IA-97-348, Partially Withheld Investigation Rept 1-96-040.Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Investigated:To Determine Whether Incomplete & or Inaccurate Info Willfully Provided by Utility During 941014 Enforcement Conference

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Partially Withheld Investigation Rept 1-96-040.Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Investigated:To Determine Whether Incomplete & or Inaccurate Info Willfully Provided by Utility During 941014 Enforcement Conference
ML20211J917
Person / Time
Site: Maine Yankee
Issue date: 05/30/1997
From: Boal D, Letts B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211J915 List:
References
FOIA-97-348 1-96-040, 1-96-40, NUDOCS 9710090047
Download: ML20211J917 (26)
v • d • e


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Title:

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION:

INCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE INFORMATION WILLFULLY PROVIDED TO THE NRC REGARDING THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM 4

Licensee: Case No.: 1 96 040 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Report Date: May 30, 1997 329 Bath Road Control Office: 01:RI Brunswick, Maine 04011 Docket No.: 50 309 Status: CLOSED Reported by: Rev ewed and Approved by:

ylikau bk bq Dennis Boal, Special Agent Barry RJ Letts, Director Office of Investigations Office of Investigations Field Office, Region IV Field Office, Region 1 Particinatina Personnel Ernest P. Wilson, Senior Special Agent Office of Investigations Field Office, Region I

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W4MlING NOT I SEMINA , PLACE N EN1 . OR USS C OF I RE .T OF OlR il M TY THE AP OVD OFF OF REPO IT. VI IZED INI IVE ON, DIS Y L IN /'j CRIMINAL E ION. /9

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SYNOPSIS This investigation was initiated on (ctober 24, 1996, by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations (01), Region I (RI), to determine whether incomplete and/or inaccurate information was willfully provided by the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPCo) during an NRC Enforcement Conference on Ntober 14, 1994, regarding the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (NY),

Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, 01 did not substantiate that NYAPCo officials willfully provided incomplete or inaccurate information regarding the EFW to the NRC during an October 14, 1994, enforcement conference.

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, e's s NOT,FOR PtSLIC DJ L WI PROV FIELD OFFICE DIREC4QR] 0FFI -

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, OFF 'I .JEy0NI Case No. 1-96 040 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS EA92 SYNOPSIS ................................. 1 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ........................... 5 DETAIL 5 0F INVESTIGATION ......................... 7 Applicable Regulations ....................... 7 Pur>ose of Investigation ...................... 7 Bac(ground ............................. 7 I nte rvi ews o f A11 ege r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Coordination with NRC Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Allegation: Incom)1ete and Inaccurate Information was Willfully Provided to the 4RC Regarding the Emergency Feedwater System at Maine Yankee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Evidence / Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Evidence / Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Agent's Analysis ......................20 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 LIST OF EXHIBITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 NOT IC I_ m I ' 0F

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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES l

i EXHIBII BRAND, Ethan Suxrvisor. Nuclear Safety Engineering 17 Group (NSE3), NYAPCo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 FROTHINGHAM, John. Manager. Quality Programs Department (0PD) HYAPCo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26827 i

20 FRIZZLE, Charles, President and Chief E:tecutive Officer, NYAPCo . . . . .

)

21

. FULLER, Edward. President, Associated Projects Analysis . . . . . . . . .

28 LEITCH, Graham. Vice President, Operationt. NYAPCo . . . , , . . . . . .

l 23

- SMITH, Stever., Manager, Operations Departnent, MYAPCo . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .M ? C 22 WHITTIER,. George, Vice President, Engineering, NYAPCo . : . . . . . . . .

25 VEILLEUX, Michael. Manager, Maintenance Department, HYAPCo . . . . . . .

19 YEROKUN, Jimi. Senior Resident Inspector at HY NRC . . . . . . . . . . .

1 SCL WI AP A 0F NOT FOR PUBL C I

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s DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION Aoolicable Regulations

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!' 10 CFR 50.5: Deliberate misconduct (1994 Edition), i l

10 CFR 50.9: Completeness and accuracy of information (1994 Edition).

l Puroose of Investicatiga l

1 This investigation was initiated on October 24, 1996, by the Nuclear ,

l Regulatory Comission (NRC), Office of Invest.igations (01), Region I (RJ), to '

! determine whether incomplete and/or inaccurate information was willfully l l provided to the NRC during an Enforcement Conference (EC) on October 14, 1994, '

i by the Haine Yankee Atomic Power Company (NYAPCo), regarding the Emergency

! Feedwater System (EFW) at the Haine Yankee Atomic Power Station (HY) l (Exhibit 1).

