IR 05000309/1990013
| ML20059E255 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1990 |
| From: | Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059E253 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-90-13, NUDOCS 9009100107 | |
| Download: ML20059E255 (16) | |
Text
.
.
'
.
,
.
.
!
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No:
50-309/90-13, License No:
'
Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Inspection At: Wiseasset, Maine Conducted:
June 20 through July 30, 1990 Inspectors:
Charles S. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector Richard J. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector Astrid E. Iopez, Reactor Engineer 7!2/!fd Approved:
M q
S-k.E.
. McCabe, Chief, Reaetor Projects Section 3B Date OVERVIEW Operations:
Plant Shift Supervisor participation in the Morning Manager's Meet-ings was assessed as contributing positively to safe operation. Operations personnel aggressively pursued resolution of operational issues and, although management did not identify a weakness in the administrative control of procedure changes, the responses were thorough and conservative.
However, the system restoration section of the monthly Emergency Diesel Generator surveillance pro-cedure was weak, and inconsistent with the format of other ECCS procedures.
,
Radiological Controls:
The efforts to reduce personnel contaminations resulted in improved management awareness and ability to address weaknesses.
Maintenance / Surveillance: Maintenance on and surveillance of the containment control air compressor, CEA (Control Element Assembly) exercising, and instal-lation of a temporary power supply for the turbine control system were conducted i
acceptably.
Procedure adherence weaknesses were identified in the performance of a Reactor Protective System functional check and a control room ventilation filter flow surveillance. Disposition of a mispositioned RPS (Reactor Protection System) " summer" control switch remains unresolved.
Security: A quarterly security meeting was conducted on July 17.
Based on l
current program status, meeting frequency was reduceo to bi-annual.
A weakness in the use of security door palm switches was noted; appropriate corrective
,
'
action was taken by Maine Yankee.
.
I Engineering / Technical Support:
Installation of control room temperature instru-mentation was poor, but there was no impact on plant safety.
NRC Bulletin 84-02, TMI Action Items II.F.2.4 and II.B.3.4, and Temporary Instruction 2515/101, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, were closed.
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification:
Plant housekeeping was generally good'
but inconsistent.
The licensing organization's response to questions on service water injection temperature was excellent.
Increased senior Maine Yankee man-agement attention to the quality and use of procedures is warranted.
_
>
9009100107 900823 PDR ADOCK 05000309 -
G PNUA
._.
_ _
_
,
I
.
..
.
,
-.
,
.
..
.,
..
,
..
- ,4
'
-I i
,
.. -
,
,
TABLE OF CONTENTS l
,
!
.PAGE
I
- 1.
PlantOperations(IP 71707,-71710).....................................
1!
. i i
2.
Radiological Control s (IPJ 71707)............... -.....................
S-
'
3.
Maintenance / Surveillance (IP 62703,'61726)...........................
.
,
!
. 4.
PhysicalSecurity(IP! 71707)..........-...............................'29-
-
,
S.
Engineering / Technical: Support (IP '37828)..................~.........
i
'
t
- 6.
SafetyAssessment/QualityVerification(IP 35502 40500)'.............
-121
'
7.
Administrative.................................
.....................- 13.,
I
.
a.
Persons Contacted...............>...................:............
!13-c)
,
b.-
Summary of Facility Activities.........:.........;.................
14'
'l
,
c.
Interface with the State Of Maine (IP 94600)...,.....=...........
- ' i d.
Exit Meeting (IP 30703)..................,.......................
Inspection Hours:...............................................:.
-;t? l M
,
- 14 e.
.
,i
'h
,
?
~ i i
.i
'
>
.>
~$
f
.
,
t I
t
!
$
i Li k
'
>
'
i I
r i
i
E!
'l
'
i
- .
,
,
,-
r b.
i m
_
,
.
.
_.
.
.-
.. -.
_
.
.
.,
.;
,
,
.l
.
/
OETAILS
..
1.
Plant Operations
,
On a daily basis,. durin0 routine facility tours, inspectors checked the following: manning, access control, adherence to' procedures and Limiting Conditions for Operation, instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control room annunciators, radiation monitors, emergency power
,
source operability, operability of the Safety Parameter Display System.
i (SPOS), control-room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating orders.
'
On a weekly basis, selected Eng_ineered Safety Feature (ESF) trains were
. verified to be operable. The condition of' plant' equipment, radiological.
controls, security and safety were mossed.. On a biweekly frequency the inspector reviewed a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, portions of the: containment isolation valve lineup-and the post-
_
ing.of notices to workers.- Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were:also evaluated.
