IR 05000309/1985014
| ML20128L128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1985 |
| From: | Elsasser T, Ferlic K, Holden C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128L125 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-85-14, NUDOCS 8507240304 | |
| Download: ML20128L128 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket / Report: 50-309/85-14 License:
DPR-36 Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Dates:
May 28 - June 29, 1985 Inspectors:
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CfMolden, Senior Residyfit Inspector Date k A Sc "w A fa.
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Ferlic, Project Engirfeer Date Approved by:
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y C. Elsasser, Chief,Aeactor Projects Section 3C
'Date Summary: Inspection on May 28 - June 29, 1985 (Report No. 50-309/85-14)
Areas Inspected:
Routine resident and region-based inspection (149 hours0.00172 days <br />0.0414 hours <br />2.463624e-4 weeks <br />5.66945e-5 months <br />) of the control room, accessible parts of plant structures, plant operations, radiation protection, physical security, fire protection, plant operating records, mainten-ance, surveillance, open items, and reports to the NRC.
No violations were iden-
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tified.
8507240304 850719 PDR ADOCK 05000309 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including reactor operators, maintenance and surveillance technicians, and the licensee's management staff.
2.
Summary of Facility Activities Details of the following are included in the body of the report.
The plant operated at full power at the start of the inspection period.
On May 31, 1985, the licensee identified oxygen in the waste gas storage tanks.
, The licensee released the contents of the waste gas tanks in order to elimi-nate the potential for an. explosive mixture of gas in the storage tanks.
On June 8, 1985, the plant reduced power to 56 percent in order to switch to the steam driven main feed pump and conduct a routine surveillance test of the steam non-return valves.
The plant returned to 100 percent power on June 10, 1985.
On June-20, 1985', the plant began cold leg temperature (Tc) coastdown opera-tions prior to the cycle 8-9 refueling outage scheduled to begin on August 17, 1985.
On June 22, 1985, an Emergency Drill involving the site, local communities, and State government was conducted.
Inspection Report 85-12 covers the de-tails of the exercise.
At the end of the report period, the plant was_at approximately 95 percent power in Tc coastdown approaching the refueling outage scheduled for August 17, 1985 through approximately October 1, 1985.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Followup Item (309/82-01-01), Reevaluation of the low temperature
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overpressure protection.
On May 28, 1985, the NRC approved Amendment No. 82 to Maine Yankee's Technical Specifications.
This amendment incorporated the use of a variable setpoint for the power operated relief valves and the charging flow restrictor.
This amendment became effective June 28, 1985.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/83-10-03), Licensee to identify and implement need-to-know subject areas in the Maintenance. Technician Training Program.
' Procedure 5-208-6, Initial and Continuing Training and Qualification of Main-tenance Department Personnel, Revision 9, adequately identifies the initial and requalification need-to-know subject areas and requirements for electri-cians and mechanics in the Maintenance Department.
This item is closed.
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(Update) Follow Item (309/83-10-04), Licensee to incorporate a method for notifying-the Training Department of plant procedure changes which affect
'_ training programs.
A new procedure, Procedure 18-380-1, Request for the De-velopment, Implementation, or Revision of Training Programs and Materials,
.is currently in the licensee-review process.
This procedure establishes a mechanism to= identify and correct any training program' deficiencies including those deficiencies which would arise due to procedural changes.
Although an-identified. individual is not responsible for reviewing the training program to determine if. changes / updates are required, compliance with Procedure 18-380-1 by plant personnel provides an acceptable methodology to revise / update training programs. _This item remains open pending approval and implementation of Procedure 18-380-1.
(Closed) Followup Item (309/84-22-01), Pull ropes sealed in conduits may be
. potential degradation of fire barriers.
Through discussions with NRR and re-
) gion-based fire protection inspectors,- it was determined that the pull ropes do not present a degradation of the fire barrier.
(Closed) Followup Item (309/84-22-02), Contamination control of spent fuel-rack disassembly.
The licensee took aggressive action to resolve the inspec-tors concerns ~by moving the job location to an isolated area, providing supervision at the job site, and emphasizing to the workers the radiation control measures that were to be followed.
Additionally, the licensee made arrangements to have the next group of spent fuel racks sent to the contractor for disassembly.
4.
Review of Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operation through directxh arvation throughout the reporting peried.
Except as noted below, conditions were found to be in compliance with the following licensee-documents:
Maine Yankee Technical-Specifications.
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Maine Yankee Technical Data Book.
Maine Yankee Fire Protection Program.
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. Maine Yankee Radiation Protection Program.
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Maine Yankee Tagging Rules.
Administrative and Operating Procedures
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a.
' Instrumentation Control room process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
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No unacceptable conditions in process instrumentation were identified.
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b.
Annunciator Alarms The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledged. These conditions were discussed with shift personnel who were knowledgeable of the alarms and actions required. Operator re-sponse was verified to be in accordance with Procedure 2-100-1, Response to Panalarms,~ Revision 5.
