IR 05000309/1985036
| ML20153C151 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1986 |
| From: | Elsasser T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153C145 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-85-36, NUDOCS 8602180313 | |
| Download: ML20153C151 (8) | |
Text
_
x
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Docket / Report: 50-309/85-36 License:
DPR-36 Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Dates:
December 14, 1985 - January 11, 1986 Inspectors:
Cornelius F. Ho den, Senior Resident Inspector Jeffery R r son, Resident Inspector Approved:
/M
,
T. C. Elspr, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3C date Summary: Inspection on December 14, 1985 - January 11, 1986 (Report No.
50-309/85-36)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection (94 hrs) of the control room, access-ible parts of plant structures, plant operations, radiation protection, physical security, fire protection, plant operating records, maintenance and surveillance.
Results: One manual trip during this inspection was the result of an Operator error (securing the wrong pump).
One followup item was initiated to monitor leakage past a check valve in the safety injection system.
No violations were identified.
.
8602180313 860210 PDR ADOCM 05000309 G
_
_.
.
r DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance techr.i-cians and the licensee's management staff.
2.
Summary of Facility Activities
.
On December 14, 1985, at the start of the report period, the plant was at 97 percent power, which was the maximum power attainable with two electric driven feedwater pumps.
Power was reduced to 86 percent on December 24 in order to repair #1 governor valve control system, and returned to 97 percent later that same day.
The plant reduced power to 80 percent on December'28 because of main condenser waterbox "D" fouling.
Af ter waterbox "0" was' backwashed, the plant returned to 97 percent power on December 29.
On December 31, service water pump "A" developed a ground and caught fire.'
The fire brigade reacted quickly and put out the fire.
The service water pump was repaired offsite and returned to service on January 6, 1986.
Power was reduced to 55 percent late on January 3, 1986 in order to place the steam driven feedwater pump in service and returned to 75 percent to clean main condenser waterboxes.
The plant was manually tripped from 75 percent power after an operator error caused loss of circulating water to one half of the main condenser,~ This resulted in exceeding the administrative limit on condenser differential pressure.
The plant experienced a spike in the primary system dose equivalent iodine and declared an Jnusual Event on January 4, 1986.
The Unusual Event was' secured later that day when dose equivalent iodine returned to;a level less than the licensee imposed administrative
.li mi t.
The plant returned to power' operations on January 5 and reached 100 percent power on January 8.
The plant was running at 100 percent power at the end of the inspection period.
3.
Followup on Previous Inspe'ction Findings
~
a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (UNR 79-16-06) All "D" procedures to be re-viewed to ascertain if any should be reclassified and procedure 0-06-1 revised as necessary.
The-inspector reviewed procedure 0-06-1, Procedure Preparation, Classification and Format, Rev. 6, and determined that all procedures are required to be classified in accordance with Technical Specification 5.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.33.
A random check of Maine Yankee's procedures was conducted.
No discrepancies were found.
b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI 80-BU-08) Examination of contain-ment liner penetration welds.
This item was reviewed during the August, 1985 integrated leak rate test covered under inspection report 85-18.
It was determined that the licensee did select a representative sample of weld channels that were vented during testing.
_
__
_
.
.
c.
(Update) Inspector Followup Item (IFI 80-BU-11) Masonry Wall Design.
In a letter dated 11/8/85, NRR approved all corrective action on masonry walls with the exception of the South wall of the spent fuel pool.
A
.
safety evaluation is currently being prepared by NRR.
d.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI 81-06-05) Leak reduction program procedure requires more specific definition as to when leak checks can be conducted with the system depressurized.
The inspector reviewed pro-cedure 3.'17.7, Visual Examination of High Radiation, Post-Accident Sys-tems, Rev. 1 dated 6/28/84.
The procedure specifies that inspections shull be made with systems at normal operating pressure.
The _ inspector reviewed the results from the last inspection conducted during the Fall 1985 Refueling Outage and determined that corrective action was being taken and documented.
e.
