IR 05000309/1989009

Insp Rept 50-309/89-09 on 890518-0621.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Previous Insp Findings, Operational Safety Verification,Maint,Surveillance,Physical Security,Radiation Protection & mid-cycle Assessment

ML20247Q721
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	07/27/1989
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247Q712	List: IR 05000309/1989009 ML20247Q707
References
50-309-89-09, 50-309-89-9, NUDOCS 8908070233
Download: ML20247Q721 (8)

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., -U.S. NUCLEAR REG'ULATORY COMMISSION REGION I.~

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Report:No: 50-309/89-09

,Ocense.No: DpR-36'

. Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power

83 Edison Drive  !

. Augusta, Maine 04336 Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine j Conducted: May 18 to. June 21,'1989 Inspectors: Cornelius:F. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector Ric rd J. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector Approved: Nd mbd Lowell E.' Tripp, Chief, Rea(,4or Projects Section 3A .

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Summary': nspection on May 18'to June 21, 1989 (Report Number 50-309/.89-09)

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Areas Inspected: . Routine resident inspections of plant operations-including:

followup on previous. inspection findings, operational . safety verification,

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-maintenance, surveillance, physical. security,- radiation ' protection. and mid-

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cycle > assessment- . Inspection activities' consisted of 198 hours0.00229 days <br />0.055 hours <br />3.27381e-4 weeks <br />7.5339e-5 months <br /> of inspection including 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> of backshift- inspection, and 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> of' deep backshift .in-

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spection (between- 10:00 p.m. and' 5:00 a.m. on weekdays, or during weekends or holidays). Backshift inspections were conducted on the following dates: May 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31 and June 5, 8 10, 13, 16,.17, 18, and 20,.198 .

.Results: The inspectors concluded that the plant continues 'to be operated safely. The inspector was concerned that a maintenance procedure for reactor trip breakers could be reviewed and issued yet contain many error Because the mechanics performing the maintenance were knowledgeable of both precedure requirements and the breakers they were able to make the necessary changes to

- the procedures. The ALARA Committee Actions was a positive step towards re-

.ducing plant exposure JgSEsN!82$g9

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JABLEOFCONTENTS-PAGE e rsons Contacted.................................................... 1

! S umma ry o f Fa c i l i ty Ac ti v i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

' Followup on Previously Identified Items.............................. 1 Operational Safety Veri fication (IP 71707)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . Plant Maintenance (IP 62703)........................................, 2 Surveillance Testing (IP 61726)...................................... 3 Observations of Physical Security (IP 71707)......................... 3 Radiological Controls (IP 71707)..................................... 4 System Alignment Inspection (IP 71710)............................... 4 1 Exit Interview (IP 30703)............................................ 6

• The NRC Inspection Manual inspection procedure (IP) . that was used a', inspec-tion' guidance is listed for each applicable report sectio i

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DETAILS ' Persons. Contacted LWithin. this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with ( various- licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance tech-

.nicians.and licensee management staff.

l Summary of Facility Activities The plant was at .100 percent power at the start of the inspection' perio The plant reduced power on June 2 for routine surveillance testine f the

^ turbine valves and related maintenance. The plant returned to 100 ercent power and ~ remained ' at. that power for the rest of the inspection perio . Followup on. Previous Inspection' Findings (Closed) Violation 50-309/86-02-01: Masonry Block Walls not surveyed utilizing - controlled procedure In response to this issue the-licensee developed procedure MYPP-1 Maine- Yankee Masonry Wall. (IEB 80-11) Survey procedure. The procedure requires review of drawings, walkdowns of plant buildings' and analysis of findings. The procedure also requires that' review of identified walls be analyzed in accord-ance with established engineering procedures without reliance on arching actio (Closed) Unres'olved Item 50-309/87-01-02- Classification of the pri-mary component cooling water system inside containment. Based on the review of the component cooling water system in NRC Inspection Report 50-309/89-80, Safety System Functional Inspection, this item is close . Operational Safety Verification On a daily basis, during routine facility tours the following were checked: manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LCO's, instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control room annun-ciators, radiation monitors, emergency power source operability, opera-bility of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), control room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating orders. On a weekly basis, selected Engineered Safety Features (ESF) trains were verified to operable. The condition nf plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety

, were. assessed. On a biweekly frequency the inspector reviewed a safety-l related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup and the posting of notices to worker Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also evaluated.

