IR 05000309/1997008

Insp Rept 50-309/97-08 on 970908-1129.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support Re Security & Safeguards Activities

ML20197K197
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	12/29/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20197K172	List: IR 05000309/1997008 ML20197K168 ML20197K176
References
50-309-97-08, 50-309-97-8, NUDOCS 9801050245
Download: ML20197K197 (33)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

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Docket No:

50 309 License No:

DPR 36 i

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Report No:

50 309/97 08

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I Licensee:

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPC)

f Facility:

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station

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Location:

Bailey Point Wiseasset, Maine Dates:

September 8,1997 to November 29,1997 Inspectors:

Richard Rasmussen, Senior Resident inspector Division of Reactor Projects Paul Frechette, Physical Security inspector Division of Reactor Safety

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Edward King, Physical Security inspector Division of Reactor Safety Approved by:

A. Randolph Blough, Director Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company NRC Inspection Report 50-309/97 08 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a three-month period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes the results of an announced inspection by regional physical security inspectors.

Operations The reactor plant and spent fuel pool cooling systems were placed in the desired condition for the upcoming months. Maine Yankee initiated actions to analyzo and prepare for cold weather. Maintenance activities were completed and heating systems were functioning properly. The inspector did not identify any further areas of concern for cold weather. (Cection 01.1 and 2.1)

Maintenance Pre-evolution planning and appropriate edlological oversight resulted in the successful removal of the incore instruments. This evolution, which had potentially significant radiological consequences, was performed safely and in accordance with the procedure. (Section M1.1)

Initial oversight of site characterization activities by Maine Yankee was weak. The

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stop work imposed by Maine Yankee was appropriate to assure minor issues were adequately addressed and corrected. Communication issues were addressed and Maine Yankee personnel were assigned responsibility to monitor the site characterization. Issues identified by outside parties and agencies were being documented and addressed. Environmental sampling was being conducted in accordance with the procedures. (Section 2.1)

Enaineerina The spent fuel pool heat up test was an appropriate verification nf the spent fuel pool heat-up rate. The procedure was well written and was properly approved. The test was performed and data was recorded as required by the procedure. (Section E2.1)

A weak procedure, poor procedure adherence, and inadequate planning for the capsulo removal resulted in the evolution taking over twice as long as required.

However, due to the relatively low dose rates in the work area the additional radiation exposure was not significant. The radiological controls and oversight implemented by heal.% physics were excellent and resulted in the completion of the job with no exposure or contamination concerns. (Section E2.2)

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Plant Suncor!

The audit of health physics was a notable effort by Maine Yankee to identify and prevent issues similar to those which occurred at a similar f acility undergoin0 decommissioning. The audit was thorough end the issues were appropriately accepted for resolution. (Section R7.1)

The staffing of the emergency response organization has been adequately managed and maintained throughout the reduction of personnel at Maine Yankee. A training drill was an effective tool to assure new personnel were familiar with their positions and emergency plan procedures. (Section P5.1)

The inspectors determined that, except for the violation associated with the detection sids, the licensee was conducting its security and safeguards activities in a manner that protected public h9alth and safety. The Security Program, as implemented, met the licensee's commitments end NRC requirements. (Section S)

The falsification of fire watch rounds was determined to be a result of improper implementation of the fire protection plan by Maine Yankee. The lack of procedures for the implementr.tlon of compensatory fire watch rounds is a violation of NRC requirements. (Section F4.1)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS i

i TABLE OF CONT ENTS............................................... iv I

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1. Operations

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Conduct of Operations.................................... 1

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01.1 General Comments (71707)........................... 1

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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment................... 1

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O2.1. (Closed) LER 97-05, Cold Weather Preparations............. 1 l

Miscellaneous ',)perations issues............................ 2

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08.1 Review md Closure of Open issues...................... 2 i

08.2- (Closed) Unresolved item 50 309/97 05 07: Failure to me6t

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requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for new fuel criticality monitors... 5

08.3 - (Closed) LER 93-08-00, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

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Valves Found Unlocked

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08.4 (Closed) LER 9312 00, Control Room Ventilation Trains Inoperable

Due to Preventative Maintenance

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08.5 (Closed) IFl 50 309/97 0101, Spill of 1300 Gallons Tnrough Pump i

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P ac k l og.......................................... 7

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11. M aint e n a nc e................................................... 7 i

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M1 Conduct of Maintenance................................... 7 M1.1 Incore Instrument Removal............................ 7

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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment........' 8

M2.1 Site characterization................................ 8

M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance lasues (92902)

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M8.1 (Closed) LER 94 015 00, Secondary Component Cooling System

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Outside Design Basis Due to an inoperable Non Safeguards isoWlon

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Tr ip V alv e....................................... 10

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Ill. E ngineering.................................................. 10 i

E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment.................

E2.1 Spent Fuel Pool Heat-up Testing.......................

E2.2 Core Material Specimen Surveillance Capsule Removal........ 11 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lesues............................ 12 E8.1 = (Closed) LER 97-08 00, inservice Inspection and Testing Deficiencies.

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IV.. Plant Support

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R7=

Quality Assurance in Radiological Protection and Chemistry Activities i

.......-............................................13 R7.1; Quality Assurance Audit of Radiation Protection............ 13-i

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- Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness,........14 i

P5.1 Emergency Preparedness Activities..........

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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities.................. 14

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- Status of Security Facilitle's and Equipment..................... 15

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S2.1 ~ Protected Area Detection Aids

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S2.2 Alarm Stations and Communications....................

S2.3 Testing, Maintenance and Coinpensatory Measures..........

r SS Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification...........

S6 Security Organization and Administration......................

S7 Cuality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities...........

S7.1 Audits

.._.......................................18 F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance................ 19

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F4.1 Falsification of Fire Watch Logs (URI 50 309/97 05 07) Closed..

F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection lasues

.........................20 F8.1 (Closed) LER 93 04 00, inoperable Fire Door............... 20

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V. Management Meetings........................................... 20

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X1 Exit Meeting Summ ary................................... 2 0 i

X3 Management Meeting Summary............................. 20

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t PARTI AL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED............................... 22 l

. lNSPECTION ""* C EDURES USED..................................... 23 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED.............................. 23

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LIST OF ACR0NYMS USED.......................................... 2 8 -

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Report Details i

I Summary of Plant Stalug Throughout the inspection period Maine Ye kee remained in the decommissioning mode.

