ML20154G200
| ML20154G200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1997 |
| From: | Letts B, Elizabeth Wilson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 1-96-025, 1-96-25, NUDOCS 9810130090 | |
| Download: ML20154G200 (36) | |
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Title:
MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION: -
INACCURATE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO NRC REGARDING THE CAPACITY OF THE ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP Licensee: Case No.: 1 96 025 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Report Date: June 27,1997 329 Bath Road .
Brunswick, Maine 04011 Control Office: OI:RI Docket No.: 50 309 Status: CLOSED Reported by: -
Reviewed and Approved by:
g C -
diwWC]
' Ernest P. Wilson. Special Agent Office of Investigations 3 $/'
Barry R.lLetts, Director Office of Investigations Field Office Region 1 Field Office, Region I Participating Personnel:
Dennis N. Boal, 5 c41 Agent Office of Investi ations Field Office, Reg on IV C
CCC025 I AtARNING I N T, P I iTHF,Puk l T /
C_ S OF THIS J PORT' 0F [NVISTIGhION , DE S /
ITY TH t N / FFf'IALQF I$ PC ZED DI L Y APP)TI UL II VE
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4 , ,
- SYNOPSIS .
4 4
This investigation was initiated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
Office of Investigations (OI), Region I, on July 11, 1996, to determine if -
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPCo) willfully provided inaccurate 1 i
information regarding the capacity of the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve (ASDV) .
to the NRC in a March 1986 submittal of the Procedures Generation Package,.
i which incorporated, by reference, revised Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) ,
Based upon the evidence' developed during'this investigation, it is concluded that MYAPCo willfully provided inaccurate information regarding the capacity of the ASDV to the NRC in the 1986 submittal of the PGP.
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4 P LIC 'SCLOh 0 FF D CT OFF EO NV STI ION , I Case No. -
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! I NC FOR UBL j WI E RE , FI VE I Case No. 1 9 25 2
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Et9ft SYNOPSIS
................................. 1 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
............................ 5 .
DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION ......................... 7 Applicable Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 I Pur:cse of Investigation ...................... 7 Bac(ground
............................. 7 Coordination with NRC Headquarters Staff .............. 8 Allegation (MYAPCo Willfully Provided Inaccurate l Information Regarding the Capacity of the ASDV to the NRC in a March 1986 Submittal of the PGP. Which Incor l by Reference. the Revised E0Ps) . . . . . . . . .porated. ........9 l
Evidence ....................... .
9 Review of Pertinent Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . ...
Interviews .........................18
.. .9 Agent's Analysis .
.....................26 Conclusion .........................29 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 LIST OF EXHIBITS ............................33
/ T BLI DI T U W' [5 F CE I tT , F TP II Case No. 1 96 025 3 l
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Case No. 1 96 025 4 9
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES i
Exhibit ARSENAULT, Robert E., Assistant Manager. Maintenance
. Engi neeri ng, MYAPCo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 BRAND, Ethan B., Nuclear Safety Engineering Group Supervisor,
! HYAPCo
.............................. 62 Senior Nuclear Safety Specialist, MYAPCo ..... 58 60 FRIZZLE, Charles D., President and Chief Executive Officer, NYAPCo . . . 66
{ WHITTIER, G. Douglas Vice President of Engineering, NYAPCo . . . . . . . 65 4
GARRITY, John H., III, Senior.Vice President & Chief Operating Officer. Harathon Consulting Group /former Vice President of Licensing & Engineering. HYAPCo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 TAYLOR. James H., Nuclear Safety Engineer, NYAPCo . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
! YEROKUN, Jimi. Senior Resident Inspector, NRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- 57 SMITH. Steve P., Hanager of Operations, MYAPCo
........... 67 & 68 i
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NTF PUB I DI L URE W P V' .
I FIC DIRE , OFF CE OF VEST. T , I I Case No. 1 9 25
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o DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION -
Aeolicable Reaulations 1
Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act, i 10 CFR Part 50,' Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Actions).
1 Puroose of Investication
- This investigation was initiated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
. Office of Investigations (01), Region I, on July 11, 1996, to determine if ~
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (HYAPCo) willfully provided inaccurate information regarding the capacity of the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve (ASDV) to the NRC in a March 1986 submittal of the Procedures Generation .Nekage (PGP), which incor Procedures (EOPs).porated,Revising by(orreference, upgrading)revised Emergency the E0Ps was a T1ree 0)erating Mile Island ,
(TMI) Action Item and was imposed on HYAPCo by a 1984 NRC Confirmatory Order I (Exhibit 1).
Backaround .
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MYAPCo is the holder of facility 0)erating License No. DPR 36, issued on I
, September 15, 1972, by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), predecessor to the l NRC, pursuant to.10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50. The Maine !
Yankee (NY) Atomic Power Station is a three loop pressurized water reactor l (PWR) designed by Combustion Engineering (CE) and is located in Wiscasset. l Maine. Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC), Bolton, MA., provides '
engineering services, including analysis work, to MYAPCo.
In November 1980, the NRC issued NUREG 0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan 1 Re uirements," which incorporated all TMI related items approved for I
- im lementation by the NRC following the accident at TMI. Action Item number
. I. 1, " Guidance For the Evaluation and Development of Procedures For Transients and Accidents," provided clarification and additional requirements for, among other things, the reanalysis of the Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) event procedure (Exhibit 2, pp. 1 3).
By letter dated March 18, 1986, MYAPCo submitted the E0P PGP to the NRC and indicated therein that the E0P background documents would be submitted within the next month (Exhibit 3).
By letter dated March 4,1996. MYAPCo made a 10 CFR 50.9 notification t'o the NRC indicating that inaccurate information concerning the capacity of the ASDV at MY had been submitted to the NRC in 1986. Specifically, the licensee disclosed that the ASDV capacity was actually 21/2* of total steam flow, rather than the 5% that had been identified in the PGP submittal. The ASDV is used in the recovery strategy for the ICC event (Exhibit 4).
Since the 10 CFR 50.9 notification, MYAPCo has >eriodically provided status updates to the NRC concerning the discrepant AS)V capacity and what it meant NO FOR PU IC DI L WITMUT ROY FE O ' CE DI CTOR, FFIC OF I ESTI TI ,
Case No. 1 96 025 7
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to the operation of the plant. By letter dated March 28, 1996, NYAPCo informed the NRC that the 21/2% ASDV was adequate for all design basis accidents but not for the ICC event, an event that is outside of the design basis of the MY plant (Exhibit 5).
AGENT'S NOTE: For purposes of this Report of Investigation, the terms Atmospheric Steam Dump (ASD), ASD Valve (ASDV), and Atmospheric Dump '
Valve (ADV) are used interchangeably. ,
Coordination with NRC Headouarters Staff During the course of this investigation seriodic meetings were held between 01-Region I (RI) and officials from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), the Office of General Counsel (OGC), and the Office of Enforcement (OE). As the fact pattern developed. it became necessary for OI:RI to obtain official agency opinions from OGC, NRR, and DE concerning the potential violations involved in this case, particularly since the substantive issue on l
which the inat. curate information had been )rovided dealt with the ICC E09, a '
- beyond design basis" event. Because of tle passage of time since the provision of the inaccurate information in the PGP submittal, a statute of I
limitations it, sue also arosa. Therefore, on November 21,1996, 01:RI formally requested assistance, in the form of written opinions from OGC, NRR, and OE, on matters crucial to the then on going 1nvestigation (Exhibit 6). 3 l
l 0GC responded to 01's Request for Assistance in a memorandum dated 3
December 19,1996 (Exhibit 7), and offered, in pertinent part, the following information and legal opinions: -
e that the final' rule on 10 CFR 50.9 describes the standard for accuracy and completeness to be adhered to y.hga information is supplied to the agency: i e
that the Commission, through promulgation of 10 CFR 50.9(a), did mt impose a duty to correct information previously provided to the Commission. Therefore, the failure to correct does not constitute a violation of 50.9(a);
e that the statute of limitations likely bars enforcement action against HYAPCo for its initial [1986] submission of inaccurate information regarding the ASDV. The imposition of a civil penalt although a notice of violation (NOV) could be issued:y would be barred, .
e there does not appear to be a substantive requirement for the ASDV with respect to an ICC event, so there would be no substantive violation with regard to the ASDV itself:
e that the NRC's 1984 Order does not impose a requirement that the E0Ps meet certain standards with respect to an ICC event; e
that unless the ASDV is described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as a 5% valve, the fact that it is a 21/2% valve would not give rise to a violation of 10 CFR 50.59:
TFORPl)BLICDI L WI APP OV FI ICE IRf(CTOR, RIC INVE IGATI RE ON Case No. 1 96 025 8
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AGENT'S NOTE: The NY FSAR was reviewed during this i
investigation and it was determined that the FSAR does not include a capacity for the ASDV. Also, NRR instructed OI that the Updated FSAR did not specify ASDV capacity (see Exhibit 8, infra).
NRR responded (Exhibit 8) to 01's Request for Assistance. After a review of OGC's response to 01, NRR added, among other things, the following:
i e .
the apparent submission of false information concerning the size of the .