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The inspector observed selected phases of.the' plant's operations'to deter-L mine compliance with the NRC's regulations. The inspector determined that

.the areas i_nspected and licensee actions did not constitute 'a health.and

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safety hazard to the public or plant personnel. ,

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The inspector . observed portions of the hands _on fire brigade training

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which'was performed during the ' inspection report period. Imp'rovements to the program include the addition of a tactical leader along with the fire

. brigade- leader. - The tactical leader leads the team which is actually at-

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tacking the fire. The fire brigade leader is tFen able to direct' other activities such as the establishment of a backup team. Another improve-

- ment to. the program was the addition 'of an onsite drill following the off-site - drill . Using the same. crew and a similar drill scenario, a drill is conducted offsite using a real fire and . simulated plant . environmen Shortly thereafter, the drill is repeated onsite, simulating the fire in

.the plant. environment? The inspector observed an onsite drill on June 1 ' Response was timely and actions were appropriate. A critique performed immediately. following the dril.1 was effective in identifying ' areas for improvemen The plant'also identified an increase in the number uf low voltage alarms'

associated with 115 Kilovolts (KV) offsite power. The 115 KV line has two di f ferent ..al a rms . The first_ is a computer alarm that actuates at 114 K The second 'is a panalarm that alarms at 4050 volts on the 4160 volt bu .The 115 KV bus supplies the 4160 volt bus through transformer The recent alarms (June ~6 and 19) were computer low voltage alarms which did not result ln actual low voltage, on the 4160 volt safety bu In each case the operators-contacted the dispatcher to correct the condition. The licensee has initiated a study of the low voltage conditions and expects to initiate-action to resolve the issu . Plant Maintenance The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and main-tenance procedures, codes and standards, safety tag use, equipment align-ment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, retest requirements, and re-portability per Technical Specification Deficiency Date Report Number Description 6/7 1974-89 Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance 1975-89 6/13 2293-89 Rebuild Steam Trap - TR-23

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The inspector witnessed portions of routine reactor trip breaker mainten-ance. The maintenance technicians were using a recently revised procedure and selected a spare breaker for initial maintenance as a means to check the new changes. The technicians involved were noted by the inspector to be knowledgeable regarding the equipment and procedure requirements. Dur-ing the course of the maintenance, the technicians identified a number of minor procedure errors and properly obtained the necessary corrections through the formal procedure change request process. At the end of the inspection period, the inspector expressed a concern to licensee manage-ment that a procedure for reactor trip breakers could be reviewed and issued containing many error Licensee management acknowledged this concern; licensee response will be reviewed during routine resident -in-spection Steam Trap TR-23 is a trap within the containment integrity boundary in the High Pressure Drain System. Inspector review of the activity included verification of the control and safety classification of valves tempor-arily used as containment integrity boundaries and the return to the normal system alignment. No discrepancies were identifie . Surveillance Testing The inspector observed parts of tests to assess licensee performance in accordance with approved procedures and LCO's, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolutio The following surveillance were reviewed:

Date Procedure Number Title

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6/6 3.1.20 Safeguards Valve Testing 6/12 3.1.12 Post Accident Purge Monthly Surveil-lance No deficiencies were noted 7 Observations of physical Security Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory measures when required. Area lighting was reviewed during routine weekend backshift inspections. An expanded security drill was con-ducted during this inspection period that included assistance from local law enforcement agencies. The drill provided a valuable coordination opportunity between the security force, operations personnel and local law enforcement agencie _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _

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Radiological Controls Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-L -ing period. Areas reviewed included external radiation exposure control l and contamination control. Standard industry radiological work practices I

and conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observed. Independent surveys of radiological bound-aries and random surveys of nonradiological points throughout t'ne facility were performed by the inspecto On June 8, the inspector attended one of two special ALARA committee meet-ings scheduled. to review the actions of each plant department to reduce exposure to their staffs during 198 Representatives from each depart-ment were requested to present the recent initiatives taken by their department to reduce exposur The two departments which made presenta-tions at 'the meeting were Training and Operations. The committee felt that most of the initiatives presented by the Training department were directed at other departments. The committee requested that Training re-evaluate actions they may take in the remainder of the year for their own staff and return to the committee with a presentation of any new initia-tives. The Operations department had taken actions inclu.iing a survey of their staff for ideas on ways to reduce exposure. A significant amount of feedback was received and most suggestions were able to be acted upo Operations Department management has been monitoring and . evaluating the effect of the changes to ensure positive result The inspector considered the special ALARA Committee Meetings to review internal department initiatives to be a positive effort toward reducing i personnel exposur . System Alignment Inspection The inspector performed a system alignment inspection of the Instrument and Service Air Systems. These systems are not classified as safety re-lated and utilire common compressors and receivers to supply service air for general use and filtered, dried instrument air for pneumatically oper-ated components and instrumentation. The Service Air header is equipped with an isolation valve which closes automatically when low pressure is sensed in the receivers. This feature prevents a rupture in the Service Air System from affecting the Instrument Air System. Safety related pneu-matically operated components and instrumentation which require a supply of compressed air to perform safety functions are equipped with individual air flasks sized to supply sufficient air in an accident situation. The Instrument Air System has two headers, each supplied by one of receiver Normally, the receivers are supplied from a single compressor, with a secor.d compressor aligned to automatically start on low rece ver pressur A third, spare compressor is available which requires manual operator actio _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Prior toEthe inspection, the Plant Engineering. Department (PED) 'had per-formed an extensive revision to the Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P& ids)

associated 'with the Instrument and Service Air Systems. The revision

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included the addition of a significant number 'of valves to the diagram .The ~ valves which were not identified previously. on the P& ids largely con-sisted.of the root isolation valves on branch lines from the instrument air system headers and isolation valves.to individual components. Instru-ment Air to pneumatically operated components was generally aligned in the system alignment . procedures for the- system in which the component is installed. Historically, the licensee has not experienced difficulties

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maintaining the . proper alignment of the instrument air system, with one

- exception. A recent plant trip on December 16, 1988, resulted from ' an -

improperly aligned air supply to a heater drain tank level control valve (LER 88-10).

