision During plant inspections, the inspector observed the condition of equipment associated with various alarms. No unacceptable conditions were identified, Shift Manning The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the operating requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, both to the number and type of licenses. Control room and shift manning were observed to be in conformance with CFR 50.54, Radiation Protection Controls Radiation Protection control areas were inspected. Radiation Work Permits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents, as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was

. inspected. Proper posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas was reviewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing of appropriate personnel monitoring devices. There were no unacceptable conditions. identifie Fire Protection / Prevention l The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipment. Combustible materials were being controlled and were not found near vital areas. Selected cable penetrations were j examined and fire barriers were found intact. Cable trays were l clear.of debris. No abnormal conditions were identifie j i

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f. ECCS System Alignment An operability verification was performed on selected ECCS trains prior to initial startup. Accessible valve positions, power supplies and breaker positions were examined. Visual inspections of major components were performed. Instrument operability and agreement between channels were also reviewe For the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, the following items were reviewed: The. licensee's system lineup procedure; equipment conditions such as hangers, supports and housekeeping; installation of required locking devices; and valve position indicatio During this review the inspector noticed that the isolation valve from the primary water storage tank to the suction of the steam driven auxiliary feed pump (AFW-4) was not on the AFW locked valve check list. .The valve was, however, locked in the required position and is painted so as to designate it as an ECCS valve. A discussion with the licensee indicated that this valve was removed from the check list after modifications to the system which included installation of a check valve. The inspector agreed with the licensee's position that this valve does not need to be included as part of the ECCS valve check lis No deficiencies were noted, g. SIAS Actuation During the Critical Baron Concentration Determination portion of low power physics testing the plant experienced an inadvertant initiation of the train "A" safety injection actuation system (SIAS). The operators immediately recognized the cause of the signal to be due to a monthly surveillance being performed on the SIAS channe The operators restored systems to normal within approximately one minute of the SIAS actuation. Because of the operators prompt actions no plant trip occurred. An estimated 150 gallons of borated water were injected into the reactor coolant system (RCS). Primary water was then added to dilute the RCS boron concentration and return to the conditions required by the test. The inspector was present in the control room during this occurranc The cause of the SIAS actuation was determined to be stuck closed contacts in the channel B relay. These closed channel B contacts in conjunction with the channel A testing provided the 2 out of 4 coincidence for a SIAS actuation in train A. The relay was replaced and satisfactorily teste The relay was disassembled and inspected but no cause for the failure was apparent. The inspector had no further concern T

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5. Maintenance Primary Component Cooling (PCC)

During this outage repairs were made to various components in the PCC system which required draining chromated water from large portions of the system. For a period of over 2 weeks makeup to the PCC system was approximately 600 gallons a day. Sump and tank levels were trended and sampled to determine the leak path. Because portions of the system were drained the licensee believed that leakage could_have been into those portions of the system. After repairs were completed and the system was filled makeup to the PCC system remained approximately 200 gallons per da Underground piping was uncovered and a hole was found in a section of 14 inch diameter pipe. The pipe was weld repaired and upon testing the licensee discovered another hole. The pipe was weld repaired and satisfactorily teste /

Draining and making repairs to,the system made one RHR train inoperable. The inspector verified that the conditions of the and remedial action statement were. met for reactor core energy remova The licensee determined that both holes were in locations that srre in contact with wooden crib work used for support during initial construction. The licensee is presently evaluating both short and long term plans to inspect and protect the piping from further degradation. This is inspector follow item 309/85-30-0 Environmental Qualification On October 10, 1985, the licen::ce reported that Rosemont transmitters (Model 1153, series A,B&D) were not installed in accordance with manufacturers recommendations. The deficiencies would invalidate the environmental qualification (EQ) of the transmitters but would not effect their operability under non-accident condition The manufacturer specifies a torque value and thread sealant for the conduit seal assemblies. A torque value and 0 ring grease are also specified for the transmitter cover. However, these transmitters .

-were installed in 1982 prior to resolution of EQ issues related to the transmitter The Yankee Nuclear Services Division, EQ Coordinator, has reviewed all Qualification Documentation Reviews (QDR) to determine any other possible deficiencies. An inspection was performed on these transmitters and other EQ components to ensure conformance with the QORs. The following actions were taken as a result of the review:

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8 Torque cover plate screws on NANCO limit switche . Verify or add drain holes to Weidmuller terminal junction boxe . Grease 0-rings on Conax RTD To assure that equipment is maintained environmentally qualified after surveillance, the licensee requires o-rings to be replaced when the transmitter cover is removed. An engineering review is required in order for the I & C technician to get the new o-ring from plant stores.The engineering reviews contain instructions for maintaining equipment EQ. A discussion with the licensee indicated that o-rings were not required to be replaced after special functional testing (SFT), and therefore, no engineering review would specify EQ requirements. The inspector requested documentation that the SFT contained adequate instructions to restore EQ equipment or documentation that the EQ inspection had been performed after the S FT.

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As a result of this review, the licensee found 2 containment spray header pressure transmitters that had the SFT performed after the EQ inspection without instructions in the SFT procedure to torque the 3 transmitter covers. A <epair order was initiated to torque the cover plates. The inspector had no further concerns.

6. Surveillance In addition to low power physics testing the inspector observed testing of the 18 emergency diesel generator and the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump. These tests were conducted in accordance with approved procedures. Discrepancies found during testing were corrected and satisfactorily retested. No concerns were identifie Low Power Physics Testing The inspector observed portions of various low power physics test The test prerequisites, required plant conditions and adherence to approved procedures were verified. Test results were reviewed and found to meet the acceptance criteria of Cycle 9 Core Performance Analysis and .the Technical Specification tt The following tests were reviewed:

-- CEA rod drop times

-- Critical Boron Concentration

-- Isothermal Temperature Coefficient & Moderator Temperature Coefficient

-- CEA Worths

-- Worth of the most limiting near full power ejected CEA Minor ~ discrepancies in recorded data were discussed with the licensee and satisfactorily resolve _

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7. Observations of Physical Security The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular and backshift hours, that. selected aspects of the security plan were in.accordance with the regulatory requirements, physical security plan and approved procedures, as noted below, Physical Security Plan

--- Observations and personnel interviews' indicated that a full time member of the security organization, with authority to direct physical security actions, was present as require Manning of all three shifts was observed to be as require Physical Barriers Selected barriers in the protected area, access controlled area, and the vital areas were observed and random monitoring of the isolation zone was performed. Observations of truck and car searches were mad Access Control Observations of the following items were made:

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Identification, authorization and badging

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Escorting

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Searches

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Communications 8. Exit-Interview Meetings were held periodically with senior facili'y mana'gement to discuss .

the inspection scope and findings.

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