IR 05000309/1989013

Insp Rept 50-309/89-13 on 890622-0731.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint, Surveillance,Physical Security & Radiation Protection

ML20246E776
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	08/18/1989
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246E771	List: IR 05000309/1989013 ML20246E767
References
50-309-89-13, NUDOCS 8908300009
Download: ML20246E776 (8)

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,, 9 U.S. NUCLEAR. REGULATORY CCMMISSION

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REGION I

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Report No: ,50-309/89-13 License No: DPR-36-

' Licensee: Maine-Yankee Atomic Power 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 4 ' Inspection At:'.Wiscasset, Maine

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Conducted: June'22 to July 31, 3989 Inspectors:- -Cornelius F. Holden.. Senior Resident Inspector Richard J. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector Approved by: fM b O, h- fl Pln Ebe C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date Summary: Inspection on June- 22 to July' 31,1989 (Report Number 50-309/89-13)

Areas Inspected: Routins. resident-inspections including: operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance,. physical ' security and radiation pro-tection. ~ The inspection involved 148 inspector hours by the resident inspec-tors. Backshift inspections (28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> plus I hour deep backshift) were con-ducte Results: The inspectors concluded that the program for control of the power upgrade and implementation of that program were well done (Sect %n 4). Also, resolution and repair of the Demineralized Water Storage Tank leak has been thoroughly planned and implemented (Section 4). The lack of a defined program for dealing with radioactively hot particles became a concern because of the potential for unmonitored exposure and inconsistent implementation of control measures (Section 7).

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PAGE Persons Contacted......................... .......................... I Summary of Facility Activities....................................... 1 l Operational Safety Verification (IP 71707,35502,40500)............. 1 Pl ar.t Ma i nte na nce (I P 62703) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Surveillance (IP 61726).............................................. 5 Phy si ca l Sec uri ty ( I P 71707 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Radiological. Controls (IP 71707)............................. ........ 5 Exit Interview (IP 30703)..... ............... ......... ............ 6 l 1

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a DETAILS 1 1.- Persons Contacted Interviews and discussions were conducte'd with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance technicians, and the licensee's management staff.- Summary-of Facility Activitie . At/the start of the inspection, the plant was at 100 percent power. The 4- plant reduced power to 75 percent on July 8 to conduct mussel control. and'

routine turbine valve-surveillance. Power was increased to 100 percent on July 9 af ter^ correcting a minor problem with turbine valve indicatio On July 20 the licensee implemented Technical Specification change 113 which authorized operation at a steady state power level of 2700 megawatts thermal (MWt). Utilizing:a redeveloped plan, power was raised in inter-vals with evaluation time programmed inte the schedule. On July 25 tur-bine governor valves were fully open with power at 2638 MWt. The: plant maintained. full power operations for the rest of the-perio ,- Operational Safety Verification (IP 71707, 35502, 40500)

On a daily basis, during routine' safety tours the following were checked:

~ manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LCOs, instruments-tion, recorder traces, protective systems, control room annunciators, radiation monitors, emergency power source operability, operability of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), control room logs, shift super-visor logs, and operating orders. On a weekly basis, selected Engineered Safety Features (ESF) trains were verified opcreble. The condition of plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety were assesse On a biweekly frequency, the inspector revicued a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, partions of the containment

' isolation valve lineup, and the posting of notices to workers. Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also evaluate The inspector observed selected phases of plant operations to determine compliance with NRC regulations. The inspector founo no health.or safety hazards, Containment pressure is required to be less than 3 psig by the Tech-nical Specifications. During summer incrcases in outdoor tempera-

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ture, containment pressure tends to increase as the containment air l heats up. Additionally, a small nitrogen leak from the #2 Safety i Injection Tank (SIT) increased containment pressure slightly. The licensee decided to reduce containment pressure by performing a rou- i tine surveillance test, Post Accident Purge (PAP) System Monthly i