At tiv@s during the period focused on safe maintenance of the spent fuel, reorganization of he facBy staff, revision of site procedures, including technical specifications and the emt gency plo, and performance of the site characterization, l. Ooerations

' onduct of Operations 01.1 general Comments (71707)

i Using Inspection procedure 71707,the inspector conducted reviews of ongoing i

plant operations. Several major activities were completed to put the plant in the i

condition desired for the upcoming months. The spent fuel pool rerack project was

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stopped, and the final condition was analyzed es acceptable. Primary component cooling water was restored as the normal ecoling supply to the spent fuel pool hem exchanger. The temporary secondary component cooling water hoses were removed. The inco.e radiation detection instrumentation was removed, the upper guide structure was installed, and the reactor head was set In place. The refueling cavity was drained and the fuel transfer canal blank flange was installed.

Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 (Closed! t.ER 97-05 Cold Weather Prenarations a.

Insoection Scope (717141 Tha inspector reviewed the preparation 9 made by Maine Yankee for cold weather.

The inspector also independently toured the facility to look for areas of concern,

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Observations and Findinas With the plant in the shutdown condition, the heat generation within the facility is greatly reduced. Because the spent fuel poolIsland has not yet been developed, Maine Yankee intends to heat the entire facility this winter. To assure proper Implementation of tne cold weather preparations, a senior member of the operations department was assigned as a lead and focal point of the project. As a result of brainstorming sessions,54 issues were Identified. These issues 'nere tracked and the resolutions were documented.- As of November 18,1997, all but eight actions were completed. The remaining items, several of which were efficiency improvements, were being tracked and were manageable.

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The auxiliary heating system at Maine Yankee uses oil burning boilers to produce steem. The steam is routed to radiators throughout the plant. Prior to the onset of cold weather, Maine Yan' tee performed maintenance activities to prepare the auxikary boilers and steam heating system for winter.

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One area of concern was the containment building. Freezing in the containment building could result in freezing and damage to the fuel transfer canal, which is a spent fuel pool boundary. To address this concern Maine Yankee will heat the containment using the normal containment heating unit. l.. sine Yankee has estimated that the installec heater has adequate capacity to preclud1 freezing.

d Several areas within containment are monitored for temperature by the plant

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computer. The computer readings and alarm:. can be read by the operators in the control room. Additionally, Maine Yankee is preparing to install a blank flange on the spent fuel pool end of the transfer canal. This flange will prevent the tube from fillisq with water and will further eliminate the risk due to freezing.

A previous area of concern in cold weather was the intake structure. Licensee Event Report (LER) 97 05 reported the potential for freezing due to a loss of power during extreme cold periods. Although this potential still exists, the consequences are greatly reduced with the plant shutdown and defueled. The heat up rate of the spent fuel pool allows adequate time to address any resultant problems from a loss

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of power to the intake structure. Additionally, operators monitor temperature on a once per shift basis normally, and once every four hours during periods with

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temperature less than 20* F. Therefore, LER 97-05 is closed, c.

Conclusion Maine Yankee initiated actions to analyze and prepare for cold weather.

Maintenance activities were completed and heating systems were functioning properly. The inspector did not identify any further areas of concern for cold

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weather,

Miscelleneous Operations issues 08.1 Review and Closure of Open issutti Previously opened issues related to systems or components no longer required to be maintained in the current plant condition were reviewed. The issues below were determined to no longer have any safety or regulatory significance with the plant in the decommissioning mode. The following list of unresolved items (URis), LERs, and follow up of previously cited violations (VIOs) were reviewed and are closed.

CO 309/94-04-01 URI Erosion Corrosion Database Deleted 50 309/94 14 02 URI MOV Pressure Locking and Thermobinding 50-309/90 01-02 URI Inoperable Fire Protection Ventilation Dampers

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- 50 309/95 07 02 URl Potential Overpressurization of CCW System l

i 50 309/95 10-01 VIO - Design Control Weaknesses 50 309/95 12 01 URI Control Room HVAC Filter Flow Surveillance Testing

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50 309/95 12 02 URI Evaluation of Freon Relief Valves Near Breathing Air

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50 309/95 02 00 - LER - Cracked CAM Followers in General Electric SBM I

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50 309/96 05 01 VIO Design Basis Documentation not Malntained up to date

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50 309/96-08 03 URI

- Emergency Diesel Generator Room Damper Tornado l

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50 309/96 12 03 IFl Documentation of Air Balance Surveillance Testing

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50 309/96 14 02 URI Testing of HPSI Pumps and Valves i

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Safety Related Logic Circuit Testing Update

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- 50 309/96 16-01 URI Technical Specification Interpretations t

50 309/96 16 02 URI Post Trip Reviews l

50 309/96 16 03 URI Emergency Operation Procedures

50 309/96-16-05 URI Standby Power Meters not Calibrated and Periodically Tested

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50 309/96 16 07 URI Containment Cleanliness After Outage

n 309/9616-08 URI SER Conditions Satisfied but not Documented 50 309/96 16-09 URI MSL Rupture Analysis Errors and Inconsistencies

' 50 309/96 16 10 URI Lack of a Documented Process to Demonstrate Code Capability 50 309/96 16 11.- ' URI CS System and the CCW Systems

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50 309/96 16 12 URI

- CCW and RHl1 Heat Exchanger.

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50 309/961613 URI

- RHR Heat Exchanger Thermal Transient

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URI Electrical Calculations for EDG i

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50 309/96-16 15: URI - EQ lssues L

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- 50-309/96 16 16 URI-FSAR Discrepancies.

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50 309/961617L URI Reportability of CCW Operations Different than FSAR i

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- 00 309/96-16 20 URI ' Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Loading

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50 309/96 16-24 URI - Control Poom Ventilation Testing Deficiency -

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Weaknesses in the Erosion / Corrosion Program 50 309/9616 25. URl_-

50-309/95 17-00 LER LSI S 63 Leaking from Inlet Flange

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50 309/96-05-00 LER PAB Hasonry Wall Seismic Deficiency

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-50 SO9/95-11-01-LER. Seat Ring Degradation in Contromatics Butterfly Valves

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. 50 309/96-16-00 LER Failure to Maintain Short Term Corrective Action

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50 309/96 19-00 LER SCC Standby Pump Autostart Pressure Switch Inoperable

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. 50-309/96 22 00 LER Containment PCC Piping Design inadequate

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~ RWST Level Transmitter Uncertain Qualified Life i

50-309/96-23 00 LER 50-309/96 25 00.LER RCS Emergency Vent Valves inoperable

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50 309/96 26-00 LER EQ of Cables, Connectors inside CTMT May Not Meet Requirements 50-309/96 27-00 LER - FN-44 A&B Declared inoperable

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50-309/96 28 00 LER Inadequate Emergency Feedwater Pump Check Valve Surveillance

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. 50-309/96-20-00 LER High Pressure Safety injection Pump Auto-Start Wire

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- 50 309/96-31-00- LER. Plant Trip During Reactor Protection System Surveillance ii 50-309/96-34-00 ~ LER Inadequate Cable Separation For Post Accident