_
The inspector observed selected operations to deternine compliance with the NRC's regulations.
The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personnel.
The following are noteworthy:
J
'
!
a.
Administrative Control of-Proced'ures
'
,
On July 16, 1990 operators emphasized a previously identified: opera-tional concern c - Service Water inlet temperature, _ Plant operation t
,
at full-power was < Alect to an inlet temperature limitation of 75 F i
and inlet temperatures were approaching 72 F as a result of prolonged-
'
hot weather.
!
As a result of the operators' concern, Licensing issued a memorandum-
documenting an analysis which. supported a service water inlet tempera-i ture of 90 F with the new service water heat exchangers in use, and
'
80 F with the old service water heat exchangers in use. Operations I
personnel changed the. limit.s on reactor power based on inlet tempera-ture in.the service water system operating.' procedure (Procedure 1-15-3)
using a temporary PCR.(Procedure Change Request).
The inspcetor questioned the.use of a temporary procedure change to
~
implement restrictions which are apparently not temporary.
Since the-change restricts full power operation, the inspector also questioned the propriety of placing' restrictions in the service water system operating procedure, since the intent of Procedure 1-15-3 does not
,
'
address restrictions on power operation, and the restrictions could
.
therefore be temporarily changed without prior management review.
i In response, operations management found that restrictions on reactor
power due to injection amperature were contained in several proce-dures, including plar.; startup and operation at power.
However, the
-
,
-
.
.
..
,
.
.
9.
,
- .
...
.
L
r restrictions had not been enanged in' procedures other th'an the service water procedure. The remtining" procedures were changed to reflect
,
,
reactor power restrictions based on the new; inlet temperature analysis.
!
Plant-management concluded that use of temporary procedure changes.
required review and clarification.
The inspector observed that operations personnel were' aggressive in
,
pursuing technical resolution o'f the restrictions on operation. Al-
'.
though the need for review of procedural controls was not self-identi-
'
fled, operations management demonstrated a clear' understanding of the issue, and the response was thorough and conservative, b.
Safety System Walkdown i
On July 23, 1990, the-inspector conducted a walkdown of the Emergency
Diesel Generator air start and fuel' oil systems.
Prior to performing-
'
visual verification that controlled valves werelin-the required posi -
y tions, valve positions contained.inLcontrolled procedure 3.1.4, Emer-gency Diesel Generator Surveillance, were compared with controlled drawings of the fuel-oil and air start systems to insure procedure accuracy.
Operators use procedure 3.1.4 to perform monthly surveil-larn.es of EDG-1A and EDG-1B; the procedure-. incorporates system re -
storation after valve manipulation.
.
The inspector noted that the procedure does not contain a separate section for system restoration, and only valves which are-required to
,
be manipulated are verified to be in proper position by= procedure.
The inspector concluded that, due to.the fragmented approach to valve
_
position verification, the potential exists for a valve that is in- '
-
correctly positioned to remain in the incorrectLposition'.
lant management was aware'of the procedure weakness, indicated.that other ECCS surveillances had been'previously changed to incorporate a:
separate section for system alignment-and restora+. ion,-and committed-to review and upgrade procedure-3.1.4.
'
This procedure weakness, together with other orocedure related weak--
nesses identified elsewhere in this report, are indicative of a'need for review of management policy regarding procedutes. >This finding is discussed further in Detail 6 of this report.
c.
Leakage Past Reactor Head Vent Valves On June 28, after achieving normal operating temperature and pressure in the reactor coolant system, plant operators noted inconsistent quench tank parameters, elevated pressurizer code safety tailpipe-temperatures, and elevated reactor coolant system calculated leakage.
These parameters were considered indicative of leakage past a pres-
surizer code safety valve. A propriate Technical Specification actions were implemented.
!
,.
.;
.
.
..
,
.
.
,
.
!
'i Subsequent investigation, including' support-from-the PED (Plant Engi-neering Department), identified that the leakage was not through the
'
pressurizer safeties, but through the reactor head vent valves.
These valves are' motor-operated valves-that had been closed under cold, depressurized conditiens and then-were deenergized:in the closed posi-tion.
It was postulated that, upon pressurization and heat up,. leakaga
.past the vrive seats in.'tiated.
The valves were energized and stroked
~
in the slose direction.
The. indicationn of-leakage. stopped.
