IR 05000309/1987016
| ML20236S563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1987 |
| From: | Cheung L, Dev M, Eselgroth P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236S556 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-87-16, NUDOCS 8711250255 | |
| Download: ML20236S563 (25) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-309/87-16 Docket No.
50-309 License No.
DPR-36 Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 Facility Name: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Inspection Conducted: July 20-24, 1987 Inspectors:
(JM1'
IAdd-Che ng, R pc Sr Engineer g dets iaklez
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M. Dev, Reactor En~gineer
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Other participants and contributors to this report include:
R. C. Wilson, Engineer, NRC-NRR/DRIS-VIB E. Trottier, Engineer, NRC-NRR C. Smith, Reactor Engineer, NRC-RII C. J. Paulk, Reactor Engineer, NRC-RII M. J. Jacobus, Engineer, Sandia National Lab H. Stromberg, Senior Engineer, Idaho National Engineering Lab
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J. W. Stoffel, Seni r Engineer, Idaho National Engineering L b l
Approved by:
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P. W. Esel th, Acting Chief,
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date Plant Sys ms Section, E8/DRS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on July 20-24, 1987 (Inspection Report No. 050-309/87-16).
Areas Inspected:
Special, announced inspection to review the licensee's implementation of a program for establishing and maintaining the qualification of electrical equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
E711250255 871119 PDR ADOCK 05000309 G
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l Results:
The inspection determined that the licensee has implemented a program to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 except for certain l
deficiencies listed below:
Violations Paragraph Item Number (s)
1)
Qualification of containment-sump-level-14.0 50-309/87-16-13 instrument-circuit-terminal blocks and cables for reactor coolant hot and cold leg RTDs 2)
Qualification of Veam-Litton Connectors 12.6 50-209/87-16-14 Unresolved items 1)
Status of SOV-1102 in EQ 5.0 50-309/87-16-01 program 2)
Commercial grade items 11.0 50-309/87-16-02 for EQ application t
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Discrepancies in procedure 11.0 50-309/87-16-03 0-04-1 4)
Acceptance criteria for 12.3 50-309/87-16-04 Weidmueller terminal blocks qualification test 5)
Incorrect data for similarity 12.4 50-309/87-16-05 analysis for Brand Rex cable 6)
Qualification of Rockbestos 12.5 50-309/87-16-06 i
coaxial cables l
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Potential moisture intrusion to 12.6 50-309/87-16-07 Veam-Litton connectors 8)
D. G. O'Brien electrical penetration 12.7 50-309/87-16-08 assemblies, QDR and Raychem sleeves 9)
3M conduit seals damming material, 12.8 50-309/87-16-09 moisture intrusion consideration 10) ASCO solenoid valves, moisture 12.9 50-309/87-16-10 intrusion and yearly check
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11) Justification for Limitorque valve 12.10 50-309/87-16-11 actuators that cannot be cycled twice a year 12) Limit Switch housing with damaged 13.1 50-309/87-16-12 gasket
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPCO)
R. C. Crosby, Assistant to Maintenance Manager j
S. D. Evans, Licensing Engineer
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C. D. Frizzle, Vice President, Operation
J. H. Garrity, Plant Manager
J. S. George, Material Coordinator J. Hebert, Plant Engineering Manager
R. Lawton, QA Manager
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D. Lemieux, I&C Maintenance Supervisor j
H. Madden, Electrical Engineering Supervisor
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S. Morrison, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor A. Proctor, Stores Supervisor J. B. Randazza, Executive Vice President A. Shean, Training Manager
W. Tracy Jr., QA Engineer
G. D. Whittier, Nuclear Engineering & Licensing Manager
W. W. Wicks, Training Instructor
1.2 Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)
P. L. Anderson, MY Project Manager
J. P. Bonner, EQ Coordinator
B. J. Drain, I&C Engineer
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P. R. Johnson, Sr. Electrical Engineer i
A. Parker, QA Engineer
M. P. Saniuk, Electrical Engineer R. Shone, Engineering Manager, MY Project j
S. F. Urbanoski, Principal Engineer
.4 A. Wade, Instrumentation & Control Engineer 1.3 DiBenedetto Associate
B. Willkens, Engineer 1.4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission C. J. Anderson, Chief, Plant System Section, DRS j
C. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector
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U. Potapovs, Chief, EQ Section, NRR
- Denotes those present at exit meeting at the plant site on July 24, 1987.
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l 2.0 Purpose The purpose of this inspection was to review the licensee's implementation of a program to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station and their implementation of corrective action com-mitments resulting from deficiencies identified in Franklin Research Center Technical Evaluation Report (FRC-TER).
3.0 Background On February 8,1979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE)
y issued to all licensees of operating plants, (except those included in i
the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP)), IE Bulletin (IEB) - 79-01, l
" Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment."
On January 14, 1980, the NRC Issued IEB-79-01B which included D0R Guidelines and NUREG-0588 as attachments 4 and 5, respectively.
Subsequently on May 23, 1980 Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 was issued and stated that the DOR Guidelines and portions of NUREG-0588 form the requirements that licensee must meet regarding environmental qualification of safety related electrical equipment in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4.
Supplements to IEB-79-01B were issued for further clarification and definition of the staff's needs.
These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30 and October 24, 1980.
A final rule on the environmental qualification (EQ) of electrical
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equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants became effective
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on February 22, 1983, This i ule, Section 50.49 of 10 CFR Part 50, i
specif~ied requirements of electrical equipment important to safety I
located in a harsh environment.