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, Surveillance, procedure 3.1.12. This surveillance was conducted be, tween. June 26 and 30. The inspector witnessed portions of this evolu-tion; No inadequacies were identifie , b .- Earlier.this year the plant identified.a loss of water trend from the:

Demineralized Water Storage. Tank (DWST). The DWST is used to supply pure water to the auxilisry and emergency feedwater pumps.' Operators identf fied that the DWST was losing approximately 2000 gallons per day. A review was conducted to determine'if the leak:was *nternal to other parts of the feedwater or_ condensate systens or outside of the system. When no other leakage was detected the licensee suspected portions of the underground piping were leakin .The licensee developed a plan for excavating the underground piping, beginning with highly suspect areas. The plan included detailed con-trols over the excavation, examination of the protective coating, methods of. repair, and temporary support requirements. The repair L package waswell developed and contained a number of contingency plan The licensee implemented the repair program and discovered the leak '

on a recirculation line for the emergency and auxiliary feedwater pumps. The emergency feedwater (EFW) pumps and the auxiliary feed-water (AFW) pumps take a suction on the DWST through underground pip-ing. The recirculation line for each of the three cumps . joins into a common line which runs underground back to' the DWST., The leak was found in an elbow on the recirculation line. This line has been in service since original construction. During original construction wooden staging was used for fit-up prior to wrapping the piping.with anticorrosion protective wrap and refilling the ditch. The wood was not repositioned during the wrapping of the pipe and therefore the area in contact with the wood was not protected against corrosio Similar problems have been identified in the past with buried pipin The licensee installed a temporary clamp as an interim repair. That option was chosen over a permanent repair because the leak has been contained, alternate methods of providing recirculation capability for the EFW and AFW pumps would require complex interpretations of the Technical Specifications and might be detrimental to safety, and the situation as it exists does not impact the availability or oper-l ability of the pumps.

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I The inspector closely monitored the licensee'c r9 pair efforts. The L inspector concurred that operability of the EFW and AFW pumps is not impacted by the excavation or repair. The EFW and AFW pumps have remained operable throughout the repair. The licensee has plans to L

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continue excavation'of the remaining portions.of the EFW and AFW. pip -

.ing untilcall portions of the pipe have been uncovered, examined and wrapped with anti-corrosion protective coating. .The inspector had no further question ' On July 10, 1989 the NRC issued amendment 113 which changed the steady state power level for Maine Yankee from 2630 megawatts thermal'

-(MWt) to 2700 MWt. Licensee procedure 8-26-2,.2700 MWt Power Esca-lation Monitoring and Control, provided the controls for power in-crease above 2630 MWt,'provided for monitoring plant parameters as-sociated with the power increase, and verified final ~ equilibrium condition acceptance. The licensee made the necessary changes to plant procedures, changed the inputs in the Reactor protective cir-cuit, and rescaled the feed flow transmitter The inspectors mont -

tored the licensee's development of power increase plans and wit-nessed selected portions of the changes mad The licensee made an initial power increase of 10 MWt on July 20 in accordance with the power increase plan. A variety of parameters were monitored and evaluated. The licensee's plans called for 10 MWt power increases followed by a week of monitoring plant systems for unexpected changes. Following the initial power increase, the main turbine governor valves were nearly open (approximately 90 percent).

Routine power adjustments over the next several days due to cc.oling water changes resulted in the governor valves being fully open at a plant power level of 2638 MWt on July 25. The licensee plans to con-tinue power increases from this point after the. next refueling, when replacement of the high pressure' turbine is anticipated to result in 2700 MWt operation. The inspector concluded tnat the licensee's pro-gram.for power increase was well controlled and implemented in a de-liberate, cautious manne P1 1 ant Maintenance (IP 62703)

The Inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and preblem in~vestigation activities te verify compliance with regulations, administrative and main-tenance procedures, codes and standards,. proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel. qualifications, radio-logical controls, retest requirements, and deportabilit The following maintenance evolutions were reviewed:

Discrepancy Date Re;: ort Number Description 7/11/89 2774-89 Low Pressure Safety Injection Valve (LSI-M-11) Automatic Bus Transfer Re-lay cleanin _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _- ,,, s s % . .

