IR 05000309/1989002

Insp Rept 50-309/89-02 on 890131-0228.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Previous Insp Findings, Review of Special Repts,Licensee Event Followup,Operational Safety Verification,Maint,Surveillance & Physical Security

ML20247N019
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	03/24/1989
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247N009	List: IR 05000309/1989002 ML20247N004
References
50-309-89-02, 50-309-89-2, IEB-83-06, IEB-83-6, NUDOCS 8904060180
Download: ML20247N019 (10)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

w- -

. .

.

I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

! Region I Report No.: 50-309/89-02 License No.: DPR-36 Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine

'

Conducted: January 31 through February 28, 1989 Inspectors: Cornelius Holden, Senior Resident Inspector Richard Freudenberger, Resident Inspector Patr ck Sears, Project Manager, NRR

.

8/~ Date N89

'

Approved By:

Lowell E. ~Trifp/ Chief

~

-- Reactor Projects Section No. 3A Division of Reactor Projects Summary: Inspection on January 31 thru February- 28,1989 (Report Number 50-309/89-02 Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspections of plant operations including:

followup on previous inspection findings, review of spec'1a1 reports, licensee event followup, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, physical security, radiation protection and fire protectio Results: The. response to address the electrical containment penetration environmental qualification concern (Detail 5) and the repair of the main feed-water regulating valves (Detail 4.a) demonstrated a well coordinated effort among the Engineering, Maintenance, Radiation Protection, and Operations Departments. The initiative to update and review the Fire Protection Program has been . effective in identifying weaknesses and bringing them forward for resolution (Detail 12). SIMS item MPA A-15 (Detail 4.b) and IE Bulletin 83-06 (Detail 3) were reviewed and close ,

Q

___

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ - _____ _

. .

. .

.

DETAILS Persons Contacted ( Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance tech-nicians and the licensee's management staff.

l 2. Summary of Facility Activities The licensee was at 100 percent power at the start of the inspection perio An orderly plant shutdown was conducted on February 14, 1989, following the identification of discrepancies in the environmental qualif-ication of the containment penetration connector A plant startup was conducted on February 21, and shutdown on February 22 when one of the main feedwater regulating valves experienced a broken ste The reactor was '

.

taken critical on February 22, and the plant phased on the grid on February 23, af ter replacing all three feedwater regulating valve stem The plant remained at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspec-tion perio . Fo_1_lowup on Previous ~ Inspection Findings (Closed) IE Bulletin 83-06 Nonconforming material supplied by Tube-Line Corporatio The inspector reviewed IE bulletin 83-06: " Nonconforming Materials Supplied by the Tube-Line Corporation Facilities at Long Island City, New York; Houston, Texas; and Carol Stream, Illinois," dated July 22, 198 The bulletin requested that all power reactor facilities review their purchasing records to identify any Tube-Line Corporation supplied ASME Code materials which had been furnished to the facilit Also, licensees were requested to provide a list of Tube-Line Corporation supplied materials and identify the systems in which these materials are er will be installed, and to implement a program to ensure the integrity of the materials or replace the In his response dated November 17,1983, the licensee identified eight items which were furnished by, or would appear to have been furnished by the Tube-Line Corporation. Seven of the items were stainless steel fit-tings which were purchased for use as non-safety class items and, there-fore, are of no concern to the issue raised by IE Bulletin 83-06. The remaining item was purchased as safety class material (Nuclear Safety Class SC-2, Quality Level C) and consisted of one (1) 14" diameter Long Radius 90 degree elbow, Schedule 80, A-234 WPB seamles This item was carried in the warehouse as a spare. The licensee placed a hold on this item to prevent its use until it could be properly dispositioned. This elbow was later scrapped on February 9,198 .

. .

.

4. Operational Safety Verification (IP 71707)

On a daily basis during routine facility tours, the following were checked: manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LC0's !

instrumentation, recorder monitors, emergency power source operability,

'

operability of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), control room logs, shift supervisor logs and operating orders. On a weekly basis, selected Engineered Safety Features (ESF) trains were verified to be oper-able. The condition of the plant equipment, radiological controls, secur-ity and safety were assesse On a biweekly frequency the inspector reviewed a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample resul ts , shift turn-overs, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup and the posting of notices to worker Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also !

evaluate i The inspector observed selected phases of the plant's operations to deter- '

mine compliance with the NRC's regulations. The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health .

and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are l noteworthy areas the inspector reviewed:

! Fire Protection '

As part of an initiative to review and update the Fire Protection :