In accordance with this rule, electrical i
equipment for Maine Yankee may be qualified to the criteria specified in j
either the D0R Guidelines or 10 CFR 50.49, except for replacement equip-
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Replacement equipment installed subsequent to February 22, 1983 must be qualified in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.49, using
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the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.89, unless there are sound reasons to
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the contrary.
On April 4, 1984 a meeting was held to discuss Maine Yankee's proposed method to resolve the environmental qualification deficiencies identified in the April 8, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and February 23, 1983 FRC-TER.
Discussions also included Maine Yankee's general methodology for compliance with 10 CFR 50.49, and justification for continued operation l-for those equipment items for which environmental qualification is not yet completed. The minutes of the meeting and proposed method of resolution
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for each of the environmental qualification deficiencies are documented in a May 31, 1984 submittal from the licensee.
A safety evaluation report on environmental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety was issued on December 13, 1984, describing the licensee's proposed resolution of identified deficiencies in the
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TER. The SER also concluded that Maine Yankee's electrical equipment environmental qualification program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
4.0 Maine Yankee EQ Program The Maine Yankee EQ Program Manual (EQPM) established the EQ requirements for Maine Yankee plant.
It also provides control for the implementation of the EQ program.
The following information specific to the Maine Yankee plant is included in this EQPM:
EQ program responsibilities
EQ program interface requirements
Clarification and interpretation of EQ parameters
EQ master list of all electrical equipment important to safety and
located in a harsh environment EQ worksheets for the electrical equipment on the EQ master list
(containing normal and accident parameters)
EQ diagram showing the component and associated equipment (cables,
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terminal blocks, splices and limit switches).
EQ usage table of electrical equipment within scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
- Normal and accident environmental service condition for each area
containing electrical equipment identified on the EQ master list.
Reference to the Qualification Document Review package for each item
of electrical equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50 49.
Procedures for performing EQ-related activities (e.g. maintenance,
procurement etc.)
To supplement the EQPM, an individual Qualification Document Review (QDR)
package is provided to support the qualification of each equipment type within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
Each QDR consists of 6 sections.
Section A is a summary of the qualification of that equipment,
including qualification status, equipment description and ac-ceptance/ performance criteria.
Section B contains the EQ worksheets and EQ diagrams.
- Section C lists references pertaining to the qualification of the
equipment.
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Section D contains supplementary review sheets for operating time,
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operating temperature, pressure and other parameters.
Section E documents the installation, maintenance and storage
requirements.
Section F contains the post accident temperature and pressure l
profiles.
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documents, including test reports, vendor catalog information, q
purchase information, Franklin TER resolutions, vendor instruction
manuals and operation assessment review.
The inspection team reviewed EQPM Revision 4 dated February 23, 1987 and twenty eight QDRs and found that the documents are organized in a logical manner and that the materials cyntained therein are easy to audit.
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Based on the above, the inspection. team concluaed that the lic.ensee has established a program that meets uhe requirements of 10 CFR Sg.49 for environmental qualification of electrical equipment except for'the deficiencies as identified in the Inspection Summary.
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I 5.0 EQ Master List
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The Maine Yankee administrative procedure that delineates the requirements for an EQ master list is MY-EQP-1, " Procedure for the Preparation, Review, and Approval of EQPM Revisions." The Maine Yankee EQ master list appeared as Appendix I (17 pages) in the EQPM.
The requirement to establish an EQ master list, and the instructions for preparing it were found in Section 3 of MY-EQP-1.
In summary, the EQ master list contains all electrical equipment that is important to safety and located in an area subject to a harsh environment following a High Energy Line Break (HELB) or Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
When a component is identified as a candidate for the EQ master list, procedure MY-EQP-1 requires that an EQ work sheet and an EQ diagram be prepared.
The EQ worksheets, and EQ diagrams appeared as Appendices II and III, respectively, to the EQPM.
Any changes to items on the EQ master list in particular are the re-sponsibilities of the Maine Yankee EQ coordinator.
The EQ coordinator must review and initiate the evaluation of the proposed change and its impact on the EQPM.
Instructions for naking such changes were found in Section 3.8 of MY-EQP-1.
As a result of this review af the EQ master list and associated proce-dures, the inspectors found administrative controls to be in place and adequate. However, a deficiency in the implementation of the program to control the master list was noted'in the case of SOV-1102.
Solenoid valve 50V-1102 isolates the main steam system from the aux'liary feedwater pump.
This valve receives a containment-isolation-safety-injec-tion actuation closing signal to prevent the release of-radioactive steam if a steam generator experiences a tube rupture.
However, this valve is not found in the Containment Isolation Data Table (FSAR Table 5.1.2.1).
Discussion with the lice 6see and a review of relevant documents show that the status of this valve (in or out of the EQ program) has been the
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subject of some confusion over the past years.
Licensee's evaluations began in 1983 and ended in December 1986.
The conclusion coached by the licensee before this inspection was that 50V-1102 should r.ot be part of the EQ program.
They started removing SOV-1102 from the EQ secpe.
This activity was not yet complete at the beginning of this in;pection. A review by the inspectors found 50V-1102 on the EQ master 7ist, but without the required,EQ worksheet.
Further, an EQ diaoram was noted for SOV-1102 and the equipment usage table had seven entries for vquipment associated with SOV-1102.