ASDV was material to the NRC, and action could have been taken against HYAPCo pursuant to Section 186 of the AEA of 1954, as amended, under the VEPCO doctrine. Howeve.', the statute of limitations now bars the
' imposition of a civil penalty and the minor safety significance of this condition (i.e., the actual 21/2* ASDV vs. the St A50V) would not have warranted the NRC taking enforcement action against.the licensee:
e that MYAPCo's development and implementation of the E0Ps satisfied the NRC's 1984 Order, and that the NRC staff expected that the E0Ps may not mitigate beyond design basis events. However, the staff did expect that the E0Ps would use all available equipment to make ever possible effort to mitigate severe accidents, including the beyond desi n basis ICC.
Due to the inaccurate information in the E0P PGP, MYAPC ~ failed to ensure that the plant operators would make every effort to mitigate the ICC: and e that, based on the staff's technical review and the OGC analysis, NRR
' recommended that the OI investigation of this matter not be pursued further. The staff intends to pursue this matter through OE.
A11ecation: MYAPCo Willfully Provided Inaccurate Information Regarding the Capacity of the ASDV to the NRC in a March 1986 Submittal of the PGP, Which Incorporated, by Reference, the Revised E0Ps
. Evidence Review of Pertinent Documentation
- 1. By Generic Letter (GL) No. 82 43 dated December 17, 1982, the NRC transmitted Supplement 1 to NUkEG 0737 to MYAPCo which provided clarification of, among other things, the upgrading of E0Ps. The supplement specifies that each licensee shall submit to NRC a PGP that, in accordance with NUREG 0737. Item I.1.C.1, reanalyzed transients and accidents, the analyses of which would serve as the basis for integrating upgraded E0Ps. The supplement also notes that NRC approval of the submittal was not necessary the E0Ps (Exhibit 9, pp. 1 and 21). prior to upgrading and implementing
- 2. By letters dated April 19 and December 2,1983. January 6 and February 23, 1984, MYAPCo responded to GL 8? 33 and informe) the NRC
- that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), NYAPCo was furnishMg t% requested information, including a description of plan- for implementation and l NOT OR LIC I L Willi (kJT APPROV
- \
Case No. 1 96 025 9
integration of the emergency response ' capabilities (Exhibit 10, pp. 1 9).
I
- 3. By Confirmatory Order dated June 14, 1984, the NRC formally imposed the commitments MYAPCo made in the response letters, supra. The Order also contained the following statement, "The Order simply requires implementation of these items in accordance with your proposed schedule." The Order is stamped [apparently by the license'e with a Responsibility block indicating t1at WHITTIER, among others,]had responsibility. A cc: listing for the Order contains the names of John H. GARRITY. senior director, MYAPCo. and P.L. ANDERSON project manager, YAEC (Exhibit 11, pp. I and 3).
l 4. MiAPCo inemorandum froMto J. FUOTO, dated December 14, 1984.
l i a ts answers to questions that had been asked on December 12, 1994.
esponded that the ASD could handle approximately 5% of 100*
mwer steam production. the 5% cite having come from the Plant Training ianual (Exhibit 12, pp. I and 5).
- 5. YAEC's " Transient Analysis For E0P Using TREAT Code" for MY contains i
hand written notes dated August 12, 1985, that also depict the fact that the St ADV relieving capacity came from the Systems Training Manual (Exhibit 13, p. 2).
. 6. A MYAPCo memorandum, dated October 22, 1985, from M to J. E. BRINKLER, regarding the E0P project status, indicates that M held conversations with C. FRIZZLE and D. WHITTIER on ICC and Steam l Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) issues during the E0P upgrade project.
Specifically, g discussions about the " low probability events" involving ICC -
' wrote, ". . . it was decided that as these events are beyond the requirements of our existing license analysis, following Westinghouse's tactics should not create any licensing problems" (Exhibit 14).
, 7. YAEC h508, " Verification of the E0Ps For Maine Yankee Using TREAT Code."
prepared and approved for MY in November 1985 by YAEC personnel, utilized, in t1e analysis, an ASDV rated at 5% full power steam flow.
The analysis concludes that MY can recover from SGTR and ICC situations (Exhibit 15, pp. 1, 43, and 115 117).
- 8. The MY E0Ps Writers Guide - Revision 1, undated, identifies the ICC event as an Emergency Procedure and designates its Procedure Identification Number as FR C.1. The Guide designates FR as meaning a Functional Restoration procedure for the restoration of a Critical Safety Function (CSF) to a satisfied position: the "C" as meaning Core Cooling CSF: and the .I as a designator as the first emergency in &
given category. in this case Core Cooling, i.e., .1 is ICC: .2 is Degraded Core Cooling: and .3 is Saturated Core. Cooling. The ICC event, FR C.1, is the topic of this case.] (Exhibit 16, pp[.110). ,
- 9. A document titled, " Technical Differences Between Maine Yankee E0P's and
, Westinghouse ERG's" (Emergency Response Guidelines), printed in February 1
F L (T ICE)FOR'PUBL REC y IC F C DIdCLOSAPP g GATITH0lfT RE " OVAL OF. f I
Case No. 1 96 025 10
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1986, indicates that its pur>ose was to document any technical differences between a given 4Y E0P and its corresponding Westinghouse ERG. The document includes an explanation / basis for differences in the
, SGTR and ICC events, but has no mention of the capacity of the ASDV, or that there is a difference between the capacities of the ASDVs (Exhibit 17, pp. 1, 2, 33 36, and 43).
- 10. ' A YAEC memorandum, dated February 11, 1986,
Subject:
" Capacity of Decay Heat Release Valve / Silencer," is a request for the Maine Yankee Project (MYP) division of YAEC to determine the flow capacity of the decay heat release valve / silencer, since, for MY's E0P analyses. YAEC's Nuclear Engineering Division (NED) had used a value of 5% of full power steam flow as the capacit for the ASDV. The source of the 5% capacity was identified as the sfgps Training Manual (MYSTM). The memo points out that the 5% w rate was not consistent with the flow rate ghibit18).tihe silencer or the ASDV itself, which was identified by CE as 21/22
- 11. Exhibit IS, supra, contains stamped information indicating that the memo was routed from YAEC's PLA [ Peter ANDERSON] to MYAPCo's CDF
' Charles D. FRIZZLE] for JRH [ James R. MEBERT] and RLB [nfi] on Pebruary 13. 1986. A handwritten note on the memo notifies " Charlie"
- r. FRIZZLE] that the document is necessary to correct an error in the Training Manual.
- 12. (TAG) memorandum da ch 14, g A YAEC to P.L. Transient ANDERSON of tAnal e MYP, sisS Groubbject:
, Cases." specifies that recent evaluations of the TREAT results led to i the discovery that the actual ADV capacity was 21/2% of rated steam flow rather thangh assumed in the TREAT analysis, and asks for 1
reanalysis to be' run h the correct capacity of 2 1/2* ADV. Written in the summary section of the memo is the following "These runs are expected to demonstrate acceptable results" (Exhibit 19). i
, 13. Exhibit 19. supra, was stamped as received in the MYP of YAEC on March 18, 1986, and contains another stamp indicating that the memo was sent from PLA [ ne to MYAPCo's CDF [ FRIZZLE] for REA [R.E.
ARSENAULT] and on or about March 19, 1986.
4 AGENT'S NOTE: The TAG, HYP, and NED are all divisions of YAEC. The "To" and "From" stamp is a HYP instrument utilized to alert the licensee as to who the document should be delivered to for action, if any, or for information only.
- 14. A MY Service Request (MYSR) H 86 62, dated March 21, 1986, titled:
" Manual Atmospheric Steam Dump," is a request for the design and installation of a manual bypass valve around the existing ASDV, which would provide manual cooldown if the ASDV failed. The manual bypass was scheduled to be installed during the 1987 outage. The project was requested by YAEC and the cognizant MYAPCo person listed was FRIZZLE.
OT FOR UBL DIkLOSU W PROV i
I FICE D CT , ICE IN EST TI , II Case No. 1 96 025 11'
This MYSR does not mention the capacity of the ASDV or that there was a problem with its size (Exhibit 20).
, 15. A MYAPCo memorandum dated March 31, 1986.. fro to ANDERSON, l concerning responses to a 50.59 review, includi ose on the FR C.1 ICC event, do not contain any mention that the capacity of the ASDV was in question or that the size was a problem. The memo was stamped as l
received by V,'P on April 3,1986 (Exhibit 21, pp. I and 3).
l
- 16. A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation of the ICC Procedure, dated May 29, 1986, indicates there is no unreviewed safety question because of the revired procedure. Further, it notes, "The entry conditions for this i
prc:.edure are not achieved during any FSAR transient," and that the ICC condition is ". . . well outside the bounds of the transients considered in the FSAR" (Exhibit 22). -
- 17. A MYAPCo letter to the NRC, dated April 7,1986, signed by WHITTIER (Exhibit 23), transmits E0P background documents in accordance with the previous MYAPCo PGP letter from WHITTIER to the NRC of March 18, 1586 (see Exhibit 3).
- 18. A handwritten note dated May 22. 1986, to Chris [nfi), discusses the l installation of a manual bypass valve around the ASDVs because of the concern for having a method to remove heat from the core if the motor oxrated valve or the pressure control valve failed during an accident.
Tie note says the manual valve should be sized to equal the valve being bypassed. *The note does not mention actual sizes and does not indicate that the ASDV, by itself, was inadequate (Exhibit 24).