During plant inspections, the inspector observed the condition of equip-ment associated with various alarms.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
c.
Shift Manning The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the operating requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, with respect to the number and the type of licenses.
Control room and shift manning were observed to be in' conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.
-d.
Radiation Protection Controls Radiation ~ protection control areas were inspected.
Radiation Work Per-
.mits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents, as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was inspected.
Proper posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas was re-viewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing of appropriate personnel monitoring devices. There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
The inspector observed that the plant has undertaken an aggressive pro-gram and has made substantial progress towards reducing the amount of radiological controlled areas throughout the plant.
This effort has in-
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volved extensive cleaning of areas, restowing outage material, and de-
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l contaminating equipment previously judged to be unacceptable for cleaning.
In addition to the cleanup effort, the plant has embarked on a program
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to eliminate the use of lab coats within the controlled area. This re-
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quires a radiologically clean plant at the onset and constant attention in order to maintain it in that condition.
On June 28, 1985, the licen-
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see instituted a policy of no lab coats for many areas throughout the controlled area.
The inspector will continue to monitor this area
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.through routine observations.
At the close of this inspection period, l '.
plant cleanliness supported the new lab coat policy.
The attention given to the reduction of radiological controlled areas has improved plant cleanliness and contributed to an improvement in plant housekeeping.
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Plant Housekeeping Controls Storage of material and components was observed with respect to preven-tion of fire and safety hazards.
Plant housekeeping was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
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f.
Fire Protection / Prevention The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipment.
Combustible materials were being controlled and were not found near vital areas.
Selected cable penetrations were examined and fire barriers were found intact.
Cable trays were clear of debris.
No abnormal conditions were identified.
g.
Control of Equipment During plant inspections, selected equipment under safety tag control was examined.
Equipment conditions were consistent with information in plant control logs.
h.
Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)
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The inspector attended Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings on May 30, June 4, and June 26, 1985.
Technical Specification 5.5 re-quirements for required member attendance were verified.
Routine PORC review topics were presented for discussion including the Maine Yankee Cycle 9 Core Performance Analysis. The inspector had no further comments.
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Coastdown Operations
~0n June 20, the plant began cold leg temperature (Tc) coastdown opera-tions for the Cycle 8-9 refueling outage which is expected to start on August 17, 1985. The inspector reviewed coastdown operations with the plant operators who were knowledgeable about the response of plant para-meters during.this phase of operations.
j.
New Fuel Inspection The inspector witnessed new fuel receipt and transfer to new fuel stor-age.
No discrepancies were noted.
5.
Observations of Physical Security The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular and offshift hours, that selected aspects of the security plan were in conformance with regulatory requirements, physical security plans and ap-proved procedures, as noted below.
a.
Physical Security Plan Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full time
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member of the security organization, with authority to direct
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physical security actions, was present as required.
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Manning of all three shifts on various days was observed to be as require P-
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b.
Physical Barriers Selected barriers in the protected area, access controlled areas, and the vital areas were observed and random monitoring of the isolation zone was performed.
Observations of truck and car searches were made.
c.
Access Control Observations of the following items were made:
Identification, authorization, and badging.
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Access control searches.
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Escorting.
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Communications.
No violations were noted.
6.
Plant Maintenance The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation ac-tivities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and maintenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radiological con-trols for worker protection, fire protection, retest requirements, and re-portability per Technical Specifications.
The following activities were in-cluded: observation of the release of decay drum "C."
Details of this review are given in Section 8, below.
7.
Surveillance Testing The inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and LCO's, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution.
Safeguards valve testing, Procedure 3.1.20, Revision 20 was issued.
The inspector had no further com-ments.
8.
Waste Gas Contamination On May 31, 1985, the licensee identified oxygen was present in the waste gas decay drums.
The level of oxygen contamination was approximately 8 percent in the service tank.
The inspector reviewed the events which led to this situation.
On May 30, 1985, the licensee released the contents of the C decay drum prior to the completion of the usual 60 day hold period.
The intent of the hold period is to allow for the decay of short lived radioisotopes.
The release was within the Technical Specification limits.
The licensee conducted an investigation to determine why the volume of waste gas was much greater this cycle than in previous cycles.
In previous cycles the inservice decay drum would remain on line for approximately 55 days.
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During the month of May, the online decay drum was inservice for approximately 9 days.
The licensee determined that maintenance had been performed on Waste Gas Compressor C-3A in April 1985.
Following maintenance, C-3A was placed inservice.
In retrospect, a trend of rapid filling of decay drums was noticed following the return of C-3A to service.
The licensee sampled the on line decay drum in order to identify the gasses present in the drums.
Oxygen was discovered in the decay drum. The decay drums normally contain hydrogen, the cover gas used in the Volume Control Tank (VcT) and other primary plant fission products.