Whether this valve should be in the EQ scope does not'
affect its qualification at the present time, since it's qualification 7s was established and maintained.
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During this in'spection, the licensee revised their previous decision and determined that 50V-1102 should be in the EQ scope, and that they would restore and update the qualification data for this valve. This is.tn.
unresolved item pending-MRC review of the licensee's actions to
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include 50V-1102 in the EQ scope including all pertinent qualj fication documents (50-309/87-16-01).
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6.0 IE Bulletins and Informatics Notices s,,.
s The inspectors reviewed Procedure 20-2-1, Operational Assessment System, Revision 4, and Procedure 20-3-1, Maine Yankee Commitment Management System, Revision 3.
These procedures establish the method for handling and evaluating Information Notices (ins) as well as in-house and industry L
operational experiences.
The inspectors also discussed these procedures and their implemorsation with the Licensing Engineer and the Maine Yankee EQ Coordinator.
i The ins are reviewed for applicability to Maine Yankee by the Manager of Operationa? Support (MOS).
The MOS' then assigns a tracking number (OAS f
I Control Nutzber) and sends the Notice tc the Manager of Plant Engine 3 ring, and the Maine Yankee EQ Coerdirator at the corporate offices.
These two t
groups evaluatC the IN and detent.ine'a course of action that would be t
necessary to resolve the issue. Tracking is done by a tickler system to ensure completion of the package.
Tne inspectors reviewed a selected sample of five IN packages to verify that the program was in plac9 and that the procedures were working.
The following IN packages were resiewed:
IN 81-29, Equipment Qualification Testing
,1N 82-52, Equipment Environmental Qualification Testing Experience
IN 83-72, Environmental Qualification Testing Experience
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1N 84-57, Moisture Intrusion in Safety Related Electrical Equipment
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JN 86-03, Potential Deficiencies in EQ cf Limitorque MOV Operator
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After reviewing %ese records and the procedures, and talking with licensee personne t, the inspecton concluded that the program was working
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end that the procedures were being followed.
7.0 QA/QC, Interfaces
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< The licenree's EQPM delineatef responsibilities and authorities of the Yankee Atcaic Power Station personnel performing activities related to environfrict.al qualification of sa fety-related components.
Preparation, j<
revicw ar.d approval of the procurement and maintenance of the environ-mentally cuali Ued equipment are conducted in accordance with the licensee's Operation QA Plar..
The YAEC corporate QA conducted an audit, MY-86-19, to verify the
adequacy end effectiveness of the licensee's EQ Program.
This audit was
. roncLeted in two phases.
Phr,e I consisted of the review of the MY EQPM, procedures, selected QDS; and EQ related training.
Phase II consisted of the review of activities related to Qualification Documentation Reports, relected QDR field verf fication, EQ preventive maintenance program, resolu-i tica mi implementation of NRC71&E Information Notices and Bulletins, vendor manual cocccT,. as EQ training.
The audit identified two deficiencies:
x (1) Lack of prevision to incorporate special EQ maintenance requirements into the station preventive maintenance program; and (2) Absence of any
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specific program to control vendor manuals having impact on the station equipment wW.rormental qualific1 Mon and the associated QDRs.
The inspectbrs reviewed the resolution'ana the licensee's corrective actions for thesa d;3iciencies and found them adequate and timely.
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The licensee also contractad the DiBenedetto Associates, Inc. to conduct an irdapendent programmatic and technical evaluation of the licensee's EQ program.
The concerr.s acd recommendations initiated through this evaluation were incorporated idte the licensee's EQ Action Items List. The licensee evaluated and resolved the action items and implemented the corrective actions {n a timely nnner.
The inspectors discussed with the licensee's cognizant Operations QA engineer regarding QA/QC discipline involvemen; with the EQ program.
The Operation QA group reviews the Material Procurement Requests and Repair Orders, conducts surveillance evaluation inspection, and performs audits to verify the l'.u naec's compliar.ce to IC CFR 50.49 requirements. The station QC personnel per fom surveillance and monitoring activities, conduct material receipt inspen. ion and verify the implementation of EQ requirements.
The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station is currently staffed with a QA Supervisor suppor;ed by threa QA engineers, and one QC Supervisor with two QC engineers and three QC inspemors. The current staffing is adequate to perform EQ activities.
The irdividuah are knowledguble of EQ requirements and possess adiruate training ud enecience.
No deficiencies were identifiec in this review.
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8.0 EQ Maintenance Program The corrective and preventive maintenance of Maine Yankee EQ equipment was inspected by reviewing procedures and maintenance documents and by inter-viewing maintenance personnel.
The following procedures were reviewed, in addition to maintenance documents used as examples of the conduct of main-tenance activities:
EQPM sections 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5
0-16-2, Maintenance of Safety Classified Systems, Components, or
Structures, Revision 0 0-16-3, Discrepancy Reporting Procedure, Revision 0
0-16-4, Repair Orders, Revision 0
0-16-5, Administration of Non-Routine Corrective Maintenance,
Revision 0 17-21-2, Engineering Design Change Request - Maine Yankee, Revision 3
17-21-3, Engineering Design Change Request - Yankee Nuclear Services
Division (YNSD), Revision 2 Engineering Instruction WE-100, Engineering Design Request,
Revision 14 Engineering Instruction WE-101, Plant Design Change Request,
Revision 8 Non preventive maintenance, including installation, modification, and correction, can be initiated by an Engineering Design Change Request (EDCR) or a Discrepancy Report (DR).