- 19. A handwritten Calculation Sheet, undated, includes the sentence, " Size a new atmospheric steam dump" valve to be installed in parallel to the existing steam dump valve. It indicates the maximum flow is equal to 5% of Main Steam Flow and includes a diagram of the location of the new velve. A document attached to the calculation sheet is from Table 7.3.5
- [nfi) Decay Heat Release Valve (MS A 162), and indicates the capacity as "Approximately 2.5% of fu'1 power steam" (Exhibit 25).
- 20. A handwritten note dated June 13. 1986, signed by E indicates that Paul BERGERON [of YAEC's TAG) did not recommend holding up the implementation of the new E0P set until after completion of the additional TREAT runs on SGTR and ICC (Exhibit 26).
- 21. A YAEC memorandum dated June 19, 1986,
Subject:
" Reanalysis of SGTR and ICC TREAT Cases," was forwarded to MYAPCo's FRIZZLE on or about June 30, 1986. The memo repeats the finding of the discovery that the actual ASDV capacity at MY was 21/2t rather than the 5% assumed in YAEC 1508, but that reanalysis was expected to demonstrate acceptable results (Exhibit 27).
AGENT'S NOTE: The June 19, 1986,.and March 14, 1986, t
memos are almost identical, with the exception of a slightly different explanation of the manner in which
~
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the TREAT analysis considered cooldown end .
depressurization involved in the SGTR scenario.
- 22. A MYAPCo letter to NRC dated June 20, 1986, sMeYby WHITTIER. informs the NRC that the newly upgraded E0Ps should be implemented by July 1, 1986. The memo also notes that MY completed a detailed verification and validation program to justify acce)tability of the upgraded E0Ps, which were based on the Westinghouse EO)s, for HY's use: no unreviewed safety questions were found (Exhibit 28).
- 23. A MYAPCo memorandum fromM to the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) Procedures Subcont- dated July 18, 1986, documents that discussions were held betwee and FRIZZLE concerning E0P
, workload distribution (Exhibit 29).
- 24. By lette September 9, 1986, Westinghouse Electric Corp. (WEC) notifie t1st it had been ascertained that the ASDV for HY was actually 21/2 f total steam flow, rather than the 5% used in the TREAT code for plant specific analysis, ' at ". . . it is foreseen -
that no apparent problem will exist." wrote back to WEC on i September 22, 1986, and advised that reanalysis using the actual 21/2%
ASDV was ongoing (Exhibit 30).
- 25. MYSR No. M 86 200, appears to be dated and approved by FRIZZLE on October 10. 1986, and received in the MYP of YAEC on October 20, 1986.
It is a request for an ASD bypass valve to provide additional capacity
' and redundancy for the ASD system ". . . as required by analysis.'
Installation was to take place during the 1987 refuel outage. This HYSR was closed out [without being accomplished] by YNSD of YAEC on August 10, 1988, with the sentence, "To be superseded by an updated SR per J. Hebert" (Exhibit 31).
i
- 26. A YAEC memorandum, dated October 16. 1986.
Subject:
"Results for MY I FR C.1 ICC Procedure TREAT Reanalysis," was received in the MYP on 1 November 6,1986, and indicates that reanalysis showed that the 5t ADV 0
, case was successful, however, the 21/2% ADV case demonstrated unacceptable results. It concluded that ". . . plant recovery from an ICC condition is not possible using a 21/2% ADV." The memo contains a stam indicating that on November 7,1986, it was transmitted from DERSON to MYAPCo's CDF [ FRIZZLE] for JEB [BRINKLER]/GNS RHN [ NELSON] (Exhibit 32).
- 27. A YAEC menvrandum, dated November 6,1986.
Subject:
"New Atmospheric Dump Capability," was transmitted from YAEC to CDF [ FRIZZLE] for 3RH
[HEBERT] on November 11, 1936, and indicated that, due to time constraints, MY agreed that the CPA process would not be followed andatth[ Conceptual a new St ASDV Project would beAuthorintion) instelled during 1987. The memo notes that the requirement for installation of the new valve is based on recovery from the ICC scenario (Exhibit 33).
- 28. to BRINKLER, A MYAPCo indicates memorandum that reanalysis by YAEC dated usingDecember the 21/2 9, 1986, from @% ASDV 4
Case No. 1 96 025 13
. . . .. .. ....... ; :.p :: - -
- u .: :
that the' ASDV had insufficient decay heat removal capability to allow .
recovery from the postulated ICC transient prior to core damage. The memo also notes that a 5% capacity bypass valve was scheduled to be installed during the 1987 outage, and'that following installation. MY will be able to recover from the ICC transient. STOWERS also wrote that no further action was necessary (Exhibit 34).
- 29. E0P Change Request on ICC FR C.1 was originateu by M on H 1987, validated by ARSENAULT on April 1,1987, and comaleted by on June 9, 1987: the change involved wording of the EO) and additional guidance to the operators. P was evaluated, verified, and validated on May 6, 1987, by ARSENAULT and T. GIFFORD. The capacity of the ASDV is not i uded on these documents (Exhibit 35).
l
- 30. A YAEC memorandum, dated September 21. 1987, concerns the new ASDV that l was to be installed during the 1987 refuel outage, but was deferred by '
HY. The memo indicates that a meeting was held between YAEC's ANDERSON l and HYAPCo management, which resulted in a decision to add a redundant 21/2% ASDV in parallel with the existing valves. Work on the design change was due to begin in early December 1987. The memo was stamped l indicating transmittal on September 24, 1987, to CDF [ FRIZZLE] for 1RH
[HEBERT] (Exhibit 36).
l
- 31. The re analysis of the E0Ps is contained in YAEC 1508. Revision 1.
titled " Verification of The E0Ps For Haine Yankee Using TREAT Code," and is dated and signed by YAEC personnel in November 1987 (Exhibit 37). It documents 'the following pertinent information: -
e that acceptability of the NY ICC E0P requires an A3DV capacity of l 5% rated steam flow, and that recovery from an ICC at HY could not !
be demonstrated with an ASDV capacity less than St (pp. 3, 44, and l 45):
e that the original version of YAEC 1508 used a !.! value for the ASDV, which was taken from the NY Plant Specific Guidelines, before it was determined that the ASDV at HY was actually 21/2%
(pp. 10 and 86):
e that the 2 1/2% ASDV for the SGTR E0P scenario is adequate for HY (p. 40).
- 32. CPA No. 5 87 for a Redundant ASD Capability, dated November 30, 1987, estimates that the cost of improving the reliability of the ASDV capability by installing a manual 2 1/2t valve in existing valves was $108,000 (Exhibit 38, pp.16) parallel to the .
- 33. A Conceptual Design Review Acknowledgment (CDRA) memorandum dated December 2, 1987, to HYAPCo's Mike VEILLEUX, concerns CPA No. 5 87, supra, and contains notes apparently made by him (HJV on December 9, 1987, indicating that the intent of the expenditure of $108,000 was not included on the CPA request, but that the was ". . . requested by our management . . project . " (Exhibit for39).
the' redundant ASDV i
NOTh0RP C",ISbLOSURE THOUT PR h F F L CEJIIxEC 0F' 0F IhVESTJS 'S Case No. 1 96 025 14
- 34. Another CDRA memorandum is dated and signed by FRIZZLE on December 3, 1987, and indicates that CPA No. 5 87 for the redundant ASDV should be approved as written and states that, among other things, there is a lack of capacity for ASDV [to allow for] alternatives (Exhibit 40).
- 35. MYSR No. H 89 012, issued on January 6, 1989, was to add a redundant manual
" 21/2% ASDV by pass to provide a total vent capacity of St
. , . . for recover approved CPA 5 87,y supra.from Installation ICC scenario."
wasReference was made to occur during to the the '90" refuel outage. The project was requested by J. HERBERT and authorized
. by GARRITY (Exhibit 41). .
AGENT'S NOTE: This is the only SR which specifically identifies recovery from ICC as the reason and/or justification for adding the redundant ASDV.
i
- 36. An internal MYAP randum of Hessage and Re>1y, dated Ma indicates that discussed with Bob JORDAi on May1989, 15, ythe 16, 1989, effects that the 2700 Mwth power u> grade would have on, among other things, the ICC E0P (FR C.1). JOR)AN's written reply on May 17. 1989, indicates that the E0Ps in question were reviewed and were found to be valid for conditions involving a 21/2% increase in decay heat level and that YNSD concurred (Exhibit 42).
- 37. General Physics Corporation's (GPC) audit of MY's E0Ps dated May 1989, documents an audit conducted during the week of May 8, 1989 l (Exhibit 43). The audit contains the following re levant information:
e Reviews of the NY PGP and YAEC 1508 Rev.1, were accomplished. It was noted that the 21/2* ASDV was insufficient for ICC and that it was recommended that hardware or procedural guidance be implemented to increate steam dum rated full power steam flow. (pp.p1,capacity to at 2, 7, 9 11, 31,least and5%32).of e An exit meeting was held on May 12, 1989, at which time all
' ' s and observations were discussed with, among others, and GARRITY (p. 5).
- 38. A memo, dated May 16, 1989, details a written message from to HEBERT, which points out that the GPC audit had identified l
that the capacity of the ASD for M sufficient and that YNSD had confirmed this through analysis. requested that the issue of ASDV capacity be resolved before an C E0P audit that was scheduled to begin July 10, 1989. HEBERT responded on May 23, 1989, that he had not seen the YNSD analysis, but believed that the code safeties would provide sufficient relieving capacity (Exhibit 44).