(Closed) Violation (VIO 83-11-02) Failure to follow the Technical Specification Requirements for review and approval of chemistry proce-dures. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to this violation (MY letter to NRC, dated July 27, 1983) and the associated corrective actions which included a review of all chemistry procedures, revision to ten of those procedures, and proper review and approval of the revised procedures.
No discrepancies were found, f.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI 83-14-01) Provide an updated de-scription of the Public Prompt Notification System within the emergency plan.
This action was completed with a revision to the emergency plan dated July 20, 1984.
g.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI 83-14-02) Submit an annual state-ment to the State of Maine that silent and growl tests have been per-formed.
The inspector verified that the State was notified of the Public Emergency Alerting System stationary sirens test performed in 1983 and 1984.
h.
(Closed) Violation (VIO 84-09-05) On two different occasions more than one group of rods were manipulated during rod testing.
As a result, the licensee has instructed all-operators to review the precaution steps of all in progress procedures prior to assuming watch.
The inspector re-viewed ~the licensee's response to this violation (MY letter to NRC, dated October 19,1984)'and the associated corrective actions.
No discrepan-cies were'found.
1.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI 85-16-01) Licensee to establish specific control, mechanism for instrument drain lines.
The inspector reviewed licensee procedure 1-12-5, Establishment of Containment Integ-rity, Rev. 24.
This procedure identifies the vent plug and drain valves of the applicable instrument detectors as containment integrity bound-aries.
Specific actions for the control of these plugs and valves are
' required.
The Instrument and Control (I&C) technicians who manipulate these plugs and valves are trained to complete the necessary control
-
-
-
-.
,
.
functions prior to starting work.
The inspector conducted a tour and noted'that vent plugs and drain valves are designated with orange tags.
This' item is closed.
j.
(Closed) 1 spector Followup Item (IFI 85-16-02) Pipe restraints to be added to service water system to correct seismic considerations of the expansion foint.
The licensee installed additional seismic restraints to the service water piping using Engineering Design Change Request (EDCR) 85-44.
The inspector reviewed the EDCR and the installation and had no further questions.
4.
Routine-Periodic Inspections a.
Daily Inspection During routine facility tours, the following were checked: manning, ac-cess control, adherence to procedures and LCO's, instrumentation, recor-der traces, protactive systems, control rod positions, Containment, tem-perature and pressure, control room annunciators, radiation monitors, radiation monitoring, emergency power source operability, control room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating orders, b.
System Alignment Inspection Operating confirmation was made of selected piping system trains. Ac-cessible valve positions were examined and status determined.
Power supply and breaker alignment was checked.
Visual inspection of major components was performed.. Operability of instruments essential to system performance was assessed; the auxiliary feedwater system was selected for this ~,eview.
In addition to the above, items that might degrade system performance (hangers, supports, housekeeping, etc.) and valve position / locking were reviewed.
No items for further inspection at this time were identified, and no unacceptable conditions were noted.
c.
Biweekly Inspections During plant tours, the inspector observed shift turnovers, chemistry sample results and the use of radiation work permits and Health Physics-procedures. - Area radiation and air monitor use and operational status were reviewed. 'P,lant housekeeping and cleanliness were evaluated.
No items for further inspection at this time were identified, and no unacceptable conditions were noted.
d.
Plant Maintenance The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and maintenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement,
,
L
.-._
-
+
-
.
x_
't'
a
.
-
- ~.
.
M
'"
i
' safety tag use,, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifica-tions, radiological controls'for worker protection, fire protection,
retest requirements, and reportability per Technical Specifications.
_'The_following activities'were included:
-
~,
u -
,
,
'Replacementofemergenc[ diesel 1Aturbo.lubeoilpumpmotor
- -t
'
?jepair)ofcasing'drainvalvdandcalibrationofsuctionpressure
--
switch'fo~r charging pumps y
,
,.
.
,
.
L No unacceptable' conditions were identified,
!Survellia'nce Testing
- '
e.
>
A
.
5Theinspectorobservedparts'ofteststoassessperformanceinaccordance-
' with approved procedures ~and LCO's, test results, removal and restoration
-
~ of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution. ' Emergency Core
>
Cooling System flow testing and Valve Position Verification were reviewed.
e During_the performance of this surveillance test the licensee checks the pressure in the low pressure ~ safety injection (LPSI) header.
