IR 05000309/1987020

Insp Rept 50-309/87-20 on 870718-0901.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Control Room,Accessible Parts of Plant Structures,Plant Operations,Radiation Protection,Physical Security,Fire Protection & Plant Operating Records

ML20235G105
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	09/21/1987
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235G073	List: IR 05000309/1987020 ML20235G071
References
TASK-2.B.1, TASK-TM 50-309-87-20, NUDOCS 8709290441
Download: ML20235G105 (11)

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Docket / Report: 50-309/87-20 License: DPR-36 Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Dates: July 18 - September 1, 1987 Inspectors: Cornelius F. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector Ri pard J. Freudenbarger, Resident Inspector Approved By: -

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L'. Trif t , Chief, Reactor Projects / ddte Section 3A, DRP Summary: I_nspection on July 18 to September 1,1987 (Report N /87-20)

Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection (184 hours0.00213 days <br />0.0511 hours <br />3.042328e-4 weeks <br />7.0012e-5 months <br />) of the control room, accessible parts of plant structures, plant operations, radiation protection, physical security, fire protection, plant operating records, requalification training program, maintenance and surveillanc Results: No violation was identified. One unresolved item was opened pending l further review of the diesel generator cooling system (Detail 8).

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DETAILS PersonsContactg Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance tech-nicians and the licensee's m'anagement staf . Summary of Facility Activities At the beginning of the report period the plant was in cold shutdown while j repairs were being conducted on the main turbines. A reactor startup was {

performed on August 22. The turbine was phased to the grid on the morning of August 24. Power was increased to approximately 20 percent while tur-bine vibration data was collected. Later that day the plant was shutdown for turbine balancing followed by a plant startup and power escalation on August 24. At the end of the report period the plant was at 98.5 percent powe . Followup on Previous Inspection Finding (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-309/85-34-01) . Recording of as found data in Surveillance procedure The inspector reviewed Pro- j cedure 0-10-2, " Surveillance Tests and Records", and several surveil- 1 lance procedures for which either the Operations Department or the Plant Engineering Department were responsible. Current revisions of these procedures have incorporated provisions for the recording of as found data. A review of several comph ' d surveillance procedures identified proper recording of as found dat.). (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-309/87-14-01) Verify licensee performed surveillance procedure 3. " Inspection of Fire Pump Diesel Engine", prior to coming out of refueling outage. The inspec-tor reviewed the work package (DR3645-87) that performed the surveil-lance procedure, to verify that it was completed prior to plant i startup from refueling. The surveillance procedure was performed on l June 13, 1987; the plant start up was on June 18, 198 (Closed) TMI Action Item II.B.1 - Reactor Coolant System Vents. A review of the Reactor Coolant System Vents was conducted prior to the date that the Technical Specification revision, which requires the vents, became effectiv Details of this review are contained in paragraph l l

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4. Routine Periodic Inspections Daily Inspection During routine facility tours, the following were checked: manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LC0's, instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control rod positions, contain-ment pressure, control room annunciators, radiation monitors, emerg-ency power source operability, control room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating order System Alignment Inspection Operating confirmation was made of portions of the Pressurizer and fressure Relief System and the Safety Injection Tank Accessible valve positions and status were examined. Power supply and breaker alignment was checked. Visual inspection of major components was performed. Operability of instruments essential to system perform-ance was assessed. System drawings were compared to as installed equipment. No discrepancies were identified by this revie Biweekly Inspections During plant tours, the inspector observed shift turnovers, chemistry sample results and the use of radiation work permits and Health Physics procedures. Area radiation and air monitor use and opera-tional status were reviewed. Plant Housekeeping and cleanliness were evaluated. No significant problems were identified, Plant Maintenance The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investi-gation activities to verify compliance with regulations) administra-tive and maintenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, per-sonnel qualifications, radiological controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and deportability per Technical Specification The inspector witnessed portions of the prime standards calibration of the primary vent stack gas monitor. No discrepancies were note Surveillance Testing The inspector observed parts of the monthly Appendix R diesel gener-ator (DG-2) test run and the Post Accident Purge (PAP) flow tes The tests were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and LCO's. The inspector also reviewed the test results and recording, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution. There were no discrepancies identified by this review.