l Backaround I

On August 4, 1994. while the NY reactor was in a cold shutdown condition the plant operators determined that an EFW isolation valve for the il Steam

, Generator was leaking. It was determined that under accident conditions which require isolation of EFW, the. isolation valve leakage could exceed Safety Analysis assumptions and the NRC was informed on September 1,1994 (Exhibit 7), MY initiated an engineering root cause evaluation that was com leted Au ust 8. 1994 (Exhibit 6), and subsequently initiated a higher le se Eva October 6, 1994, S ,7 C l

i l The NRC identified the EFW isolation valve leakage issue in NRC Inspection

! . 50 309/94 15, dated September 20,1994 (Exhibit 8), and held an enforcement

conference (EC) on October 14, 1994, and issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) on
October 20, 1994 (Exhibit 9). Additional activities were conducted by the licensee, to include reviews by the Naclear Safety Audit and Review Comittee

. (NSARC) and the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) (Exhibit 15).

76 IC IR ,

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Coordination with NRC Staff On November 3, 1996, NRC:01 d the draft fi 7C In a November 7,1996, telephone conference, Jimi YER0KUN, Senior Resident observed Inspector at HY, NRC, advised 01:RI and the R ion I s l

e orial variations in the documents n I staff g!

j but did not identify any niaterial conjuct an inspection at HY regarding the materials provided to l

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Case No. 1 96 040 9

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01:RI and to provide a written summary analysis relative to the focus of this 01:RI investigation.

OnDecember 12,1996, YER0KUN, concluded his review of the EFW documents that hadbeenprovidedby01:RI(3versionsoftheNYPRCE#190,datedOctober6, 1994, August 1 and 2,1994 [vice 1996]; and 4 versicas of the HY EFS Event Invettigation Report (EIR),1 dated Se)tember 16, 1994, and 3 dated

  • September 20,1994), and said he saw tie results - f editing in the documents, but did not see evidence that information was hiuden from the NRC. YER0KUN said he did not identify any differences that tauld have caused the NRC's decision following the EC to be different. YER0KUN advised that, in general, inadequacies were highlighted in engineering and in the maintenance process.

YER0KUN added that the ordering of the causes did not change NRC considerations and de emphasizing engineering problems was not, in itself, a problem. YER0KUN opined that the key consideration for the NRC, was that the issue did not rise to a safety significant determination, as demonstrated by the NY safety analysis (Exhibit 19).

On December 6 1996, the RI staff provided an analysis of the information 7C g' l and determined that, in the materials reviewed. MY did not w .11old information from the NRC (Exhibit 4).

On January 31, 1997: YEROKUN provided an analysis of additional information provided by 01:RI and determined, again, in the materials reviewed, that HY did not withhold information from the NRC (Exhibit 14).

A11eaation: Incomplete and Inaccurate Information was Willfully Provided to the NRC Regarding the Emergency Feedwater System at Maine Yankee Evidence / Documents HY Procedure. No. 20 100 1. Rev. 15 (Exhibit 5)

This procedure provides guidance for a Plant Root Cause Evaluation Report, and establishes review responsibility by the NSEG. the Plant Manager, the PORC, each responsible department manager, and the Vice President for Operations.

In addition, this procedure required the tracking of the report's '

reconnendations in the Maine Yankee Task Tracking System (HYTTS).

Enaineerina Root Cause. dated Auoust 8.1994 (Exhibit 6)

This document titled, "EFW.A 338/EFW A 340 Seat Leakage," was the initial review of the August 4, 1994, EFW valve leakage event and was conducted by .

Lyndon BARR0N, Performance Engineer, Plant Engineering Department, HY, BARR0N concluded that the maintenance procedure did not provide sufficient details regarding seat / disc and actuator orientation.

MY letter to the NRC dated September 1. 1994 (Exhibit 7)

This letter transmitted the Licensee Event Report (LER) ' No. 94 016 to the NRC, which identified Jhe August 4,1994, EFW isolation valve leakage event. The LER reported that the reactor was in a cold shutdown condition and plant 70R IC DI '

F FI E RE , E I I , [ I

. 1 Case No. 1 96 040 10

A operators determined that an EFW isolation valve for #1 Steam Generator was leaking to the #2and#3SteamGenerators.Further investigation identified accident similar leakage in the It was determined that, under conditions, which require isolation of EFW, the isolation valve leakage could exceed Safety Analysis assumptions.

NRC Letter to HY. dated Seotember 22. 1994 (Exhibit 8) i that

- This letter remrts incorporated tie August the NRC inspection 4, 1994. findingsevent.

