IR 05000309/1988009
| ML20151D915 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1988 |
| From: | Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151D906 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-88-09, 50-309-88-9, NUDOCS 8807250288 | |
| Download: ML20151D915 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Report No.:
50-309/88-09 License No.:
DPR-36 Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power 83 Edison Drive i
Augusta, Maine 04336 Inspection At:
Wiscasset, Maine Conducted:
May 26, 1988 to June 29, 1988 Inspectors:
Cornelius F. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector Richard J. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector Day
' F. Limroth Project Engineer
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Approved By:
ILoe1E. Trip', Chief
Date
Reactor Projects Section No. 3A Summary:
Inspection on May_26, 1988 to June 29, 1988 (Report Number 50-309/88-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine resident inspections of plant operations including:
followup on previous inspection findings, review of special reports, licensee event followup, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, physical security, radiation protection and fire protection.
The inspection included backshift inspections on May 30 and June 24.
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Results:
No violations were identified. The inspectors identified a concern in that prior to their involvement in questioning the contamination levels near the Refueling Water Storage Tank Siphon Heater, there were apparently no plans to decontaminate the area (Detail 9).
The inspectors noted good practices in
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the implementation of the annual hands on fire fighting training (Detail 5.a)
and the control of work associated with an expedited adjustment to valve CH-F-38 (Detail 6).
The inspectors also noted improvement in limiting the storage of equipment in the steam valve house, an area which contains safety related equipment.
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DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted l
I Within this report period,. interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance tech-nicians and the licensee's management staff.
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2.
Summary of Facility Activities At the start of the report period the plant was at 100 percent power. On May 31 to June 1 and on June 24-to June 25, power was reduced to 75 per-cent for mussel control operations and turbine valve and main steam excess flow check valve routine surveillance testing. The plant remained at full power for the rest of the report period.
3.
. Review of Licensee Event Reports (IP 90713)
The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Report (LER) to deter-mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent reoccurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
LER 88-005 Potential Harsh Environment Postulated for Unqualified Solenoid Valves.
The licensee identified four solenoid operated valves associated with the charging pump suction header vent system which may be in a harsh environ-ment postulated to exist during a design basis accident scenario.
The solenoid valves were not included in the Environmental Qualification (EQ)
master equipment list, and not installed to EQ standards.
During the recirculation phase of an accident these valves could be postulated to fail in the open position, allowing radioactively contaminated water into a non safety class system. The licensee revised the Emergency Operating Procedures to manually isolate the valves prior to recirculation and is performing a more detailed analysis of the potential harsh environment.
The information provided in the LER was found to be complete and accurate.
This problem was discussed in Detail 12 of Inspection Report No. 50-309/
88-06. The inspector had no further questions.
4.
Followup on previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation 50-309/87-27-01 This violation involved the use of a diagram that was not reviewed for adequacy by comparison to the latest revision of the set of controlled prints prior to being distributed and used to perform work.
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m The inspector reviewed the changes to the work package assembly checklist in the DR/R0 work package assembly guideline and has reviewed many work packages since the time of the violation.
No further examples of this type have been identified.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's action's have been effective in preventing recurrence.
This item is closed.
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Operational Safety Verification (IP 71707)
On a daily basis, during routine facility tours the following were checked:
manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LC0's, instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control room annun-clators, radiation _ monitors, emergency power source operability, operabil-ity of _ the - Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), control room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating orders. On a weekly basis, selected Engineered Safety Features (ESF) trains were verified to be operable. The e
condition of the plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety. were assessed. On a biweekly frequency the inspector reviewed a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup and the posting of notices to workers.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also evaluated.
The inspector observed selected phases of the plant's operations as listed above to determine compliance with the NRC's regulations.
The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not
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constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personnel.
The following are noteworthy observations from the areas reviewed:
a.
Annually, three days of hands on fire training is conducted for all fire brigade members and backups, at the fire fighting training facility in Wiscasset, The inspector reviewed procedure 19.6 "Fire Training" and witnessed a portion of the hands on training.
Through a cooperative effort with the Wiscasset fire department, the fire fighting training facility has been supplied with a variety of equip-ment to support training with class "A" and
"B" fires of various intensities in environments similar to those found in the plant. All fire brigade members attended the training which was conducted by state certified fire fighting instructors. The training consisted of a combination of classroom discussions, demonstrations of proper fire fighting techniques, and fire fighting exercises. The objectives of the exercises were clear and consistent with the purpose of the hands on training. Feedback discussions after the completion of exercises were useful in identifying areas for improvement.