Inspector review included comparison of Operating Procedure 1-23-1 "In-strument and Service Air Systems," revision 9, to the revised Instrument and Service Air System P&ID's and in plant verification of the operating configuration of the syste The inspector identified inconsistencies in the labell'ng 'of valve posi-tions on. the revised P&ID's and an incomplete system alignment procedur Both of these findings were considered to be of minimal direct safety impact. However,-an inaccurate P&ID and an incomplete system alignment procedure could lead to operational difficultie Valves- which are administrative 1y controlled as part of the containment integrity boundary are included in Operations Procedure 1-12-5 " Establish-ment of Containment Integrity." The P&ID's identify valves controlled for this purpose with "LCCI" indicating " Locked Closed Containment Integrity,"

or "CIS," meaning that the valve is actuated by a containment isolation signal. Some valves which should have been labeled "LCCI" on the P&ID's

- were not. These valves were controlled by procedure 1-12-5. This obser-vation was explained to the licensee. The licensee reviewed and corrected the inconsistencies identified in the Instrument and Service Air Systems P&ID's and will provide additional guidance for future revisions to P&ID' Operations Procedure 1-23-1 " Instrument and Service Air Systems" provides guidance for the alignment of the Instrument and Service Air Systems to the headers. However, the positions of the root valves from the headers to branch lines supplying individual components were not included in the procedur Until the recent revision to the Instrument and Service Air Systems P&ID's many of these valves were not identified or assigned valve I

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L 5 l Prior to the 'nspection, the Plant Engineering Department (PED) had per-formed an extensive revision to the Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P& ids)

associated with the Instrument and Service Air Systems. The revision included the addition of a significant number of valves to the diagram The valves which were not identified previously on the P& ids largely con-sisted of the root isolation valves on branch lines from the instrument air system headers and isolation valves to individual components. Instru-ment Air to pneumatically operated components was generally aligned in the system alignmer,t procedures for the system in which the component is installed. Historically, the licensee has not experienced difficulties maintaining the proper alignment of the instrument air system, with one exception. A recent plant trip on December 16, 1988, resulted from an improperly aligned air supply to a heater drain tank level control valve (LER 88-10).

Inspector review included comparison of Operating Procedure 1-23-1 "In-strument and Service Air Systems," revision 9, to the revised Instrument and Service Air System P&ID's and in plant verification of the operating configuration of the syste The inspector identified inconsistencies in the labell'ng of valve posi-tions on the revised P&ID's and an incomplete system alignment procedur Both of these findings were considered to be of minimal direct sa fety impact. However, an inaccurate P&ID and an incomplete system alignment procedure could lead to operational difficultie ' Valves which are administratively controlled as part of the containment integrity boundary are included in Operations Procedure 1-12-5 " Establish-ment of Containment Integrity." The P&ID's identify valves controlled for this purpose with "LCCI" indicating " Locked Closed Containment Integrity,"

or "CIS," meaning that the valve is actuated by a containment isolation signal. Some valves which should have been labeled "LCCI" on the P&ID's were not. These valves were controlled by precedure 1-12-5. This obser-vation was explained to the licensee. The licensee reviewed and corrected the inconsistencies identified in the Instrument and Service Air Systems P&ID's and will provide additional guidance for future revisions to P&ID' Operations Procedure 1-23-1 " Instrument and Service Air Systems" provides guidance for the alignment of the Instrument and Service Air Systems to the headers. However, the positions of the root valves from the headers to branch lines supplying individual components were not included in the procedur Until the recent revision to the Instrument and Service Air Systems P&ID's many of these valves were not identified or assigned valve

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, j l numbers. The inspector discussed the control'of the instrument air system alignment with the Operations Department Manager. Due to Instrument Air

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System difficulties elsewhere in the industry, the licensee had previously 1 identified the need for improvements to system alignment procedures and l identification tags and had initiated actions to make the improvement The positions of Instrument Air valves recently added to the revised prints were checked to be properly aligned by the licensee. None were L found to be out of their normal positio The inspector had no further question . Exit Interview Meetings were held periodically with senior facility management to discuss the scope and findings of the inspewction. A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection. The licensee did not identify any 10 CFR 2.790 material.

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