EFW 1eakage [IR No.

This50309/9415)

NRC inspection identified the failure of the NY engineering organization to determine leakage criteria for the EFW isolation valves, and to translate such into appropriate testing requirements, as an apparent violation.

NBC NOV Letter to MY. dated October 20. 1994 (Exhibit 9) -

This letter transmits the NOV to NY and sunnarizes the EC results. Also attached were copies of overhead slides that NYAPCo had provided at the -

October 14, 1994 EC, H U etter Transmittina a Revised LER to NRC. dated October 28. 1994 (Ex11 bit 10)

This document revised the safety significance of the August 4,1994, EFW event downward, citing recently completed analyses that showed plant safety was not significantly compromised by the August 4,1994 EFW event.

NRC Letter to MY. dated December 5. 1994 (Exhibit 11)-

This letter acknowledged the NY reply to the NOV. It confirmed receipt of the NY response that explained corrective and preventive actions were initiated regarding post maintenance testing of EFW isolation valves.

, MY Nuclear Oversioht Committee (NOC) Reoorts (Exhibit 13)

The NY NOC submitted reports for August 13, 1994, January 16, 1995, June 7, 1995, and August 15,1995, to the Chairman of the Board, NYAPCo. Also l

included with the documents were NOC working notes for the period February 7, 1995, through February 10, 1995. These reports, in part, compiled by Edward D. AJLLER, President Associated Projects Analysis, and a member of the NOC, identified areas of concern by the Board at NYAPCo. In the reports there are references to the August 4, 1994, CFW event. These documents were provided to the staff fcr review.

i FC s W0lf PRO) 0F l IE IC D , FIC 1 I S MNI Case No. 1 9 40 <

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NRC Memorandum. dated January 31. 1997 (Exhibit 14)

This memorandum is from the staff to 01 and related that a staff review of the additional HY documents (Exhibit 13), provided by 01, determined that no additional safety or technical concerns were presented therein.

NSARC Heetina Reoort. dated October 21. 1994 (Exhibit 15)

These documents detail a special meeting to review PRCE #190, and identified ,

that PRCE #190 did not include specific root cause de ons and, therefore, required revision. The doctments reflect revisions and 7 C.

the subsequent review and approval of PRCE #190 by t .

Manaoement Review Board Reoort. dated May 2.1995 (Exhibit 16)

This report titled, " Corrective Actions Associated with Hultiple Events Involving Incorrect Assembl the following individuals: John y of FR01111NGHAM, Eccentric Butterfly Valves,"

Manager, Qualitywas completed by Programs, Russ PR0llTY, Assistant to the Vice President. Oxrations, Mike EVRINGHAM, Operations Training Section ilead, and STOWERS (loard Consultant).

The re@rt sumarized that on March 15, 1995, a larger, but similar valve, was found to have the same problem as identified in the August 4,1994, EFV valve leakage event. MY recognized the " serious nature" of the problem, including the apparent failure of corrective action, and initiated this Management Review Board action. The Boar identified four issues deserving management attention. This report conclu<ced, in part, that certain management 3ractices required further review. Items identified were failure to complete EC commitments in a timely manner, and failure to input PRCE recommendations into "HYTTS." This report discussed prevent future similar problems, processes that HY should have enacted towith a trend towa problem but also to review the issue to look for additional generic and safety implications. The report identified programmatic problems, but did not detect any wrongdoing issues.

Evidence / Testimony Interview of BRAND (Exhibit 17)

  • Interviewed on December 10, 1996 BRAN

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t et PRCE "7 C

- BRAND said that NSEG proced allow for numerous rewrites of the draft PRCE reports. He recalled that provided a draft PRCE #190 report to one of tne NY man I] whose sec on was reviewed. BRAND said the manager may have ask to reposition a portion of the report about his (the y mana r's) se ion to a less noticeable place in the PRCE r rt. aid ar st i i

L I WI 0F ICE CE Case No. 1 96 040 12

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BRAND said he reviewed PRCE #190 and he was not aware of any HY' attempts to hide any information from the NRC in PRCE (190. He opined that all factors were completely and accurately reflected therein, including the resolution of the EFW valve leakage issue.

l BRAND said that on senior level rson ass E 7C Interview of FRIZZLE (Exhibit 20) -

Interviewed on February 3,1997. FRIZZLE, President and Chief Executive Officer, NYAPCo, said he attended the pre EC meetings that were routine s at NY (Exhibit 19, . 149), FRIZZLE ance at is a limited to mana Npre>aratormeeti F ZZLE added that he did not see con casual factor in the August 4,*1 EFW ra on con as a s e t (Exhibit 19, p. 55). FRIZZLE

'7c also did not recall any discussio that there was a problem with the openness or " level of candor" w pre EC meetings (Exhibit 19, p. 163). 76 FRIZZLE said that he attended the EC, and there was no information withheld from the NRC; it was an open and productive meeting (Exhibit 19, p. 166).