The EDCR can be initiated by either engineering at the plant or engineering YNSD.
The plant maintenance departments can initiate DRs, which are reviewed by the Maine Yankee Plant Engineering Department (PED) in Framingham; PED then issues a Repair Order (RO) to supplement the DR. The EQ coordinator for Maine Yankee is a member of PED.
The electrical and I&C maintenance departments at Maine Yankee maintain their own separate preventive maintenance logs for EQ equipment, based on input from the EQ coordinator and using information from Section E of the l
QDR Packages.
EQ preventive maintenance activities are authorized through j
the DR/R0 process.
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Maine Yankee has not yet reached the stage where maintenance shop procedures i
are automatically used when a specific activity is required.
Even if the I
shop has a procedure for performing a specific activity, the procedure will be attached to a DR and reviewed by PED prior to issue of the RO.
If engineering initiates the request for maintenance, the procedure will be provided with the EDCR.
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As an example of how EQ maintenance is performed, replacement of the cover
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0-ring in flow transmitter FT-311 was traced in detail.
0-ring replacement is required whenever the cover is opened, or every 60 months, whichever occurs first.
The I&C Department tracking system provides a quarterly printout of scheduled preventive maintenance including calibration.
When I
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calibration is required, I&C initiates a DR, and PED adds a Controls and Limitation sheet to the DR/R0 package, specifying in detail the 0-ring l
replacement and lubrication, and cover re-torqueing. Materials and tools are specified, and a signoff line is provided for the technician to record the torque wrench used and its calibration due-date.
In other cases, the shop might include the detailed maintenance procedure in the DR; PED would then approve or change the procedure as necessary.
I&C maintenance records are kept on cards by system rather than by indi-vidual component, although the tracking system is building a data base by components, The card file for electrical maintenance is arranged by com-ponents.
Both maintenance departments are represented on the Maine Yankee EQ committee, which has six to eight members from the plant and from Framingham.
Items discussed include EQ activities at all of the Yankee plants. The E0 committee had not met since the electrical maintenance supervisor, who was interviewed by the inspector, assumed his position in January 1987.
The licensee is developing procedures to permit using maintenance depart-ment procedures without specific PED approval for each instance of perfor-mance. The more cautious approach used to date has provided additional assurance that the EQ maintenance requirements are introduced as accurately as possible.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee has an effective EQ maintenance-program that is still evolving toward its long-term form in a carefully controlled mar.ner.
9.0 EQ Control of Modification Plant modifications affecting EQ are controlled as described in the
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maintenance program section above.
Checklists included in the appropriate j
forms, and the requirement for design change approval by the PED group
which includes the Maine Yankee EQ coordinator, ensure proper review of changes for impact on EQ.
No concerns were noted by the inspectors.
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EQ Training Program The inspectors reviewed the Maine Yankee Nuclear Services Division Procedure, MY-EQP-5, Revision 0, dated July 25, 1986 that establishes requirements for EQ indoctrination and training.
The procedure was found to contain require-l ments and implementing instructions of suitable detail to accomplish the l
stated purposes (indoctrination and documentation).
l The Maine Yankee memorandum that officially assigned the current EQ coordi-nator was reviewed and the EQ coordinator was interviewed by the inspector.
In addition, the inspector also reviewed MY Procedure 17-200-2, Revision 2, dated January 27, 1986, which establishes requirements for indoctrination.
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of newly hired Plant Engineering Department (PED) personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the training file of seven new contractor employees (Cianbro, Inc.)
and six new MY employees to verify implementation of this requirement and did not identify any deficiencies.
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The inspectors also reviewed specific training conducted in response to IN 86-53, " Improper Installation of Heat Shrinkable Tubing." Lesson plans that specifically identified IN 86-53 were found in training records associated with electrical maintenance, I&C, and other specialty training lesson plans.
In addition, the Raychem splice kit supplier for Maine Yankee (Val Quip Corporation) conducted a one-hour training session on the proper instal-lation technique for Raychem splices on September 11, 1986.
This training was attended by thirteen MY employees.
Based on this review, the inspectors concluded that the licensee has an adequate EQ training program.
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EQ Procurement Program Procedure MY-EQP-3 establishes the EQ requirements to be specified when purchasing new equipment or replacement parts within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
The inspectors reviewed this procedure (Revision 0, dated February 22,1985) and the following procedures which implement these requirements, to determine the adequacy of the licensee's EQ procurement program:
Environmental Qualification Program Manual, Section 3.2, Material
Purchase Requests, Revision 1.
Procedure No. 0-02-1, Classification of Nuclear Systems Components,
and Structures, Revision 0.
Procedure No. 0-04-1, Material, Equipment, and Service Requisition-
ing, Revision 0.
The inspectors also reviewed Revision 1 of Procedure MY-EQP-3, which is essentially completed, however is not yet issued.
Paragraph 5.3.3 of this procedure permits the use of commercial grade items for EQ applications.
There are no controlling documents to ensure that the commercial grade items would meet the EQ requirements.
The licensee stated that no com-mercial grade items had been procured for EQ applications, and that the statement in Paragraph 5.3.3 will be revised to exclude commercial grade items. This item is unresolved pending NRC review of the revised version of Procedure MY-EQP-3(50-309/87-16-02).
The inspectors also reviewed operational QA program manual, section IV entitled " Procurement Document Control." The inspectors noted that discrepancies exist in that responsibilities of EQ personnel defined in procedure 0-04-1 differ from the operational QA manual. The licensee agreed to review both documents and to resolve the discrepancies.