To prevent recurrence of this problem,' Maine YankeeL plans to proce-duralize the restroking < f the head vent valves af ter exceeding' 500
,
degrees Fahrenheit in the reactor coolant system, -if the valves.have been opened since.last' heated above 500 degrees.
The inspector observed that the plant. operators aggressively pursued..
O the indications of primary system-leakage.and appropriately implemented Technical Specification reauarements,'and that PED personnel were.
.
contacted-and became instrumental:in the effective -resolution of this'
l operational, issue. The operators' aggressive pursuit of the. leakage,
implementation.of Technical Specification. requirements, and close cooperation with PED were assessed as positive contributors to safe
- peration, i
l d.
Morning Manager's Meeting
'
.
- 1 During attendance at the morning manager's: meeting, the inspector noted
'
that the PSSs (Plant Shift l Supervisors) weresactively involved and demonstrated a questioning attitude toward plant activities, follow-up
,
on plant "open items," and long-term action issues.
PSS participation in the morning' meetings is indicative of a positive approach to reso-lution of technical issues and of a' safe, conservative. approach to-
plant operation.
2.
Radiological Controls
!
' Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during~the' reporting period. Areas reviewed included Organization and Management, external l
radiation exposure control and contamination control. ' Standard industry
'
radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control procedures-and 10 CFR'Part 20 requirements were observed, a.
Trending of Personnel CLenaminat bns
'
.
The radiologice', controls section routinely trac.ed. personnel contami-
.
nations throughout the 1990 refueling outage.. Tne trending analysis identifica a. problem with contamination at the containment personnel hatch. Additional efforts were taken to: observe and'c-orrect-poor techniques in the removal of anti-contamination garments at-the con-
'
tainment personnel hatch step off pads..This effort resulted in a significant reduction in personnel contamination:in that area.
..
.
t
.
,
r y
.
,
,
,
.
.
Further -trending,identi'ted the need for a cult'ure change among the-plant workers with respect to reducing personnel contamination result--
,
ing from working in radiologically contaminated areas.. These issues were. elevated to m A gement levels during morning meeting discussions.-
Management actionn.d effect a long term culture change will be assessed by the inspectors-in accordance with the NRC inspection program.
In general, Maine Yankee's efforts to trend radiological controls performance have resulted in improved management awareness of and
'
ability.to address weaknesses, b.
Inadvertent Radioactive Gas Release
"
I On July 26, maintenance techn'icians were performing routine maintenance :
to clean the waste gas compressor afte wooler gage glass. -The. gage
'
glass isolation valves were closed and administrative 1y controlled.
Radiological-Controls: coverage for the work. identified' radioactive gas in the Primary Auxiliary Building about two hours after work-started. -Leakage-past one of.thp gage glass: isolation valves was
,
located and terminated shortly thereaf ter.
An evaluation of the release was conducted.
Based on the'c5ange in.
'
Decay Drum "A" pressure, a calculated volume of.190.4 cubic' feet of gas was released to the-Primary Auxiliary Building atmosphere.
Ven-tilation for this building is filtered and_ exhausted via the Primary Vent Stack, a monitored release path. The radioactivity of the-re-i lease was significantly.below regulatory limits. Maine Yar kee plans to perform an evaluation of the-event to determine the aderuacy of
the control and planning of ths maintenance activity.
Maine Yankee informed the State of Maine of the unplanned release via
{
a public 1.1formatinn telephone recording in accordance with State'
requirements.
10 CFR 50.72 requires that Maine. Yankee: notify.the NRC-of any event for which notification to other government agencies:has=
been made.
In this case, Maine Yankee'did not notify the NRC. 'This appeared to be inconsistent with several past examplesLin which appro-priate notifications were accomplished.
However,. communications be-
,.
tween Maine Yankee and the State.of Maine have become much more fre-l~
L quent recently, and the licensee personnel. involved considered this
'
notification of the State to be. informational. Determination of which communications.are consi h red reportable to the NRC was discussed-with Maine Yankee management..To ensure that the NRC is aware of State notification of' events which otherwise may not be reportable'to the NRC, Maine Yankee revised their NRC reporting guidance to ensure that such matters are reported to the NRCzin the future..The inspector noted that Maine Yankee's response to this issue was:timelytand appro -
t l:
priate, and classified this matter as a non-cited. Severity level V
violation (NCV 50-309/90-13-01).
l.
f:
l
!
.~.
.
.
.
.
,
.
!
3.