- 39. A MYAPCo memorandum,
Subject:
"EOP Philosophy Steering Committee Minutes," indicates a meeting was held on June 29, 1989, to discuss, among other things, the inability of the ASD to reduce steam generator pressures in an ICC event. A listed resolution was to change the F{
Case No. 1 96 025 15
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1 . .
I
- sequence of teps in order to st'op heatup earlier in the transient. was in attendance at the meeting (Exhibit 45).
4 i 40. An E0P Audit Action Plan, dated July 14, 1989, specifies that the supalementary transient analysis showed that the recovery strategy used in 91 C.1 [ICC) and FR C.2 will not work if the main condenser is i
unavailable. The planned action was to identify additional ways to dump steam: the current status indicated that SR 89 12 had been written to l add an ADV (Exhibit 46). ,
- 41. NRC Inspection Re> ort (IR) No. 50 309/89 81, dated 10/27/89, documented i
an inspection of.MY's E0Ps during the period of July 17 28, 1989 i (Exhibit 47). It was stamped as received at NYAPCo and included the j
following pertinent information:
j e NRC's overall assessment indicated that the E0Ps were generally i well written and that, with some modifications, the program at MY
- could be used as an example of a well developed program. Further, i .at an exit meeting held on July 28,1989, the NRC described the NY ,
i E0P program as ". . . very good . . . in the up i
i programs looked at to date . . ." (pp.1 and 8)per ; 15% of the
- e That no violations or deviations were identified as result of the i j inspection (p. 8)
- '
t
! . e Documents reviewed by the NRC during the inspection included the I GPC Audit of May 1989, the July 14, 1989. Audit Action Plan, and the E0P meeting minutes of June 29, 1989 (p. 26):
- e That the only deficiency identified for the ICC Fr.C.1 E0P was a missing step [The inspection did not contain any mention of the capacity of the ASD.] (p. 31); and e
.That, among others, FIZZLE, . and WHITTIER
, , attended the NRC exit meeting (p. 21GARRITY. M). .
- 42. By letter dated February 26, 1990, the NRC transmitted to MYAPCo's FRIZZLE a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (Exhibit 48) regsrding the PGP for HY. The SER, relying on NYAPCo's PGP submittal, points out that for the Main Steam System. . . . of primary importance . . .* is that the ASDV capacity is 5% of nominal rated steam flow at MY, and that it
' differed from the Westin house ERGS in that regard (p. 32); and that licensee's specific anal sis demonstrated that, for ICC, secondary depressurization using t e ADV was accepteble (p. 10). The SER requested that any revisions to the PGPs be retained and not be submitted to the NRC (pp. I and 28).
- 43. MY's E0Ps Technical Guidelines, Revision 2, dated September 5. 1989, depicts the design differences between the Westinghouse reference plant and MY. Under the caption of Main Steam System, it indicates that the ASDV for MY is 2 1 *f steam flow. The document contains the typed initials of on each page (Exhibit 49, p. 24).
~
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i AGENT'S NOTE: This is a correction to the MY Technical Guidelines that had previously identified
- the ASDV capacity as the erroneous 5%.
- 44. A MYAPCo memo dated September 13,1991,'
Subject:
"EOP Steering Committee (ESC) meeting of 9/6/91," from B. PLUMMER, indicates that a question was raised as to whether the~ NRC was aware that the JCC analysis for MY did not work. Under the heading " Outstanding Items" is i
the following: "FR C.1/C.2 Inability to dump adequate steam capacity to recover during ICC." A determination was to be made before the next E0P l meeting to find out if it was acceptable to have an unsuccessful ICC
) recovery in the FRP's [ Functional Recovery Procedures] (Exhibit 50, pp. 1, 3, and 5).
A ENT'S NOTE: tt PLUMMER was an E0P Coordinator sometime after
- 45. A MYAPCo men,o dated February 4. 1992, from PLUMMER, concerns an upcoming l
ESC meeting on February 7, 1992, and indicates the following under the
" Outstanding Item" heading; specifically, under the item associated with the inability to dump adequate steam to recover from an ICC: " STATUS:
YNSD has told me that there is no documentation to support the idea that the NRC has a) proved the aosition that we cannot recover from an ICC situation wit 1 the atmosp1eric steam dump system. Will write a service i request to determine if alternate means of recovery is acceptable" (Exhibit 51).
- 46. MYAPCo's Capital Major Projects Work Order #89 56E (Exhibit 52),
approved by WHITTIER on November 30, 1990, and FRIZZLE on December 3, 1990, authorized the design and installation of a redundant atmospheric steam vent system ". . . to be used for the mitigation of a steam generator tube rupture" (pp. I and 4). SR M 89 12 was referenced
( ). 4). Attached to this work order is a document titled. "MY SGTR REANALYSIS STRATEGY," which utilizes the correct 21/2% ADV capacity and
, indicates that the licensing basis remained valid for HY. Under the caption "ADV Failure Option," is a note indicating that a 5% ADV capacity is necessary to support FR C.1 recovery from ICC (pp. 6, 7,12, and 14).
- 47. YAEC's HYSR Lo l Dump By Pass,"g, identifiesatthat was received the SR #89 MYP on 012, Januarytitled, 12,"1989, Atmospheric dated outSteam March 9, 1989, and was canceled by MY on May 11, 1992 (Exhibit 53).
l l
- 48. Exhibit 54 is a series of 7 additional ESC Meeting Minutes from July 10, i
1991, through December 11, 1993, all of which carried as an " Outstanding Item," the FR C.1/C.2 inability to dump adequate steam capacity to recover
" during an ICC. The November 1991 minutes note that.
. . . Rousseau has checked past documentation and cannot find any thing that would let us believe the NRC knows that ICC is non recoverable on (p. 14). The last reported status was, theatmosphericsteamdum!*"ASDVcapabilitywill[be)addedorthereis
" Waiting to determine if 4T f UBLIbDI U WI Rh 9
, VFJpiJ E[CIER -
TI TI , .I I Case No. 1 96 025 17
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a possibility of gaining several
- steaming capacity with the aux steam reliefs * (pp. 1, 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 16 18, 20, and 22 28).
- 49. A January 1991 E0P Change Re uest on the ICC procedure step which directs operators to manuall lift the SG code safeties, requests the rer m l of this step since e vendor advised that lifting of the code safeties was not feasible. The request was verified and validated on January 26, 1993, and disposition Was final on July 25,1993 (Exhibit 55).
- 50. What appears to be an E mail from HATHAWAY to himself, dated June 18, 1996, indicates that a detailed review of the NRC's SER [ February 1990]
was made, and because of that review, it was then asked by PLUMMER if NRC knew that NY could not recover from the event [ICC). In another note to himself. HATHAWAY wrote that the NRC's SER was thorough l reviewed by K. EMBRY/B. PLUMMER and that they had provided deta led responses to each item (Exhibit 56).
l AGENT'S NOTE: EMBRY followedO and PLUMMER followed EMBRY as E0P coordinator. HATHAWAY is the E0P coordinator that ultimately documented the ASDV issue on February 29,1996, which led to the licensee's 10 CFR 50.9 notification on March 4,1996.
Intervier
~ The following individuals were interviewed by 01:RI on the dates indicated and a summary of thefr testimony follows:
HAmt Position Date of Interview Robert ARSENAULT Asst. Manager Maintenance October 30,1996 Engineering i
i Ethan BRAND Supervisor, Nuclear Safety December 10. 1996 Engineering
, Charles FRIZZLE President and CEO February 3, 1997
\
- John H. GARRITY former VP, NYAPCo August 7, 1996 Steven SMITH Operations Manager February 20 &
March 19, 1997 l
M Senior Nuclear Safety Specialist August 20 &
' December 11, 1996,
& February 20 1997 James TAYLOR Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer August 8, 1996 Douglas WHITTIER Vice President, Licensing and February 19 & 20, Engineering 1997
! O 'FORhlIC SCLO50RE W APPRT AL l YE F CE y gE OF IGATI I}I) 5 Case No. 1 96 025 18 l . . : : : . :: ::: :: =iii.G ==: E - - - i i:- ' ;--~ ~
! Jimi YER0KUN SRIc NRC October 30, 1996 1
Interview of YEROKUN (Exhibit 57) j YEROKUN advised that he was visited by MYAPCo's HATHAWAY in the days before j
the licensee's submittal of the 10 CFR 50.9 report cr. March 4,1996. HATHAWAY disclosed to YEROKUN that he had something " sign $ficant" to report. HATHAWAY 1 went on to say that he recently found that MY could not recover from an ICC i with the 21/2% ASDV, and, furthermore, that the NRC had been provided with I
inaccurate information on the size of the ASDV in 1986 and MY had never l corrected the inaccuracy. A day or two .later, HATHAWAY returned to YEROKUN's office at MY and re>orted that management at HY had apparently been aware for sometime of the proslem with the undersized A50V, had tried to get it fixed,
, but for whatever reason, it never got done.
j Interview of (Exhibits 58. 59. & 60 i
- M as worked at MYAPCo since 1978 and was the E0P Coordinator from approximately 1984 to 1989. He noted that the E0Ps developed over many years -
and were "evolutionar " in that hundreds of changes were made as continuous j revisions took place.y,Some documents that had been submitted to the NRC a
changed a day or two later. The upgrading of the NY E0Ps was a huge i undertaking; he reported to Jim BRINKLER for the E0P project (Exhibit 58, i pp. 11, 15, and 66).