This item is unresolved pending the NRC's review of the corrected documents (50-309/87-16-03).
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Material Purchase Requests (MPRs) are the documents used for generation of Purchase Orders.
Procedure 0-04-1 controls the preparation, review, and approval of MPRs. The procedure defines three levels of procurement.
Procurement Level 1 is for the purchase of Class 1E components.
The inspectors randomly selected the records of the following four MPRs to verify the lice'see's implementation of the procurement program, i
MPR No. 2217 dated April 14, 1983 for procurement of 0-rings.
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MPR No. 9467, dated March 24, 1982 for procurement of flexible
standard switchboard wire.
MPR No. 4598, dated March 7, 1984 for procurement of 2/c No. 12 AWG
Control Cable.
l MPR No. 02-87-4-S4, dated 7-17-87 for procurement of torque switch.
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No deficiencies were identified in the review of these records.
12.0 Detail Review of EQ Files The licensee's EQ files were examined to verify the qualified status of equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
In addition to comparing plant service conditions with qualification test conditions and verifying the basis for these conditions, the inspectors selectively reviewed areas such as required post-accident operating time compared to the duration of time the equipment has been demonstrated to be qualified; similarity of tested equipment to that installed in the plant (insulation class, component materials, test configuration versus installed configuration and documenta-tion for both); evaluation of adequacy of test conditions, aging calculations for qualified life and replacement interval determination; effects of decrease in insulation resistance on equipment performance; adequacy of
demonstrated equipment accuray; evaluation of test anomalies; and appli-l cability of EQ problems reported in IE Bulletins and Information Notices I
and their resolutions.
The inspectors reviewed twenty eight EQ files.
The types of equipment covered by these files included areas such as electrical cables, Limitorque
motor operated valves, pump motors, solenoid operated valves, pressure transmitters, cable splices, radiation detectors, neutron monitors, thermo-couples, and resistance temperature detectors. An equipment type is defined as a specific type of electrical equipment, designated by manufacturer and model, which is representative of all identical equipment in the plant area exposed to the same or less severe environmental service conditions.
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The organization of the EQ files was described in Paragraph 4.0.
The files adequately documented qualification of the equipment except as described below. The files were readily auditable and with the exceptions described below are complete and accurate.
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12.1 Gamma - Metrics Neutron Monitor and Cables (QDR-2473)
This equipment is used to verify reactor sub-criticality after an accident.
The inspector reviewed the test reports and noticed that the LOCA test conditions enveloped the plant requirements.
However, the submergence test of the junction box associated with this equip-ment was based on a test with a metal seal.
The actual installation used a silicone rubber seal and the LOCA test used a silicone rubber seal.
Following completion of the inspection, the licensee contacted the equipment vendor and performed detailed analysis for the silicon rubber seal qualification for submergence application, stating that no moisture penetrated the seal throughout the steam-environment test.
The NRC is still in the process of generically reviewing cases involving qualifying submergence applications by analysis.
The inspector noticed that the required radiation dosage for the junc-tion box and the silicone rubber seal (submerged condition after LOCA)
was not stated in the EQ file. Also, the tested radiation dose to the silicone rubber seal is not clear in the test report; different pages in the test report indicate 200 Mrad and 3200 Mrad.
There is no radia-tion test certificate to verify this.
The licensee's response to this concern indicates that 200 Mrad is the correct tested dose, and that the radiation test was conducted by the same testing facility, therefore no radiation test certificate is required.
On August 11, the licensee called the inspector stating that this equipment is a RG 1.97 item which is not required to comply with the rule until the 1988 outage.
The final qualification of this
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equipment will be reviewed during a future inspection of RG 1.97 equipment.
12.2 General Atomic Radiation Monitor (GDR-2427)
The inspectors reviewed the EQ file for the General Atomic high range radiation monitor.
The following concerns were conveyed to the licensee:
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The effect of interconnecting devices other than the cable was not addressed in the file (e.g., connectors, penetration, etc.).
b.
The calculated value of insulation resistance for the cable did not address the effects of a steam environment (i.e., it assumes dry conditions).
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The effect of the readout decreasing from 1 R/hr to 0.45 R/hr due to signal transmission error, may cause the green " operate" light (signalling that the detector is operating properly) to go off.
This was not addressed in the EQ file.
The licensee stated that this is a RG 1.97 item, which is not re-quired to comply with the rule until the 1988 outage.
The inspector had no further questions regarding this matter at this time.
12.3 Weidmuller Terminal Blocks (QDR-0968)
The inspector reviewed the EQ file for Weidmuller terminal blocks, model number SAK6N, used iro'de containment for solenoid and motor operated valve connectie.r.
The test documented in the EQ file included specimens of the same model number.
The plant parameters were enveloped by the test. An acceptance criteria of 1.0 Ampere i
leakage was used without specifying the basis and no insulation re-sistance values were reported during the LOCA simulation.
The licensee had obtained (in June 1987) leakage current data and stated
that they would be appropriately evaluated and included in the EQ file.
This item is unresolved pending NRC review of licensee's evaluation of leakage current in the EQ file (50-309/87-16-04).
l 12.4 Brand Rex Cable (QDR 0870)
The inspector reviewed the file for Brand Rex cable used for power,
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control, and thermoccuole circuits applications, both inside and l
outside containment.
