IR 05000309/1988006

Insp Rept 50-309/88-06 on 880317-0420.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Previous Insp Findings, Review of Special Repts,Licensee Event Followup,Operational Safety Verification,Surveillance & Physical Security

ML20154A585
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	05/09/1988
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154A581	List: IR 05000309/1988006 ML20154A577
References
50-309-88-06, 50-309-88-6, NUDOCS 8805160059
Download: ML20154A585 (9)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I

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Report'No.: 50-309/88-06 License No.: 'DPR-36 Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336

. Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Dates: March 17, 1988 to April 20, 1988 Inspectors: Cornelius F. Holden, Senior Resident Ir.spector Rich rd J. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector Approved By: $A2MY-f ub; g9 M3

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1'/'" Reactor Projects Section No. 3A '

Summary: Inspection on March 17, to April 20, 1988 (Report Number 50-309/88-06  ;

Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspections of plant operations including; followup on previous inspection findings, review of special _ reports, licensee event followup, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, physical security, radiation protection and fire protection. Backshift inspec-tions were conducted on March 17, 28, April 2, 9,12,16 and 17,198 Results: The inspectors had no adverse findings. The inspection of the sta-tion batteries identified a number of strengths including good procedures and-knowledgeable technician The Morning Managers Meeting and the associated tracking systems continue to be a strength in the identification and resolution of issues at a sufficiently low level.

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance tech-nicians and the licensee's management staf . Summary of Facility Activities The plant operated at 100 percent power throughout the report period except for a power reduction to 85 percent power on April 2, to perform turbine valve and main steam excess flow check valve routine surveillance testin . Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (CLOSED) Unresolved Item 50-309/87-05-01; Types B and C Leak Rate Monitor Functional Chec This item involved the functional checking of the instruments (pressure gage, temperature gage, flow meter) within the leak rate monitor (LRM)

used to perform Type B and C local leak rate test ,

The inspector reviewed revised Procedure No. 3.17.4 revision 14, "Class B and C Leakage Testing," which addresses the functional check to be per-formed on the LRM while in use. The procedure stipulates that a calibra-

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tion check should be performed on flow meters and gages once every three .

weeks during the testing period, that flow meters shall be checked again upon completion of the B and C Testing Program, and that gages shall be calibrated upon completion of the Type B & C Testing Program. The pro-cedure also stipulates that flow meters shall be calibrated at least once a year prior to the B and C testing period and has provisions for evalua-tion the validity of surveillance tests performed with an instrument found in a degraded conditio The inspector determined that these provisions meet the intent of ANSI /

ANS-56.B-1981 " Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements" section 4.2.4 "Calibration Checks (Type B and C Tests)". This item is close . Operational Safety Verification (IP 71707)

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On a daily basis during routine facility tours, the following were checked: manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LCO's, l instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control room annun-l

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ciators, radiation monitors, emergency power source operability, opera-bility of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), control room logs, j shift supervisor logs, and operating orders. On a weekly basis, selected l

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Engineered Safety Features (ESF) trains were verified to operable. The condition of the plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety. were assesse On a biweekly frequency the inspector reviewed safety-related tagouts, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, por-tions of the containment isolation valve lineup and the posting of notices to workers. Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also evaluate The inspector observed selected phases of the plant's operations to deter-mine compliance with the NRC's regulations. The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safe'ty hazard to the public or plant personnel. The following are noteworthy areas the inspector reviewed:  ;

On March 25, 1988, the inspector witnessed the release of Waste Gas Decay Drum (TK-60A). The release permit was processed as required and double verifications of the lineup were made. The release was manually control-led within the limits (15 cubic feet per minute) as required by the re-lease permit. The inspector noted that one portion of the procedure (pro-cedure 1-21-3 rev. 11) required the operator to set a pneumatic control valve to control the differential pressure during a release to 10 psi When the release was started, differential pressure rose to 40 psig and

, the release was automatically terminated by the pneumatic control valve.

The pneumatic control valve provides the automatic isolation of the re-lease if required due to increases in activity. With the system set for automatic isolation, the plant manually controls the release rate which allows finer control. After discussions with the control room, the oper-ators reset the pneumatic control valve to allow it to remain open at 45 psig differential pressur While not significant, the inspector dis-cussed this item with the staff since operators were required to operate this system differently than specified in the procedure. The licensee agreed to review and correct the situatio .

l On April 12, 1988, Control Element Assembly (CEA) 51 was dropped during

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the bi monthly CEA exercise surveillance tes Power was stabilized at ninety-two percent. The CEA was recovered and fully withdrawn within ten minutes. Reactor parameters were verified to be within limits throughout and af ter the recovery of the CEA. The licensee had previously initiated

! an action plan to study CEA misalignments and drops to develop methods to

, increase the reliability of the Control Element Drive Mechanism This occurrence will be evaluated.