I 6 advised that he was aware in the early 1986 time frame that YAEC 1508 contained the erroneous analysis assumption that the ASDV at MY was St. rather than the actual 2 1/2%, and that it (YAEC 1508) was going to be sent to the NRC as part of the PGP. He claims he made FRIZZLE and YAEC, as an
{ organization, aware of same prior to the submittal to the NRC (Exhibit 58,
! pp. 31 37, and 44).
Malso recalls having discussions with GARRITY, to the effect that the wrong ASD capacity was used for the YAEC analysis of E0Ps, both before, and i
- times after. submittal of the PGP to the NRC (Exhibit 58, pp. 46 54).
J reiterated that he definitely informed FRIZZLE and GARRITY of the
! ty assumption and th ate informat' ion had been communicated to the
- NRC (Exhibit 58, 3. 64). basically recalls understanding from
! s with RIZZLE, ITY, and others (possibly WHITTIER), that he was to handle the t aspects of the E0Ps and Licensing would i e regulatory relations. felt he did so and thought MYAPCo i
management would handle the NRC regu atory aspects (Exhibit 58, pp. 70, 71, 74, 86, and 120: and Exhibit 60, p. 61).
1 Mprovided the N.' to Licensing for submittal to the NRC. The E0Ps themselves did not go to the NRC, nor were they required. YAEC 1508, which
! contained the s ASD assumption, was not required but, for
! thoroughness, i it with the PGP nonetheless (Exhibit 58,
)
pp. 48, and 11 ). said he was the person wh ed the i erroneous ASDV capacity to YAEC for the TREAT analysis. obtained the 1 5% capacity from the MY plant training manual, where, as it t , it contained the erroneous capacity. There was no intention on part to
{
! TF ,PUBL DISCLOS WI RV j ELD 'FFIC IRE , OFFICE INVE ON IN i Case No. 1 96 025 19 f
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O e provide the wrong ASD capacity. In October 1986, using the actual 21/2%
ASDV, it was e ined by YAEC that MY could not recover from an ICC.
Thereafter, worked on the technical fix (Exhibit 58, pp. 48 50, 73, and 158 162).
O opined that the entire situation of the inaccurate information being submitted to the NRC was a classic miscommunication between various groups at MYAPCo t input to the revision of the E0Ps (Exhibit 58, p.167).
However,
~
believes he got " bad advice" from GARRITY about not reporting i issues to E because FRIZZLE didn't need to know about problems. GARRITY usually wanted answers or solutions to problems before an issue was raised (Exhibit 58, pp. 52 54).
stated that when he was interviewed by TAYLOR during the Plant Root ause Evaluation (PRCE) of the ASD issue in May 1996. He asked TAYLOR to keep his revelation about FRIZZLE's and GARRITY' r e nowledge of the error in the PGP submittal confidential because he was uncomfortable implicatin ana ement, without having confirmation that he had done so in writing. -
looked for, but coul
- nd, anything in writing of his discussions with FRIZZLE or GARRITY. was re rimanded by FRIZZLE in July 1996 for his actions during the E0P/PGP to the NRC. The action was apparently taken based on i ~a ion he provided to TAYLOR during the PRCE process. When -
emind FRIZZLE that he, too, was aware of the inaccuracy to the NRC, FRIZZLE nodded in the affirmative
.(Exhibit 59 and Exhibit 60, pp. 68 70).
AGENT'S NOTE: expressed a willingness to undergo a polygraph examination rega oing the question of his claims of advance notifications to FRIZZLE and GARRITY on the inaccuracy of the PGP submittal. He stated he is inclined to take a polygraph, but reserved the right to seek advice from his attorney (Exhibit 58, pp.169 and 170 Exhibit 60, pp. 70 72).
Interview of ARSENAULT (Exhibit 61)
ARSENAULT has been employed with the Yankee organization (YAEC or MYAPCo) since 1968: he has been with MYAPCo since the early 70's. For part of that time, from about 1984 to 1987, he served as a principal engineer and supported MYAPCo's effort to upgrade the E0Ps.
ARSENAULT worked on the validation and verification of the revised E0Ps. The HY E0Ps were constantly changing and being modified. ARSENAULT was directly involved in the validation process, via the simulator, but he does not recall becoming aware of the discrepancy in the capacity of the ASDV through that effort. In hindsight, ARSENAULT thought the simulator verification should have, at least, identified the discrepancy in the ASDV capacity, but he does not recall if it was detected at that point.
At some point during the development of the revised E0Ps. he became aware that there was a discrepancy between the actual size of the ASDV at NY (21/2%) and what had been assumed (5%) in the initial analysis completed by YAEC.
ARSENAULT was not aware at that time that inaccurate infcrmation relative to 1
1 FI
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the capacity of the ASDV had been transmitted to the NRC in the PGP in 1986.
. He only learned of that inaccuracy recently, sometime after March 1996.
ARSENAULT acknowledged that his name ap> ears on at least a couple of internal memos, dated in 1986, which point out t1e discrepancy in the size of the ASDV.
He has no specific recollection of seeing the memos. He reiterated that he l was not aware that inaccurate information had been sent to the NRC in the PGP. i The last he had heard about the ASDV issue rior to 1996, was in approximately 1 1990, when it was raised in a budget meeti in order to spend money to get ,
the ASDV capacity issue taken care of. ARS NAULT has no knowledge as to why '
the ASDV capacity was never resolved.
Interview of BRAND (Exhibit 62) s been em)loyed with MYAPCo since Jan 7. BRAND supervises He has .>een closely associated with at work for the past 4 years an has known him for a total of ten years. 8 D had no involvement in the generation of the revised E0Ps in the mid 1980s. but was responsible for the PRCE #209 on the revised E0Ps and the ASD capacity issue (pp. I and 2).
BRAND acknowledged that Mapproached him early in the PRCE process, orobably in early May 1996, and from their informal talk, BRAND perceived that S M was uncom with the way the PRCE was going because the PRCE had Tscertained that had apparently made an honest mistake by allowing a submittal to be ma to the NRC in Mar 6 that contained the erroneous ASD valve capacity. BRAND characterized s a highly profes honest, extremely ethical individual. In late June or early July 1996, told BRAND that he was concerned that he g to be made a sea goat, that if the conclusion was reached that h didn't tell anybo about the error in the ASD capa before it was submitt NRC, t at conclusion would not be true. b told BRAND that he knows he told FRIZZLE .
and WHITTIER, and maybe ot1ers, of the error be ore submittal to the NRC (p. 2).
~
BRAND has no reason to doubt Mversion of events, or that6might have told management of the error in the ASD capacity before it went to the NRC in March 1986. However, BRAND had questions about how accurate an individual's memory was from ten years ago. BRAND does not believe FRIZZLE or WHITTIER would intentionally allow submittal of inaccurate information to the NRC (p. 3).
BRAND's view of the E0P/PGP issue, as gleaned from reading the PRCE report, is that the initial submittal in March 1986 was preliminary, and that the Beyond Design Basis scenario of the ICC was of extremely low safety significance and was being reanalyzed at the time of the submittal. BRAND believes it was well known, at the time (1986), that the ASD valve for MY was 21/2%. but the thought was that the reanalysis was going to show that the 21/22 capacity ASD was adequate for the postulated ICC event. BRAND stated that the ICC scenario is not a credible event, because it is way beyond the design basis of the slant, and that an event like SGTR is something that is credible because it 3.s happened, and it is a part of the design basis of MY, SGTR is much more
, important from a safety standpoint. Howeve . BRAND also opined that once the NOT1F PUBhcDSCLOSUWI OUT PROV )F 3 0FFkCE IRE TOR, FFICE F I " ST TI S.
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reanalysis was completed in Fall 1986, and showed that the 21/2% ASD was not enough to recover from the ICC event, then the NRC should have been notified of that fact. Apparentl NRC was not notified (p.y, 3). the issue " disappeared" after Fall 1986, and the Interview of TAYLOR (Exhibit 63)
TAYLOR has been employed by HYAPCo since January 1983. He is a nuclear safety engineer, and he reports to BRAND. TAYLOR was the lead on PRCE #209, which involved the ASD issues, and completed it in July 1996 (p.1).
TAYLOR opined that O did a good e E0P revision assignment.
However, an honest mistake was made by - th respect to the size of the ASD valve used in the analysis by YAEC. included YAEC 1508. with the 5t ASD capacity and the indication that the NY plant could recover from an ICC event, in the PGP in 1986. As was found out later in 1986, after submittal to the NRC had already been made, the wrong ASD capacity was used (5%) for the analysis, and when the correct capacity (21/2%) was unied, analysis showed that HY could not recover from ICC. For reasons delineated in the PRCE (see Exhibit 69), the issue got dropped (p. 2).
Mas officially interviewed for the PRCE in May 1996. M basically inf indicated, at that time, that only he had been aware that discrepant tion regarding the ASD capacity had been submitted to the NRC in 1986.
' officially changed his story on that issue on July 30,1996,
. apparently after suamitting errone,he received a letter of disciplinary action from FRIZZLE for ous information to the NRC. This change in testimony after TAYLOR's PRCE had been completed. As a result of the' change, as re interviewed by TAYLOR, and Attorney Tom SCHMUTZ of wis, and Bockius (MLB) on July 30 and 31,1996. On those days, claimed that he had informed, at least. FRIZZLE and GARRITY that the pending March 1986 PGP submittal to the NRC contained the wrong ASD capacity (pp. 2 and 3).
