ML20235J293

Insp Rept 50-309/87-22 on 870804-06.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Changes to Emergency Preparedness Program, Emergency Facilities,Equipment,Instrumentation & Supplies, Organization & Mgt Control & Training

ML20235J293
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	09/14/1987
From:	Conklin C, Lazarus W, Thomas W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235J276	List: ML20235J273 ML20235J280 ML20235J293
References
50-309-87-22, NUDOCS 8710010389
Download: ML20235J293 (6)

See also: IR 05000309/1987022

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-309/87-22

Docket No. 50-309

License No. DPR-36 q

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Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company ]

83 Edison Drive

Augusta, Maine 04336

Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine.

Inspection Conducted: August 4-6, 1987

Inspectors: 7// 7 '

W." Thomas, EmergEncyareparedness / Da'te -

Specialist EP&RPB, DRSS

G('r

C. Conklin, Emergency Preparedness

skin-Date

Specialist, EP&RPB, DRSS

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Approved by: 7/~

! M4<<w I A/ E7

W, J/ Azar (s) Chief. Emergency Date

P aredness Section, EP&RPB, DRSS

Inspection Summary: Inspection on August 4-6, 1987 (Report No. 50-309/87-22)  !

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Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection. The.

inspection areas included: Changes to.the Emergency Preparedness Program;- .j

Emergency Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies; Organization j

and Management Control; Training; Independent Reviews / Audits;'and open items i

identified in previous inspection reports.

I Results: One apparent violation was identified. The' licensee failed to j

follow the requirements of procedure 2.50.23, " Emergency Preparedness Drills i

and Exercises," which delineates the drill and exercise program,

documentation, and management oversight.

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8710010389 B70923  ;

PDR ADOCK 05000309

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DETAILS

1.0 Persons Contacted

• J. Garrity, Plant Manager

• G. Pillsbury, Radiological Controls Section Head

• L. Lawson, Quality Assurance Section Head

• D. Whittier, Manager Nuclear Engineering and Licensing

• J. Temple, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

J. Mathieson, Plant Shift Supervisor

J. Dalton, Shift Operations Supervisor

W. Wicks, Specialty Training Instructor

• denotes those present at the exit interview

2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's progress

concerning the items opened during previous inspection (Inspection

Report 50-309/87-11).

2.1 (Closed)IFI(50-309/87-11-01): No official record or log of signi-

ficant events or times was maintained in the Control Room, E0F or

OSC.

The EOF and OSC did maintain a written log throughout the exercise,

which was examined by the inspectors during the inspection. The CR

operators did maintain a rough log, which is normal CR procedure

during a shift. At the end of the shift, the SOS creates a smooth

log from the rough log. At the end of the exercise no smooth log

was generated. During future exercises the simulator CR will be

instructed to complete a smooth log for possible incident

reconstruction purposes.

2.2 (Closed)IFI(50-309/87-11-02): Protective action recommendations

were not included in the initial General Emergency notifications.

EPIPs (2.50.16 - Protective Action Recommendations and 2.50.17 -

Emergency Notification) are being revised to indicate that the CR

operators make initial PARS as a part of their initial notification

process until the E0F is staffed and operational. The EOF is then

responsible for making PARS to the state and local agencies, based

upon more complete information.

2.3 (Closed)IFI(50-309/87-11-03): The TSC Statusboard Keeper is also

responsible for performance of critical safety function analyses.

Although initially performed, for a period of over 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> they were

not performed until prompted by the TSC Controller.

The TSC Statusboard Keeper occasionally checks CSFs on SPDS, by

monitoring all CSF parameters necessary. However, other TSC staff-

(including the Computer Department Section Head) were constantly

monitoring CSFs on SPDS. All six (6)' CSFS are constantly displayed

on SPDS. and are color coded. If a CSF changes from normal (green)

to any abnormal color (yellow, orange or red), that change is

automatically displayed on the SPDS screen.

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2.4 (0 pen) IFI (50-309/87-11-04): Initial staffing levels of the OSC and

E0F should be evaluated in order to assure timely facility

activation and provision for full support of the plant Emergency

Response Organization.

The licensee is evaluating staffing levels to ensure a more complete '

response. The OSC procedure (2.50.18) will contain a

staffing / organizational chart to assist the coordinator in ensuring

all positions are staffed. A new EOF procedure is being created and

will also contain a staffing / organizational chart. This action will l

be completed by December 1, 1987.

2.5 (0 pen)IFI(50-309/87-11-05): Radio communications between the OSC

and in plant repair / corrective action, and survey teams was not

reliable. ,

The licensee is installing a radio jack in the OSC which will enable

OSC staff to take a remote radio base station from the E0F and plug i

it into an OSC outlet. Use of this remote base station, which is  !

connected to the mair, base station and antenna in the plant, will l

greatly improve radio communications and free up one more portable

radio for use by and OSC team. This action will be completed by ,

December 1, 1987. l

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2.6 (0 pen)IFI(50-309/87-11-06): Controller radiological data maps for j

Offsite Monituring Teams were difficult to use. The maps should

have shown North and a scale as well as pre-designated sampling.

locaticas.

For future exercises, controller radiological data maps are being

revised to indicate north, a map scale and locations of

pre-designated sampling points. This action will be_ completed by

the next exercise.

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3.0 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program

3.1 Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program

There have been no significant changes to the licensee emergency i

preparedness program since the last inspection. Changes which have  !