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50-309/96-36-00'

LER Entry into 3,0,A'When Exhaust Fan Shut Down

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50-309/97-02-01 IFl Revised Separation Criteria 50-309/97-05-03 VIO Failure to Reestablish Pump Baseline Values 50 309/97 05-04 VIO Test Control Incorrer,t Acceptance Criteria 50 309/97-05 05 VIO Implementation of Code Alternative Without NRC Approval 50 309/96 42-C0 LER Lack of Thermal Reliof Valves fcr Several Heat Exchangers 50-309/96-39-00 LER Both Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable 50 309/96-40-00 LER inadequate Surveillance Procedure for RTB Actuation 50-309/96-43-00 LER Generic Letter 96-01 Identified Surveillance issue =,

50-309/97 02-00 LER PCC/ SCC Vacuum Relief Valve Testing 50-309/97-03-00 LER Leaking Fuel Pins identified in Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies 50 309/97 04-00 LER RCS Loop Fill Header MOV Overpressure 50 300/97-10-00 LER Steam Generator Tube Deficiency issues 50-309/96 43-01 LER GL 9601 Testing issues

50-309/93-10-00 LER Surveillance testing of ECCS Subcomponents 08.2 LQ.losed) - Unresolved item 50-309/97-05-07: Failure to meet requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for new fuel criticality mc nitors.

This issue involved the failure to have in place either a criticdity monitoring system for storage and handling of new (non-irradiated) fuel or an NRC-approved exemption to this requirement contained in 10 CFR 70.24.10 CFR 70.24 requires that each licensee authorized to possess more than a small amount of special nuclear material (SNM) maintain in each area in which such materialis hand:ed, used, or stored a criticality monitoring system which will energize clearly audible alarm signals if accidental criticality occurs. The purpose of 10 CFR 70.24 is to ensure that, if a criticality were to occur during the ha' idling of SNM, personnel would be alerted to that f act and would take appropriate action.

Most nuclear power plant licensees were granted exemptions from 10 CFR 70.24 during the construction of their plants as part of the Part 70 licer'se issued to permit the receipt of the initial core. Generally, these exemptions were not explicitly renewed when the Part 50 operating license was issued, which contained the

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combined Part 50 and Part 70 authority. In August 1981, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), in the course of reviewing the operating licenses for its Browns Ferry facilities, noted that the exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 that had been granted during the construction phase had not been explicitly granted in the operating license. By letters dated August 11,1981, and August 31,1987, TVA requested an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. On May 11,1988, NRC informed TVA that "the previously issued ex6mptions are stillin effect even though the specific provisions of the Part 70 licenses were not incorporated into the Part 50 license."

Notwithstanding the correspondence with TVA, the NRC has determined that, in cases where a licensee recolved the exemption as part of the Part 70 license issueo during the construction phase, both the Part 70 and Part 50 licenses should be examined to determine the status of the exemption. The NRC view now is that unless a licensee's licensing basis specifies otherwise, an exemption expires with the expiration of the Part 70 license. The NRC intends to amend 10 CFR 70.24 to provide for administrative controls in lieu of criticality monitors.

The NRC has conclud-1 that a violation of 10 CFR 70.24 existed. The NRC has also determined that numerous other licensees have similar circumstances that were caused by confusion regarding the continuation of an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 originally issued prior to issuance of the Part 50 license. After considering all the factors that resulted in these violations the NRC has concluded that while a violation did exist, it is appropriate to exercise enforcement d scretion for Violations involving Special Circumstances in accordance with Section Vil B.6 of the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600.

08.3 (Closed) LER 93-08-00. Emeraency Core Coolina Svstem (ECCS) Velves Found Unfocked LER 93 08 00, ECCS Valves Found Unlocked, reported 19 valves associated with the service water system that were not locked. This was due to an oversight in the locked valve program, and a 1 of the valves were in the correct positions. The valves were locked and the controlling procedures were revised. The inspector reviewed the service water system alignmer.t and found no discrepancies. This item is closed.

08.4 (Closed) LER 93-12-00. Control Room Ventilation Trains inocerable Due to Preventative Maintenance Maine Yankee reported that quarterly maintenance of the control room ventilation system resulted in both trains of control room ventilation being inoperable for short periods of time. Amendment 146 of the technical specifications was made to accommodate this problem. This LER is close _

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08.5 (Closed) IFl 50 309/97-01-01.Soill of 1300 Gallons Throuah Pumo Packina Section 04.1 of NRC inspection report 50-309/97 01, documented instances of weak performance in operations which lead to a spill of approximately 1300 gallons of water to the spray pump sump. Subsequently, violation VIO 50-300/97 03-01, was issued to document similar performance issues. Therefore, IFl 50-309/97-01-01,is closed and corrective actions will be tracked by the above violation.

II. Maintenanc_g, M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Incore Instrument Removal a.

Insnection Scoce (62707)

In preparation for setting the reactor head back on the vessel, Maine Yankee used maintenance procedure 6-02-4,Incore Detector Removal, to remove the incore radiation detectors. The inspector reviewed the procedure and observed portions of the evolution, b.

Observations and Findinas The incore instruments (ICI's) were used during power operation to map the reaction rates within the core to monitor fuel performance. The first section of the detectors that were exposed to the core were highly irradiated. Af ter approximately 30 feet the contact radiation levels decreased to less that 50 mr/ hour. The removal process maintained the first section of tubing under water in the reactor cavity. The remainder of the tubing, approximately 120 feet, was removed from the water and cut up into drums for disposal. The irradiated detector tips were cut up under water and placed into trash baskets. The trash baskets were transferred to the spent fuel pool for storage pending disposal.

Preparation for this evolution was excellent. Training was conducted which featured slides of actual ICI removals during previous outages. The training covered specific duties, lessons learned, radiological controls, safety concerns, and contingencies. A pre evolution brief was conducted prior to each shift to discuss project status and radiological conditions.

The removal of the detectors was accomplished as planned. The removal required team work between a crane operator, tool handlers, cutter operators, and health physics technicians. Communications were clear and concise. Radiological oversight was appropriate and the job was completed within the estimated dose, c.

Conclusion Pre-evolution planning and appropriate radiological oversight resulted in the successful removal of the incore instruments. This evolution, which had potentially i

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-significant radiological consequences, was performed safely and in accordance with the procedure.

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Site Characterization a.

Inspection Scooe (80721)

In preparation for decommissioning, Maine Yankee was perform:ng a detailed site

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characterization. This characterization will provide the basis for decommissioning activities and their associated costs. The inspector reviewed the site characterization plan, observed activities in the field, and obtained independent samples for analysis.