TAYLOR admitted to 01 that @had approached him informally, as early as A>ril 1996, and informed him, in confidence, that FRIZZLE and GARRITY k7ew of t1e ASD error in the PGP f 986 NRC submittal. TAYLOR said t' it between April and' June 96 separate occasions. old him this information on 2 or 3 old TAYLOR he would look through his documents to try and find something in writing to support his recoll .n that FRIZZLE and GARRITY, .and possibly WHITTIER, knew of the error. ~
bfailed to come un with written substan f his claim. For that reason, and the fact tlat TAYLOR con information to be confidential, he (TAYLOR) did not include ' revelation in the PRCE. TAYLOR considered the in m ion confidentia and, more importantly, unsubstantiated. It was
- position, at the time, a he had informed management of the error in.the PGP submittal, he would ha'. ; documented it. TAYLOR did not intend to conce he information, but rather, thought he was following the desires of since the information could not be substantiated in writing (pp. 2 3).
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J i AGENT'S NOTE: TAYLOR and MLB's SCHMUTZ were working to ether on the 4
PRCE and MLB's E0P investigations which addressed i 1
', culpability. TAYLOR a parently failed to disclose informal information a TY and FRIZZLE until after 1, 1996, reinterview of (see Supplemental Information).
Interview of GARRITY (Exhibit 64)
GARRITY was employed by MYAPCo from 1970 to August 1990. He served as plant manager from 1984 to 1987, as assistant vice president for NE&L from 1988 to l 1989, as vice president for NE&L from 1989 to February 1990, and as FRIZZLt's assistant until leaving MYAPCo in August 1990 (pp. 8 and 9).
GARRITY recalled that he became aware of the discrepancy between the training
- material and the actual design of the plant, with respect to the size of the ADV, sometime either right before becoming plant manager, or during his tenure as plant manager between 1984 and 1987; at the time, the E0Ps were no where i
near final. He was involved in various efforts to increase the capacity of the existing valve, but it still had not been resolved when he left HYAPCo in August 1990. He was aware of the technical discrepancy but not the fact that the NRC had been, or was going to be, provided with discrepant information l (pp. 14 19).
GARRITY denies being aware that discrepant information had been sent to the
. NRC as part of the PGP in 1986. He claims he didn't become aware of the
- discrepant submittal until May 1996, when he was contacted for a PRCE
- interview. GARRITY said that had he been aware that inaccurate information j was going to be submitted to the NRC in 1986 he would allowed it to
- go. He claims he has no recollection of being told by or anyone l else, of the inaccurate submittal (pp. 21 24, 40, and 6 .
GARRITY acknowledged several memorandums from the 1986 time frame concerning 4
the analysis of the ICC using the ASDV, the fact that there was a problem with
' the size of the ASDV, hardware fixes for it, PORC, and service requests signed by him; however, he has no recollection of those documents at the time of issuance (pp. 26 35 and 45 48). He never understood the
, inaccurate submittal to the NRC (pp. 36, 40, and 50 59). problem to be an t
' GARRITY acknowledged having discussions with4 @ regarding the E0Ps and the ADV before, and aft ITY) was p'ent manager. GARRITY has no recollection of telling to handle the hardware fix, and that he (GARRITY) would take care o icensing, or that inaccurate information had j been provided to the NRC (pp. 36 38).
4 GARRITY characterized Mas very knowledgeable lant, diligent, thorough, and well organized. He thinks highly of p. 62).
Interview of WHITTIER (Exhibit 65)
WHITTIER has been employed by HYAPCo since 1983 and is the vice president of Licensing and Engineering. During the time in question, generally the mid to late 1980s, he was the ma ager of Licensing and Engineering (p. 8).
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WHfTTIER vaguely recalls learning in the late 1980's that some people at HYAPCo wanted to re directly involved. place or increase the capacity of the ASDVs, but he was not
' He believes that the increase in ASDV capacity was tied to the SGTR event (pp. 25 27). WHITTER said he did become directly involved in discussions, particularly one meeting sometime in the early 1990's, after he became vice president, of whether or not to install another ASDV. However, his recollections are that the reason for the possible installation was to address a concern about a design basis SGTR, and not so much about ICC: ICC
" was beyond design basis. The decision was made to not install another ASDV, because HYAPCo resolved SGTR concerns through alternative means,.and it wasn't cost beneficial to add the ASDV (pp. 28 31). At the time the decision was made not to add the ASDV, he was unaware that NRC had previously been told, via his March 1986 PGP submittal, that the ASDV was St. when, in reality, it was only 21/2%. He claims he didn't learn of that inaccuracy until March 1996 (pp. 33, 34, 48, and 52).
- WHITTIER denies knowing prior to his March 1986 submittal of the PGP that incorrect information was going to be provide e NRC in that submittal (p. 37). He doesn't recall discussions with regarding the ASDV or ICC, or that inaccurate information was contained in the submittal (pp. 40 45). WHITTIER denies that he intentionally information to the NRC in the March 1986 submittal. provided inaccurate Had he known of the inaccuracy, he would have required that another submittal be made to correct the inaccuracy, ~especially after the 1990 SER was issued by the NRC (pp. 48 51, 53, 71, and 72).
AGENT'S NOTE: WHITTIER stated his will to undergo a x1ygraph examination on the guestion of whether had informed lim, prior '
to the PGP submittal in March 1 e submittal contained an error. WHITTIER maintains that did not so inform him (p. 77).
Interview of FRIZZLE (Exhibit 66)
FRIZZLE is President and CEO of HYAPCo: he has been employed by HYAPCo since August 1971. During the mid 1980's he was the Vice President of Operations and had responsibility for the revised E0Ps (pp. 5 and 10 15).
1 FRIZZLE did not have responsibility for compiling and getting the E0P information to the NRC in 1986 (p.18). FRIZZLE claims he did not know, until 1996, that YAEC 1508 contained the ASDV capacity error, or that it was submitted (pp. 18 andto19). the NRC: no one had discussed the submittal error with him FRIZZLE acknowledged that several HYP designated memos regarding the ASD, PGP, and E0P issues, in the 1986 time frame, had his name on them. He said all HYP memos would have been routed to him for dissemination at NYAPCo, but he has no gific recollection of receiving them at the time (1986) (pp. 24 30, and FR does not recall having any direct conversations cir with regarding E0Ps, ASDV. or SGTR, even though memos by show otherwise (pp. 31 33, and 128).
, TF O PL 8L C DISC I APP VAL s FI IC RE I IGAT ONS. I Case No. 1 96 025 24
FRIZZLE denies tha2Mtold him of the inaccuracy regarding the ASDV in the PGP submittal to the NRC, prior to submittal in 1986. FRIZZLE then added,
'I certainly don't recall him telling me that." FRIZZLE claims he would not i have permitted an inaccurate submittal to go to the NRC (pp. 33, 34, 51, 103, I and 124). -
FRIZZLE said he became aware in the late 1986 time period that there was a problem with the redundancy or capacity of the ASD as it a plied to SGTR, but FRIZZLE did not link that to ICC .>ecause ICC was beyo sign basis.
FRIZZLE allowed that "there is always a chance" that told him of the ASDV inaccuracy, and he (FRIZZLE) discounted it because ICC was beyond the
~ design basis. However, FRIZZLE recalls no such conversation taking place.
(pp. 35 and 36).
I FRIZZLE believes he became aware that the 21/2* ADV was not able to mitigate l an ICC event sometime in late 1986, but he doesn't recall exactly when; he did ,
not link the information to the PGP submittal (pp. 37 40, and 45). I FRIZZLE acknowledged his involvement in approving certain service requests ;
(SRs) (in the 1980s) to YAEC for resolving the ASD ca>acity problem, such as a l redundant by mitigation. pass valve. His understanding was that tw SRs were for SGTR i The hardware fixes were never made, since alternative steps in the SGTR E0P solved the problem (pp. 42 44, 49 51, 75, and 76).
FRIZZLE admitted that he by)assed the normal CPA process to authorize the installation of an ASDV in November 1986, apparently based on recovery from a ICC event. He doesn't specifically recall a memo from November 1986 (see t
Exhibit 33) detailing his authorization, but believes that the SGTR was the primary driving force behind his bypass of the CPA process (pp. 53 56).
FRIZZLE believes (from reading the current record) that the on1 rson who would have b posit 3n to know of the inaccuracy in ubmittal in 1986 was pp. 56 and 57 ever, FRIZZLE said has a very good record with MYAPCo, and that did a good job on ops (pp. 59 and
. 87).
FRIZZLE does not believe M reminded him (FRIZZLE) on July 17, 1996, that he (FRIZZLE) knew of the inaccurate submittal to NRC. FRIZZLE denied told anything, to that effect, byM,on July 17, 1996. He said '
might have provided dishonest or inaccurale information to 01 it he has claimed that (pp. 60 62, 114, and 126).
FRIZZLE did not have responsibility for, nor did he review the SER of February i 1990 for accuracy (p. 88).
AGENT'S NOTE: FRIZZLE stated that before deciding if he would be w to submit to a polygraph examination on the question of whether
. ad told him of the PG) error prior to submittal, he would want to consult with counsel. FRIZZLE repeated his request for consultation with counsel when OI offered a polygraph specifics of his July 17,1996, disciplinary meeting with (pp. 121 and 126).
