IR 05000309/1993017
| ML20059J731 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1993 |
| From: | Eapen P, Kenny T, Jimi Yerokun NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059J714 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-93-17, GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9311150031 | |
| Download: ML20059J731 (14) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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REPORT / DOCKET NOS.: 50-309/93-17
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LICENSEE NUMBER:
DPR-36 LICENSEE:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336
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e FACILITY:
Maine Yankee Nuclear Generating Station
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INSPECTION DA"dS:
September 17-21, 1993
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INSPECTORS:
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T. J./Kymf, S,r] Reactor Engineer
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Sy temLSectib(1, EB, DRS
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M/uee fs shzk N
J. T.)/(ok6n, r. Resident Inspector
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APPROVED BY:
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Dr. P. K. Eapen, Chi /f Date
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Systems Section, EB, DRS
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9311150031 '/31104 l
PDR ADOCK 05000309 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMnRY Progress has been made by MY personnel in closing open items from the MOV team
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inspection conducted in September 1992. (Section 1.0 - 3.0) One unresolved item concerning the two stage approach to dynamic testing was closed (Section 4.0) and one violation involving 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification of failures to the NRC was closed (Section 5.0).
Dynamic testing of safety-related MOVs was witnessed by the inspector. The testing was
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performed in a methodical manner with precautions and emphasis put on safety of -
equipment, materials, and personnel.. Well written procedures were used and very close
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cooperation between the test personnel and the operations personnel was also observed (Section 6.0).
Decision making by engineering management concerning system operability, observed during flow testing of certain valves in the safety injection system, was prompt and complete (Section 6.0).
A failure to follow procedures by contractor personnel, during maintenance on MOV HSI-M-42, resulted in damage to the safety-related valve in the safety. injection system which.
is a violation of Technical Specification 5.8.2, concerning written procedures. The inspector
also observed MY's prompt actions in dealing with the contractor personnel to resolve the procedural infraction (Section 6.0).
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DETAILS 1.0 INTRODUCTION On September 14-18, 1992, a team inspection was conducted to evaluate the adequacy of Maine Yankee's (MY's) actions, developed in response to NRC Generic 12tter (GL) 89-10 and its supplements 1 - 4, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance."
As a result of that inspection, documented in NRC Report No. 50-309/92-81, certain items -
were either not completed or were not in complete accord with the GL. The purpose of this inspection was to update the table that appears at the end of Inspection Report 92-81, and to witness dynamic testing of selected valves. The inspection also addressed the resolution of a violation regarding reportable concerns involving degraded voltage of certain motor-operated valves (MOVs) and an unresolved item regarding the two-stage approach for GL 89-10 MOVs.
The team inspection concluded that the implementatien of MY's program was progressing effectively toward its scheduled completion of June 30,1994, and in accordance with the recommendations of GL 89-10. The team also concluded that the program was being effectively managed and that it met the intent of GL 89-10, with some exceptions. Those exceptions were addressed in Table I to Inspection Report 92-81. This report addresses the items listed in Table 1, and a violation and unresolved item.
2.0 UPDATE OF TABLE 1 IN INSPECTION REPORT 92-81
2.1 Design Basis Reviews Identify expected fluid temperatures for worst-case scenarios and assure that design
basis reviews include this information.
MY's calculation, " Thermal Hydraulic Design Basis for MOVs Associated with the Maine Yankee Program," MYC-780, has currently been revised. The calculation addresses all expected fluid temperatures for worst-case scenarios.
MY was to evaluate the effects of high temperatures on the output of AC motors in
MOVs. Incorporate any information provided by Limitorque Corporation as soon as possible.
At the time of the initial inspection, MY had not evaluated the effects of high temperature on the output of AC motors. MY management stated that information provided by Limitorque would be incorporated as soon as possible. The results of Limitorque's research became available in a Part 21 Notification, dated May 13, 1993. The inspector verified that the output of AC motors at high temperatures has been evaluated, and the results incorporated into the MOV progra.
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The inspector reviewed MYP 93-0651, "Limitorque Potential 10 CFR 21, " Reliance
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30 Motors Reduced Starting Torque at Elevated Temperatures," dated June 16,1993.