Program, on February 2, the Fire Protection Coordinator identified a l backlog of outstanding Discrepancy Reports (DR's) associated with the l Remote Battery Pack Emergency Lighting System. This system consists of 56 battery pack emergency lights located throughout the facilit Of these, 28 are considered to be required to meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix R specifications. During the most recent monthly test con- l ducted on January 16, 1989, 20 of the emergency lighting units were found to be malfunctionin All of the units had been previously '

identified as malfunctioning and DR's had been initiated. Of the 20 !

units which were inoperable, 13 were Appendix R related. Immediate action to repair the most essential Appendix R units was completed by February 4, with all Appendix R units completed by February 11, 198 The degradation of the emergency lighting system was reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee on February 8, in accordance with Procedure 126-6 " Administrative Controls of Selected Non Tech Spec Plant Components" revision number 1. The purpose of the procedure is to assure that proper priority is placed on the repair of plant equipment relied upon to address NRC regulations which are not covered by Technical Specifications. The procedure establishes time limitations for degraded or inoperable equipment of regulatory con-cern. The repair of the Remote Battery Pack Emergency Lighting Sys-tem was completed within the guidelines of procedure 1-26- . !

. _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

. .

.

3 l

It was determined that the cause of the majority of the battery pack lighting malfunctions was attributable to the testing method. The battery packs were tested on a monthly basis by unplugging the normal power supply and requiring the lights to operate via the battery pack for 60 seconds. On a refueling basis the lights are subjected to a similar test which required them to operate for eight hours on the battery packs. The units were not designed to perform this repeti-tive eight-hour operation. Many of the malfunctions were identified by the monthly test after the recent (November 88) refueling outage test. As a result of these findings, the licensee reviewed the test-ing program and established a preventive maintenance procedure to trend battery voltage, charger output voltage and verify that the parameters are within manufacturer's recommendation The inspector determined that the actions taken to. resolve the degraded condition of the Remote Battery pack Emergency Lighting System were appropriate, timely and provided a long-term solutio The licensee's initiative to review and update the Fire Protection Program thus far has been effective in identi fying weaknesses and bringing them forward for resolutio The inspectors will continue to follow licensee activities in this are b. Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Stem Failure  !

On February 22,1989, at 12:05 a.m., the operators noted a rapidly decreasing #3 steam generator (S/G) level indication. The plant was at 55 percent power and increasing following the containment penetra-tion repair effort. An operator was dispatched to the main feedwater regulating valve (FRV) for #3 S/G (FW-F-307) where he identified that the stem for the FRV had separated from the air operator. The con-trol room operator was able to maintain level by opening the bypass valve around the #3 FRV. A power reduction was started and mainten-ance crews were called in to install a stem locking mechanism on #3 FRV to prevent any movemen As power was decreased the operators utilized the motor operated isolation valve (FW-M-304) to throttle flow to #3 S/G. At 1:30 a.m., valve FW-M-304 indicated shut. The  :

plant was taken off the line at 2:09 Technical Specification 3.22 "Feedwater Trip System" requires that the FRV's automatically shut on a feedwater isolation system signa With the locking device installed on the stem of FW-F-307, the feed-water trip system was inoperable for #3 S/G. The Technical Specifi-cation allows a two-hour remedial action to restore the trip function or isolate the valv When the motor operated isolation valve FW-M-304 was shut the licensee exited the remedial action of the Technical Specification _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ .

_

- . - _

. -_ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _-

.

. .

.

The licensee conducted a review of the stem failure. The stem failed in the area where the stem is threaded into the valve actuator and locked in place with a locking bar. Indications were that the stem had cracked previously and propagated during operation. The other two FRV stems were inspected. Both of these valves were found to have cracked stems. All three FRV stems'were replaced. The licensee identified other failures of this valve at another nuclear power-station where the valves are used in a similar applicatio The valves in question are a Copes-Vulcan 12-inch class 900 valve with a model D-100-400 actuator. The actuators are reverse acting with a portion of the weight of the positioner supported by the valve stem. Through normal vibration in the feedwater line the licensee believes that the stems suffered fatigue failur The valves were installed in 1982. Based on the service time prior to this failure, the . licensee concluded that the plant could return to operation for the remainder of the current cycle with new valve stems while a root cause evaluation of the stem failure is complete A reactor startup was conducted on February 22, and a plant startup was conducted on February 23. The inspector witnessed these evolu-tions from the control room. The inspector will continue to follow the licensee's root cause evaluation of the failure of the valve stems. The inspectors had no further questions, Safety Valves The inspectors reviewea the licensee's outage program for safety valve repairs. The licensee had developed a program to remove, test and repair as necessary a portion of the safety valves each outag During the past outage the licensee conducted testing and repairs to approximately 45 safety valves. A contractor was utilized to supple-ment the normal plant staff and perform the safety valve work. Cer- i tain safety valves are required to be certified and stamped by an i organization that meets the requirements of the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors. The contractor utilized for the valve work employed another contractor who possessed the necessary stamp qualification to perform the safety valve wor The inspector reviewed the documentation for the safety valve wor Each valve package contained a worksheet that described the as found condition of the valve, the repairs, if any, and the retesting asso-ciated with each valve. The inspector conducted interviews and docu- 1 ment reviews which indicated that the individuals who performed the I certification testing of the valves were qualified to do s All valves which were required to be tested were tested and stamped except as noted below in one exampl l l