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Observations and Findinas The site characterization was being performed by a contractor. A Site Characterization Plan which describes the characterization process was submitted by the contractor to Maine Yankee and approved. Additionally, procedures used by the contractor were reviewed and approved by Maine Yankee. The site characterization effort was being monitored by several prospective decommissioning contractors. Questions received from all personnelinvolved were being documented and resolved.

The site characterization plan focused on five areas: 1) Environmenta' ladiological Characterization; 2) Radiological Characterization of Surfaces and Sta :tures; 3)

Radiological Characterization of Systems; 4) Hazardous Material C,haracterization Survey; and 5) Background Study Plan. Site characterization work commenced the week of November 3,1997. The contractor started with two teams, an environmental team and a systems team.

The environmental team performed several types of surveys to identify plant related radionuculides in the local environment. Drive-over surveys were performed to look for areas above background. The drive over surveys involved a gamma scan using a plastic scintillator detector. This detector was mounted to a four wheel drive truck, a four wheel drive all terrain vehicle, and in some cases a backpack. A global positioning system (GPS) receiver was used in conjunction with the surveys to mark the locations of the readings. The GPS readings were corrected for the inherent GPS inaccuracies through the use of a stationary receiver at a known location that produces a real time GPS correction factor. The GPS readings and survey data were recorded and stored in a computer.

The drive-over surveys were nearly completed for accessible areas. However, early snowfallin the area prohibited the completion of one area. Areas with e!evated -

readings were marked in the field with surveyors flags and additional analysis wi!!

be performed to determine the cause of the readings. At the close of the inspection, the results of these surveys were still being analyzed.

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Throughout the owner controlled area, soll samples were being collected.

zi The' entire area was subject to sampling on a random basis. Additionally, the

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frequency of sampling was increased in areas suspected to contain plant--

related materials or areas with visible or historic disturbance. Samples were -

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taken less frequently in the remote and wooded areas of the property. Each

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L sample location was marked with a stake. - At each sample location, soll

= samples were taken to a depth of six inches and a micro-rem radiation.

reading was taken. Soil samples were sealed in plastic bags and controlled

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through'a chain-of custody program..

l A large percentage of the area surrounding the plant is river and mud flats.- At low 4-tide the mud flats are extensive and are used by local residents for digging clams -

and worms. The characterization plan called for samples of the mud flats. An air

boat was used to provide easy access for obtaining samples. Mud samples were

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-taken on the flats all around the owner controlled area, as well as across the river i

on the banks of Montsweeg Island. initially, samples were only taken to a depth of

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s!x inches ' Howevert due to questions related to the basis for the six inches, a g

- number of samples will be taken to eighteen inches.

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In addition to the mud flat samples, sediment samples were taken from the river -

bottom near the discharge diffuser pipe. The discharge diffuser pipe is the effluent path for all normal plant discharg%. As of tho end of this inspection period, the h_

soil, mud, or sediment samples had not been analyzed due to the laboratory preparation and procedures not being completed.-

U The inspector observed a portion of the field sampling and obtained independent samples at several locations. The inspector observed the technicians adequately documenting their surveys and samples and obtaining the samples in accordance

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with their sampling procedures. The results of the NRC analysis will be compared

to the licensee results.

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Systems and structures characterization work was also started. System surveys -

involved opening systems to check the internals for activity. The Maine-Yankee

. work control system was being used to control work on plant systems. Mechanics

- were performing the physical work of opening systems and the contractor was performing the surveys.' At the completion of the surveys, systems required to be -

. functional were being restored and raturned to operations.

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Structures surveys involved scanning buiWing floors, walls, and ceilings. One of the fbt buildings checked, the information center, w'as identified to have elevated' areas

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of avivity in the carpet. The identification of contamination in the information center was not expecte_d because it is located outside of the protected area.; The -

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3 rock sample used in the information center for educotional seminars. The activity:

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was not related to' plant' operation. The contaminated carpet'was removed and

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disposed of as radioactive waMe Structure surveys were ongoing at the end of the -

inspection period?

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- During the.first several weeks of site characterization, the Inspector noted a lack of

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field oversight of sampling and surveying by Maine Yankee.- The inspector raised -

_

.

.

this concern with Maine Yankee management'who responded by increasing their -

"

- level of oversight.40n November.18,1997, Maine Yankee quality assurance identified that required procedures were not in place for-the performance _of surveys -

of systems and structures. As a result, Maine Yankee issued a stop work order and i

required the contractor to perform a root cause analysisJ Corrective actions-

' included reviewing procedures, issuing missing procedures, training of personnel, and reperforming a' percentage of'the surveys completed wlthout adequate-

,.

procedures. Additionally, a communication plan was developed to assure better

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- communications between Maine Yankee and the contractor. The actions required to

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- resume work were completed and Maine Yankee released the hold on November 24,,

i 1997..

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.

c.

Conclusion

]

d Initial oversight'of site characterization activities by Maine Yankee was weak. The

'

L stop work. imposed by Maine Yankee was appropriate to assure minor issues were -

adequately addressed and corrected. Communication issues were addressed and

,

Maine Yankee personnel responsible to monitor the site characterization were -

assigned. Issues identified by outside parties and agencies were being documented and addressed. Environmental sampling was being conducted in accordance with the procedures.

.

r

.

- MS Miscellaneous Meintenance issues (92902)

.

- M8.1 (Closed) LER 94-015-00.Secqndarv Comoonent Coolina System Outside Desian

Basis Due to an Inonerable Non-Safeauards isolation Trio Valve

,

During testing, Maine Yankee identified a faulty switch causing the secondary component cooling (SCC) non safeguards isolation trip valve to fall, in the -

,

' decommissioning mode'of operation, the SCC non safeguards isolation trip valve no

'

.

-longer provides a safety function.. This LER is closed.

-

.t 111. Enaineerina E2; 7.agkr:ng Support of Facilities and Equipment y

E2.1

$ gent Fuel Pool Heat-Uo Testina

x

a.

Insoection Scone (86700)

'

On October '22,1997, Maine Yankee commenced a test of the spent fuel pool heat-

-

up rate.1 The inspector reviewed the procedure, 417 23, Spent Fuel Pool Heat-Up

-

_

Rate Test, and ~ observed portions of the testing.

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Observations and Findinos Procedure 417-23, Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up Rate Test, was developed by Maine Yankee to characterize the heat-up rate of the spent fal pool. This information will then be used as the bases for several engineering evaluations, such as the spent fuel pool island cooling system design and modifications to the emergency plan.

The procedure had two phases, the first being the securing of all spent fuel pool cooling and flow and monitoring the heat-up rate. During this phase pool temperature went from 81' F to 147 F ever a period of 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br />. During this phase the fuel building ventilation system was kept in service. Data recorded included pool temperature and level, and indoor and outdoor temperatures and humidities.