This analysis used Limitorque's information to determine if each MOV had adequate torque to operate under design basis conditions, with high motor temperatures and worst-case degraded voltage. MY's analysis assumed that each MOV was stroked approximately three times, in accordance with the inservice testing program, and the valve stroke time was equal to the " inoperable" stroke time defined in the Technical Specifications. These assumptions provide for the most conservative motor temperature prior to the design basis accident. Valves were considered unsatisfactory if the temperature exceeded 180 C (beyond the range of Limitorque's data) or if the torque available was less than the maximum required operating torque. This analysis concluded that eight valves may have insufficient torque to perform under design basis conditions.
Safety 1ssue Concern (SIC)93-003, provided a detailed analysis for these eight valves and documented that the degradation was primarily caused by overheating during tests. This analysis showed that four valves, SL-M-29/40/51 and RH-M-1, are not tested during normal operations, and therefore, not susceptible to overheating except during testing. Further evaluations showed PR-M-16/17, have lower motor temperatures due to an incorrect assumption in the original udeulation. However,
this incorrect assumption did not adversely affect the motor capability. For valves LSI-M-40/41, the capability of the valve to meet design basis operation after surveillance valve strokes is considered degraded for fifteen minutes subsequent to stroking. Therefore, MY issued Temporary Procedure Change (TPC)093-149 to Procedure 3-1-2.3, "ECCS Routine Testing-Valve Testing and Position Verification,"
to require a fifteen-minute delay between stroking these valves. The inspector
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concluded that MY's analysis and actions were adequate to assure that the output of AC motors at elevated temperatures is satisfactory for all MOVs.
Review all normal and emergency operating procedures to assure that all possible
system configurations have been accounted for in the methodology used to determine worst-case differential pressure. NOPs and EOPs were not adequately reviewed for the GL 89-10 program.
This area is still under review by Maine Yankee. The expected completion date is June 30,1994.
2.2 Diagnostic Systems Review validation results from diagnostic equipment ven?
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equipment inaccuracies into the GL 89-10 program as sova as possible.
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In the response to Inspection No. 92-81, dated February 12, 1993, MY management stated, " Maine Yankee does not generally use 12% inaccuracy for the VOTES
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equipment. The inaccuracy for each test setup depends on a number of variables."
In the response to GL 89-10, Supplement 5, dated July 21,1993, MY discussed the use of calibration curves using the straight line fit method in accordance with B&W Nuclear Services (BWNS) that can result in additional uncertainties.
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MY has incorporated equipment inaccuracies irto the GL 89-10 program. The inspector reviewed Maine Yankee's "MOV Testing Guidance," MN-93-70, Revision 0,' that discusses the following adjustments for MOV testing.
Compensation of the VOTES diagnostic test equipment has been fixed at 9% and is
included in the calculation of the switch setting values.
This compensation has been incorporated into the testing procedures.
2.3 MOV Switch Settings and Setpoint Control
'i The existing engineering methodology for thrust calculations allows for the selection
of alternate calculations and/or results. The GL 89-10 program does not provide
guidance for selection of the appropriate thrust calculation for each valve, and does
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not require technical justnication for exceptions to the guidance, where it is not followed.
Written guidelines are being developed and are scheduled to be completed June 6,1994.
j An assumed standard valve factor of.3 has been shown to yield non-conservative
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results in some cases. MY's GL 89-10 program does not provide for the need to l
feedback test results and reevaluate valve factors based upon actual test data.
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Feedback of test data is being incorporated into valve factor determinations. -The
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evaluation is expected to be completed by June 6,1994.
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The GL 89-10 program does not reflect specific justification of why it is not practical
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to test any particular MOV under worst-case differential pressure and flow.
MY plans to provide specific justification for all MOVs not tested under worsticase differential pressure and flow. This is expected to be completed by June 1994.
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The MOVATS database may not provide conservative thrust estimates in all cases.
- The GL 89-10 program does not provide a technical justification to demonstrate that the thrust estimates applied are the most conservative, consistent with due regard for
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avoiding overthrust. Provide technical justification to demonstrate that the thrust estimates applied are the most conservative for each MOV.
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MY plans to make calculation revisions that will include removal of the MOVATS
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database. This is expected to be completed by June 1994.
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No margin for rate of loading.
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The rate ofloading effects for MOVs during dynamic closing tests are now considered by MY, and calculations are now included in the testing program.
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Stem friction coefficients used in the GL 89-10 program have not been validated from
as-found testing done at the end of the lubrication period before relubrications is performed.