Maintenance / Surveillance The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify c)mpliance with regulations, administrative and main-tenance procedures, coiies and standards, proper QA/0C involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radio-logical controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and report-
!
ability per. Technical Specifications'.
Also, the inspector observed parts of surveillance tests to assess perform-ance in' accordance with approved procedures and Limiting Conditions for.
'
-0peration, test results, remo,al and-restoration of equipment, and defi-ciency review and resolution. The fallowing activities were considered to be' noteworthy:
la.
Power Range Safety Channel Functional Test On September 13, 1990, the inspectors observed portions of the monthly functional test for Power Range Safety Channel "A."
The procedure is performed to verify that. alarms and' trips function properly and' occur
,
at acceptable setpoints, as required by Technical Specifications.
'
Two Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) technicians performed the test with the apparent intention-that one of the technicians would read the procedure steps and sign them off when completed, and the other technician would perform the steps.
However, the technicians occa-sionally lost independence when the technician performing the checks completed steps before they ere read, or read steps from'the procedure himself.
As a result of tFs technicians each not performing those-specific actions which they were assigned, the technician performing'
the checks initially failed to change a switch position as-required I
by step 3.7 and therefore could not obtain the voltage indication required in step 3.8.
!
Later, while performing step.3.37, the technician ' ould not obtain a c
I full-scale indication for the Subchannel "A" Calibrate function, as stated in the procedure. The. technician performed' steps 3.38 and i
3.39 to determine if the same problem existed with the Subchannel'"B" i
Calibrate function prior to consulting his supervisor.
Steps 3.37 through 3.39 were not signed off as completed, t
The lack of independence discussed above had no ' safety significance since the error was caught by the technicians.
The failure to stop at Procedure Step 3.37 when the expected reading was not obtained had l
no direct impact on safety since resolution was obtained for the in-correct reading prior to completion of'the functional check involved.
F The inspectors were concerned, however, that the failure of the tech-nicians to perform the test as a team and the lack of careful adherence to procedures might be symptomatic of a programmatic weakness in the i
e
..
.
.
,
.
...
.
.
area of procedure, adherence.
In response to the inspectors' concerns,.
plant management reviewed the circumstances surrounding the surveil-lance and interviewed the technicians involved..They concluded that-the technician involved did not have a clear understanding of manage-ment philosopny and expectations ~ regarding procedure adherence.
_Re-medial action for the.1&C technician consisted of training to re-inforce Maine Yankee expectations for procedure adherence. - (Refar to Details 3.f
- i 6.c for further discussion of procedure adherence).
b.
Surveillance Observations CEA Exercising
- l On July 24, 1990,. the inspector observed CEA exercising required by l
Technical Snacification 4'.2, performed using procedure 3.1.8.
Opera-j tor actions e conservative, controlled, and in accordance with procedure, operator ve'rified operability of the_ reed swit-h and
. pulse cuunting CEA position indication system and no significant problems were encountered, c.
Mispositioned RPS Switch (UNR 50-309/90-13-01)
'
On July 25, 1990,-an I&C_(Instrument and Controls) technician,aer-
,
forming surveillance procedure:3-6.2.2.1, Power Range Safety Cianne'is,
'
discovered that the summer control switch in the summing circuit'for
-
i RPS (Reactor Protection System) = Channel "D'!- was.not in-the correct q
position. Normal positiok for the' switch, used to. select upper and-
-
lower power range detector input-to the summing circuit, is "(A+B)/2";
i the switch was discovered _in the "A" position.
Thettechnician returned
!
the switch to its normal position'and satisfactorily completed the j
surveillance.
^
a The output of the dual linear power range channels is used in the V0P (variable overpower) trip circuit, the fM/LP (thermal: margin / low power)
trip circuit, the S/0 (symmetric of f set) trip circuit,. and for indi-
.
cation of reactor power.
Since the four independent RPS channels are configured so that any two out of four tripped RPS channels will cause j
a reactor trip and the-remaining three RPS channels were operable with their summer control switches in the correct position, no single
failure would have prevented a reactor trip if the setpoints for V0P,
!
TM/LP, or S/0 had been exceeded.
j i
Daily calorimetric adjustments were performed when the selector switch
'
was selected to the "A" position; therefore, the output of RPS Channel i
"D" was indicative of reactor power even though input was from one de-i tector rather than two.
In addition, since FSAR section 7.5.2.5 pro-
!
vides for such operation of the summing circuit with an inoperable
ion chamber in the dual linear channel, Maine Yankee concluded that,
!
with the summer control switch mispositioned, the trip -circuits for i
RPS Channel "D" would still have responded to a plant transient.