The cable uses XLPE insulation and a hypalon
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jacket, the same as the tested specimens.
The test parameters enve-loped the plant requirements. The package contains a numerical error in the qualification data which was brought to the licensee's atten-tion.
(Section A.5, Page A3 gives an argument to qualify 27 mil insulated cable based on testing of 51 mil insulated cable; however, the tested cable is actually 20 mil). The licensee stated that this j
would be corrected.
l The package contains a statement that 24 ma leakage current is ac-ceptable without justification for instrument circuits.
The licensee stated that this generic criterion would be replaced by specific criteria based on actual applications.
The licensee also provided the inspector with calculation showing the worst case leakage current in the thermocouple circuit is within the acceptable range and stated all these would be incorporated into the EQ file.
This item is unresolved pending NRC verification of:
1) the numerical error is corrected; 2) the generic acceptance criterion (24 ma leakage cur-rent) is replaced by specific criteria based on evaluation; and 3) the worst case leakage current calculation is incorporated into the EQ file (50-309/87-16-05).
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12.5 Rockbestos Coaxial Cables (QDR-0840-1)
The first generation of Rockbestos Model RSS-6-104 was considered unqualified. At first, it was not clear to the inspector from review-ing the Summary section of the QDR which generation of the coaxial cables was installed at Maine Yankee (RSS-6-104 for first generation, RSS-6-104/LD for second generation, or RSS-6-104/LE for third genera-tion).
However, the file did contain a reference to a purchase order which indicates that the cable purchased is a second generation cable (this is also confirmed by physical inspection at the plant).
However, the file did not contain a direct statement that second generation cable is installed.
The licensee uses two Rockbestos test reports (QR-2806 and QD-2806S) to support the qualification of the cable.
However, these documents are considered invalid because of Information Notice 84-44 "Environt.tal Qualification Testing of Rockestos Cables." The inspector noticed that the file did contain new Rockbestos test report QR-6802 (for the qualification of the third generation cable) dated March 12, 1986, which is considered a valid document.
However, this report was not used to support the qualification.
The licensee stated that the two old reports would be deleted from the file and that the new report would be used to support the qualification together with a vendor prepared similarity analyses (between the second and the third generation cables) which was found in the QDR, Page B214.
This item is unresolved pending NRC's review of licensee's revised file for this cable 1) invalid test reports are removed from the file; 2) new test report and similarity analysis are included in the file; and (3) a statement that the cable to be qualified is a second generation (LD)
cable (50-309/87-16-06).
12.6 Veam-Litton Connectors (QDR #3168)
Revision 2 of the QDR is based on an unnumbered, November 1978, test j
report by Isomedix for Litton and proprietary to Reuter-Stokes.
Revision 3 is based on NTS Hartwood test report 558-1657A, dated November 4,1985, for Litton-Veam Division.
Both QDR revisions I
failed to establish similarity between the installed equipment and the tested specimens.
No discussion of design differences was pro-
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vided except a statement in the NTS Hartwood test report that all CIR l
series connectors are identical except for the number and size of j
contacts that the insert (insulator) can accommodate.
Since it is known that some of the connectors may be potted with Veam Specifica-tion VAP-201 material while other connectors use different potting materials, as an example of possible design differences, a mere statement by a test laboratory involving model numbers that it did not test is inadequate for demonstrating similarity. The licensee I
stated that similarity can be established by an analysis.
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17 The 1978 test report did not address thermocouple circuits, the principal use of the connectors at Maine Yankee. Although the test was claimed to be in accordance with IEEE 323-1974, the test report contains no data or description of the thermocouple circuit perfor-l mance during the LOCA test.
The 1985 test report indicates that the connector used for thermocouple circuits was tested; however, no test result data was given'in the test report.
The licensee was unable to provide this data for the inspectors' review during the inspection period. The licensee contacted the test laboratory which confirmed that the required test data were available (in chart form) to demonstrate successful completion of the test.
The inspectors concluded that qualification of Veam-Litton connectors was not established at the time of this inspection.
This is in violation of 10 CFR 50.49 paragraphs (f) and (g) which require that each item of electrical equipment important to safety be qualified and that qualification must be completed at a time no later than November 30, 1985 (50-309/87-16-14).
However, based on additional information provided during the inspection, the licensee was able to show the inspectors that the connectors are qualifiable.
A Combustion Engineering letter LD-87-025, dated May 22, 1987 addressed to the NRC, reports that during LOCA testing of Litton connectors series 16A and 20 (presumed similar to Maine Yankee connectors), moisture entered the connectors. An error of 45 F was reported by Combusion Engineering, who did not include Maine Yankee among the twelve plant sites they identified as affected.
The licensee did not receive a copy of this letter.
The licensee' stated that they presently procure the connectors from Westinghouse, after previously buying from Combusion Engineering and Reuter-Stokes.
However, they will evaluate the applicability of this letter to the connector installed at Maine Yankee.
This item is unresolved pending NRC review of licensee's evaluation (50-309/87-16-07),
12.7 D. G. O'Brien Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPA), QDR-1017 a.
Unlike other files, this QDR for electrical penetration assemblies was difficult to audit and the licensee agreed to contact D. G. O'Brien and revise the QDR.
D. G. O'Brien Test Report ER 268 and Analysis ER 315 address LOCA test failures and design corrections intended to correct these failures, and also provide justification for modifying the test specimen and LOCA testing it without repeating earlier steps of the test sequence.