Interview of FULLER (Exhibit 21)

Interviewed on February 10, 1997, FULLER, President Associated Projects Analysis, and a member of the NY NOC, recalled the PRCE process at HY and the EFW event in August 1994. FULLER said he did not recall discussions about the

, plant configuration control versus inadeguacies in the engineering and

, maintenance processes. In addition, FULLER did not recall discussions about a related EC, preparations for the EC.' or the withholding of information from the NRC.

4 FULLER said that who arranged

'ms with t , re ore, many seussi M about scheduling. FULLER had no recollection of going to o ice to cuestion him a opics pertaining to the EFW or ot E JC issues. FlLLER said tha may have been part of a gro t discussed topics with the HOC, but he ad no specific recollection of presence or input. ,

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Case No. 1 96 040 13

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Interview of WITTIER (Exhibit 22) .

Interviewed on February 19,1997', WITTIER, Vice President, Engineering, NYAPCo, said the plant root cause process is used for issuqs thal; cut across departmental lines, and for issues that are judged to be more important.

Generally, they start out using one level and cilange as they gain additional information, because the assessment of the issue's significance may change -

(Exhibit 22, p.144). ,

WITTIER said the pre EC meetings are to first understand what the issues are and thwn to get a cross section of people to) ether that are involved with the issues: the August 4,1994, EFW event was innerdepartmental. The people that were involved were NYAPCo Counsel, the Licensing Group, Q wrations, Haintenance Department, and Engineering De>artment. And the purpose was to understand the facts, the causal factors, the root causes of the issues *and to outline plans fer corrective action. Typically, there is more than one meeting, and, eventually, they have a " dry run' and actually go through a j presentation (Exhibit 22, pp. 106 and 107).

Mil 1 TIER said the decision as to which personnel would attend the EC was conducted appropriate on a group or collegial basis, and de{07).nding on the issue, by the functio al manager (Exhibit 22, p.

MlITTIER recalled thatMattended some of the pre EC meetings, but could not remember precisely how many there were (Exhibit 22, o.113). WITTIER said there were conversations pbout what t t at tie EC but he did not ')C remember any issue being brought forwar relating to the ' level of candor." MilTTIER said he did not recall any ation that some issues were

- out of bounds, or that "we* did not want to bring those up to the NRC, to

. raise their attention or raise a flag (Exhibit 22, p.115).

WH E9 r a' y JTT ER recall a iway conversati (WillTIER) ind- t he did not og conclusions.

MilTTIER saidi lusions were focused ava 111ty of design, -

or safety anal formation, and had not focused on inadequacies involving post maintenance testing. Mi!TTIER said it'was his personal belief, because r ne conducted his own informal investigation, that the emineering problems were focused on fairly basic >roblems with the post main;enance testing pro 3 ram.' WHITTIER felt that f( had missed the mark in the needed M*

to llave some si vesents. He did not remember focusing on that area, as seemed to focus on r area. WiITTIER .

recalled telling is comments, because had asked for comments.

MilTTIER said he very strongly that the roo cause independent and felt a little awkward in this position, because process he did notneeds

. to be want to tell what to write w5en the are doin; an i nt root cause. But, had asked for h and ie had nions.

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< I E hI Case No. 1 96 040 14

1 l MillTIER said the final PRCE fl90 dis ed reorderin , but he did not recall anything par and 134). WlI1 TIER did

not recall in order to o

r Furthef, Mi!go along i

< with ElITTI said he did not remember

's c rns way convers ever saying that he did not agree with PRCE

. TTIER 7C

  1. 190aswritten(Exhibit .

114). M111 TIER said he did not, at any time duringthisprocess,tell1 to bur the design conclusion somewhere in the body of the report, ratier n hig ighti it up front, MII1 TIER said i what he remembered w ask f nts, which he gave, but he closed with, (Exhibit 22, p 119).

i WillTIER maybe not in said the he s believed thatthe desbn would issue avewas liked. kresented Wi!1 TIER to theit NRC, said X altho is his memory that1 believed the desion issue deserved greater emphasis

than what he (Mi!T believed was appropriate (Exhibit 22, p. 118).