'
,
l
.
., <
.
_
^
.
.
.
c
.
=
!
The inspectors concluded that there is no safety significance associ-ated with the mispositioned Summer Control Switch; however, Technical Specifications limit plant operations to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with w e RPS channel bypassed for maintenance or surveillance activities. At.the conclusion-of the reporting period, plant management was attempting to determine
~
vthen the Summer Control Switch was mispositioned.
This item will remain unresolved pending conclusion of licensee review to; determine-if the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Limiting Conditi~on of Operation was exceeded.
d.
Containment Control Air Compressor Rebuild The inspectors observed portions of_ rebuilding and. functional testing i
'
of a spare containment control air compressor, The containment = control
'"
air system utilizes two air compressors for redundancy.
Maine Yankee maintains a-spare compressor ready for installation.
A test stand was constructed which allows a'" break in" run and functional testing a
of the air compressor af ter. it is rebuilt.-
i
-
!
The maintenance technician rebuilding.the compressor was knowledgeable i
of the configuration of the air, compressor and' recent enhancements made by the manufacturer to several of.the replacement _ parts.
A second maintenance technician was assigned to-the job 1to learn details of rebuilding the air compressor.
General maintenance technician training provides the basics of air compressor design and operation principles. Maintenance technicians then receive "on-the-job" training for specific plant components.
,
'
While working on these components, gener_ic corrective maintenance pro-cedures are used to control work.
The inspector judged that the process currently'used to qualify main-j tenance technicians to work on specific plant components provides
'
adequate training to make the activities "within the skills of the i
trada." However, the process is informal and may need strengthening to assure that only adequately trained individuals perform work on
!
plant components when.using generic corrective maintenance procedures.
This matter will be assessed further_ incident to. routine-inspection, e.
Failed EHC Power Supplies l
On July 1, while placing the main' generator voltage regulator into service, oscillations in the output from the main generator exciter were noted by the plant operators.
Plant startup activities were suspended to allow troubleshooting of the exciter controls. The os-cillations could not be reproduced during troubleshooting activities and the generator was phased to the grid at approximately 1:30 y
..
- $
!
.
,
.
.
,
.
8'
,
The following day., senior plant neagers were informed of the exciter -
,
voltage oscillations at the Morning Managers Meeting. After consider-
able; discussion and the observation thtt oscillations in megawatts electric could still be observed, there was no decision on a course.
cf' action.
?
At approximately 9:00 a.m.
operators'noted increasing oscillations-
,
,
in exciter voltage. At 11:00 a.m., the 15V'DC secondary power supply in the EHC (Electro-Hydraulic Control) cabinet was'noted to be smoking.
The' primary power supplies, remained. operable,-allowing a controlled power reduction to take.the turbine;off-line for further evaluation
-
and repair of the-EHC system.
Byc11:37 a.m., the generator was dis-connected from the grid and-the EHC~ power supplies were deenergized.
I The failure of the secondary power suppl.ies (newly installed during--
'
the recent outage) was determined to be due to their inability, to utilize.the " unfiltered" input.from the PMG (Permanent Magnet Genera-q tor).
A temporary supply for the' secondary EHC power supplies was_
_
r installed from Vital Instrument Bus 4, which isL supplied with filtered 120V AC power.
L
~
,
The inspector reviewed.the installation of the temporary power supply, including aspects such as:the Safety Class 1E-to non-safety class
,
interface, the temporary modification control requirements and 10 CFR
,
)
50.59 evaluation.
No discrepancies were identified. The inspector:
.
noted that significant involvement and support from'the Plant Engi :
(
neering Department contributed to the, successful-identification and
installation of the temporary power supply, and_is considered a-strength.
'
The inspector concluded that a more methodical approach to. followup and resolution of technical issues raised at the Morning Manager's Meeting may have prevented the electrical transient and plant shutdown.
f.
Control Room Ventilation Filter Flow The inspectors observed the performance of Operations Surveillance-
_
Procedure 3.1.18, " Control Room Ventilation Filter. Flow." _ The proce-
dure was performed by a licensed. operator, with the majority of the?
actions required by the procedure performed in the control room.
'
Precaution 3.2 of the procedure states "If control room temperature
. exceeds 75 F, maintenance action shall be initiated."