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As part of the hands on training, a drill is-conducted with an actual fire in.the burn building with a simulated plant environment and con-taminated area. The. licensee considers.this drill to meet the intent of the requirement for a quarterly drill for 'each shift fire brigade during' the' quarter in which the hands on training takes place.
The inspector r6 viewed this practice to ensure the licensee's interpreta-tion was in compliance with the regulations.
It was concluded that
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this is an acceptable practice provided the drill performed during hands on training is.not considered as one of the two in plant drills
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that each fire brigade member is required to participate in per year, b.
On May' 15,1988, the licenseo determined that the Mensor pressure detector associated with the containment weight of ~ air (CWOA) system
' was drif ting, resulting in erroneous indications for the CWOA.
The Mensor 'was removed from service and a Rosemont pressure transmitter
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was used to provide the pressure input -to the CWOA system.
The CWOA-system utilizes a pressure detector and eleven temperature detectors inside containment to calculate a temperature compensated mass of air in the containment. By comparing daily average mass readings a trend can be established to identify containment leakage. The Plant Oper-ations Review Committee (PORC) had previously determined that the Rosemont transmitter was a suitable replacement.
With the Rosemont transmitter in service the CWOA system began to provide varying out-put.
Evaluation of the data was performed as required by Technical
' Specifications.
The licensee declared the Rosemont pressure trans-mitter inoperable.
Plant Technical Specifications require that the CWOA system not be out of service for more than ten days with the reactor cri_tical or a report made to the NRC as to why the system is
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out of service.
The licensee installed a new Mensor pressure detec-tor within ten days of declaring the Rosemont inoperable.
The inspector had no further questions.
c.
On June 23, an I&C technician was replacing the coil on the solenoid control valve to the air operator for valve CH-F-38.
The technician noted a terminal box in the power supply to the solenoid valve. The terminal box was not included in the controlled drawings for the circuit.
Upon~ further inspection the terminal box was found to con-tain a Weidmuller terminal block, which had been qualified for the environment in which it was installed. However, the terminal block was installed in an orientation different from that suggested by the Qualification Documentation Review Package.
Therefore, the "as installed" terminal block may not have been environmentally qualified for its application. The field leads from the terminal block to the solenoid valve were also not included in the Qualification Documenta-tion Review Package, therefore the environmental qualification status of these leads was questionable.
At the time this condition was
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The valve was kept in this position until the terminal block and leads were replaced with equipment which has the necessary documen-tation to prove it environmentally qualified.
The solenoid valve is a normally energized solenoid which is deenergized to put the valve in its safeguards position.
Therefore any credible failure associ-ated with the power supply to the solenoid would result in the vane (CH-F-38) failing to its safeguard position.
The licensee is per-
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i forming an analysis to determine the environmental qualification l
status of the "as found" installation.
This item is unresolved
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pending completion of the analysis. (UNR 50-309/88-09-01).
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6.
Plant Maintenance (IP 62703)
The inspector-observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and main-tenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radio-logical controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and reporta-bility per' Technical Specifications.
The following maintenance evolutions were reviewed:
Discrepancy Date Report Number Description 5/31 2427-88 Diesel Fire Pump (P-5) Rebuild 6/22-24 0033-88 Preventive Maintenance of Secondary Compon-ent Cooling Pump (P-108)
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6/24 2965-88 Valve packing adjustment and stem lubrica-tion (CH-F-38)
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The inspector witnessed the work associated with the expedited adjustment of valve CH-F-38.
The valve had failed to stroke closed in the time l
required after work had been performed on the elsctrical portion of the solenoid valve associated with the air operator to CH-F-38. The licensee declared the valve inoperable and had two hours to decrease the stroke I-time of the valve to an acceptable value or tett the similar component in the opposite train of the system. The inspector reviewed the work package and the Radiation Work Permit, both of which were prepared in an expedited manner.
The valve packing adjustment and stem lubrication were accom-plished and the documentation was prepared accurately and in accordance with plant procedures. The work was performed and completed within two hours.
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- The inspectors - noted that the licensee has taken actions to iprovide improved storage of equipment in areas which contain safety related equip-
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ment, especially in the steam valve house.
The inspectors will continue
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to follow the licensee's actions in this area.
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No violations were identified.
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SurveillanceTesting(IP6172R The inspector. observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and LCO's, test results,' removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution.