Once hydrogen was identified in the waste gas system, a Plant Onsite Review Committee (PORC) meeting was called to discuss the situation.
Eight percent oxygen was considered an explosive mixture in combination with the level of hydrogen that was present in the tank.
The PORC recommended that the contents of the decay drums be released and a variety of measures taken to identify and eliminate the source of the oxygen in the decay drums.
These measures included placing the C-3B waste gas compressor in service, testing the un-loader valve on the C-3A waste gas compressor for leaks, monitoring the surge drum and the inservice decay drum for oxygen, checking the remainder of the waste gas system for leaks, and reviewing the combination of all the compo-nents in the system for any process deficiencies.
A thorough evaluation of the unloader valve for the C-3A waste gas compressor was conducted with inconclusive results.
The remainder of the waste gas sys-tem was subject to scrutiny but no problems were identified.
The licensee continues to evaluate the contents of the waste gas. system at periodic inter-vals to detect oxygen and the problem of oxygen introduction has not recurred.
During the upcoming outage, the licensee plans to refurbish the isolation valves for the decay drums to prevent leakage between drums (this repair was planned prior to the identification of oxygen in the decay drums).
The in-spector will continue to follow the licensee's analysis of the oxygen problem (309/85-14-01).
9.
Review of Plant Training
The inspector reviewed the overall training and retraining activities for non-licensed employees to assess conformance with Technical Specifications, QA program requirements, licensee commitments, and facility requirements.
The inspection included interviews with selected plant personnel who had re-ceived training (general employee training, technical training, and requali-fication training) and review of the documentation and records of such training.
Plant general employee training was found to adequately inform employee's of administrative controls and procedures, radiological health and safety, con-trolled access and security, industrial safety, controlled access and security, emergency plan requirements, and Quality Assurance and Quality Control.
In-structions to female employees concerning prenatal radiation exposure was satisfactory.
Industrial general employee training and requalification records, with one exception, were readily accessible and promptly locate r -
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Review of department training included review of compliance with facility training requirements, need-to-know subject areas, and the actual training performed by three departments (Maintenance (crane operator training), in-strumentation and controls, administration (technical file center)).
The training performed and subsequent documentation was in compliance with pro-cedures.
Records and documentation was readily available.
Several concerns were identified in the instrumentation and controls depa*t-ment training.
The inspector was informed that identical concerns were iden-tified in a recent independent audit and corrective action was in progress.
-The corrective action was reviewed and discussed with the licensee. The in-spectors concerns were adequately addressed. One generic potential improve-ment was noted in the area of on-the-job training.
Although a large amount of on-the-job training is performed, documentation of such training is not always a routine practice. Where applicable, credit should be taken and documented for such training.
The licensee has recently computerized (Fall 1984) the training records for plant personnel.
Review of the computerized records with the reviewed train-ing records and documentation indicated the computer records were correct and accurate.
No violations were identified.
10.
Diesel Generator Cooling On June 25, 1985, the licensee was informed by Yankee Atomic that a problem with the air supply for the temperature control valves for the emergency diesel generators had been discovered.
The licensee notified the NRC and conducted an analysis of the situation.
The emergency diesel generators (DG-1A and DG-1B) are cooled by component cooling water.
Primary component cooling (PCC) supplies water to DG-1A and secondary component cooling (SCC) supplies water to DG-1B.
Temperature con-trol valves modulate the cooling water flow when the diesel is operating to maintain a 25 degree temperature change across the heat exchanger.
These temperature control valves (TCV) use air to open and fail closed on a loss of air. The safety grate air supply to both TCV's is provided from the diesel starting air tanks through a common line having a single pressure reducing valve.
Failure of this pressure reducing valve could cause both temperature control valves to fail shut resulting in the loss of cooling water to both emergency diesel generators. The plant fire system is the installed backup cooling system for the diesel generators; however, the fire system has been manually isolated in order to prevent leakage of the fire system into the chromated component cooling system.
The operators were' informed on how the single failure of the pressure reducing valve will affect diesel generator cooling and received instructions on how to compensate for the loss of cooling water if a failure should occur.
The
. Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) convened a meeting on June 26, 1985
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to discuss the short term corrective actions.
PORC recommended that the TCV's be blocked open with mechanical jumpers to preclude the failure of a single air regulator from causing the loss of cooling water to the diesel generators.
In arriving at their recommendation, PORC discussed excessive chilling of the lube oil, tube erosion of the heat exchangers from constant cooling water-flow, and the seismic qualification of the TCV's with the mechanical jumpers installed.
The plant installed the jumpers on June 26, 1985 and supplemented the routine log readings of the diesel generators in order to detect any ad-verse trends.
None were noted.
The plant continues to study the cooling water arrangement for the diesel generators and is developing a long term solution for the problem.
The in-spector will continue to follow this item in subsequent reports (IFI 309/85-14-02).
.11.
Exit Interview Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
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