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Discrepancy Date Report tiumber- Description 7/7/89 2166-89 Pressurizer level LT-101Y Rosemount transmitter-replacemen /17/89 2423-89 Feedwater Flow Transmitter (FT-1211) .

Rescalin ' The Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System utilizes common pip-ing from the discharge header of the two LPSI pumps to distribute the

. flow to the three reactor coolant system loops. In each _of the branch lines to the loops there is a motor-operated valve which is required to open on.a safety injection' actuation signal.(SIAS). The motor-operators to these valves have normal and alternate power sources from opposite train safety busses. Automatic bus transfer devices (ABTs) automatically transfer to the alternate source when the normal source is de-energized and back' to the normal source when it is re energized. During the routine monthly Emergency Core Cool-ing System (ECCS) surveillance test, the operability of the ABTs is-verified by de-energizing the normal power source and timing the tr.ansfer to the alternate' source. The. normal power source is then re-energized and the transfer back to the normal power source is time During surveillance testing on July 11, the ABT associated with valve LSI-M-11 transferred to the alternate power source within the time established by the acceptance criteria. However, when the normal power' supply was re-energized, the ABT did not transfer back. The-

' inspector observed troubleshooting activities and repair and retest of the ABT, and reviewed control room actions in response to the re-pair work. A relay in the ABT was found to have dirty contacts. The contacts were cleaned and the test was successfully performed three times. During the repair the control room operators appropriately implemented Technical Specification 3.6. The inspector had no fur-ther questions, Based on notification of Rosemount and on NRC Information Notice 89-42, the licensee tested Rosemount transmitters subject to potential failure. Two transmitters did not meet the acceptance criteria and therefore were replaced. The inspectors witnessed portions of the

testing and the replacement of pressurizer level transmitter LT-101 The licensee has an ongoing program for review of calibration data for the affected transmitters to identify degradation in transmitter performanc No discrepancies were note ,

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'5.: ; Surveillance (IP6172Q kt , ' ,

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The inspector observed parts of testi to assess' performance in accordance-with approved performane n nd LCOs, test results, removal and restoratio of equipment, and deficien:y review and resolution.

l .n .The:following surveillance were reviesed:

Date" Procedure Number Title 6/26/89 3. Emerger.cy and Auxiliary Feed' Pump Test'-

6/29/89 7. Post Accident Sampiing Panet Operation

.No inadequacies were identifie . Physical Security (IP 71707)

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Checks' were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the. security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included sttffing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle' searches, personnel identification, access control, badging,. and compensatory meas-ures when required. No inadequacies were identified. The NRC and licen-

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see met on July 18.and 19 to discuss portions of the Maine Yankee Security Plan upgrad3 The' issues raised during this meeting will continue to form-L 'the basis-for future discussions between the NRC and the license . Radiological Controls (IP 71707)

Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis. Areas reviewed included Organization and Management, external . radiation exposure control, .

and contamination control. Standard industry radiological work practices,

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and conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 re" quirements were observed. Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspector. Radiation Work Permit 89-7-509 wcs reviewed in dept .

The inspector reviewed the radiological controls in piace for the Rose-mount transmitter replacement and the DWST leak search. The radiological controls for the Rosemount transmitter replacement were thorough and in-

, cluded dedicated health physics (HP) coverage and good use of low back-ground area The inspector discussed, with plant management, hot particle concerns with the DWST work. Some hot particles had been identified during routine sur-veys. Althougn no personnel satety issues were identified as a result, L

the inspector expresseo concern over the lack of programmatic controls for

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hot particles. Without clear guidan:e on this issue, possible incon-sistent implementation could result in' unmonitored worker exposure. The licensee has iecently designated a senior level review of the health physics program .at Maine Yar.kee, to include the hot particle issue. The inspector will review the progress of the program review in upcoming rou-tine inspection . Exit Interview (IP 30703)

Meetings were periodically held with senior far.111ty management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection. No pro-prietary information was identifie .

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