The operator
,
observed that thermometers t:Unted on the main control board indicated approximatt:y 78 F, and stated that the observed temperature was acceptable since, according to Engineering, the thermometer readings were four to five degrees high as a result of the transfer. of heat from equipment inside the MCB (main control board).
The operator continued with the procedure without initiating maintenance actio F.
,
.
<
.
,.
.
9
.
When the inspector questioned the PSS (Plar t Shift Supervisor)'about the temperature precaution, the: PSS. halted performance of the procedure.
The PSS found that a-maintenance work request had been previously
..
initiated to correct the apparent temp'trature discrepancy.
The PSS.
also questioned the location and lac 8. of. calibration of the thermome-ters, and the basis for the 75 F re',triction on-control room tempera-'
ture.
During the course oflhis. review, it became apparent:that the basis for the restriction,on control room' ambient. temperature was to prevent failures in control room ins?rumentation in the event that MCB internal temperatures exceeded 116 F.(refer to _ Detail 5.9 for -
control of the. thermometer installation).
'
The inspectors considered action taken by the PSS-to resolve the pro-cedure requirements and'to identify a technical issue for evidence-of
. good safety perspective, Although a; work request existed to address
,
control room temperature-in excess of the-limit, and despite his general understanding of the lack of immediate impact on plant safety, the
failure of the' operator to initiate or verify maintenance action.in-dicates a. tendency to rely on personal. knowledge rather than procedural instructions.. As a result of the lack of a questioning attitude on'
the part of the operator, the inadequate positioning of the thermome-ters, placed to insure reliability of' control room instrumentation, could hav" remained unidentified.
,
4.
Physical Security
-
s Checks were made to determine whether security. conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and. approved procedures; Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers,
~
vehicle searches and personnel. identification, access control, badging,
.
,'
and compensatory measures when required; No unacceptable conditions were identified.
The following are noteworthy.
'
a.
Quarterly Security Meeting
't A quarterly security meeting was held at-Region. I on July 17, 1990,
_
to discuss licensee efforts to upgrade the' Maine Yankee Nuclear'
Security Program.
The quarterly meetings.between Maine' Yankee and the NRC are the-result of an Enforcement Conference held on December
20,.1988, to discuss findings documented in NRC inspection. report-50-309/88-20.
Based upon the present status of Maine Yankee's efforts to upgrade their nuclear security program, the meeting frequency has been changed to a bi-annual schedule.
'
,
'
b.
Controlled Area Access On two occasions during the-inspection, period, plant' employees were observed using the palm switch on security doors improperly. When the inspector questioned the practice, plant management issued a
.i-l
,
--
- - - -
.
.
V.
."
.
.
memorandum to<all plant personnel identifying the incorrect practice..
~
delineating correct palm switch procedure, and requesting all per-
.
sonnel;to refrain from using.the incorrect procedure.
Since the instances were isolated and no actual breach of security.
areas were observed, the inspector concluded the improper use of the
.
palm switch had no safety. significance.
In addition, prompt action and subsequent monitoring by-plant management in response to the con-cern appeared to be ef f ective in correcting _ the deficiency.
{l 5.
Em ineering/ Technical Support
'
a.
As discussed in Detail 3.f above, the surveillance procedure for' con-trol room habitability contains a prerequisite which requires operator-action when control room ambient -temperature exceeds 75 F (degrees
.
,
i Fahranheit).
The: limitation on: control _ room ambient temperature'_is based on an engineering analysis intended to limit temperature inside control room panels to less than 110 F, thereby; insuring:. reliability of control room instrumentation.
However, the inspectors'could not y
determine the basis for translation from panel: internal temperature limit of 110 F to the control room ambient temperature limit-of 75 F.
i In addition, the inspectors were unable to determine whv t * mometers, I
used by operators to monitor control room ambient tecaperature, were
!
mounted on the panels.
Operations personnel notta that the thermometers
were not calibrated and that a commitment to' perform additional analysis j
of the temperature gradient from panel internal _ temperature to control
'
room ambient temperature;had not been met.
,
The inspectors determined that the installation of control room tem-
-
perature instrumentation was not adequate.to insure the components i
could perform their intended function. Actual control room ambient
temperature was determined to be less than 74 F_using calibrated-tem-
perature instrumentation, therefore no safety significance is associ-ated with this inadequacy. -Maine Yankee has since calibrated!the thermometers and is reviewing the adequar.y of the installation and the possibility of relocating them to a more ideal location.
l b.