MY has considered stem friction coefficients, and is conducting "as-found" tests in
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order to verify that the assumed stem friction coefficient bounds the worst-case lubricant conditions in MOVs. MY expects to complete this testing by June 1994.
Develop a formal method to use differential pressure test results to validate
assumptions used in thrust equations.
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MY plans on evaluating the test results and comparing them to the assumptions used to calculate the required thrust and torque, and make any changes necessary for operability. They do not plan on changing or validating assumptions unless they have an engineering basis to do so. This is expected to be completed by June 1994.
Thrust / torque window does not consider output under degraded voltage conditions,
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MY has not developed technical justification for the determination of the upper limit
on torque switch settings. MY stated that limited use of motor stall characteristics might be factored into some determinations of torque switch upper limits.
MY's methodology of torque switch calculations differs from the normal Limitorque methodology. The inspector reviewed Technical Evaluation 238-93, which describes the MY methodology and how it differs from Limitorque. MY's position for the differing methodologies is as follows:
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When the primary function of the torque switch is to protect the MOV from
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potential damage (opening or closing on limit), the switch setting is used only for mechanical overload protection.
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Electrical overload conditions are protected by proper sizing of the thermal
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overload relay heater element. These have been calculated and sized to prevent motor damage, and allow valve operation for normal and design basis conditions.
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Degraded voltage motor capability is verified to exceed the requirements of.
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safety-related design basis operation. This is done both as part of determining
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switch settings, and acceptance criteria for dynamic testing.
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When the primary function of the torque switch is the control switch (close),
then the switch is set anywhere wiatin the acceptable range given on the switch setting sheet. It is possible that the actuator may stall prior to control switch
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trip, but it is not possible that the actuator will stall prior to reaching the required safety-related position since degraded voltage pullout torque (DVPT).
is greater than the required torque.
MY discussed their methodology with Limitorque in May of 1993, and the Limitorque representative agreed that this position was acceptable when properly -
implemented.
- The reason MY believes this alternate position is more desirable because DVPTs are calculated values, and, as a result, do not need correction for measurement error or equipment repeatability. Design basis torque requirements are also calculated values and if dynamic tests are involved, the resulting conservative number includes error.
and repeatability in the summary of the test results. Therefore, the calculated
degraded voltage capability need only be larger than the calculated required design
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basis torque. When DVPT is used as an upper limit for TSS one must assume that actuator stall without Torque Switch Trip is the condition being prevented. This
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requires consideration of measurement error and equipment repeatability resulting in unnecessary thrust / torque window limitation.
.t Implement a system to ensure that all valve thrust requirements receive an appropriate
level of engineering review prior to being released to the field for use during testing.
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Develop appropriate controls over the basis for valve thrust requirements to be used
for field testing.
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j Valve thrust requirements are now receiving an engineering review prior to being released to the field for use during testing. Also, appropriate controls over the basis for valve thrust require-ments have been developed and are being used for field
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testing. The inspector confirmed the above during the review of the "MOV Testing Guideline" and the current diagnostic test procedures being used during the present outage.
Ensure that all MOV test procedures fully account for diagnostic test equipment
inaccuracies.
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Revised diagnostic test procedures, to account for revised thrust window limits and equipment inaccuracies, were reviewed by the inspector. The inspector validated that
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the new procedures are being used for the present outage.
Torque switch settings have not been reviewed to ensure that they account for test
equipment repeatability and to ensure that adequate margin exists.
i The current procedures being used, now account for test equipment repeatability and ensure that adequate margin exists. This is accomplished by performing a minimum
of 5 tests where the measured thrust / torque data obtained must not exhibit an increasing or decreasing trend from test to test.
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2.4 Diagnostic Testing i
Specific acceptance criteria were not included in MOV dynamic test procedures to e
enable operability determinations prior to return of the MOVs to service.
l The MOV dynamic test procedures c. ntain specific acceptance criteria ta enable the operability determination prior to the MOV's return to service. These criteria are also delineated in the attachments to the MOV Testing Guideline.
Specific guidance to perform detailed evaluations of dynamic test results have not e
been developed yet.
r There is now specific guidance to perform detailed evaluations of dynamic test results
incorporated in the MY test procedures. This information is also delineated in the attachments to the MOV Testing Guideline.
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2.5 Schedule
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The licensee's goal is to complete design basis reviews under GL 89-10 by the end of
1992.