! Mil 1 TIER said he did not pressureW to issue the PRCE (190 report, and was not aware of anyone doin that. WiITTIER said he did not recall

' FROTHINGHAM coming to him wi conversation FROTHINGHAM had ific discomfort about a lengt concerning the fact that I k.

was uncomfortable with his ( 's) input to PRCE #190 and the prepara ion meetings for the EC (Exhibit 22, pp. 121 124),

WHITTIER stated that he did not remember ifWeame in to see him, one on one, to tell him that he was very concerned about the " level cf candor" 7C that was going to be displayed at the EC on the EFW issue and in PRCE (190 (Exhibit 22, p. 140), .

Interview of SHITH (Exhibit 23)

Interviewed on February 20, 1997, SMITH, Manager, Operations Department, i

j said he attended all the NY pre EC meetings, but was not sure that 7C

' attended all of them. He did not recall conversations about whether would attend the s j a end the EC (Exhibit pp. 23,pecific 8 11). EC, but recalled that p manager did I SMITH did not recall configuration control being discussed in the pre EC '

j ' meetings. He also did not recall any discussions about limits on the level of 1 interaction between NRC and NY. SHIlli attended the EC on October 14, 1994,

and made a presentation. He said no information was directed to be withheld
from the NRC, nor was information withheld from the NRC (Exhibit 23, l

pp. 12 14).

SMITH recalled no discu s about the ' level of candor" during the EC, and 7C 4 he was not aware thatM phad voiced concerns about the information 3

presented at the EC (Exfi ,t 23, pp. 14 18).

Interview of VEILLEUX (Exhibit 25)

Interviewed on Februar 20, 1997, r, Maintenance De MYAPCo,recalledthatb. initially requested VEILLEUXManafBARR0Ninvestigathartment, tha ttm E

I Case N . 1 96 040 15

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I August 4,1994, EF14 valve leaka')e event to determine the root cause of the problem. VEILLEUX said during ;he investigation into the causes of the EFW 76 leaks, it became obvious that the sco>e needed broade (VEILLElll) requested a more formal PR:E, an

@ (Exhibit 25, pp. 12 and 13).

VEILLEUX said the PRCE chartering authority is the individual who defines the

  • scope of expectation for the root cause determination, therefore, he (VLILLEUX) helped to define the scope of PRCE #190 (Exhibit 25, p. 20), ,

VEILLEUX recalled several meetings with M . from the time PRCE (190 was I initiated, to the time it was finalized. VEILLEUX recalled having three  !

meetings withMand attended other group meetings. VEILLEUX said they I-had more than the average number of PRCE meetings, because of the significance '

and the technical nature of the issue (Exhibit 25, pp. 20 22).

VEILLEUX said W did not convey to him a concern that someone else, other than the chartering authority, was directing S how to write PRCE #190 (Exhibit 25, p. 27). ,

VEILLEUX recalled some format type changes as PRCE #190 went through various editing modes and changes, but did not recall that the order of the root 7G.

causes was an isse?. VEILLEUX said he was are th i greed with the changes, and said he did not pressure (Exhibit 25, pp. 30 34).

1 VEILLEUX did not recal1 @ PPhaying that he did not agree with how the ;7 c pre EC meeting was going, or w1at was going to be presented to the NRC (Exhibit 25, pp. 40 and 51 54).

VEILLEUX said the " dry runs," were a matter of discussing what was the best

>resentation, hcw ta put this information forward in the best possible light, low to refine presentation skills, and were not of the nature that we should withhold information. VEILLEUX said he was not ware of any information that

. was purposely withheld from the EC (Exhibit 25, p. 41).

VEILLEUX said the order of how the root causes are presented does not matter, as long as they are all somewhere in the paper, or somewhere in the '

i presentation to the NRC. VEILLEUX said it did not matter from a technical nature and the order did not matter to him (Exhibit 25, p. 44). .

VEILLEUX said he was not aware thatO complained to any HY officers or " G-officials, relative to the " level of candor" that was displayed at the EC / .

(Exhibit 25, pp. 51 and 52).

VEILLEUX recalled the EC process, to a certain dejree, as being a healthy process and there were a lot of discussions. VEILLEUX explained that HY identified some good information and good root causes came out of the process, although it was a rather lengthy It was his first EC, but he believed that everyone did well, process.and it was their intent to provide accurate and truthful information for themselves and to the NRC (Exhibit 25, pp. 55 and 56).