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f. Reactor Coolant System Vents The Technical Specification Amendment requiring Reactor Coolant Sys-tem Vents became effective on August . 24. Prior to the Technical Specification becoming effective the inspector performed a review of the system to ensure that the necessary procedures and controls were in place and to ensure that the vents were properly prepared for oreration. The Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) have been revised to include guidance on the operation ,of the vents and Sur-veillance Procedure 3.1.20 " Safeguards Valve Testing", has been revised to include testing of the vent system on a refueling interval .

basis -in accordance with the Technical Specification Amendment. Al- !

though the reactor coolant system vent valves (Limitorque motor operated valves) were purchased to Environmental Qualification (EQ)

standards, the system is not required to meet current EQ standards because the system is installed to be used for beyond design basis events. However, the licensee has decided to maintain the valves to current EQ standards. Prior to the implementation of the Technical Specification requiring the Reactor Coolant Vents to be operational the licensee performed most of the necessary upgrades to the motor operated valves needed for them to meet current EQ standard The rest - of the upgrades will be performed during the 1988 refueling outag While performing the upgrades to the valves a problem was identified with the fasteners used to bolt the valve operator to the valve. Some of the fasteners were set screws with nuts instead of the cap screws that are usually supplied with Limitorque Several of the improper fasteners had failed. All of the fasteners for all ;

of the Reactor Coolant Vent Valves were replaced. The licensee con- i ducted a review of similar valve installations in the plant and found ]

no further problems. The inspector had no further question g. Reactor Coolant Pump Start On August 18, the plant was in a hot shutdown condition with no Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) running. Reactor coolant system pressure was being maintained at approximately 1500 psig in accordance with the night order The RCP that was running earlier in the day had been secured to reduce the plant's power and water consumptio Reactor coolant system temperature gradually decreased until a reactor coolant pump restart was necessary. When the reactor coolant pump was restarted an ar.ticipated pressure transient was experience As the pressure increased the safety injection actuation system auto-matically unblocked as expected, then as pressure decreased the safety injection actuation block enable was received at approximately 1685 psi During this relatively fast moving transient, the oper- ,

ators responded properly to prevent an inadvertent initiation of )

safety injection, which would have occurred at 1585 psig. The oper-ating crew's response demonstrated team coordination and a thorough knowledge of the plant system _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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4 Backshift Inspections The resident inspectors conducted backshif t inspections on August 11, 15, 16, 18 and 22, 5. Observations of Physical Security Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory measures when require During this report period the licensee has made upgrades to its pratected area fence. During the day while work was being performed compensatory measures were properly taken by posting a guard. At the completion of the work day the licensee discontinued compensatory measures. During routine backshift inspections on July 24 the inspector noted that the potential existed for compromising the isolation zone due to installation of a new pole for the fence. When the inspector questioned the need for compen-satory measures, the compensatory measures were reinstated. The inspector considered the instance to be of minimal significance, however, it may demonstrate the need for increased awareness in the implementation of the security pla . Radiological Controls Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-ing period. Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observe Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspecto . Requalification Training On June 9 and 10, 1987, two Region One inspectors conducted an unannounced inspection of the Maine Yankee requalification training program. The pur-pose of this inspection was to review the conduct and documentation of the licensed operator requalification program against the licensee's NRC approved requalification program and against 10 CFR 55 Appendix A. Docu-mentation is included in this report for completenes The inspector reviewed Maine Yankee LER's from January 1986 to the present and found no events which might have root causes associated with operator training programs. The licensee was at the end of a refueling outage and the inspector noted that formal training specific to the refueling evolution had been conducted prior to the outage.

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A. Individual Training Records L

l The individual training records of twelve licensed operators were reviewed for the following items:

, the most recent annual written examination and the operator's L responses; documented evidence of accelerated re-training and re-evaluation when examination passing criteria were not met; lecture attendance and completion of periodic quizzes and tests; control manipulations required by 10CFR55 Appendix A paragraph 3.a and NUREG 0737; annual procedure reviews; and, approval to resume licensed duties under the provision of 10 CFR 55.31 (e) when appropriat The inspector found one inconsistency with the above record Some operatrars had been listed as excused from lectures but did not have formal excused absence forms filled out and signed by management as required by training department policy. The facility took action to correct this inconsistency and the inspector noted no apparent abuse of the excused absence polic One strength was noted in this are Accelerated re-training and re-evaluation is formal, well documented, and prompted by failure to meet standard NRC examination passing criteria. Individualized pro- _

grams of instruction and evaluation are approved by a Training and l Qualification Review Board consisting of upper level Training Department managemen Operator Interviews Four licensed operators were interviewed to assess their perceptions of requalification training program effectivenes These included two senior operators (SRO) and two operators (RO). All operators interviewed regarded their required requalification training as bene-ficial and as having an appropriate balance between classroom and simulator trainin They generally regarded the instructors as knowledgeable and the instruction techniques used as effective. It appears that good lines of communication exist between the operations and training organizatio ,