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i l
- \
i AGENT'S NOTE: FRIZZLE was relieved of his duties and position at MYAPCo j by the Board of Director's, effective February 1997.
f Interview of SMITH (Exhibits 67 and 68)
- SMITH is the manager of the Operations Department at the MY plant. He has j been employed by MYAPCo since 1981 (Exhibit 67, pp. 4 6).
4 j SMITH received a copy of the February 29,1996, memo from HATHAWAY detailing 3
+
the ASDV issue and the fact that NYAPCo had provided the NRC with inaccurate information concerning the E0Ps in 1986: he was copied on the memo as the
} Operations Manager. This was the first he became aware that inaccurate j
information on the ASDV had been provided to the NRC. SMITH, generally, has 1 known, as have other licensed operators, that the ASDV at NY was 21/2%.
2 However, he was not directly involved in the revised E0P project and was not knowledgeable of the PGP, and, therefore, he didn't know anything about the inaccuracy to the NRC. He had no knowledge that WHITTIER or FRIZZLE might have been aware of the inaccuracy before the PGP was submitted (Exhibit 68, pp. 39 42 and 43 45).
Aaent's Analysis Given that the PGP submittal was made in March 1986, OI placed greater weight on the documentary evidence, than on the ten year old recollections of the interviewees. The documents and testimony establish that the E0P revision
' process was evolutionary in nature, that is, changes and modifications to the E0Ps were constahtly on going.
Otestified that he provided the St ASDV capacity to YAEC for their use in the TREAT analyses revised E0Ps: he did not realize that the 5%
capacity was wrong. -
had o the 5% number from a HY training manual. There is no evidence that purposel to YAEC: it appears to have been an honest mistake.y The provided first the false riumber indication that the Si capacity was not accurate a> pears in the February 11, 1986, YAEC memo (Exhibit 18). The memo contains tie note that it was necessary to correct the training manual only.
WHITTIER signed out the PGP transmitta to the NRC on March 18, 1986, one day before FRIZZLE, ARSENAULT, and were sent, or received, the YAEC memo of March 14, 1986 (Exhibit 19 . That memo pointed out the' discrepancy in the capacity of the ASDV and indicated that the actual capacity of 21/2% required reanalysis. The same memo, however, advised that reanalysis m axpected to demonstrate acceptable results using the 21/2*
ancy between the ASDV size as Madmits reported in YAEC that 1508, he knewand the of the21discrep/2% capacity ASDV in th actual before he provided the PGP to Licensing for submittal to the NRC. YAEC 1508 (the actual analy_ sis document) was not a document required by the NRC to be submitted, but WMincluded it in the package, nonetheless. The PGP and E0Ps do not conta n any indication of the capacities of the hardware, but merely instruct the operator on required actions to take in a given emergency.
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4 O did not rsonally transmit the PGP, with YAEC 1508, to the NRC. He was also of the blief, at that tira, that the reanalysis by YAEC was expected to show favorable results.
made a note on June 13,1986 (Exhibit 26), of a phone conversation he a wi Paul Bergeron (YAEC's TAG), in which BERGERON advised not to hold up implementation of the new E0Ps while the reanalysis of SGTR and ICC were on oing at YAEC. The sole reason for the reanalysis was the discov h th was actually 21/2%, and not the 5% initially provided by lieved that the reanalysis would show favorable results and was re orced by of Harch 14, 1986, supra. This June 13, 1986, note is evidence that did discuss E0P matters with others, and did not act on his own, before un rtaking something as important as holding up
~
implementation of the E0Ps before the reanalysis was finished.
Msteadfastly claims that, at a minimum, he informed FRIZZLE and GARRITY of the error in the PGP grigt to its submittal to the NRC in March 1986. He also indicated that, it ikely than not, that he told WHITTIE a error as well, although emory was less clear on WHITTIER.
claims his understanding o is responsibility, after notifying those individuals, was to work on getting more steam dumping capability, and others, like the Licensing Department under WHI1 TIER, would handle the issue with the regulator. -
believes he lived up to his responsibility as a licensee employee by in orming management of the error in the PGP, before it went to the NRC. He does not believe it was his duty to directly inform the NRC of the e t was the job of Licensing. Witnesses in this case describ as honest, ethical, hard working, and meticulous. gen r contem documented the fact that he had various discussions witn FRIZZLE,poraneous WHITTIER, y BERGERON, and others, about the E0P project, but he did not document anything specific concerning his notification to them of the PGP error, or that the erroneous information was going ided, or had been provided, to the NRC. GARRITY also substantiate claim that they had various discussions on the E0Ps as a resu f RITY's interest in the project, but GARRITY claims he doesn't recall being told of the PGP error prior to submittal.
In the absence of documentary evidence of Mspecific claim that he told ca dividuals of the error, it comes down to circumstantial evidence and m word against that of FRIZZLE, GARRITY, and WHITTIER. It is a fact that did engage each of these individuals in discussions on the E0P i n*t a fact supported by some documentation and corroborated by GARRITY.
= '1 lsaid that le was inclined to take a pol
~
to consult with his attorney prior to doing so.ygraph, WHI1 TIER but reserved his right readily acce without condition OI's offer of a polygraph examination on the issue.pted, FRIZZLE said he would have to consult with his legal counsel befor g to any polygraph. The evidence does not support, in any way, that was a renegade emp1 yee, or one that would have acted on his own, in al owing a known error t itted to the NRC. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that continuove 1ked with others about the E0Ps.
Further, TAYLOR admitted that told him, as early as April 1996, and l OR b BLI DISC U Wf <MPROV 0F l FE FF E D RECT , OF ICE F VE I T s I Case No. 1 96 025 7
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before TAYLOR officially began t of information that possibly implicated FRIZZLE and GARRITY. therefore, is deemed to be a credible witness on the issue of having i orme , at least, FRIZZLE and GARRITY that the PGP contained the error.
It wasn't until the Fall of 1986, almost seven months after the March 1986 PGP submittal, that the YAEC reanalysis showed that the 21/2% ASDV was not, by itself, capable of mitigating the beyond design basis ICC event: 'it did show acceptable results for the SGTR, a desian basis event. This is significant because as licensee officials testified, their primary focus was always on i
design basis events and those items specified in the FSAR/UFSAR. The documents show that various modifications and fixes to the ASDV problem were l contemplated, and even initiated, primarily to create more margin by increasing steam dumping ca) ability for the SGTR. WHITTIER, FRIZZLE, and GARRITY recalled the focus >eing on the SG"R event, and that if the various '
modifications and/or fixes for the ASDV that were being considered aided the ICC scenario as well, that would have been an added benefit. As it turns out,
- the licensee required for the cancelled SGTR event, installation of a redundant ASDV since it was not and alternative tho of dumping steam were implemented aroviding more margin for SGTR.
and the NRC staff agree that the SGTt is a more significant and likely event than an ICC.
On the issue of correcting the error with the NRC after the fact, many of the documents, and much of the testimony, describes general knowledge by HYAPCo personnel of the undersized ASDV and the fact that consideration was given to increasing its steam dumping capability. However, Af1tr the PGP submittal in Harch 1986, it is not clear from the evidence that HYAPCo personnel tied the
. discrepancy between the 5% and 2 1/2% ASDV to the fact that the wrong ASDV capacity had been submitted to the NRC.
The GP audit in May 1989 identified the discrepancy in the ASDV size. The problem with the ASDV size was an item on the audit action plan list, and it was pointed out in the E0PSC meeting of June 1989 that HY could not recover from an ICC using the 2 1/2% ASDV. These documents were all purportedly reviewed by the NRC during the July 1989 inspection, but not take issue with the size of the ASDV or the ICC E0P. ltantIRdid thought the licensee inspection, a had rectified the error with the NRC long before t e July 1989 ek of adverse findings during the inspection reinforced this belief. orrected the ASDV capacity reference in the NY technical gui September 1989, near the end of his tenure as E0P coordinator. had no continuing responsibility for the E0Ps after that.
During the period from March 1986 to March 1996, there were various opportunities for the licensee to correct the record with the NRC. A prime example of a missed opportunity was after the NRC's E0P SER was issued to the licensee (see Exhibit 48). Given the fact that it was generally understood at HYAPCo that the ASDV was 21/2% and not St a review of the SER should have raised a flag to the licensee, particularly since the SER describes the ASDV as 5% and states that ". . . it is of primary importance." Indeed, although not authenticated by OI, Exhibit 56 indicates that all items of the SER were reviewed, and it points out that the question 1htD arose as to whether the NRC NOT ORPUkICDI OS FIE OF QE DIff OR, FICE IT k AP RIVA[
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knew MY could not recover from ICC. After the PGP submittal, the licensee i eventually learned that they could not recover from an ICC with a 21/2% ASDV and that there was no documentation which indicated the NRC had approved an unsuccessful ICC recovery strategy. The SER indicates that MY had a 5% ASDV and that depressurizing with the ASDV demonstrated acceptable results. This was not rectified with the NRC until the March 1996 10 CFR 50.9 re> ort. The licensee knew, or should have known, after receiving the E0P SER t1at the NRC was erroneously under the impression that MY could recover from an ICC event.