The inspector reviewed " Thermal Hydraulic Design Basis for MOVs Associated with the Maine Yankee MOV Program," Calculation Number MYC-780. This calculation addressed every valve in the GL 89-10 program and delineated all the pertinent data about each valve, including pressures (upstream, downstream, and delta pressure).
System parameters, temperature ranges, and other information describing the valve, its position normally, and its usage for plant operation.
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A program has not been developed to trend MOV failures and root causes.
- MY is currently developing a trending system and hopes to have it completed by the end of the current outage.
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r Assess the next refueling outage schedule to ensure that all remaining MOV testing
can be accomplished within the planned outage period and notify the NRC with
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justification of any changes in the established program schedule.
l The inspector reviewed the testing schedule and verified that all of the GL 89-10 MOVs will have been tested in accordance with the initial requirements of GL 89-10 j
by the end of the current refueling outage. Future testing (through cycles 14,15, and 16) is scheduled to meet the 3-cycle or 5-year retest tre-nding requirements for GL 89-
10. MY stated they may perform retesting earlier, to optimize the work load, or to
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support the specific need for a valve.
j 3.0 ADDITIONAL ITEMS FROM REPORT NO. 50-309/92-81
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There were several additional items discussed in Report No. 92-81 that were not listed in l
Table 1. The following addresses these items-
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3.1 Design Basis Reviews l
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MY personnel stated that requests have been made to valve vendors for seismic
considerations as part of the weak link evaluations, and that the information would be
incorporated into design basis reviews and thrust calculations.
The inspector reviewed Volume 3 of the MOV Program Manual, which is a controlled document, and confirmed that MY purchased the weak link analysis for
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every valve in the GL 89-10 program from each valve vendor under a certificate of-j conformance. These analyses and calculations have been incorporated into the MY
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testing program.
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3.2 MOV Switch Settings and Setpoint Control MY is evaluating future use of the Isolation Valve Assessment (IVA) software
provided by Idaho National Engineering Laboratories (INEL) to predict gate valve performance.
MY has purchased the IVA software and has incorporated it into the valve program.
3.3 MOV Testing The team noted several instances where test data recorded may have been
inconsistent. For example, the VOTES data sheet for the tests of MOVs SIA-M-53 and 54 in February 1992, recorded 700 GPM versus 740 GPM, as measured and recorded in the test procedure. MY agreed to address this weakness in future testing.
MY is using clamp on flow detectors to obtain the necessary flow data where normally installed instrumentation may not be adequate. The temporary flow devices are installed as near the valve as possible to obtain the most accurate flow information.
Review of the static test of HSI-M-50 indicated the absence of an engineering review
of the diagnostic traces prior to the work order signoff. While the inspector had no hardware concerns after review of the data, MY recognized the procedural problem in bypassing the engineering review prior to the work order signoff. The licensee initiated a design screening report to resolve this problem.
Engineering reviews the diagnostic traces prior to work order signoff. A required signature, by engineering, and has been incorporated into the MY MOV valve testing procedure.
3.4 MOV Maintenance and Post-Maintenance Testing Until a VOTES motor test load unit can be purchased, maintenance management has
specified that a complete VOTES static test be completed on all valves requiring post-maintenance testing in place of the motor load unit (MLU) test.
MY has purchased an MLU and is currently gathering a baseline data for all valves.
The inspector reviewed a draft procedure on 3-5-98, " Motor Power Monitoring Testing Procedure," which will be placed in the MOV test program after approva.i
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4.0 UNRESOLVED ITEM (URI 50-309/92-81-01) CLOSURE In a reply letter on June 18, 1990, the NRC staff commented on the MY's intent to conduct
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design basis tests on MOVs "where practicable and necessary," and to establish qualifications
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based on design basis testing one MOV in a family of MOVs. Where in-situ testing under design basis conditions is not practicable and where application of available test data cannot be justified, the staff requested that MY follow the "two-stage" approach as outlined in the GL. MY responded to the NRC staff on August 27,1990, stating their awareness of the need to utilize the two-stage approach, as appropriate. However, MY had not addressed the two-stage approach in the MOV program description at the time of this inspection. MY's revision of the MOV program to incorporate the two-stage approach for 89-10 MOVs that
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cannot be design basis tested or some other suitable approach, was identified as an
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unresolved item (URI 50-309/92-81-01).
MY has incorporated the two-stage approach for MOVs that cannot be design basis tested.