Portions of the following surveillances were reviewed:
Date Procedure Number Title
5/26 3.1.4 Emergency Diesel Generator - Monthly Sur-veillance Testing (OG-18)
6/2 3.1.9 Fire Pump Testing (P-5)
6/14 3.1.4 Emergency Diesel Generator - Monthly Sur-veillance Testing (DG-1A)
.6/22 3.1.9 Fire. Pump Testing (P-4)
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No violations were identified.
8.
Observations of Physical Security (IP 71707)
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Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory
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e requirements, the physical security plan and approved procedures.
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checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers,
-vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging and
~ compensatory measures when required.
No discrepanices were identified.
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9.
Radiological Controls (IP 71709)
Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-i ing period. Areas reviewed included Organization and Management, external radiation exposure control and contamination control. Standard industry
radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control proced-ures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observed.
Independent surveys
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of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradiological points
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throughout the facility were taken by the inspector.
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t Due to several recen'. deficiencies in the Refueling Water Storage Tank ('tWST) siphon heater piping, the licensee has. installed catch basins under
'a val _ve (CS-81) and a seal collar to collect small amounts of leakage.
These two areas have been ' repaired and are scheduled for replacement dur-
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ing the upcoming outage.
The catch basins are an interim measure. 'The inspector reviewed recent survey data for_ these two areas and discovered
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that the~ Health Physics (H.P.) technicians had identified increased radia-tion' levels in the vicinity of the catch basins.
(The RWST contains bor-ated water that is slightly contaminated because it is used during refuel-ing activities to flood the refueling cavity). The surveys were performed on two occasions and-included isotopic analyses of sand samples from the area. _The sand samples revealed contamination 'in the soil beneath the catch basins.
These surveys resulted in ' reports to management of the contamination near the RWST siphon heater.
However, corrective action to decontaminate the area was not accomplished until the inspector questioned
the contamination levels. As a result of NRC involvement, the licensee excavated the area and removed all contaminated soil.
A plan was developed to improve the catch basins and redesign the pavement in the
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area to capture any further leakage. The inspectors are maintaining close followup of the licensee's efforts.
10. Offsite Auxiliary Power Supply Adequacy Review (IP 94702)
NRR representatives were on site June 1-2, 1988, to review the 115 kv power system, as part of their ongoing review of the Surowiec line relia-bility. On December 22, 1987, Maine Yankee provided an evaluation on the adequacy of. the Surowiec line.
Under certain conditions the analysis showed that a low voltage condition at the nuclear plant' could occur if
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the Surowiec line alone was utilized to provide the plant's auxiliary power supply requirements.
The study confirmed that the Mason line, the other off site power source, was adequate and capable under all conditions to provide Maine Yankee the auxiliary power supply requirements.
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On June 1-2, 1988, NRR representatives reviewed the documentation asso-
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ciated with this study.
Particular attention was given to the proposed
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capacitor bank vthich should result i r.
satisfactory voltage at Maine Yankee'
Installation of the capacitor bank is expected by October 1988.
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Other discussions centered around the operability of the Surowiec line pending the installation and operation of the capacitor bank. Questions were raised by the NRC staff. However, some responses were not available prior to the completion of a dynamic analysis. This analysis is underway and expected to be completed in August 1988.
Further inspections are
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planned to coincide with the completion of the design analysis and installation of the capacitor bank.
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11. Storage Battery Adequacy Audit (RI TI 87-07)
The inspector performed a review of the adequacy of the lead-acid type storage batteries used by the licensee.
A previous review' of batteries included the station batteries which supply vital loads. The results of the previous review are documented in Region I Inspection Report 50-309/
88-06.
The portion of-the Storage Battery Adequacy Audit which was covered in this inspection consisted of a review of wet cell storage batteries which perform safety related functions. The batteries included in this review were:
- the Appendix "R" storage battery,
- the Appendix "R" diesel starting battery,
- the diesel fire pump starting battery.
- the emergency lighting battery packs,
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- the security battery and
- the communications battery.
The inspector determined that the Appendix "R" batteries, the diesel fire pump starting battery and the emergency lighting battery packs are main-tained by plant personnel, using procedures which are adequate to. identify any adverse trend in the storage batteries' performance and provide cor-rective action to maintain the battery systems in good working order. The security battery and the communications battery are maintained by offsite personnel.
The security battery is maintained by a contractor who is Lresponsible for the system. The communications battery is maintained by the local power company.
No adverse conditions were identified by this review.
i This review completes the inspections required by RI-TI 87-07.
12. Exit Interview (IP 30703)
Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection.
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licensee did not identify 2.790 material.
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