u______________________-_____-._______ .- _ _ _ _ _ - .

_ _ __- -__ _ -

, .

.

.

The inspector identified two discrepancies during this. review. The first was a non coded valve in an application that would appear to require a code valve. The second discrepancy involved the range of a-spring _for one of the _ safety valves which was identified during the outage as the incorrect siz This valve was 'not stamped following the completion of the set pressure lift test even though the data indicated that ~t he - valve passe Based on current manufacturing information, the spring installed in this valve appears to be one size too small. The licensee is reviewing these two issues. The-inspector will continue to follow the licensee's corrective action, Quali{/ Assurance of Diesel Generator Fuel Oil (TI 2515/93)

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B establishes overall quality assurance requirements for design, construction and operation of structures, systems and components important to safety. Consumable items where quality is necessary for functional performance of safety related components shall' also be classified as safety related and thus be subject to the applicable provisions of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 5 As a result of reviews performed at other nuclear facilities, it was found that quality attributes for diesel generator fuel oil were not prescribed as required for safety related equipment. These reviews brought into question whether diesel generator fuel oil was included in the' quality assurance plans of other operating plants. Therefore, in January 1980, the NRC requested all licensees to check their QA programs with respect to diesel genecator (DG) fuel oil, and to include DG fuel oil in their-QA programs or provide justification for not doing s This generic activity is identified as -MPA A-1 The inspector verified that diesel generator fuel oil was included in the Maine Yankee- Quality Assurance Program Procedure 0-04-1 Attach- i ment B which listed diesel fuel oil along with other items requiring additional quality assurance requirements. These additional require-ments are found in Chemistry Procedure No. 7.202, Quality Control of Large Lot Chemicals, which requires that a visual examination and measurement of the specific gravity be performed as a receipt inspec-tion. A sample is taken and analyzed for viscosity, water and sedi-ment at a later dat This review verified that MPA A-15 is complete for Maine Yanke l

__ --_--- i

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

l

-

-

6 5. _ Containment Penetrations While reviewing problems with the supplier of the containment penetrations seals at Maine Yankee, the licensee identified that the as-installed l configuration of the containment penetrations for equipment required to be L environmentally qualified was not identical to the as-analyzed condition.

I The licensee conducted a review of the penetrations to see if they met the requirements of the Environmental Qualification (E.Q.)_ progra The licensee is required to identify and maintain certain equipment in-accordance with the E.Q. requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. During the recent outage, the licensee identified that the manufacturer of the containment penetrations was supplying replacement parts that were not identical to the configuration at Maine Yankee. The licensee resolved those discrepan-cies at that time. At the conclusion of the outage, the licensee conduc-ted a . meeting with the manufacturer to discuss these discrepancies in order to avoid similar problems in future outages. During this meeting the licensee learned that the boots'which provide the seal for the connec-tors inside containment may not have been properly sized. The licensee decided to conduct a test of an unbooted assembly to determine if the unbooted configuration is qualifiabl The licensee was informed on February 14, 1989, that the test penetration seal had failed. The licen-see began a plant shutdown at 2:38 p.m. and was shutdown by 6:38 The NRC Operations Center was properly informed (ENS) at 3:30 The licensee held conference calls with the NRC Region I office and the Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) office concerning the Technical Specifi-cation requirement to place the plant in a cold shutdown condition. Tech-nical Specification (T.S.) 3.0. A requires that, if. a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) in section 3 of T.S. is not met, the licensee must perform any remedial action permitted by that specification; or commence a shutdown within one hour, be in hot shutdown within six hours, and place the plant in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Since the status of the environmental qualification of the penetrations could not be ascertained, the NRC 'xpects the licensee to declare the systems inoper-able and follow the applicable T.S. The licensee argued that the reactor coolant pump seal assemblies were sensitive to thermal transients, such as, the transient associated with plant cooldown. The licen:ee indicated that a cooldown in this situation was not necessary. The licensee did not consider the penetrations inoperable since the failure mode was attributed to a post-accident harsh environment inside the containment. The licensee reasoned that sufficient reaction time existed during which compensatory measures could be take In a letter dated February 15, 1989, the licensee documented the discuss-ions of the conference calls and committed to perform certain actions including shutting all but six containment isolation valves and prioritiz-ing the repairs to address these six valves before repairing the remainder of the penetrations. The licensee requested Enforcement Discretion in order to remain in hot shutdown versus cold shutdown until 7 February 17, 198 _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _- -- - _ . _ _ _ -

.

