IR 05000309/1988019

Partially Deleted Resident Insp Rept 50-309/88-19 on 880901- 1005 (Ref 10CFR73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Previous Insp Findings,Review of Special Repts,Licensee Event Followup & Physical Security

ML20206G191
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	10/27/1988
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206G183	List: IR 05000309/1988019 ML20206G178 ML20206G184
References
50-309-88-19, NUDOCS 8811220131
Download: ML20206G191 (8)

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.J.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Report No.: 50-309/88-19 License No.: DPR-36 Licensee: ,

Maine Yankee Atomic Power 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 i Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Conducted: September 1, 1988 to October 5, 1988 I n s,:,ectors : Cornelius F. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector Ri ard . F udenberger, Resident Inspector

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Approved By: / .

/0/S 7[f[

L&well E. Tr1H, Chief 'Date Reactor Projects Section No. 3A

- Division of Reactor Projects Summary: Inspection on September 1,1988 to October 5,1988 (Report Number 50-309/88-19 Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspectiors of plant operations including:

followup on previous inspection findings, review of special reports, licensee event fallowup, operational safety verification, mt ' ntenance , surveillance, physical security, radiation protection and fire protectio Results: Two violations were identified concerning security practices (Attach-ment A). These violations are both repeat occurrences of violations previously identified. Corrective actions as the result of the previous violations 1 apparently did not adequately address the cause of the violations. No other significant safety issues were identified. The licensee displayed conservative approaches in resolving a potential control room habitability issue and in resporiding to inoperable control board panalarms (Detail 5).

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OETAILS

, Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance tech-nicians and the licensee's management staf . Summary of Facility Activities At the beginning of the report period the plant was operating at 65 per-cent powe Power was gradually raised to 75 percent by September 5, where it remained for the rest of the report period as limited by the availabilit.y of only one of two main (unit) transformer . Review of Licensee Event Reports (IP 90713)

The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Report (LER) to deter-

mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent reoccurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

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LER 88-006 Plant Trip on Unit Transformer Failur On August 13, 1988, the reactor tripped from 98 percent power on loss

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of load due to a main turbine trip. The main turbine trip was caused by an electrical fault in one of the two unit transformer The electrical fault resulted in a transient on the electrical grid which was sensed by the reserve (offsite) power permissive relaying. Tha reserve power breakers were prevented from closing resulting in the start of both emergency diesel generators. A detailed review of this transient is included in Region I Inspection Report 50-309/88-1 The inforntion provided in the LER was found to be complete and accurat No deficiencies were identifie . Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) 50-309/85-14-01. Leakage of oxygen into the waste gas decay drums. The licensee's investigation of oxygen inleakage did not identify any probable sources. Engineering Design Change Request (EDCR) 86-16 installed an oxygen analyzer that samples the Waste Gas Surge Drum. The analyzer provides continuous readout of oxygen concentration and an annun-ciator at the Pri.aary Auxiliary Building (PAB) panel to alert operators if oxygen concentration reaches four (4) percen The inspector had no further question _ - . _ - _ _ - - - - - - - _ - - - .

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. Operational Safety Verification (IP 7170s)

On a daily basis, during routine facility tours the following were ,

checked: manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LCO's, instrumentation, recorder traces, protective. systems, control room annun-ciators, radiation monitors, emergency power source operability, operabil- i ity of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPOS), control room logs,  ;

shif t supervisor logs, and operating orders. On a weekly basis, selected Engineered Safety Features (ESF) trains were verified to be operable. The condition of the plant equipment, radiological cont rol s, security and safety were assesse On a biweekly frequency the inspector reviewed a

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safety-related tagout, chemistry sample resuits, shif t turnovers, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup and the posting of notices to  ;

workers. Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also evaluate The inspector observed selected phases of the plant's operations to verify operational safety and determine compliance with the NRC's regulation The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's

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actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or

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plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector ,

reviewed:

. On September 13, 1938, the licensee rotified the NRC Operations Center using the Emergency Notification System (ENS) of a putential i

co.1dition which may have resulted in the facility being outside the design basis. In February ot 1988, a review of control room habita-bility identified a potential flow path for outside contaminated air which could flow backwards through an exhaust fan which is de-ener-

gized on a Containment Isolation Signal (CIS) or a Safety injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), into the computer room. Air from the com-puter room then passes through the ventilation ductwork into the "A" train of the control room ventilation filter enclosure and through a common inlet air plenum, into the "B" train of the control room >

ventilation filter enclosure, from there into the control room. When  ;

t this potential flow path was identified in February 1988, the licen-l see installed an airtight damper cover over the "A" train inlet air damper to isolate the potential flow nath. An evaluation was per-

formed to determine if the potential h)w path would result in air contamination in the control room greater than the design basis ,

allowe On September 13, 1988, the result of the evaluation was '

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declared to be inconclusive since it could not be proven that the

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effects of the previously unidentified flow path were within the design basis of the facilit An ENS notification was made and a design chango is being considered to provide for a permanent solu-tio The inspector considered the licensee's actions to be

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3 On September 15, 1988, during a check of the Electrical Control Board panalarms, the section "SS" panalarms did not light. The section