D SC W3100T LC DI , IC 0F N - G T: RE I U

Case No. 1 96 040 '

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Interview of FR01HINGHAM (Exhibits 26 and 27)

! Interviewed on March 25, 1997, FROTHINGHAM. Manager, Quality Programs Department (QPD), NYAPCo, said the August 1994 EFW event occurred during a E shutdown, and it aneared that NY was oriai.311y 7 unaware of the significance of the event. BARON worked on the initial internal investigation for eleven

' days, then his visor requested the assistance of a PRCE trained individual (Exhibit 26, p. 1).

l FROTHINGHAMsaidtheeditingofPRCE#190wassensitiveandsoughttoensure

) and to confirm there was reasonable evidence to i quality, identify clarity, the causalreadability,FROTHINGHAM factors. did not recall any particular causal l factor at this time and did not recall the term " configuration control" as ,

.specifically applicable to this EFW event (Exhibit 26, p.1).

FROTHINGHAM recalled that the work order for the eccentric butterfly valv5

, was generically written and Quality Assurance had informed HY Haintenance that they did not have enough specifics. FROTHINGHAM said the eccentric butterfly valves were made by Contramatics, Inc., and recalled that another set of valves that were similar were also used in the plant. FROTHINGHAM said PRCE

  1. 190 was not completed prior to the EC on October 24, 1994. FROTHINGHAM said 7

)

that procedural adequacy was questioned in this event and there were /b approximately three meetings that he attended prior to the EC. FROTHINGHAM recalled that the biggest concern about attendance at the EC was whether he

would attend, which became the first EC he attended for HY. FROTHINGHAH could not recall whetherW attended the EC (Exhibit 26, p.1).

I FROTHINGHAM recalled that the EC was to be a public conference, therefore, how the information was to be presented was a concern; however, FROTHINGHAM stated this concern did not compromise NY's integrity. FROTHINGHAM said im did not recall any mention that information ob 'ined by HY was not to be presented to the NRC (Exhibit 26, p. 2). FROTHINGHAM said after the EC, he did not recall any discussions about whether the information provided to the NRC war inaccurate (Exhibit 27, p.12).

at the completion of PRCE (190 that he FROTHINGHAM recalled a initiated to expedite processing PRCE unique meeting #190 through the bureaucracy. In i

attendance were VEILLEUX, STOWERS, BARR0N, James TAYLOR, Senior Nuclear Safety i Engineer, NSEG, NY, and himself. FROTHINGHAM said the uniqueness was that the PRCE (190 report was being presented to the affected managers and they were

" buying * 'into the conclusions prior to the formal presentation to the PORC,

- thereby speeding up the formal PORC review process, which was a lengthy process, requiring many revisions. FROTHINGHAM said, in the past, PRCEs were

. understaffed, resources were constantly being pulled away, and due dates were continually extended. FROTHINGHAM said this meeting was an attempt to move the PRCE #190 report quickly (Exhibit 26, p. 2).

FROTHINGHAM did not recall a lot ssion on the substance of the remrt, or any prolonged discussions with during the development of the PRCE

  1. 190, but recalled discussions more on to move the report, the pac  %

o hibit 27, . 12). FROTHI s t f as

. ICE I , I I Ca'se No. 1 96 040 17 t

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may have complained that some individuals might have been upset with his recommendations, that would have been fairly routine (Exhibit 27, p.13).

FROTHINGHAM said he did not recall any discussion wherein M stated that he did not agree with the PRCE #190, or the way the information was provided Ic to the NRC in the EC, or that he was going to raise his level of concern higher up the organization (Exhibit 27, pp. 20 and 21). -

l FROTHINGHAM said he was unaware of any directions to o undertake a yc and find out what concerns were review cr regarding thean investigation, development of PRCE to try#190 (Exhibit 27, p. 23),

FROTHINGHAM said, with respect to PRCE #190 there was a request by MIZZLE thattheNSARCreviewtherootcauseanalysisanddrawconclusionsaboutthe adequacy of the root cause. That review (Exhibit 15) was performed, but review b delayed.yFROTHINGHAM the PORC, which was somewhat also explained resistantReview that the Management to theboard NSARC's role, was (Exhibit 16) discovered that, through a misunderstanding, the recommendations for PRCE #190 had not yet been put into the NY task process (Exhibit 27, pp. 24 and 25).

Interview of LEITCH (Exhibit 28).