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On April 15, 1988, control room operators noted that the symmetric offset value generated by inputs from the incore detectors was not upoating, i based on the computer output. Troubleshooting of the problem identified that the radial peaking factor output was not updating either. The appli-

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l cable portions of procedure 1-4-1 "Plant Operations Without the Plant l Computer" were implemented. This includes hand calculation of the radial

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peaking factor from excore nuclear instrumentation and the calculation of ,

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allowable power for operation with the incore detectors inoperabl A controller card in the plant computer was not scanning properly. The com-puter was rebooted and the problem did not persist. The licensee is con-sidering additional self monitoring of the plant computer to provide indi-cation when the controller cards malfunction. In the interim, an addi-tional computer code was implemented which monitors the output of the incore detectors. Every five minutes the code reviews the previous hour's outpu If there is no change in the value of the incore detectors' out-put, a computer alarm is generated to alert the operators to the proble On April 16, 1988, a Public Emergency Alert System (PEAS) siren was re-ported to be activate The siren was silenced from the control room, however, it reactivate A crew was dispatched to locally silence the siren. The public information tape was updated to include information on the inadvertent PEAS activation. Troubleshooting of the siren identified no apparent cause for the failure. A power failure in the area was con-sidered to be a contributor to the actuations. The siren was returned to service April 17, 198 No violations were identifie . System Alignment Inspection (IP 71710)

Operating confirmation was made of the Containment Spray System. At the time of the system inspection, the "A" Containment Spray Pump (P-61A) had been removed from service for maintenance with the spare "S" Containment Spray Pump aligned as the "A". Valve positions were verified and status was examined. Power supply and breaker alignment was checke Visual inspection of major components was performed. Operability of instruments essential to system performance was assesse No discrepancies were identifie . Plant Maintenance (IP 62703)

The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and main-tenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radio-logical controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and reporta-bility per Technical Specification The following maintenance evolutions were reviewed:

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Discrepancy-Date Report Number Description 4/16 1696-88 Steam leak repair to hinge pin cover gasket on main feedwater check valve ( FW-315) .

During a_ routine containment inspection on April 6,1988, a plant operator identified a small leak from a main feedwater check valve (FW-315). The leak was. found to originate from the hinge pin cover gasket at a rate of approximately one drop per second. The repair consisted of the manufac-ture of a clamp installed around the hinge pin cover, and the injection of sealant into the chambor created behind the hinge pin cover by the clam The repair was performed by a contractor on April 16, 198 The inspector reviewed the work package and witnessed the repair effor No violations were identifie . Surveillance Testing (IP 61726)

The inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance

.,ith approved procedures and LC0's, test results, removal and restoration

of equipment, and deficiency review and resolutio The following surveillances were reviewed

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Procedure Date Number Title

3/28 3. CEA Exercising 3/29 3. Station Battery Readings - Weekly Surveillance 3/29 3.5.11 Appendix "R" Battery Readings - Weekly Surveillance

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3/29 3.5.13 Appendix "R" DG-2 Diesel Starting Battery Readings 3/29 3.5.10 Diesel Fire Pump Battery Readings 4/2 3. Main Steam Excess Flow Check Flow Check Valve Testing }

3. Turbine Valve Testing

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4/2 4/4 3. ECCS Routine Testing No violations wcre identified.

l 8. Observations of Physical Security (IP 71707)

i Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included security starfing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, -

and compensatory measures when required.

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5 Radiological Controls (IP 71709)

Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-ing period. Areas reviewed included Organization and Management, external radiation exposure control and contamination contro Radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observed. Independent surveys of radiological bound-artes and random surveys of nonradiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspector. Additionally, Radiation Work Permit (RWP)

88-4-37 which involved the removal of the reactor head stud tensioners from a contaminated area to the machine shop and their rebuild was re-viewed in detail. No violations were identifie . Incore Instrument Detector (IP 71707)

During the last refueling outage one of the Incore Instrument (ICI) Detec-tors could not be fully inserted into the core. This detector was removed (dry) and stored in a lead cask. On March 21, 1988 the licensee removed the cask from its storage location and transferred the ICI to the spent fuel poo The inspector attended the pre-job briefing on March 18, 1988. Details of the job were reviewed along with special precautions. Procedure 6-02-5.1, Incore Detector Dry Disposal, was reviewed in detail. Radiation levels on the exterior of the lead lined cask were 6 Rem per hou Radiation Work iermit (RWP) 88-3-78 was reviewed. Portions of the transfer operations were witnessed. Personnel involved were knowledgeable and cautious. When

radiation levels indicated that one portion of the ICI had not transferred on the initial attempt, the cask was removed and stored in a secure high radiation location. The issue was discussed during the Morning Managers Meeting and a course of action was determine The second attempt to transfer the remaining portion of the ICI was successfu The inspector had no further question . Fitness for Outy - Drug Testing (RI TI 88-01)

The inspector examined records and data relating to the experience asso-ciated with the licensee's fitness for duty program. Information was pro-vided to the Region as requested in RI TI 88-0 . Maine Emergency Management Administration The inspector toured the Maine Emergency Management Administration's

facilities during an open house on April 1, 198 The purpose of this visit was a familiarization of the facilities and capabilities of the State during an emergenc The tour was informative.