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C. Simulator Evaluations The inspector observed a portion of a licensee administered annual operating examination in the simulato Five SR0's were evaluated by two training department supervisors. The five operators were rotated to different positions twice after starting the evaluatio The scenario incorporated normal evolutions, instrument failures, component failures, abnormal procedures and a single major transient requiring the use of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's). Each operator was evaluated on his use of procedures and Technical Speci-fications, communication ability, - diagnostic skill and supervisory effectiveness. In addition, the crew was evaluated as a whole in the areas of teamwork, timeliness of action, meeting shift goals and professionalism. However, not all operators were evaluated on their ability to use the E0P's from a supervisory position to mitigate the consequences of an acciden Because a single major transient was simulated, only two operators holding supervisory positions at the time were required to direct the implementation of E0P's to maintain plant control. The requirements of 10CFR55 Appendix A paragraph (prior to May 26, 1987) and 10CFR55.59 paragraphs a.2(ii) and c.4(iii) (after May 26, 1987) both imply the need for SRO's to be evaluated as supervisors and decision makers during the use of E0P' This is particularly important since new sympton-based E0P's have been implemented at Maine Yankee for only about one year and repre-sent a significant departure from the previous event-based proced-ure The licensee concurred with this view and has committed to evaluating SRO's on their ability to direct the implementation of the E0P's during requalification operating test This item will be reviewed again during the next scheduled operator licensing examina-tion in September 198 O. Written Regualification Examination Analysis The requirement of 10CFR55 Appendix A paragraph 4.a (which is con-tinued in the May 26, 1987 revision to 10CFR55 in paragraph 55.59.c.4(i) and Maine Yankee procedure 18-20-1, LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM), is to analyze the comprehensive written requalification examination results to determine areas in which retraining is needed and to emphasize these areas in subsequent l requalification trainin This analysis was clearly evident follow-irg the licensee's January 1987 examination and showed a potential weakness in the area of Instrumentation and Control (I and C). In contrast, there was no evidence of similar analysis of the licensee's June 1986 examinatio The inspector noted a strong similarity in l l

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the results of these two examinations, in that both showed a poten-tial weakness in the area of I and C. Although the licensee had documented that this area would receive additional emphasis during the requalification cycle beginning in August 1987, it was not clear to the inspector how the emphasis would be provided or whether it would be suf f_icient given the possibility that this may be- a con-tinuing - weak area of knowledg The licensee committed to estab-lishing a plan for emphasizing I and C during the next requalifica-tion cycle and this plan will be reviewed by the NRC during the next operator licensing examinations scheduled for September 198 Conclusions

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The Maine Yankee Licensed Operator Requalification Program, conducted in accordance with Maine Yankee procedure 18-20-1, is evaluated as j satisfactory. Within the areas inspected, no violations were iden- J tifie Two areas were identified which require licensee actio !

One area is the annual evaluation of SRO's on their use of the E0P's while performing in a supervisory role. The other area is the deter-mination of corrective action needed to upgrade operator knowledge in licensee identified weak areas and the consistent documentation of this process. . These items will be reviewed again during the next operator licensing examinations scheduled for September 1987. Pro-gram strengths include formal accelerated training prompted by fail-ure to meet standard NRC passing criteria on written requalification J

examinations, documentation of both individual and crew performance during operating tests, good communications between operations and training personnel, and an excellent historical success rate on both NRC and licensee administered examination . Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's]

The inspector reviewed the following LER's to verify the details were clearly reported. The inspector had previously verified that appropriate corrective action was taken or responsibility assigned and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specification LER N Subject 87-001 Component Cooling System Redundancy lost with NNS Air l System Depressurization j 87-002 Fire Barrier Door Blocked partially Open 87-003 Environmentally Qualified Instrumentation with Unqual-ified Wire Splice Configuration 87-004 Lack of Administrative Controls on Containment Integ-rity Valves