Interviewed on March 25, 1997. LEITCH, Vice President Operations, NYAPCo, said from an officer level he had the overall responsibility for at least the maintenance aspects of this issue, explaining that post maintenance testing is an Engineering responsibility. LEITCH said because of the serious nature of this problem, they commissioned a PRCE, the second highest level of root cause evaluation that was in place at that time. LEITCH said he approved the charter for the PRCE, so as to define exactly the scope of investigation and to insure that it was thorough, and did not just address the specifics of this

> articular issue, but also address the generic implications of the issue.

.EITCH said the normal process is to cl.artering authority (Exhibit 27, pp. 9 andprovide 10). the final report to the LEITCH recalled a number of actions resulting from the PRCE #190, a number of recomendations, and meetings involving people who had to implement those-recomendations. The meetings were to insure clarity surrounding the ,

' '. recommendations: to be sure that the recomendations made sense; and to insure the recommendations were tracked to completion. He recalled a meeting that '

discussed PRC.E #190 when it was in the final draft stage (Exhibit 27, pp. 10 and 11). ,

LEITCH said he knew all three of the individuals who conducted the PRCE #190, but did not remember if they atte the pre EC meetings. LEITCH recalled no 2 discussions about whether or not specifically, would attend the EC (Exhibit 27, pp. 14 and 15).

LEITCH said NY had pre EC meetings, which he attended,'and said the attendance selection for the pre EC meetings was not quite as fors.a1 as one may think, in that they decida to have such a meeting and the people that are involved show up for the meeting. People, generally, understood who was involved there CTL hI Case No. 1 96 040 18

were some informal discussions, and the people that felt they had a role showed up for the meeting (Exhibit 27, pp.12 and 13).  ;

LEITCH said for the EC, even before the " dry run,' they had a planning session: wherein they discussed what points needed to be made, who is the best person to make those particular points, prepare the view graphs, and the text to use for the EC. He added that it became clear who the presenters would be, in this case, Engineering, Maintenance, Quality Assurance, as well as the executive management of Operations. Engineering, and FRIZZLE, who chose to come. As far as who makes the decision who goes, he did not recall the decision making process, but there was some issue having to do with something

as mundane as transportation arrangements. LEITCH explained tiey had difficulty obtaining commercial jet service to King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, so, NYAPCo chartered two small air) lanes. One flew from Portland, Maine, and one flew from Wiscasset, Maine. Tiere was a oractical limitation, as to how many folks could fit in the two airplanes (Ex11 bit 27, pp.13 and 14).

LEITCH said thr.t during the conduct of the " dry runs." he did not recc11

discussions about the ' level of candor" or limits on the free flow of information that would be discussed at the EC. LEITCH said that no information was withheld frc's the NRC at the EC (Exhibit 27, pp.16 and 17).

! id he has no recollection of meetings withM, wherep specifically brought up questions about the 1nformation being 7 C-prov to the NRC, what may be hidden from the NRC, or that the " level of 4 candor" with the NRC was less than desirable (Exhibit 27, pp.17 and 18).

LEITCH said, at that time, M worked close to him, physically, and they would see each other in theMa is and talked frequently about a whole lot of 7C things. However, he did not recall any discussion, at about a *1ack of candor,' nor did he remember any specific mee on any subject,forthatmatter. LEITCH said he and and continue to have, a very constructive relationship. To LE ,1 seems to be free to talk about any number of issues (Exhibit 27, pp. - 19).

4 LEITCH said, clearly, the valve being installed backwards was a configuration control issue, although he did not recall applying that particular terminology to the situation. LEITCH said be would describe those issues as subsets of.

what he would call configuration control, a broader term. He said problems with post maintenance testing are illustrative of configuration control. So, he would say.- that there are many things that could lead to configuration control prcblems, and he would define configuration control as being a broader ters than maintenance procedures or post maintenance testing. LEITCH said there were a lot of ct,rrective actions, steuning from this particular issue, that would have addressed configuration control. He did not recall using that would have addressed particular ct.nfiguration control (Exhibit 27, pp.19 an 20).

ters, but the actions, certainly,d LEITCH said he may have told FULLER that the eccentric butterfly valve was an But, as issue, and one of the things that the NOC ought to take a look at.

far as prescribing who FULLER should talk to, or what documents he should I

/ fGI Case No. 1 96 040 19

review, he did not recall having any discussion with him in that regard (Exhibit 27, p. 22).

LEITCH said the document titled, "A Hanagement Review Board Report," is more comonly call an Event Review Board, and is the highest level of event review.