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taken place have been minor and have been determined to not

adversely affect the licensee's overall state of emergency

preparedness. The licensee has appropriate procedures and

mechanisms in place to assure that changes to the plan and

procedures which could affect the overall state of emergency

preparedness will be identified. All changes to the emergency plan

and implementing procedures are subject to multiple reviews and

approvals required by the Emergency Plan. The Station Operations

Review Committee (SORC) reviews all changes. -All changes are

controlled in accordance with procedures and NRC requirements prior

to implementation.

Based on the above review, this area is acceptable.

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3.2 Emergency Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation and Supplies-

The inspectors toured the Control Room, Technical Support Center,

Operational Support Centers, and the Emergency Operations Facility. 1

Copies-of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing

Procedures were available and current. Statusboards, maps, phones,

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radios, forms, radiation detection equipment, telecopiers and plant

drawings were available and maintained. Equipment _ inventories and i

instrumentation operability are checked quarterly pursuant.to j

-procedure 2.50.6. All equipment checked was operable and within .

calibration. ]

Based on the above review, this area is' acceptable..

3.3 Organization and Management Control

The inspectors reviewed the emergency preparedness normal staffing

organization. The EPC reports to the Manager, Nuclear Engineering

and Licensing, who in turn reports to the Vice President Nuclear

Operations. The EPC is responsible for all offsite; planning and the

overall implementation of the program.. Onsite activities are the

responsibility of the Radiological Controls Section Head, who in

turn reports to the Plant Manager'. The EPC has no staff, however, .j

support personnel are contracted from Yankee Atomic Electric 1

Corporation for scenario development. The inspector noted that l

lack of a mechanism which affords the EPC final review and approval-

of onsite activities may be a weakness. The licensee has agreed.to 3

evaluate this area.  :

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Based on the above review, this area is acceptable. 1

3.4 Knowledge and performance of Duties (Training) j

The following documents were reviewed: Procedure 2.50.5, Emergency.

Plan Training; attendance sheets; and test results. '

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Emergency preparedness training requirements a'e well documented.

The current training cycle is approximately 75% complete, with

scheduling of remaining personnel ongoing.' The records system is '

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easy to use. Hard copies of all records are maintained.in the

training section. Selected training modules require'that a= written

test'be passed or that practical walkthroughs be demonstrated.

Personnel who fail these tests are prevented from participating in

the Emergency Response 0 organization (ERO) until-successful results . j

are obtained. The inspector noted that there is not a formal method j

to notify plant management of personnel who should be' prevented from. .

L participating in the ERO. The licensee agreed to evaluate this '

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area. ,

The inspector interviewed two senior licensed individuals who may be

called upon to be Interim Emergency Coordinators. Scenarios were ,

chosen to provide events with security implication and a-fast

breaking event, and were given to each individual. Detection, 1

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recognition and classification was prompt' and correct for"the given  ;

si_tuations. Notifications, and any associated protective action  !

recommendations, would have been prompt. The operators were aware .

of the safety implications of events caused by sabotage. :The: .)

inspector noted that the personnel utilizing the EAL tables, tended

to use them from the least classification to the highest, and in ]i

some cases prematurely stopped their_ evaluation when the EAL met the j

given conditions.- The licensee has agreed to evaluate thi_s j

potential weakness in EAL format and training from a human factors

standpoint.

Based upon the above review, this area is' acceptable.

3.5 Independent Reviews / Audits

The Quality Assurance Group from Yankee Atomic Power Corporation L

performs the annual emergency preparedness audits. .The audit was

conducted on August 4-8, 1986. The assigned audit team consisted of

two individuals experienced in QA audits and emergency preparedness.

However, the individual with emergency preparedness experience was

subsequently unable to participate in the audit. The audit reviewed

the drill program and concluded that these activities were being

conducted in accordance with the emergency procedures., Based on'the

inspectors review it was identified that many areas of.the drill

program, including required drills, drill documentation and - .

management review and approval'were not done in'accordance with the

procedure. The above review indicates that the audit team that

conducted the audit did not identify problems or~ potential-

weaknesses in the emergency preparedness program. The inspector

l noted that several actions have been taken to resolve these

I weaknesses in future audits. This is an inspector' followup item

(50-309/87-22-01).

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l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's drill and testing program.

The' licensee has not conducted all drills and tests in accordance

with applicable implementing procedures. Specifically, the annual

Post Accident Sampling System and System Analysis Drill (Section

7.2.2.1 of 2.50.23) was not performed in 1985 or 1986.

Additionally, the required documentation and management

review / approvals (Section 7.3 of 2.50.23) are not complete for many

drills. These include:

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- Health Physics (HP) Drill on 6/26/87, no scenario, evaluation

form, and documentation form;  :

- Combined HP and Medical Drill on 12/16/86, no scenario and-

planning form; and

- HP Drill on 6/25/86, no scenario, evaluation-form and

documentation form.

This is an apparent violation (See Appendix A)(50-309/87-22-02).

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The inspector was able to determine that some aspectsi of the drill- 1

program were accomplished during the annual exercise. A review of ,

the 1987 scenario, indicated-that. activities took place that met the- i

. requirements for the Radiological. Monitoring Drill. However, the

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licensees needs to formalize this process to ensure that proper

documentation is-established regarding these-drills.

4.0 Exit Meeting. 'l

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The inspector met with licensee personne1~ denoted in Section 1 at the

conclusion of the inspection. The. licensee was informed that one  !

apparent violation was noted. The, inspector also~ discussed additional

findings and areas for ' improvement. The. licensee acknowledged-the- -)

' findings and agreed to evaluate.them'and. institute corrective actions as

appropriate. At no time during this inspection was any written material

provided.to the licensee.- t

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