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l l LER N Subject 87-005 Reactor Coolant System Loop RTD Environmental Qualif-ication Discrepancies87-006 Manual Reactor Trip After loss of Level Control in N Steam Generator 87-007 Manual Turbine Trip Due to High Vibrations LER 87-001 reported a deficiency in the component cooling water system that was discovered on May 4,198 The original plant design utilized the Secondary Component Cooling (SCC) water system tv supply cooling water to both emergency diesel generators (DG). This original design also included an emergency backup cooling water supply via the fire main sys-tem. Air operated valves (normally held shut with air pressure) isolate the fire main and SCC systems. The purpose of the fire main crossconnect was to supply a diverse and redundant means of cooling the diesel genera-tors during a loss of SCC. A hot engine alarm would cause the automatic transfer to the fire main syste In 1981, the design was changed to allow Primary Component Cooling (PCC)

water system to supply one emergency DG (DG-1A). SCC continued to supply the other diesel generator (DG-1B). Emergency backup cooling water re-mained available from the fire main system but now the fire main is con-nected to the PCC and SCC systems supplying DG-1A and DG-1B respectivel The fire main valves are not utilized and are only a means of emergency cooling. On May 4, the control air system was remcved from service in order to perform maintenance. Once air pressure was reduced the fire system valves opened resulting in the crossconnection of PCC and SC Since one system was at a higher pressure than the other, water trans-ferred from one component cooling water system to the othe Plant operators responded to the low level alarm and isolated the crossconnec-tion between the two systems. To correct the situation the plant blocked the air control valves to the fire main shut since they are not required for the design basis of the plan Additional research lead the licensee to speculate that, if the SCC system were subject to an unisolatable leak which resulted in the loss of SCC cooling, then the service air compressors which are cooled by SCC would also become inoperable. Once air pressure decreased the fire main system would have crossconnected the two component cooling systems resulting in l a failure of the PCC syste _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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The safety consequences of this type event were judged to be small by the licensee because the instrument air system is historically reliable, alternate means of cooling the air compressors are available, a break in a seismically qualified component cooling water system is unlikely. and suf ficient time exists for operators to respond and take action to prevent crossconnection. of component cooling systems and potential loss of the cooling water supply for both DG The inspector determined that the ori' nal design of the component coolin water system was changed in 1981 thro % r ngineering Design Change Request (EDCR) 80-45. This EDCR provided PCC w JG-1A and SCC cooling to DG-1 Fire main backup remained to both systems. The fire main system is not !

considered qualified for backup cooling since it was not designed as a safety class system. The fire main system consists of one electric driven and one diesel driven fire pump each capable of supplying 2500 gpm at 115 psig. These pumps are designed to automatically start when fire water header pressure drops to 90 and 80 psig respectfully. The licensee also performed other modifications that affected the cooling water system These modifications. addressed the single failure vulnerability of the air system which supplies operating air to the cooling water valves and prob-lems encountered with leaking valves. These modifications included the blocking open of PCC-A-493 and SCC-T-305, the flow control valves for cooling water, and closing the manual valves on the inlet and outlet of the fire main system at the diesel generators. In each case the licensee reviewed the potential consequences of altering the system in accordance with station procedure The inspector reviewed the other possible means of providing cooling water to the diesel generators. The air system was reviewed. The air system i consists of three compressors capable of supplying 100 psig air at 300 l scfm. The normal lineup is one compressor running, one compressor in j standby and the other compressor in off. Although the SCC system supplies the cooling water to the compressors, the fire main (with its independent diesel fire pump which auto starts on low header pressure) and the raw water system are available to supply backup cooling water to the air com-pressors. A manual valve lineup change is necessary to change this lineup. This lineup change'is specified in Abnormal Operating Procedure (A0P) 2-32, Loss of Secondary Component Cooling. The air compressors supply air to two air receivers capable of storing 50 cu. ft. of air at 125 psi The instrument air header and the service air header are supplied via the air receiver The service air header automatically l isolates when the air pressure drops to 75 psig in order to prevent the service air system from draining the instrument air syste The instru-ment air system supplies the air signal to the component cooling water and fire main valves. A backup air supply from the diesel generator air start system is available to supply air to the component cooling and fire main valves. This system would require a manual valve lineup and is normally isolated because it does not meet the single failure criteria. The diesel air start system utilizes six storage tanks each capable of storing 20 c ft. of air at approximately 200 psig.

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10 The inspector discussed the possible sequence of events 'that could lead to the potential for crossconnecting the two component cooling water systems to determine how much time the operators would have to react. The licensee agreed to study the potential scenarios and determine a worst 1 case reaction time estimate. Additionally, the licensee has initiated a study of the diesel cooling water systems which will result in permanent changes to the system This item is designated as an Unresolved Item (UNR) 50-309/87-20-0 Additionally, IFI 50-309/85-14-02, Diesel Generator Cooling Arrangement is closed, and followup of this item will be under UNR 87-20-0 . Exit Interview Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspectio i

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