The second phase of the test maintained the pool at constant temperature to measurs the pool evaporation rate. This data was co!!ected with the pool at 140 F, 130* F,120* F,110* F, and 100* F. Temperature and humidity data was again taken, c.

Conclusion The spent iuct oo',e heat-up test was an appropriate verification of the spent fuel pool heat up rate. The procedure was well written and was properly approved. The test was performed and data was recorded as required by the procedure.

E2.2 Core Material Soccimen Surveillance Caosule Remova!

a.

insoection Scone (71707)

To obtain information related to activation of the reactor vessel materials, Maine Yant se elected to pull one of the core material specimen surveillance capsules for analysis. The inspector reviewed procedure 13-26, Recovery of Irradiation Surveillance Capsule, and observed the evolution of pulling the capsule, b.

Observations and Findinos Pulling the capsule was tied to the critical path of activities as a prerequisite for setting the reactor head and for isolating the transfer canal from the refueling cavity to the spent fuel pool. This evolution was of significance because the surveillance capsule was highly activated and had a potential to cause significant radiation exposure if handled improperly. The capsules were installed inside the reactor vessel between the vessel wall and the core shroud. The capsules require a special long handled tool to be threaded onto the capsule to unlatch the built in locking mechanism and allow lifting of the specimen. The evolution was lead by an engineer from the reactor engineering group.

A pre-ev 'Jtion brief Was conducted with all of the participants in the evolution.

Stressing the need to keep the surveillance capsule submerged at all times, the

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health physics staff discussed'rediological concems associated with the hb,1

contamination control requirements, and' expected dose rates in the' work area. The Longineer discussed the general' sequence of the procedure.'However, details'of the i

-

! capsule latching mechanism and techniques for retrieval were not discussed.

,

During the first attempt to remove a capsule, the engineer failed to adequately

,

follow the procedure which resulted in the capsule latching mechanism not being.

released, in this case the engineer failed to direct the threading of the tool onto the i

coupler until the resistance of the locking mechanism was met, At this point the -

procedure directed further threading of three and one third turns to unlatch the

!

locking device. The personnel performing the evolution only threaded the tool onto the coupler three and one third turns total and attempted to remove the spec! men.

~ As a result, the lock remained engagad and the force limit was reached without removing se capsule. This error was identified by the inspector and the procedure

.

j:

was stopped and repeated.

{

However, during the second attempt the tool was threaded too far onto the coupler-

,

which caused the lock to over extend and prevent removal of the specimen.

t

. Attempts were made to remove two other specimens prior to stopping the -

i evolution. However, the personnel were within the bounds of the procedure and did not' apply excessive forces in attempts to remove the capsules.

After a discussion with the vendor and review of the drawings, the personnel were able to better understand the manipulation of the lock and the key indications they

.

were feeling with the tool. The removal of a capsule was subsequently completed

U and transferred to the spent fuel pool without further complication.

.

c.

Conclusion F

A weak procedure, poor procedure adnerence, and inadequate planning for the

capsule removal resulted in the evolution taking over twice as long as required.

L However, due to the low dose rates in the work area the additional radiation

,

'

exposure was not significant.' The radiological controls and oversight implemented by health physics were excellent and resulted in the completion of the job with no

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exposure or contamination concerns.-

P E8 Miscelleneous Engineering issues -

E8.1 -(Closed) LER 97-08-00, Inservice insoection and Testina Deficiencies

LER 97-08-OO,' reported sev'eral deficiencies in the inservice inspection and testing program.- These deficiencies called into question the operability of several:

"

. components utilized to maintain the reactor in the cold shutdown condition. NRC

"

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inspection report 97-03, section 01.2 reviewed the' specifics of this issue and the

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corrective actions taken.' JThis issue is closed.

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IV. Plant Suooort R7 Quality Assurance in Radiological Protection and Chemistry Activities R7.1 Quality Assurance Audit of Radiation Protection a.

Insoection Scope (40500)

From October 2,1997, through October 9,1997, Maine Yankee quality assurance performed an audit of the radiation protection and radioactive waste programs. The inspector attended the audit team exit meeting and reviewed the audit report, MY-97 03/09.

b.

Observations and Findinos

,

This audit was initiated, in part, because Maine Yankee was concerned with weaknesses identified at t5e Haddam Neck plant in Connecticut. The audit was a good initiative in emphasizing the importance of the health physics department in a decommissioning environment.

The audit team identified twelve issues through the course of the audit. The issues were promptly addressed by health physics management. The issues were entered into the learning bank and apparent causes and corrective actions were developed.

.

Some of the more significant issues identified were inadequacies, inconsistencies, and omissions in procedures and weaknesses in implementing effective corrective actions. Procedure reviews and revisions were ongoing and were scheduled to be completed by the end of the year. The specific issues representing the lack of appropriate corrective actions were individually addressed by Maine Yankee.

However, the issue of the Maine Yankee corrective action program remains an issue. In a separate audit, quality assurance determined that inadequacies in the corrective actions program was a site-wide issue. Maine Yankee initiated a process improvement team and is planning a new corrective actions program in January, c.

Conclusion The audit of health physics was a notable effort by Maine Yankee to identify and prevent issues similar to those which occurred at a similar facility undergoing decommissioning. The audit was thorough and the issues were appropriately accepted for resolutio,-

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. Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness

P5.1 Emeroency Prenarodness'(EP) Activities -

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Inanection Scone (82301L f

As a result of the destaffing, significant changes in the key positions of the emergency response organization (ERO) have occurred. The inspector reviewed the

-

staffing of the ERO and observed a training drill.-

.

b.'

- Observations and Findinas Maine Yankee's current ERO roster consists of two full emergency response teams

and a third team for filling " key" positions only. The licensee is in the process of

,

training individuals'who will be replacing those ERO members that are in the'

j process of retiring and have key positions.- At this time, all but a few have completed the required training.

On October 15,1997, the inspector observed a training drill that enabled the new -

members to practice and gain experience in preparation for their new ERO positions, s

iThe drill scenario featured a dropped fuel bundle which caused fuel damage and a

,

leak in the spent fuel pool liner. The insoector determined that the scenario was appropriate for:the current status of the plant. The emergency response facilities -

were staffed appropriately and the staff followed steps delineated in their emergency response plan and procedures. The inspector noted that the licensee met the objectives of the training exercise and no major deficiencies were identified.

c..

Conclusion

. The EP staff has been very dedicated in ensuring that Maine Yankee meets their I

staffing and training obligations and continue to meet the commitments made in

.their emergency plan and procedures. The NRC inspector noted that training drills were an effective tool for providing hands-on training and determining the effectiveness _of the EP training process.

Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities a.-

- Jasoection Sco:a

-

The security program was inspected during the period of October _20-23,1997 to determine whether the security program, as implemented, met the licensee's '-

commitments in the NRC-approved security plan (the Security Plan) and NRC regulatory requirements. Areas inspected included: management support and e audits; a'ntm stations and communications; protected area detection aids; testing q

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i maintenance and compensatory measures; personnel access controls; and training

- and qualification.-

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' Observations and Findinas,

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' A violation of NRC quirements was identified. ' The' violation invoived the

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. licensee's failure to ensure that detection aids used to alert security force members-.

-(SFMs) posted in the assessment towers were being control!ed and maintained as -

'

- require <1 by the Security Plan Management' support is ongoing as' evidenced _by_

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_ adequate staffing levels and the security manager's position in the organizational

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. structure provides a means for making senior _ management aware of_ programmatic

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needs.i Audits were thorough and in-depth; alarm station operators were :

knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities; and protected area detection aids were being tested and maintained in accordance with the Security Plan. Security training was being performed in accordance with the NRC approved training and

,

i:

qualification (T&Q) plan and protected area access controls of personnel were being

implemented in accordance with the Security Plan.

-

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c.

Conclusion -

-

The inspectors determined that, except for the violation associated with the

. detection aids, the licensee was conducting its security and safeguards activities in i

a manner that protected public health and safety. The Security Program, as implemented, met the licensee's commitments and NRC requirements.

-

E b

Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Protected Area Detection Aids l

a.

Insoection Scope The scope included conducting a physicalinspection of the protected area intrusion F

detection systems (IDSs) to verify that the systems were functional, effective, and met licensee commitments, b.

Observations. Findinas and Conclusion

On October 22,1997, the. inspectors observed licensee testing of the IDSs and determined they were functional and effective, and were installed and maintained as described in the Security Plan. However, it was determined based on discussions

<

with licensee management, documentation reviews, and inspector's observations,

,

that the licensee failed to ensure that the detection aids, used to alert officers in the

,

, assessment towers, were being maintained and controlled as required in the -

Security Plan.

'

Specifically, on October 10,1997, an.SFM circumvented the reset button a

associated with the audible alarm in one of the assessment positions. This action

'

. limited the ability'of the officer to be alerted to an intrusion in the protected area.

-

- This degraded condition continued for approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. During this time period, 5 additional SFMs failed to perform a complete post turnover check. This is

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?of particular concern as the applicable procedure was revised as a corrective action

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resulting from the occurrence of similar events in 1991 and 1995. This is a

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violation of NRC requirements. (VIO 50-309/97-08-01)

S2.2 Alarm Stations and Communications a.:

Inspecilon Scope

.The scope included determining whether the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and-Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) are: (1) equipped with appropriate alarm,.

surveillance, and communication capability, (2) continuausly manned by operators,-

and (3) use independent and diverse systems so that no single act can remove the

capability of detecting a threat and calling for assistance, or otherwise responding

.

y to the threat, as required by NRC regulations.

b.

Observations and Findinas Observations of CAS and SAS operations verified that the alarm stations were equipped with the appropriate alarm, surveillance, and communication capabilities.

,

Interviews with alarm station operators found them knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspectors also verified through observations and interviews that the alarm station operators were not required to engage in. activities that would interfere with the assessment and response functions, and that the

_

licensee had exercised communication methods with the local law enforcement agencies as committed to in the Security Plan.

'

c.

Conclusion -

The alarm stations and communications met the licensee's Security Plan j

commitments and NRC requirements.

. S2.3 Testina, Maintenance and Compensatorv Measures s

' a.

Insoection Scone -

The scope' included determining whether programs were implemented that will

,

. ensure the reliability of security related equipment, including proper installation, -

testing, and maintenance to replace defective or marginally effective equipment and

-

to determine that when security related equipment fails, the compensatory measures put in place are comparable to the effectiveness of the security system

'

.that existed prior to the failure.

b.

- Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed testing and maintenance records for security-related -

equipment and found that dccumentation was on file to demonstrate that the licensee was testing and maintaining systems and equipment as committed to in the

,

' Security Plan. - A priority status was being assigned to each work request and repairs were normally being completed within the same day a work request

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necessitating compensatory measures was senerated. The inspectors also noted that the working relationship between secuniy: maintenance; and the instrumentatica and control departments was excellent as evidenced by no open work requests requiring compensatory measures. However, the inspector did determine that despite repeated failures of the weekly testing on the primary-communication system in an assessment tower, no malntenance work request was

,

issued by the security organization.

,

c.

_ ConcletD Documentation on file confirmed, that security equipment was being tested and maintained as required, with tr.e exception of an assessment tower primary communication system. Repair work was timely and the use of compensatory

'

measures was found to be appropriate and minimal

,

S5 Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification a.

Inspection Scong The scope included a determination as to whether members of the security organization were trained and qualified to perform each assigned security related job task or duty in accordance with the NRC-approved T&Q plan.

b.

Observations and Findinas

.

On October 22,1997, the inspectors randomly selected and reviewed T&Q records for ten SFMs. Physical and firearms requalification records were inspected for armed SFMs and security supervisors. The inspectors found that the training had been conducted in accordance with the T&Q Plan and was properly documented.

Additionally, the inspectors interviewed a number of SFMs to determine if they possessed the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties, c.

Conclusion The inspectors determined that training had been conducted in accordance with the

-

T&O plan. Based on the SFMs responses to the inspectors' questions and chervations, the training provided by the security training staff was considered effective.

- S6 Security Organization and Administmtion

-

a.

Inscection Scope The scope included conducting a review of the level of management support for the licensee's physical security progra _

_

.

.

.

,

.

b.-

Observations and Findinos

,

Security management has ensured that tha security program is adequately staffed.

'

The inspectors reviewed the Security Manager's position in the organizational structure and reporting chain. The Security Manager reports to the Operations Dir'ector, who reports to the President of. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, c.

Conclusion Management support for the physical security program was determined to be adequate. No problems with the organizational structure that would be detrimental to the effective implementation of the security and safeguards programs were

' noted.

Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities S7.1 Audits a.

Insoection Sqpng

'

The scope included a review of the licensee's Quality Assurance (QA) report of the NRC required security program audit to determino if the licensee's commitments as contained in the Security Plan were being satisfied.

b.

Qbservations and Findinos

,

The inspectors reviewed the 1997 QA audit of the security program, conducted September 811,1997,(Audit No.97-004). The audit was found to have been conducted in accordance with the Security Plan. To enhance the effectiveness of the audit, the audit team included an independent security specialist. The audit report identified 5 findings. Two of the findings were related to procedure compliance, two were related to proceduralinconsistencies, and one finding addressed human errors related to the control, issuance, and handling of documents. The inspectors determined that the findings were not indicative of programmatic weaknesses.

However, the audit report identifies that a common factor related to all five findings was inattention to detcil. This causal factor is consistent with inspectors observations previously identified in this report.