"SS" panalarms include alarms associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators and the safety related electrical distribution syste An Auxiliary Operator was assigned to monitor the condition of all equipment that would result in a red panalarm in section "SS" every thirty minutes. Also, the plant computer provides redundant alarms for the majority of the systems with alarms in section "SS". The inspector reviewed the eqt.ipment which was monitored by the Auxiliary Operator and the Plant Computer Alarns and determined that the equip-ment was adequately monitored. The section "SS" pa slarms were ,

returned to service within three hours. The inspector reviewed the loss of the sectian "SS" panalarms with respect to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.7 It was determined that the loss of one section of the control room panalarms did not constitute a major loss of emergency assessment capability, therefore no reporting was require Containment Temperature Profiles - The inspector performed a review -

of containment temperature monitoring as described in Region I Inspection Report 50-309/88-11, detail 4.c. The review focused on

. the licensee's response to higher than normal ambient temperature That review identified that the maximum average containment tempera-ture analyzed for in the Final Safety Analysis is 113 degrees Fahren-heit. The high temperature alarm setpoint is 111 degrees Fahrenhei A further review was conducted in accordance with TI 2515/98 to gather average operating containment temperatures for the months of June, July and August of 1988 and to assess the representativeness of the of containment temperature monitorin The following data was retrieved from the licensee's computer files:

MONTH AVE TEMP MAX TEMP June 104.68 F 110.20 F  ;

July 107.65 F 111.39 F Auaust 105.89 F 111.67 F The instrumentation installed to monitor containment temperature con-i sists of tSirteen Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTO) located t

throughout ;he containment building. The output from these detectors I is processed by the plant computer to determine a weighted average containment temperature. Weighting factors were determined by divid-

ing the containment air volume into sections for wb'ch each tempera-ture detector is considered to have representat1<e indicatio In September of 1981 a licensee review of the locations of the RTO's

indicated that one detector was not representative due to its prox- ,

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imity to a ventilation duct outlet. This detector was removed from l the weighted average calculation and the air volume it represented l

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was redistributed to the weighting factors of the other twelve detec-tor The inspector reviewed the location of the detectors within .

the areas for which they are considered representativ Since the RTD locations within the loop areas could not be verified by the inspector during power operations and the inspector felt that more information was necessary ta verify the representativeness of the RTD indications due to their location on the polar crane wall, further '

review of the representativeness of the Containment Air Temperature detectors will be conducted during the refueling outage scheduled to commence October 15, 198 No violations were identifie . Plant Maintenance (IP 62703)

The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and main- ,

tenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety

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tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radio-logical controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and reporta-bility per Technical Specification The following maintenance evolutions were reviewed:

Date Report _ Number Description 9/15 3707-88 Meggar Test of Emergency Feedwater Pump (P-25A) motor leads.

9/22 4798-88 ICI Tool repair in spent fuel pool.

1 In preparation for the upcoming refueling outage, training was being per-formed on the use of the In-Core Instrument (ICI) tool. A crack was iden-

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tified at the base of the lifting ring. The inspector witnessed a portion of the repair ;ork. The tool is approximately forty feet long and stored

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in a vertical position in the Spent Fuel Poo In order to repair the weld that had cracked on the upper portion of the tool without working directly over the pool, the tool was removed from the pool and laid horizontally across the bridge crane and the edge of the pool. While the tool was being removed from the pool it was rinsed with water and a Health ,

Physics technician performed a continuous survey. However, there were no '

lanyards attached to the tool to prevent it from falling into the cool if it were accidentally dropped and the method of removing the tal from the pool saemed to cause a considerable amount of stress (bencing) as it was ;

manually moved to the horizontal position. The inspector identified these observations to maintenance supervisor responsible for the work. The method of removing the tool from the pool was considered to be poor, however no safety concerns were identifie No violations were identifie _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _

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, Surveillance Testing (IP 61726)

The inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance -

with approved procedures and LC0's, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolutio The following surveillances were reviewed:

Date Procedure Number Title

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9/15 3. Emergency and Auxiliary Feed Pump Test I 9/29 3. Turbine Valve Testing No violations were identifie . Observations of Physical Security (IP 71707)

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Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers,

! - vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging,

. and compensatory measures when require Attachment A to this report details observations in this are . Radiological Controls (Ip 71709)

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, Radinlogical controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-

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ing period. Areas reviewed included Organization and Management, external radiation exposure control and contamination contro Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control proced-ures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observed. Independent surveys i

of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspecto No significant discrepancies wer.1 seen between licensee and NRC result .

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No violations were identifie [

1 Exit Interview (IP 30703)

Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspectio The licensee did not identify 10 CFR 2.790 material.

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, ,ydyt/I4w./ u.<o-t/_ * Maine Yankee Security Observations

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During this inspection period the inspectors identified two instances which apparently constitute repeat occurrences of similar activities for which notices of violation have been issued to the licensee in the recent past (within the past two years)

4 Tlils PARAGRAPil CONTAMS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION AND IS NOIFOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE,lTIS !NTENTIONALLY LEfIBLAN .

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Tills PARAGR APil 00!lTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMAT!0N AllD is !!01 FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE,IT IS INTEHil0N ALLY LEfT DLAli The NRC is concerned that these two examples of repeat Security violations are apparently due to corrective actions which did not fully address the root cause of the previous violation '