It is always commissioned by an officer of the com

' issues, and he commissioned the one dated, May 19952, pany to (Exhibit 27,investigate

p. 23). serious Aoent's Analysis The August 4, 1994 EFW event escalated into a more significant issue than initially assumed. The O! investigation's testimonial and documentary .

evidence confirm the progression from a relatively low level incident, to the highest level of attention at NY, with a resultant NRC enforcement conference, k; was involved with the NY EFW event investig The 01 interv' ews, with supporting documentation, confi.,n, in general, account of the event's progression. The PRCE #190 review process a the NY nferences were confirmed. However, the only

testimon egardin concerns with the PRCE (190 conclusions, conf 1 nvestie was by BRAND and WHITTIER. led that WH11 TIER recalled telli his o 'ns, but added that he further t o

Neither interviewee recalled in re ere y of information provided to the NR EC. g f the interviewees recalled discussions during pre EC meetings about iness with the PRCE #190 conclusions, none recalled discussions 7 a possible attendance at the EC, none re alled receiving direct ons a ut the ' level of candor" to be used with the NRC, and none

/C received any directions to withhold pertinent information from the NRC.

identified M individuals he specifically told that he had a concern a ut the information that was going to be provided to the NR be would make his concerns known to others. OI interviewed individuals and none of them recalled a conversation wherein problems with the information that MY C or advi a related /C inf of is concern.

~

The NRC:RI staff was provided extensive documentary information obtained by OI:RI, but did not find anything to indicate that information was withheld .

from the NRC.

Notwithstanding the denials of other aised his concerns over th ter with them. 01 considers a credible witness. In addition, volunteered to take a polygn o verify the veracity of his a egations. However, testimonial ev dence and the documentation obtained 76 during the investigation do not appear to support the concern that root cause information on the.EIN event may have been withheld from the NRC. 01 concludes, from the evidence obtained, that given the amount of time elapsed.

OR CD OSURE I I I JE RE ICE IGA , I Case No. 1 96 040 20

the memory and emphasis of any meetings about PRCE #190 findings and the

' level of candor

  • may have been elevated in consciousness, but not viewed by others as having the same significance. This might explain, somewhat, the discrepancy between his concern and the available evidence.

Conclusion Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, 01 did not substantiate that NYAPCo officials willfully provided incomplete or inaccurate information regarding the EFW to the NRC du' ring an October 14, 1994, enforcement conference.

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Case No. 1 96 040 21 0

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4 ,

t j LIST OF EXHIBITS

, Exhibit i No. Descriotion 1 Investigation Status Record dated October 24, 1996,

)

j 3 Emergene Feedwater Valve Leaka9e Event Investigation Report, PRCE

  1. 190,andDrafts.

1 i 4 NRC Hemorandum, YER0KUN to Letts, dated December 16, 1996.

l'

5 HY Procedure, No. 20 100 1, Rev. No. 15, issue date April 25, 1994.

6 (Engineering) Root Cause, dated August 8, 1994.

l I 7 HY Letter to the NRC, dated September 1, 1994, with LER 94 016 i attached.

l 8 NRC Letter to HY, dated September'22, 1994, with attached i Inspection Report 50 309/94 15. ,

f

! 9 NRC NOV Letter to HY, dated October 20, 1994, with attachments.

l 10 HY Letter transmitting LER 94 016 01 (Rev. 1) to NRC, dated October 28, 1994.

11 NRC Letter to HY, dated December 5, 1994, with attachments

(NYAPCo's response to NOV).

1 12 I

13 MY Nuclear Oversight Committee Reports, dated August 13, 1994, j 8 January 16, 1995, June 7, 1995, and August 15,1995, i' NRC Hemorandum, YER0KUN to Letts, dated January 31, 1997.

14 I 15 Yankee Atomic Electric Company Memorandum, NSARC Heeting Report, i dated October 21, 1994, with attachments, f 16 HY Hanagement Review Board Report, dated May 2, 1995 .

I 17 Interview Report of BRAND, dated December 10, 1996.

4 18 4 l 19 Interview Report of YER0KUii, dated December 12, 1996.

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Case No. 1 96 040 -

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i 20 Trcnscript of Interview with FRIZZLE, dated February 3, 1997.

! 21 Intersiew Report of FULLER, dated February 10, 1997, j 22 Transcript of Interview with WHITTIER, dated February 19, 1997. l i

, 23 Transerspt of Interview with SMITH, dated February 20,1997. '

1 24 ,

25 Transcript of Interview with VEILLEUX, dated February 20, 1997.

! 26 Interview Report of FROTHINGHAM, dated March 25, 1997, 27 Transcript of Interview with FROTHINGHAM, dated March 25, 1997.

l 28 Transcript of Interview with LEITCH, dated March 25, 1997.

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