- The inspectors determined that based on discussions with security management and

-

_ a review of the responses to the findings the corrective actions were effective, c.

Conclusion The review concluded that the audit was comprehensive in scope and depth, that the findings were reported to the appropriate levels of management, and that the audit program was being properly administered.

_

.

.

F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance F4.1 Falsification of Fire Watch Loas (URI 50-309/97 05-07) Closed a.

Inspection Scope (71750)

The inspector reviewed the investigation and corrective actions taken in response to the falsification of fire watch logs by a temporary Maine Yankee employee. The individual, who was assigned to conduct fire watches, had signed off on some art logs without actually making the required periodic rounds, b.

Observations and Findinas On May 28,1997, Maine Yankee security pt,.sonnel identified that an employee designated to conduct fire watches in various areas of the plant had not been conducting the watches. This was determined when a security offices advind security supervision that the individual had not been seen on rounds for ',ome time.

Reviews of fire watch patrollogs and individual security key card recorc s revealed that at some times, the individual was not actually in some areas contrary to his signature in the logs for those areas. As a result of degraded fire seal barriers, Maine Yankee requires a roving fire watch to enter and inspect eighteen areas of the plant on an hourly basis.

As immediate corrective actions, plant support management instituted a review of fire watch records to verify that there were no obvious problems. They also conducted periodic checks of the fire watch areas to verify that personnel were conducting the required watches. The requirements and significance of conducting the fire watches was re-iterated to all individuals involved in fire watches. Maine Yankee expanded their scope of reviews to include all personnelinvolved with performing fire watches,in order to determine the extent of this discrepancy. as a result of these reviews, Maine Yankee determined that three of the four individuals assigned to perform fire warches had falsified their logs, in response to the identification of the fire watch issues, Maine Yankee terminated the involved employees and placed the fire round responsibilities with security.

These corrective actions eliminated the problems with falsification of logs; however, several subsequent issues such as missed or late rounds were identified. Maine Yankee addressed these issues through increased supervisory oversight and changes to the implementation and tracking process.

The inspector reviewed the fire protection plan and the compensatory action process. The inspector concluded that the Maine Yankee implementation of fire watches as compensatory actions was not being implemented through approved procedures as required by tachnical specifications. Technical specifications, section 5.8.2.f, required written procedwes for fire protection program implementation.

The Maine Yankee procedure,19-5, impairments to Fire Protection Systems, required compensatory measures to be established for impairments to fire protection plan fire protection systems. However, the instructions for implementation of the

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lprewfures. Instead, Maine Yankee used a training lesson plan and a' series of memos to implement the program. The inspector concluded that the inappropriate:

'

,

f alsification issues identified were a result of inadequate procedural guidance and

,

inadequate supervisory oversight.L e

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= - Maine Yankee acknowledged this lack of procedural guidance and was in the

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. process of developing a procedure to cover the roving fire watch program.-

, c.

- Conclusion The issue of falsification of fire watch rounds was determined to.be a resut of j

' improper implementation of the fire protection plan by Maine Yankee. The lack of

. procedures for the implementation of compensatory fire watch rounds is a violation

> of NRC requirements.- (VIO 50 309/97-08 02). (URI 50-309/97 05 07and VIO

= 9515-01 are closed)

.

F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues

.

I F8.1, (Closed) LER 93-04-00,Inonerable Fire Door

I

-!LER 93-04-OO, Inoperable Fire Door, resulted from changee in the ventilation system

' lineup that overpowered a fire door closing mechanism causing the door to hang l

open., Corrective actions included adding a precaution to the operations proceduro

1 for the ventilation systems.. The inspector reviewed the control area ventilation.

l procedure 1-12 3 and verified the precaution was still in place. Based on the o

review of the corrective actions and numerous tours indicating fire doors were properly _ shut, this item is closed.

V. Manaoement Meetinos

- X1- ~ Exit Meetmg Summary

.

The senior resident inspector presented the lospection results to members of the

?

licensee on December 9,1997.; The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

- The se:urity inspectors met vith licensee representatives at the conclusion of their

.

,

- inspection on. October.23,1997. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed, and the preliminary findings were presented. The

,

licensee acknowledged the preliminary inspection findings.

X3.

"xpat Meeting Summery

,

September 11,1997, Maine Yankee met with NRC representatives in Rockvillei MD,

regarding regulatory issues associated with spent fuel storage casks.

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September 30,1997, NRC and Maine Yankee held a press conference at the Maine Yankee corporate building in Brunswick, ME regarding decommissioning,' -

'

October 7,1997, NRC held a public meeting with Maine Yankee at the Wiscasset -

Middle School to discuss the decommissioning process.:

' November 6,1997, NRC held a public' meeting with Maine Yankee at the Wiscasset High School to discuss the Maine Yankee Post Shutdown Activities Report,

,

November 20,1997, Maine Yankee met with NRC representatives in Rockville, MD, to discuss a recently submitted request for changes to the technical specifications.

,

November.25,1997, Maine Yankee met with NRC representatives in Rockville, MD, to discuss proposed revisions to the emergency plan and review a related relief ~

_3 request.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l.icensee

'

W. Odell, Director, Operations'

~ G. Leitch, VP, Operations -

,

R. Fraser, VP, Engineering :

M. Meisner, VP, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs B. Plummer, Operations Manager _

'

J. Sauger, Maintenance Manager.

E. Soule, Systems Engineering Manager-W.- Ball, Assistant Manager, Operations Support G. Zinke, Quality Programs Manager-

.

- J. Hebert, Regulatory Affairs Manager

.,

Herb Torberg, Security Director Carl Urquhart, American Protective Services (APS)

V. Cumming, Training Coordinator, APS

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Other P. Dostle, Maine, Nuclear Safety inspector

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:.

Onsite Engineering IP 40500:

Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in ideinifyin0, Resolvina, and Preventing

. Problems IP 60705:

' Preparation for Refueling IP 60710:

Refueling IP 61726:

Surveillance Observation IP 62707:

Maintenance Observation IP 71707:

Plant Operations IP 71750:

Plant Support IP 81700:

Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IP 81070:

Access Control-Personnel IP 92700:

Onsite Fellowup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Pewer Reactor Fecilities

IP 92901:

Followup - Operations IP. 92902:

Followup - Maintenance IP 92903:

Followup - Engineering IP 92904:

Followup Plant Support IP 93702:

Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED ltems Opened:

50 309/97-08-01 VIO Maintenance and Control of Protected Area Detection Aids contrary to the Security Plan. (Section S2.1)

50 309/97-08-02 VIO Falsification of Fire Watch Logs contrary to the Fire Protection Plan. (Section F4.1)

' Items Closed:

50-309/97-05-00 LER Potential for intake Structure Freezing Due to Loss of Power.