NRC Bulletin 84-02: Failure of General Electric Type HFA~ Relays in Use in Class IE Safety Systems (Closed)
]
Maine Yankee's response to this Bulletin indicated that no nylon or Lexan spool-type HFA relays are used at Maine Yankee in normally ener-gized, safety-related applications.
However, they identified eight
!
nylon coil, spool-type HFA relays in normally deenergized safety-
.'
related applications other than the reactor trip system.
These relays were replaced in late 1985 with GE recommended HFA Century Series i
-
-
.
.
-
.
'
.
bb
!
Relays.
Maine Yankee also icientified and visually-inspected all-i safety-related normally energizec' HFA relays.
No deterioration was identified in the coils or coil spools.
The inspector reviewed documentation of Maine Yankee's review of spool-type HFA~ relays used and the resulting actions taken in connec--
tion with this Bulletin.
Their-activities to address the concerns
-
raised by this Bulletin'were re'sponsive and followed the GE recom-mendations.' NRC Bulletin 84-02 is closed.
c.
TMI Action' Items II.F.2.4 and II.B.3.4 '(Closed)
TMI Action ~ 1tems' II.F.2.4_ and II.B.3.4 were reviewed in. previous in-
-
_
spections, and remained open pending resolution of associated unre-solved items. More recently, item-II.F.2.4, ":nstrumentation for De-tection of Inadequate Core Cooling,'l was~ reviewed in. NRC Inspection Report 50-309/89-08 and item 11.3.3.4, " Post Accident Sampling," was.
q reviewed in.NRC Inspection Report 50-309/86-11. _ Maine Yankee actions to address these items were determined to be. adequate.. Closure was l
not documented for the. items bu.t, based on the determinations made in the above referenced reports, these TMI Action Items are closed.
t d.
Loss of Decay Heat Removal (TI 2515/101, Closed)
'
During the period May 14, 1990,.to.May 18,-1990,-the inspector reviewed
,
l Maine Yankee's actions to address. Generic Letter 88-17, as documented l
in Maine Yankee letter to the NRC dated. January 12, 1989.
In that letter Maine Yankee committed to implement actions to address-all-Expeditious Actions identified in the' Generic: Letter prior to entering?
a reduced inventory condition.
'
The inspector was _ not able to inspect for mid-loop operation because -
a procedure did not' exist to operate in a mid-loop condition'.
'
Yankee informed the inspector that they have not entered a mid-loop condition since the issuance _of GL 88-17; instead, during the 1990
.
refueling outage, they completely removed the fuel.from the reactor.
The inspector reviewed a draft procedure for mid-loop _ operation, noted several deficiencies and discussed theia with Maine Yankee management.
The inspector reviewed procedure 1-17-7,." Lowering ~RX Vessel Level From (19') to (15') for Maintenance Work," currently used for draining down to a reduced inventory condition. -The 17' level is the beginning
!
of reduced-inventory, as defined in GL 88-17,;and the 15' level is the top of.the hot leg. The inspector determined that the following plant configuration and procedural _ requirements to implement the fol-
.
lowing Expeditious Actions were acceptable and consistent with the-
-i requirements of Generic Letter 88-17:
'
i
F
- .
c t.
.;
Temperature Indication-
--
PCS Water Level
--
RCS Perturbations
--
Containment Closure
--
Training
--
-- ' -Loop Stop-Valves The inspector also determined that' action-to address operation'with>
'
loop nozzle dams was not required since nozzle dams;are not part of Maine Yankee's design.
Regarding RCSLinventory addition-the: inspector verified.that Maine
,
Yankee has procedures and administrative controls'to' provide at least'
-
two available or operable means of adding inventory. to the RCS.in
.
addition.-to pumps that are a part of the normal DHR system and'that
the path of water addition is specialized to assure the flow 'does not ~
-
bypass the reactor vessel before exiting any opening in theiRCS; The inspector verified the makeup _ capability of the HPSI pumps.is adequate:
to' reestablish RCS level following the loss of RHR.
'
Overall, the inspector concluded that Maine Yankee actions ~to'imple-ment the Expeditions Actions of Generic Letter'88-17 were adequate'
and consistent with the requirements of'the Generic l Letter;;therefore, this TI is closed.
However, at the time of the inspection,. Maine Yankee did not have calculations to verify.the RCS makeup. capability, following the loss of RHR, for gravity feed from the RWST, This item.
,
will remain unresolved pending the review'of calculations.for RWST gravity feed during a loss of RHR_in a reduced inventory. condition'
(Unresolved Item 50-309/90-13-02).