This check is performed in order to verify-proper operation of the check valve which protects the low pressure system from the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) system.
During normal operation, motor operated valves in both systems are closed. During a safety injection sequence, this check valve
~would be the only barrier between the high and low pressure systems.
~
As system pressure is reduced during the safety injection sequence, the check valve would allow low pres'sure injection. The high pressure system is designed to withstand 2500 pounds of pressure where as the low pres-sure system is designed to withstand 600 pounds pressure.
Surveillance testing indicated that the pressure in the LPSI header as-sociated with check valve LSI-12 was 400 psig versus the expected pres-sure of 0 psig.
The inspector discussed this reading with the licensee.
The licensee stated that coolant from the high pressure safety injection system (HSI) was leaking by HSI valve SI-M-11 and through the LPSI check valve LSI-12 and that the pressure quickly dropped when the instr _nt drain valve was opened.
The licensee believed the pressure was equaliz-ing at 400 psig because of further leakage downstream of the check valve.
The inspector reviewnd the results of the leak test conducted on Septem-ber 25, 1985 (which is prior to identification of the current leakage past LSI-12) and found that at 1200 psig test pressure, there was no leakage past LSI-12.
Technical Specification 4.6 limits leakage to 5 gpm.
The inspector discussed this item with the licensee in light of the fact that a rupture of the LPSI header outside of containment would eliminate that coolant from the recirculation phase of safety injection.
Because the check valve would seat firmly with a higher differential pressure
-
s. -
.
, -,
during Safety Injection actuation and the last leak rate test at 1200 psig resulted in zero leakage, the licensee believes that this pressure indication is not significant; however, the licensee is still investigat-ing the situation.
The inspector will continue to follow this item (IFI 50-309/85-36-01).
f.
Service Water Pump Fire On December 31, 1985, the plant experienced a fire in Service Water Pump
"A".
The fire brigade quickly responded and contained and extinguished the fire. The cause of the fire was determined to be a failed winding.
The motor was rewound offsite and returned to service on January 6,-1986.
<
The fire brigade ~ demonstrated good response to the fire and good control over the area,. smoke removal and protection of adjacent equipment.
No discrepancies were noted.
g.
. Cold Weather Protection The inspector reviewed the licensee's Cold Weather Operations Procedure,-
1-200-2, Rev. 1.
During routine plant tours the inspector observed the operation of the heat tracing system and observed the measures taken.to protect plant equipment. Operators were generally knowledgeable of the heat trace panel alarms.
The licensee had reviewed the Cold Weather Operations procedure several times during the fall and winter months,
,, prior to expected, severe cold weather, in order to assure that preven-tative measures were in affect.
w During-an inspectiori of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), the in-
-spector~ discovered that.a small 'section of lagging had been removed from
'
- a safety' injection line'at valve HSI-M-51.
The lagging had apparently been' removed during~the outage in August - October, 1985 in order to conduct weld-inspections. -The licensee restored the lagging to its original condition on December 14, 1985. While the area of pipe affected
.by^the missing lagging was-small and would not affect the operation of-the_ system, it indicated a weakness in the. Repair Order system to fol-
>
' lowup required lagging after maintenance.
The inspector will continue to monitor this activity during routine inspections.
No other discre-
,
pancies were noted.
5.
Observations of Physical Security Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory re-quirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures.
Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory meas-ures when required.
I t
,
J
"
-
.
During the week of January 5,1986, the licensee experienced three separate failures of portions of the access control system.
Each.of the events was
compensated.
Thefresident inspector _ performed a followup inspection onsite.
No items for further inspection were identified, and no unacceptable condi-tions were noted.
6.
Radiological Contrels Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the reporting period.
Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radio-
logical control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observed.
Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of non-radiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspector.
No items for further inspection at this time were' identified, and no unac-ceptable conditions were noted.
. 7.
Manual Plant Trip and Declaration of Unusual Event The plant reduced power on' January 3,1986 in preparation for weekend main-tenance, which included placing the steam driven feedwater pump (P-2C) in service and cleaning main condenser waterboxes. At 55 percent power, P-2C was placed in service and plant power was increased to 75 percent for waterbox cleaning.