The reports do.not adequately address that 1) data from the original LOCA test are omitted from the test report; 2) the test specimen was modified without changing its sample identification (7439E); and, 3) the LOCA test described in the reports was actually a second test performed on the modified design.
The QDR summary sections fail to state that the modified design successfully completed the test.
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b.
During the walkdown inspection, an apparent deficiency was I
observed in non-EQ connectors on two EPAs, C-4 and the one ap-i
proximately 3 feet to its right when viewed from inside contain-l ment.
Each EPA contains a header with several connectors in it, each about 2 inches in diameter.
Typically one or two cables are associated with each connector, sealed by a Raychem sleeve,
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l Three non-EQ connectors in the two subject EPAs had Raychem sleeves that were not tightly sealed and properly aligned.
The licensee could not show to NRC Inspectors that the Raychem
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sleeves for EQ and non-EQ connectors were installed using dif-l ferent procedures. Therefore, defects or deterioration in the non-EQ sleeves causes suspicion on the integrity of the EQ sleeves. The licensee committed to conduct a thorough walkdown on the EQ connectors before restart.
l These two items are unresolved pending NRC's review of 1) the revised QDR addressing NRC's concerns, and 2) the walkdown records for EQ l
connectors (50-309/87-16-08).
l 12.8 3M Conduit Seals, Scotch Cast - No. 9 (QDR-3071)
This conduit sealing material is used throuchout the plant, both inside and outside the reactor containment, and at various eleva-tions.
Two concerns were raised by the inspectors:
j a.
The qualification report indicated thet one of two materials
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should be used as a damming material, Kaowool or Flameseal.
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However, it was determined that Ductseal was used.
The licensee had not determined similarity or explained why the change was made.
The discussion with the licensee determined that Kaowool had been tried, however, it had proven to be too porous. As a i
result, the Ductseal had been chosen as a readily available material.
The damming material is used only for holding the sealing material during the curing period. When curing is complete, the damming material is not required for the qualification. The licensee committed to revising their file to include a discussion of the acceptability of using Ductseal as i
a damming material.
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b.
Wyle Laboratory who conducted the EQ test, specifies a drain hole for the Scotch Cast No. 9 sealing material to prevent moisture from collecting on top of the seal.
This was not addressed in the file.
Following the inspection, the licensee supplied a response to this concern for NRC review.
The I
licensee's response indicated that the purpose of the drain hole l
specification is to prevert moisture buildup on top of the seal.
l The reason for this concern is that moisture seepage may result.
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This issue was discussed with a cognizant engineer at Wyle Labs.
The discussion determined that seepage through the seal is pos-sible as absolute bonding to the wires may not happen.
The licensee took the approach of calculating the maximum
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moisture accumulation, given worst case conditions, for demon-I strating acceptability of the installations.
The calculations demonstrated that the limit switches (the components sealed using this material) would not become flooded, should the worse case conditions be experienced.
The licensee concluded that, based on worst case conditions, sufficient moisture would not collect in the limit switch to cause problems and agreed to incorporate this information into the EQ file.
l These two items are unresolved pending NRC verification that the I
resolution of these two concerns are incorporated into the EQ file (50-309/87-16-09).
12.9 ASCO Solenoid Valves (0DR-0401)
l These solenoid valves are used throughout the plant, both inside and outside containment, and at various elevations. Two concerns were raised by the inspector during the file review, a.
ASCO requires provision be made for moisture intrusion. The ASCO requirement is to prevent moisture intrusion by use of a properly sealed / vented junction box system.
It was not clear to the inspectors how Maine Yankee installation was meeting this criteria.
In response to this concern, the licensee indicated that, for inside containment installation, the junction boxes were vented with weep holes.
For outside containment instal-lations, where a steam environment could exist, the licensee's practice prior to the inspection, for ensuring no moisture buildup, was to remove a bottom cover hold down bolt. The inspector indicated potential problems with this practice for two reasons. The first was that the bolt hole was on a lip of the box which could be 1/4 inch or more above the bottom and, therefore, allow moisture accumulation before it started draining.
The second was that there was dirt and dust in the bottom of the boxes inspected. This dirt and dust could plug the hole and prevent draining. As part of the response, the licensee committed to provide additional drainage capability by drilling drain holes in the junction boxes instead of leaving the cover bolts out. The licensee also committed to complete the modifications prior to startup.
b.
ASCO recommends the solenoid valves be cycled at least once a year.
This was not addressed in the maintenance requirements.
The licensee researched this issue and found that, of 58 valves qualified using this file, 36 were cycled every three months and l
16 at cold shutdown in accordance with the Inservice Testing l
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Program.
The remaining 6 were part of or would be incorporated into the Maine Yankee Operation Surveillance Program.
The licensee committed to revise the file to address this concern.
These two items are unresolved pending NRC's verification that the EQ file is revised to incorporate the resolution of the above two concerns (50-309/87-16-10).
12.10 Limitorque Valve Actuators (QDR - 0531-2)
During the file review, the inspectors noticed that Limitorque recom-mended the valve operator be cycled at least twice a year. This was not addressed in the EQ file, nor was it mentioned in the valve main-tenance program.
The licensee researched this issue and responded that the actuators in question were either cycled quarterly or at each cold shutdown per inservice inspection requirements.
The licensee committed to provide justification in the EQ file for those actuators that cannot be cycled twice a year.
This item is unresolved pending the NRC's review of the licensee's justification in the EQ file (50-309/87-16-11).