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The inspector reviewed the "MOV Testing Philosophy," Revision 2 and found the approach
acceptable, as it was in accordance with GL 89-10.
5.0 VIOLATION (VIO 50-309/92-81-02) CLOSURE
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This violation was written when MY failed to report the inability of low pressure injection valves LS-MOV-11, LS-MOV-21, and LS-MOV-31, to open with degraded voltage after a diagnostic test was conducted on March 9,1992. As of September 18,1992, the 4-hour notification had not been made.
The inspector reviewed MY's letter in response to the violation, dated December 23,- 1992.
In the letter, MY addressed the violation in two ways: 1) MY took immediate corrective action and made a 4-hour notification to the NRC on December 15,1992, and 2) MY identified the need to inform individuals to their responsibility for reporting MOV failures as non-operable valves. MY has developed a " lesson learned" manual to provide past i
experiences for reportability determinations. The inspector confirmed that the program is in
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place. This violation is closed.
i 6.0 DYNAMIC VALVE TESTING I
The inspector witnessed the dynamic testing of five valves in the GL 89-10 MOV program.
The inspector also reviewed the results of ten dynamic tests including the five witnessed.
The test results were satisfactory and complied with the guidance of GL 89-10. The valves-l are listed in Enclosure 1, attached.
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The valve testing was performed in a professional manner using well written procedures.
The inspector observed that the personnel performing the tests worked closely with the operations department in setting up the tests. There were frequent briefings, by the operations department describing how the system configuration would change leading up to the testing of the valves, and what the test personal could expect in the area of the plant the tests were being conducted. When abnormalities were observed, such as the excess flow through a loop stop valve, the testing was halted and the engineering personnel were called in to address the problem. (This testing was being conducted over the weekend and engineers came in from home to resolve the discrepancies.)
When Valve HSI-M-42 "B" Train HPSI Header Stop" was being tested the test technician noticed that the thrust and torque values were increasing with each stroke and called for engineering help. The engineer arrived, reviewed the existing data and called for another stroke. The engineer stopped the testing and ordered a work order be written to investigate
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the valve abnormality.
After the work order was issued, maintenance personnel stroked the valve for trouble shooting purposes and broke the key that is inserted between the stem and the valve yoke.
The valve was disassembled and engineering observed that the broken key was the one that had been described in a 10 CFR part 21 letter and an N'RC Information Notice describing similar problems with other Velan valves.
- After reassembly on September 21, MY maintenance perennel tested HSI-M-42, per Station Procedure 5-18-3, "Limitorque Valve Operator Operational Test." At the end of the valve stroke to the closed position, the electrician observed the torque switch actuation and the
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actuator motor current decreasing to zero. At the same instant, a loud noise from the valve actuator was heard. This caused the actuator to be separated on one side from the valve and the valve stem to bend.
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Investigation by MY revealed that during the preceding activities, the contractor electricians had improperly signed a step of the actuator overhaul procedure that they had not performed.
This caused the MOV torque switch to be installed improperly. Specifically, Step 5.15.7.a '
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of MY Procedure 5-18-5, "Limitorque Operator Overhaul (SMB-0 through SMB-4),"
requires that the torque switch setting be at "I and 1" prior to reinstalling the torque switch
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in the actuator. However, the electricians did not reset the switch to 1 and 1 prior to installation with the mistaken belief the setting on it was to be the ultimate setting of the-i torque switch. Se.tting the torque switch at "I and 1" prior to installation into the actuator ensures that the switch is locked in neutral with pre-load in either the open or close direction.
The procedure was signed off as completed and no deviations were listed. This failure to i
follow procedures resulted in damage to a safety-related component and is considered a violation of Technical Specification 5.8.2, covering written procedures (50-309/93-17-01).
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The thrust exerted during the stroke was estimated to have reached 70,000 to 80,000 lbs l
versus the maximum of 55,000 lbs estimated for the valve. Three of the bolts holding the
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actuator adaptor plate to the valve yolk were slightly pulled out of the yolk and the valve (
stem was bent.
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i MY took such immediate corrective actions as excluding the involved individuals from any
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further maintenance activities, and reiterating, to maintenance personnel, the importance of procedure adherence. The safety significance of the event was minimal because _the plant l
was in a refueling outage and the HPSI system was not required to.be operable. The valve
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was subsequently repaired and properly tested, both statically and dynamically, using the MY VOTES testing system. The inspector found the licensees immediate actions to be
appropriate.