-

\

1-

- The NRC concurred with the lic'ensee and provided telephone notification

.that the ' Enforcement Discretion was approved. This approval was docu-mented in a letter to the licensee dated February 16. Enforcement Dis-i cretion is one of two methods the NRC may provide temporary relief from l T.S. LCO's. The first is a Temporary. Waiver of Compliance which applies I to situations' when a T.S. change would be required to correct the situa- {

tion. This method allows the time for emergency T.S. change processin The second method is Enforcement Discretion which applies to situations  !

for which a T.S.' change is not appropriate. The intent of such discretion is to promote safety by not imposing unnecessary transients on a plant due to a literal reading of T.S. under certain conditions where there is no safety reduction. Since the nature of this problem was temporary and non-recurring, an emergency amendment was not the appropriate method for addressing this problem. Enforcement Discretion also provides for review by both the Region and NRR and is generally limited to two day The licensee prioritized the penetrations based on the importance of the equipment affected by de-energizing the penetratio For each of the penetrations, a repair package was developed by a multi-disciplined tea Following completion of the package, an indepodent review was performe The Operations Department manned the Opermions Control Center and developed tagouts to isolate the penetration Each of the repair pack-ages was routed to the control room and the specifics were thoroughly dis-cussed with the operators before repairs were conducted. Following the completion of the repairs, each penetration was functionally tested satisfactoril The inspector verified that the licensee complied with the commitment made in the Enforcement Discretion process. Containment isolation valves and the PORV block valves were shut. The six containment isolation valves .

needed for plant conditions received top priorit The repair of these valves was conducted in a timely manner and the licensee exited the requirements for Enforcement Discretion at 7:50 a.m. on February 17. Re-pairs to the remaining penetrations were completed on February 2 The inspector concluded that the repair effort demonstrated good coordina-tion of the Engineering, Maintenance, Radiation Protection and Operations Departments in the methodical repairs of the penetrations. Repair pack-ages were thoroughly developed and independent review of each package was performed prior to the start of wor . System Alignment Inspection (IP 71710)

Operating confirmation was made of the Spent Fuel Cooling System. Access-ible portions of the system were observed to verify valve positions and labelling using controlled Piping and Instrument Diagrams as a referenc Power supply and breaker alignment was checked. Visual inspection of major components was performed. Operability of instruments essential to system performance was assessed. W discrepancies were identified.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

, _ _ - _ _ - . __ . _ - _ _ _ _ .

.

.

.

8 Plant Maintenance (IP 62703)  !

The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and main-tenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radio-logical controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and reporta-bility per Technical Specification The following maintenance evolutions were reviewed:

Discrepancy Date Report Number Description 2/6/89 0033-89 P-10B Secondary Component Cooling Pump -

Axial Motion 2/6/89 0151-89 CH-26 - Charging Pump P-14-B discharge check valve swing pin leak 2/17/89 0791-89 Repair of C-10B Containment Control Air Compressor 2/23/89 0865-89 Replacement of the Acoustic Monitor for PR-S-15, Pressurizer Safety Valve Surveillance Testing (IP 61726)

The inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and LCO's, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolutio The following surveillance were reviewed:

Date Procedure Number Title 2/27/89 3. Measurement of HPSI Valve Stem Stops ! Observations of Physical Security (IP 71707)

Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regul ato ry requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory measures when require The inspectors have been mon-itoring the improvements the licensee is making to the plant security sys-tems, conducting reviews of the matrix for improvements and conducting

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,

.

.

\

independent assessments of the security systems. The inspector reviewed the Engineering Design Change Package (EDCR)89-121, Security Lightin The EDCR was found complete and enclosed the necessary information to determine the upgrades would not aversely impact the plant. The inspector had no further question . Radiological Controls (IP 71707)

l l

Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the report- )

ing period. Areas reviewed included Organization and Management, external '

radiation exposure control and contamination contro Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control proced-ures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observe Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspecto . Exit Interview (IP 30703)

Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection. The licen-see did not identify 2.790 material.

l