(Section O2.1)

50-309/94 04 01 URI '

Erosion Corrosion Database Deleted. (Section 08.1)

50-309/94-14-02 URI MOV Pressure Locking and Thermobinding. (Section 08.1)

50 309/95 01-02-URI Inoperable Fire Protection Ventilation Dampers. (Section 08.1)

50-309/95 07 02 U RI-Potential Overpressurization of CCW System. (Section 08.1)

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. URl-Control Room HVAC Filter Flow Surveillance Testing.! (Section -

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-50 309/95 12-02-

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Cracked CAM Followers in General Electric SBM Switches.

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50-309/95 02-00: -LER; (Section 08.1) _

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50 309/96-05-01-VIO.

De:;ign 8 asis Dacumentation not Maintained up-to-date.

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(Section 08.1)

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50 309/96-08-03: URI

Emergency Diesel Generator Room Damper Tornado Design.

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j 50-309/96-12-03 IFl Documentation of. Air Balance Surveillance Testing. (Section

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08.1)

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50 309/96 14-02 URI

. Testing of HPSI Pumps and Valves. (Section 08.1)

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50 309/96 14-04 URI Satety Related Logic Circuit Tasting Update. (Section 08.1)

50 309/96 16-01 URI Technical Specification Interpretations. (Section 08.1)--

I-50 309/96 16-02 URI -

Post Trip Reviews. - (Section 08.1)

50 309/96 16-03 URI Emergency Operation Procedures. (Section 08.1)

50 309/96-16-05 URI Standby Power Meters not Calibrated and Periodically Tested.

-(Section 08.1)

-

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50-309/96-16-07 URI Containment Cleanliness After Outage.-'(Section 08.1)

50 309/96-16-08' URl'

SER Conditions Satisfied but not Documented. (Section 08.1)

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a 150 309/961611' ;URl'

CS System and the CCW Systems. -(Section 08.1)

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50-309/96-16-12. LURl' f CCW and RHR Heat Exchanger. (Section 08.1)

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50 309/96-16 16 URij FSAR Discrepancies.- (Section 08.1) -

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50-309/96-16 17 - URI-Reportability of CCW Operations Different than FSAR Design..

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-(Section 08.1)

50-309/96 18-20

URI-Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Loading. (Section 08.1)-

50 309/96 16 24 URI Control Room Ventilatinn Testing Deficiency. l(Section 08.1)

..50 309/96 16 25 URI - Weaknesses in the Erosion / Corrosion Program. - (Section 08.1)

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50 309/95-17-00 _LER LSI-S-63 Leaking from inlet Flange. (Section' 08.1)

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50-309/96-05-00 LER PAB Masonry Wall Seismic Deficiency. (Section 08.1)

~ 50-309/95 11-01 LER-Seat Ring Degradation in Contromatice Butterfly Valves..

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- (Section 08.1)

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50 309/96-16-00 LER - - Failure to Maintain Short Term Corrective Action. (Section 08.1)

- 50 309/96 19 00'

LER SCC Standby Pump Autostart Pressure Switch inoperable. -

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(Section 08.1)

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50-309/96 22-00 LER Containment PCC Piping Design inadequate. (Section 08.1)

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50 309/96-23-00 LER RWST Level Transmitter Uncertain Qualified Life. (Section

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08.1)

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- 50-309/96 25-00 LER - RCS Emergency Vent Valves inoperable. (Section 08.1)

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_ 50-309/96 26-00 LER-EQ of Cables / Connectors inside CTMT May Not Meet e

Requirements. (Section 08.1)'

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E 50-309/96 27 00 tLER-FN-44 A&B Declared inoperable. (Section 08.1)-

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- 50-309/96-28-00. LER Inadequate Emergency Feedwater Pump Check Valve

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Surveillance. ' (Section 08.1)

. 50-309/96 20-00c LER ;High Pressure Safety injection Pump Auto-Start Wire Found

Cut. (Section 08.1)-

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50-309/96-34 00 LER Inadequate Cable Separation For Post Accident Hydrogen Monitors. (Section 08.1)

50-309/96 36-00 LER Entry into 3.0.A When Exhaust Fan Shut Down. (Section 08.1)

50-309/97 02 01 IFl Revised Separation Criteria (Section 08.1)

50 309/97-05-03 VIO Failure to Reestablish Pump 8aseline Values. (Section 08.1)

50-309/97 05-04 VIO Test Control Incorrect Acceptance Criteria. (Section 08.1)

50 309/97-05-05 VIO Implementation of Code Alternative Without NRC Approval.

(Section 08.1)

50-309/96-42 00 LCR Lack of Thermal Relief Valves for Several Heat Exchangers.

(Section 08.1)

50-309/96 39-00 LER Both Emergency Diesel Generators Declared inoperable.

(Section 08.1)

50-309/96-40-00 LER Inadequate Surveillance Procedure for RTB Actuation. (Section 08.1)

50-309/96-43-00 LER Generic Letter 96-01 Identified Surveillance issues. (Section 08.1)

50 309/97-02-00 LER PCC/ SCC Vacuum Relief Valve Testing. (Section 08.1)

50-309/97-03-00 LER Leaking Fuel Pins identified in Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies.

(Section 08.1)

50-309/97 04-00 LER RCS Loop Fill Header MOV Overpressure. (Section 08.1)

50-309/97-10-00 LER Steam Generator Tube Deficiency issues. (Section 08.1)

50-309/96-43-01 LER GL 0601 Testing issues. (Section 08.1)

50-309/97-05-07 URI Failure to Meet Requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for New Fuel Criticality Monitors (Section 08.2)

50-309/93 08 00 LER ECCS Valves Found Unlocked. (Section 08.3)

50-309/93 10-00 LER Surveillance Testing of ECCS Subcomponents. (Section 08.1)

50-309/93-12-00 LER-Control Room Ventilation Trains Inoperable Due to Preventative Maintenance. (Section 08.4)

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- 50 309/94 5.5-00_'

LER SCC System Outside Design Basis Due to an laoperable Non-Safeguards isolation Trip Valve. (Section M8.1'

50 309/97 08-00-LER Inservice inspection and Testing Deficiencies. (Section E8.1)

.50 309/97 05-07 URI Falsification of Fire Watch Logs. (Section F4;1)

50 309/95 15-01 VIO inadequate Fire Program Procedures. -(Section F4.1)

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- 50 309/93-04-00 LER Inoperable Fire Door (Section F8.1)-

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- LIST OF ACRONYMS USED --

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ECCS

, Emergency Core Cooling System ERO -.

Emergency Response Organization _

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Licensee Event Report _

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MYAPS.

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission--

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TVA~

Tennessee Valley Authority 7,

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