7.0 CONCLUSION The inspector observed that MY management is involved with the MOV program. The items that needed to be addressed since the team inspection are either in the process of being -
resolved or have been resolved. MY has purchased a torque test stand, up-to-date software for predicting gate valve performance, and a motor load unit to aid in MOV static testing. A -
new database for all GL 89-10 MOVs has been completed and is being integrated into the MOV program. Also, MY has replaced 1/3 of the MOVs that were aged or with hard to find replacement parts during this outage. The inspector observed that the program is nearing completion. Contractor control during maintenance resulted in the damage of HSI-M-42, a safety-related valve of the safety injection system. However, MY took appropriate and prompt action to resolve this concer,
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ATTACIIMENT 1 EXIT MEETING ATTENDERS Maine Yankee Atomic Power Comoany
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R. Blackmore, Plant Manager W. Cloutier, YAEC T. Gifford, Assist. Mgr, CED D. Hakkila, MOV Tech. Coordinator J. Hebert, Mgr. Lic. & Engrg. Support
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R. Jordan, Licensing B. Lord, Project Engineer B. Moulton, MOV Coordinator R. Nelson, Corporate Eng. Mgr.
D. Whittier, Vice President Lic. & Eng.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission C. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector
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M ENCLOSURE 1 0.
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MAINE YANKERJLOW TEST SUMMARY FRELDvENARY RESULTS T
MOV ID VALVE SIZE TESP DYNAMIC STEM LOAD
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CONDmONS VALVE PRICI10N SENSmVE PUNCHON MANLTACIVRER FACTOR COEPPICIENP BEHAVIOR IISI M-11 Y
2520 paid CLOSE OPEN VELAN OLOBE 336 spm OPEN-L211 OPEN1 0.158 15M FLOW UNDER SEAT HSI44-12
2550 psad GOSE OPEN VEIAN GLOBB 336 gpm OPEN-1983 OPEN1 1160 10m FLOW UNDER SEAT HSI-M-21 r
2520 pdd CLOSE OPEN VEIAN GLOBE 350 ppm OPEN 0.952 OPEN1 0.120 10.47 %
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PIDW UNDER STAT
~l HSI44 22
2433 pnd CLOSE OPEN VE1AN GLOBE 3473 pre OPEN-LO31 OPEN2 0.177 9.22 %
FLOW UNDER SEAT HSIM31 y
2520 pdd CLOSE OPEN VEIAN CLOBE 331 apro OPEN-0.909 OPEN1 0.147 1233%
FLOW tJNDER SEAT
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IISI-M-32
2542 psid CLOSE OPEN VEIAN GLOBE 331 spm OPEN-a891 OPEN1 alS$
-a70%
PLOW UNDER SEAT HS1 4 41 4*
2550 paid CLOSE LOS CLOSE OPEN A VEI AN GLOBE 762 apre OPEN 0288 OPEN 1 0.161 13."13 %
_ THROTTLE IIDW UNDER SEAT HS1-M-42 4*
2525 psid ClOSE 1.22 CLOSE OPEN &
VELAN GIDBE 769 spm OPEN-1.104 OPEN 1 0.145 Ll%
IMRCrTHE PLOW UNDER SEAT CH-M-1 4'
$0.9 pcid CIDSE CLOSE VEIAN GATE 232 ppm OPEN R163 COSEI 0.18-12%
CH-M47 4*
$4.2 ps.d CLOSB CLO5E VEIAN GATE 227 spm OPEN 0391CLOSE2 0.10-22%
NOTES.
Negative valve simply inficates that the valve is asssung the actuator to pc.rfor:n the opening fune: ion (Le, the stem it in co L
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The thrur.: required to overcome flow and pressure dfereoti J ms very low for tab vabes (< 200#).
VOTES dispostic test equipmtat was med to obtain dynamk perfortnance data. Accessones included VPS for measurement of thrust MOVA measurencent of spnng pack ogwynt MPM for tocasuzement of vnetor power, and a C-kv;vsw Doir measurement device.
Nearty a!! actuators are testro on a MOVA13 torque test stand pnor to instaHation on a vehe Performance parameters an measumd und voltapas using the Torque Test Stand digital torspe meter, MPM ter measurement of motor power, VOTES with NTC for measurement for amasurement of spring pack diaptacement.
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