Conclusion Based upon the evidence developed during this investigation, it is concluded that MYAPCo willfully provided inaccurate information regarding the capacity of the ASDV to the NRC in the 1986 submittal of the PGP, l
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION - <
The licensee's PRCE Report, No. 209, is Exhibit 69.
1 i The licensee's E0P investigation of potential wrongdoing by the law firm of 1 j Horgan, Lewis & Bockius, dated July 9,1996, is being retained in the files of
, DI:RI. l J
WHITTIER (Exhibit 65, pp. 89 91) believes that the lead on PRCE No. 209, TAYLOR, might have violated internal HYAPCo procedure No. 600.80 (Exhibit 70 -
Standards of Conduct) because of his (TAYLOR's) failure to disclose certain i information to MLB. The information TAYLOR chose not to disclose to >
i during the course of M8L's E0Ps investigation was the implication, byll of FRIZZLE, GARRITY, and WHITTIER in potential wrongdoing with respect to t e provision of the inaccurate information to the NRC (Exhibit 65, pp. 89 91).
4
' Although not specifically related to the ASD issue SMITH (Exhibit 68) provided an example of the most significant disagreement he had with GARRITY concerning a safety . issue that arose in January 1989. The issue involved an i analysis that had been completed by YAEC regarding the anti pumping circuitry on the high pressure safety injection system (HPSI), and the possibility that the standby APSI pump would disable. YAEC called SMITH to let him know that j
they had a definitive answer, that, in certain circumstances, the HPSI pump j would not auto start, and therefore, it would be considered inoperable for '
< emergency core cooling purposes: immediate action would then be required per
- tech spec. This could have led to a plant shutdown. GARRITY asked SMITH to
! contact YAEC and have them hold off on sending the answer until MY had a fix for the problem. SMITH was uncomfortable with GARRITY's request and went !
. above him to FRIZZLE to report the situation. According to SMITH, FRIZZLE directed that SMITH tell YAEC to send the answer to HYAPCo immediately. SMITH believes the event was eventually resorted,to the NRC. SMITH speculated that )
this situation was probably one of t1e reasons GARRITY was let go by MYAPCo (pp. 9 17).
AGENT'S NOTE: The HPSI issue has been referred to'the NRC RI staff for their review.
On January 29, 1997, the facts of this case were briefed to Assistant United States Attorney Donald CLARK, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the U.S.
Attorney, District of Haine, Portland HE. CLARK stated that it did not
. appear likely that a referral of this case to D0J was warranted. CLARK has been kept apprised of continuing develoxnents, but has not expressed an interest in pursuing this matter throug1 prosecution. He will, however, be provided a copy of this report for closer review.
I fF UB I DISC OS WI APPR'DV IC IRE , IC F V GAT NS RE i Case No. 1 96 025 ,1
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F UBLIC D SCL RE WI OV FI FICE CT FFIC OF IN9 STIGA I Case No. 1 96 025 -
32
I LIST OF EXHIBITS I 1
1 ;
Exhibit
): No. Descriotion -
i l
1 Investigation Status Record, dated July 11, 1996.
1 2 Clarification of THI Action Plan Requirements, NUREG 0737, November 1980.
3 MYAPCo Letter, d.ated March 18, 1986, to NRC, with attached PGP.
. 4 MYAPCo Letter, dated March 4, 1996, to NRC,
Subject:
Notification Under 10 CFR 50.9, with attachments.
5 MYAPCo Letter, dated March 28, 1996, to NRC,
Subject:
Discrepancy in E0P Verification Analysis.
6 OI:RI Request for Assistance, dated November 21, 1996, to NRR.
7 OGC Memorandum, dated December 19, 1996, to NRR and OI:RI.
8 NRR Memorandum, undated, to 01.
9 NRC Generic Letter, dated December 17, 1982, to all Licensees of Operating Reactors.
10 MYAPCo Letters, dated April 19, 1983 December 2, 1983, January 6, 1984, and February 3, 1984.
11 NRC's Transmittal Letter to MYAPCo, Jated June 14, 1984, with Confirmatory Order enclosed.
12 MYAPCo Memorandum from @ dated December 14, 1984, with attachment.
13 YAEC Transient Analysis for E0P using TREAT Code with handwritten notes attached.
14 MYAPCo Memorandum from Mto BRINKLER, dated October 22, 1985.
15 YAEC-1508, dated in November 1985.
16 MY E0Ps Writers Guide, Rev. 1. undated.
17 Technical Differences between.HYEOPs and WEC ERGS, February 1986.
18 YAEC Memorandum, dated February 11, 1986,
Subject:
Capacity of Dacay Heat Release Valve / Silencer.
hTF OF 'JCE -
BLIC'DI D LOS I d APP b F E CT , FICE INVE JGAT iS, E I Case No. 1 6 025 33
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19 YAEC Memorandum. dated March 14'1986,
Subject:
Reanalysis of SGTR l and ICC TREAT Cases.
i 20 MYSR M 86 62, dated March 21, 1986.
s 21 -
MYAPCO Memorandum fromMto ANDERSON, dated March 31,1986, with attachment.
~
22 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation, dated May 29,1986.
23 MYAPCo Letter, WHITTIER to NRC, dated April 7, 1986, without enclosure. ,
t 24 Handwritten Note, dated May 22, 1986.
25 Handwritten Calculation Sheet, undated, with Attachment.
26 Handwritten Note fromM dated June 13, 1986.
27 YAEC Memorandum, dated June 19, 1986.
Subject:
Reanalysis of SGTR I and ICC TREAT Cases. I 28 MYAPCo Letter, WHITTIER to NRC, dated June 20, 1986.
29 MYAPC,o Memorandum from M to PORC, dated July 18, 1986.
30 WEC Letter t6 dated September 9.1986, and M
. Response Letter, dated September 22, 1986.
31 MYSR H 86 200 Signed by FRIZZLE on October 10, 1986.
32 YAEC Memorandum. dated October 16, 1986,
Subject:
Results for MY FR C.1 ICC Procedure TREAT Reanalysis.
33 YAEC Memorandum, dated November 6, 1986,
Subject:
New Atmospheric Dump Capability.
34 MYAPCo Memorandum, O to BRINKLER, dated December 9, 1986.
35 E0P Change Request, dated September 27, 1987, Re: ICC.
36 YAECMemorandum,datedSeptember 21, 1987,
Subject:
ASDV.
37 YEAC 1508 Revision 1, dated in November 1987.
38 CPA No. 5 87, dated November 30, 1987, with attachments.
39 CDRA Memorandum, dated December 2, 1987.
40 CDRA Memorandum, dated December 3, 1987, signed by FRIZZLE.
41 MYSR No. M 89 012, dated January 6, 1989, with attachment.
N'DTFOR UBLIC: ISCLOS RE WI" hPRO F F .D (ICEpl ECT OFFI 0F I ESTI TI -
Case No. 1 96 025 34
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- n 42 Internal'HYAPCo Memorandum, message and reply, dated May 16 and 17, 1989.
43 GPC Audit of MY's E0Ps, dated May 1989.
44 Internal MYAPCo Memorandum, message and reply, dated May 16, 1989.
45
.MYAPCo Memorandum, dated June 29, 1989,
Subject:
E0P Philosophy
-Steering Committee Minutes.
46 E0P Audit Action Plan, dated July 14, 1989.
47 NRC Transmittal Letter to MYAPCo, dated October 27, 1989, enclosing NRC IR No. 50 309/89 81.
48 NRC Letter to FRIZZLE, dated 2/26/90, enclosing NRC's SER.
49 MY E0Ps Technical Gui.delines, Rev. 2, dated September 5,1989. '
50 MYAPCo Memo, dated September 31, 1991,
Subject:
E0P Steering Committee (SC).
51 MYAPCo Memo, dated February 4, 1992,
Subject:
E0P SC.
52 MYAPCo's Major Projects Work. Order No. 89 56E.
53 YAEC's MYSR Log Listing ASDV By Pass.
l 54
! A Series of MYAPCo Memorandums,
Subject:
E0P SC, from July 10, 1991, through December 11, 1993.
55 E0P Change Re attachments. quest No. 92 87, dated January 1, 1991, with
- 56 E mails from HATHAWAY to HATHAWAY, dated June 18, 1996, and July 1,1996.
~
j 57 Interview Report of YEROKUN, dated October 30, 1996.
58 Transcribed Interview of M dated August 20, 1996.
59
' Interview attachments.Re port ofM dated December 11, 1996, with 60 Transcribed Interview of M dated February 20, 1997.
61 Interview Report of ARSENAULT, dated October 30, 1996.
62 Interview Report of BRAND, dated December 10 and 13,1996.
. 63 Interview Report of TAYLOR, dated August 8,1996, with attachments.
T FOR ELD ICE D BLIC D d OSURE ITHOUfAP CTOR, FICE. INVE ;GATI
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64 Transcribed Interview of GARRITY, dated August 7,1996.
65 Transcribed Interview of WHITTIER, dated February 19 and 20,1997.
66 Transcribed Interview of FRIZZLE, d'a ted February 3,1997.
67 Excerpt from Transcribed Interview of SMITH, dated February 20, 1997.
68 Transcribed Interview of SMITH, dated March 19, 1997. ~
69 PRCE # 209, dated July 3,1996, with attachments.
70 MYAPCo's Salaried Employees Standards of Conduct, Issued June 4,
, 1996. .
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