During this time of year debris, such as leaves and dead grass, is heavy in the Back River.and consequently carries through the circulating water travelling screens.
Some of this debris ends up in the waterbox inlet ~
plenum and restricts flow..In order to clean waterboxes, the licensee takes one. box out of service, and maintenance personnel enter the inlet of the waterbox to clean debris.
At the conclusion of cleaning waterbox "B", operators made preparations to place it back in service. -The "B" circulating water pump was placed in the red flag position to allow repositioning of the circulating water valves dur-ing filling of the waterbox.
After filling the system, the operator went to secure "B" circulating water pump but mistakenly secured "A" instead.
The discharge valve is interlocked to.close when the pump is secured. With "A" circulating water pumps secured and "B" circulating water pump not running, the vacuum breakers for the north side of the main condenser are interlocked to open which accelerated the loss of vacuum for that section of the main condenser.
The operator realized what was happening and monitored the differential pres-sure between the two halves of the main condenser.
Circulating water for "A" box could not be restored until the pump discharge valve went fully shut to
'
clear the interlock (approximately 60 seconds). When the administrative limit of 2.5 inches differential pressure was reached, the operators manually tripped the plant.
All plant systems functioned normall p, a
P
.
y
'
.8
<
i
.
Maine Yankee hasma' khown fuel defect which has resulted in elevated primary coolant' activity., Prior to the trip, the dose equivalent iodine was averaging
._05' micro Ci/gm.
Technical ~ Specifications (T.S.) have three limits on dose equivalent' iodine,.with the_ most' limiting requiring a= plant shutdown when dose equivalent; iodine exceeds 1~.0 mic'rotGi/gm for more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. 'When the fuel defect,was.first: discovered on' November 19, 1985, Maine Yankee reviewed
'theilr. Emergency Plan.
The EmergencyfPlan action levels were not correlated to a s'pecific primary-coolant activity level.
The licensee determined that while'the plant was operating with this known fuel defect, it would be ad-vantageous to combine the T;5. action statement and the Emergency Plan action
.
level..The. Manager.of Operations issued a memorandum on November 27, 1985 which ' directed the Plant Shift. Supervisor to declare an Unusual Event when dose equivalent iodine exceeded the 1.0 mirco Ci/gm level.
'
'Following a plant trip, iodine levels are expected to spike because of tem-
~
perature changes in the fuel. 'The plant routinely ramples for iodine follow-ing a plant trip.,.After the January 3, 1986 trip, the plant drew two samples and analyzed them (the second sample was to confirm the first).
The first
,
sample resulted in'a dose equivalent iodine of 2.81 micro Ci/gm. The second
sample resulted in dose equivalent iodine of 2.54 micro Cl/gm (indicating that iodine levels had passed the peak and were lowering).
The plant declared an
-
Unusual Event at 2:30 p.m. based on these results.
An Unusual Event is the lowest classification of events in the Emergency Plan and indicates a poten-tial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
The shift complement is able to deal with Unusual Event conditions but plant personnel are placed on standby in the event additional manpower is needed.
~
A Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting was convened at_5 p.m. to discuss the plant trip, iodine levels and plans for restart. The inspector observed this meeting and witnessed control room activities.
The inspector determined that purification flow had been increased to assist in reducing primary coolant activity.
At 8:30 p.m. a sample of the primary coolant in,dicated iodine levels were
-
below 1.0 micro Ci/gm (.977 micro Ci/gm).
The plant de-escalated from the
'
Unusual Event.
A plant startup was delayed because of faulty indication on
'
one of the control element drive assemblies.
The plant was taken critical at 1:49 a.m. on January 5, 1986.
No discrepancies were noted.
8.
Exit Interview Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings was presented to the licensee at the end of the inspection.
Preliminary inspection findings were discussed with licensee nanagement periodically during the inspection.
A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclu-sion of the inspection, j
-
-
.
.
.
- - -
- -
-
-
-
-
.
- -
-
-
- -
- -