6.
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification ~
a.
Housekeeping The inspectors observed that' plant cleanliness, although generally quite good, varied considerably from one area <of:the plant to.another.,
For instance, during a containment tour on July 11, 1990,. housekeeping was very good, with minor deficiencies 'noted in control of " operator aids" and anchoring of tool boxes in the outer annulus area..However, during a subsequent tour of the plant,-the inspectorsLfound boron deposits on valves associated with HPSI and LPSI,.significant accumu-lation of dirt on the air intake for' the 'HPSI -pump motors, and 'a gene-rally cluttered condition in the vicinity of the LPSI and Containment Spray pumps, a
The inspectors concluded that plant managers were not aware of the l
state of' housekeeping in these areas.
The Plant Manager indicat'ed that the program of management tours,.which was discontinued'during i
the -1990 refueling. outage, would be put back into effect.
Increased
!
!
..
.
'
.. '
.
,
,
131 s
- management attent, ion.to plant conditions is warranted to prevent a decline in plant material ~ condition.
Plant conditions'will-continue to-be monitored as part of routine inspection activities.
'
b.
Licensing Responsiveness to Service Water Injection Temperature Concerns-
'
As discussed'in section 1.a above, the inspectors monitored Maine
>
Yankee' actions to' increase.the service water injection temperaturesi
,
at_which limitat. ions on reactor power are-imposed..The completedL
-
engineering analysis supporting. increased service water injection
-temperatures was reviewed during the SSFIF Followup Inspection (NRC,
' Inspection Report 50-309/90-80,- Detail'3.0, Item 2).
In response to'
>
inspector' questions concerning; documentation, Maine Yankee licensing-personnel. drafted Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. letter to.the.NRC'
'
dated July 19,1990,' establishing completion:of the analysis and-sum -
,
marizing the conclusions of the. analysis.
Since review and acceptance L
.
of the analysis had been established in the.SSFI Followup Inspection report, the' inspectors concluded that Maine Yankee licensing personnel
- demonstrated exceptional respons,iveness to.NRCfconcerns.
>
,
c.
Procedure Adherence l
,
During this period, the inspectors identified several concerns-relating i
to the quality and use of procedures at Mdne Yankee (refer _to Details 1.a, 1.b', 3.a and 3.f).
No immediate' safety significance was associ-ated with any of the observations, and managers at Maine Yankee recog-nized and were responsive:to NRC concerns.
However,'the' inspectors are concerned that the present operational culture appears to allow o
plant personnel to feel comfortable with the-procedures in their
,
,present state, and with a less than rigorous approach to procedure..
'
adherence.
A good-record of plant performance and-. knowledgeable' and
motivated personnel have combined to create an_ atmosphere in which.
procedures are viewed as a-requirement but not as a tool,fwithithe result that opportunities are missed to -improve the quality of 'proce-dures and some employees appear to view the use of procedures as more r
hindrance than help. The. Plant Manager agreed that a culture change t
is needed.
The inspectors concluded that attention from senior man-agement is necessary to assure procedure quality and proper control of safety-related activities ' This consideration will be. routinely reassessed-during future inspections.
7.
Administrative a.
Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various Maine Yankee personnel, including plant operators, main-tenance technicians and management.
.
-
,
.
,
-
..
.
b.
Summary of Facility Activitiek I
- l
~At the beginning of the report period, the plant was in the-refueling shutdown condition. The reactor. was taken critical on June 28'and '
,
,
the turbine was phased to the grid on June 30, following Low Power
.;
Physics Testing.- On July 2,. the-generator was removed from service:
!
and the reactor remained critical during'the repair of failed secondary i
Electro-Hydraulic Control power supplies.; The plant was returned to
!
power operation the following' day and remained at power.for the re-
)
mainder of the: report period.
-l c.
Interface with the State of Maine Periodically, the-resident' inspectors and the onsite representative of the State of. Maine discussed findings and activities of their-'cor-
.!
responding organizations. No unacceptable plant' conditions were
- l identified.
- q f
d.
Exit Meeting Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection: scope and findings.-. A. summary of. findings for
the report period was also discussed 'at the conclusion,of the inspec-
!
tion on July-30, 1990.
!
I
e.
Inspection Hours
}
i The inspection involved 198.5 inspection h'ours, including 21 backshift j
and 10 deep backshift hours.
=1
!
s a
'i i
k
'
s
. i
)
,
b
!