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1 Control of Plant Activities (IP 71707)

The licensee utilizes a variety of methods to control and track issues resulting from daily plant activities. The Morning Managers Meeting is the focal point of . these control measure During their daily meeting, the managers discuss the significant issues since the last meeting and the daily work plan. These morning meetings generate issues to be followed which may involve a number of plant departments. There are several sys-tems utilized to track these issues, such as, Performance Improvement Opportunities, Coordination Improvement Opportunities, and Mysterie Each of these systems has its unique feature Performance Improvement Opportunities (PI0's) are designated for issues where errors have been detected or a deficiency in the manner in which an

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evolution is performed is detecte Coordination Improvement Opportun-ities (CIO's) are issues that arise from lost work time or production losse A CIO Committee reviews each CIO and reports to the Morning Managers Meeting the results of its reviews. Mysteries are issues that are not understood at the time of their discovery. Sometimes the involve-ment of other departments resolves the issue when someone with particular knowledge of a piece of equipment or proces t

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Each of these systems has its own tracking system. When situations arise l'

that require the coordinated effort of a number of departments, a matrix system is utilized to assign responsibilities for data collection and resolution of different item Committees are formed to regularly meet and resolve the issue.

. All methods for disposition of plant issues are reviewed at the Morning Managers Meeting. Although this meeting generally has a quorum of Plant '

Operations Review Committee (PORC) members, these are not used as PORC meetings. At the Morning Managers Meeting, status of open items and final closecut reports are discussed.

l l The overall effect of these systems is a well informed management team that can advise and coordinate the actions of all plant personne . Storage Battery Adequacy Audit (RI TI 87-07)

Scope of Review The inspector performed a review of the adequacy of the lead-acid type storage batteries used by the license This review was conducted in

[ accordance with Region I Temporary Instruction 87-07, "Storage Battery Adequacy Audit." An attachment to ohe Temporary Instruction outlining the scope of the information required for the audit was provided to the license A copy of the document is attached as appendix "A" to this repor Not all portions of the Temporary Instruction were complete The remaining portions will be completed in future inspections.

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k This portion of the inspection centered on the station batteries. The seismic lifetime, electrical sizing, room ventilation, protection from ignition hazards, electrolyte temperature, charging procedures, perform- <

ance tests, and replacement criteria of the station batterie The in-spector also observed the performance of the weekly station battery sur-veillance and reviewed the following maintenance surveillance procedures associated with the station batteries: "Station Battery Readings - Weekly Surveillance" No. 3.5.1, Revision 11, "Station Battery Readings - Every Other Month" No. 3.5.2, Revision 10, and "Station Batteries Rated Load Discharge Test", No. 3.5.3, Revision 1 Findings The licensee's low voltage vital electrical system is made up of four separate 125V D.C. buses. Each bus is provided with a separate station batte ry . Buses 1 and bus 2 are normally powered from the "A" train emerg-ency bus and buses 3 and 4 are normally powered from the "B" train emerg-ency bus. Bus 1 can be cross-connected to bus 3 and bus 2 to bus 4. Each station battery is sized based on the combined loads of the buses to which it can be cross-connected, plus a suitable margi As part of a seismic margins upgrade, the licensee has previously commit-ted to replace the station batteries and their associated racks. Batter-ies 1 and 3 were replaced in the 1987 refueling outage. Batteries 2 and 4 are scheduled for replacement during the 1988 outag The seismic integrity of station batteries 1 and 3 has been established

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for the twenty year life of the batteries by means of a similarity analysis to a representative battery rack and cells previously teste The analysis was performed by the manufacturer. There is no criteria for determining the seismic end of life of the batteries based on the inser-vice condition of the batteries in use by the licensee. At the time of installation of station batteries 2 and 4, an analysis was performed by the manufacturer to show that the battery would not overturn during a seismic event. Batteries 1 and 3 have full seismic qualificatio General information of the station batteries is listed below:

General Station Station Information Batteries 1&3 Batteries 2&4 Qualified seismic life 20 years Not documented Qualified Electrical Life 20 years 25 years Age 1 year 16 years Time in service 1 year 16 years

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Plans for replacement None 1988 Outage l

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The inspector determined that the procedures reviewed contained good de-  :

tailed-instructions and provisions for signoffs were evident. Appropriate -

limitations, precautions, and notes concerning equipment operability re-quirements and personnel safety hazards were included. Personnel perform-ing the observed surveillances were knowledgeable. of the procedure re-quirements and acceptance criteri The station battery rooms were found to be clean and free of localized heat sources, fire ignition hazards, and i to have sufficient ventilation flow. Administrative controls of changes  !

to the load requirements of the station batteries and the installation of jumpers to bypass' cells were goo No violations were identified.

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1 Exit Interview (IP 30703)

Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings for the report  :

period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspectio The !

licensee did not identify 2.790 materia ,.

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