13.0 Plant Physical Inspection The NRC inspectors conducted physical inspections on July 22, 1987 of EQ components, both inside and outside the reactor containment, at various elevations.
Items selected for examination included pump motors, Limitorque valve actuators, electrical penetrations, cables, cable splices, connectors, solenoid operated valves and high range containment radiation monitors.
The inspectors examined characteristics such as mounting configuration, orientation, connection interfaces, bend radius, model and instrument type, cleanliness and physical condition.
The following findings were identified:
13.1 Limit Switches Housing with Damaged Gasket Four limit switches were inspected during the plant walkdown.
These limit switches are used on SOV-1102, SOV-2601, S0V-2602, and A0V-2603.
When the cover was removed from the limit switch on SOV-2603, it was apparent that leakage into the switch had occurred. A residue that appeared to be boron remained in the bottom of the housing.
Further examination revealed moisture in the housing.
The licensee stated that a line containing borated water had ruptured in this area and had leaked past the seal into the limit switch.
The action taken was to clean out the limit switch housing, clean the limit switch con-tacts, and reseal the switch (some boron stains remained on the bottom of the housing after cleaning).
This however, did not explain the moisture found in the switch at the time of the inspection. The I
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licensee examined the switch cover' gasket and concluded that the gasket was damaged when the cover was reinstalled, and this allowed condensate to form inside the housing.
The damaged gasket was replaced per Repair Order No. 4919-87.
In addition, the licensee committed to inspect the limit switch in about two months to ensure no further moisture entered the switch.
Since two other limit switches in the same area were inspected and no i
moisture was found, the inspectors considered this an isolated
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maintenance /QC fault.
Following completion of the inspection, the licensee submitted for NRC review a response to this concern.
The response indicates that the subject limit switen provides Control Room indication that Valve BD-T-32 has closed following a safety injection or containment isola-tion signal.
Valve BD-T-32 is an air operated valve actuated by SOV-2603. Any postulated limit switch malfunction will not affect the closure of the valve, since the power murce of the SOV is in-dependent from that of the valve indication. The subject limit switch is located in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB).
Following a Design Basis Accident in the containment, the environmental effects in the PAB are limited to radiation and a small temperature increase associated with the assumed loss of ventilation.
For a postulated HELB in the PAB, which would result in a steam environment, S0V-2603 is not required for mitigation.
This is an unresolved item pending NRC's review of licensee's future inspection record to assure no moisture accumulation in the limit switch housing (50-309/87-16-12).
13.2 Moisture Intrusion to Limitorque Valve Actuatior D W ng the physical inspection on Limitorque valves HCV-311 and HCV-333, both located in the Primary Auxiliary Building, the in-spectors observed the length of conduit runs going into the limit switch compartment.
The conduit run for one of the valves was about j
30 feet long, with a vertical drop of about 5 feet going into tha
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actuator's limit switch compartment.
l The inspectors observed the limit switch compartment and found the l
leads were spliced with Raychem splices and the terminal blocks
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removed. There were no provisions for moisture removal, i.e.,
no
weep holes. The inspector expressed a concern that without the
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placement of weep holes, water accumulation could degrade the func-tional capability of the cable splices.
The licensee agreed to conduct a walkdown on the field installation for all EQ Limitorque valves, both inside and outside the reactor containment, and to provide drainage to prevent moisture accumulation. The inspector had no further questions.
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13.3 Limitorque Actuator T-Drain Provision During the physical inspection on Limitorque valves, the inspectors observed the lack of "T" drains on valve HCV-271 actuator.
It was
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not clear that Limitorque Test Report No. 600198 qualified the motor
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without "T" drains.
The licensee researched this issue and provided an excerpt from the Nuclear User's Group report titled "Clarifica-tion of Information Related to the Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motorized Valve Operators," dated April 1986.
The report demonstrated that "T" drains were not on the specimens tested for Report 600198.
This was considered to be an acceptable response and the inspectors had no more concerns.
13.4 Terminal Block inside Limitorque Actuator Housing During the physical inspection on Limitorque valves, the inspectors observed a terminal block inside valve HCV-146 actuator housing.
There were no identifying marks on the terminal block.
Therefore, the manufacturer and model number could not be verified.
The licensee researched and concluded that the terminal blocks had been received as part of the actuator package from Limitorque. The licensee also found that the terminal block was a Marathon-300.
Qualification of the Marathon-300 terminal blocks was addressed in the qualification file.
This is considered to be an acceptable response.
14.0 Licensee's Actions on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-309/87-10-1):
Equipment Qualification related deficiencies.
On May 26, 1987 during the cycle 9/10 refueling shutdown, the licensee identified that several Raychem splices were inadequately installed, two containment-sump-level-instrument terminal blocks were not environmental-ly qualified, and four RTD circuits in Loops 2 and 3 hot and cold leg temperature measurement contained cable whose qualification was not established.
The Licensee initiated Discrepancy Report / Repair Orders to replace questionable Raychem splices using proper size sleeves and shim, as re-quired.
An independent QC verification was also conducted prior to ac-ceptance by the Operations group.
The licensee had established and implemented procedures for the installation of the Raychem splices.
In addition, the licensee performed an evaluation of the originally installed splices. Based on the test results of the Commonwealth Edison's Raychem splices of a similar configuration to that of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, the licensee concluded that, as far as the insulation of the original splice was concerned, it adequately enveloped the Raychem recommended usage range, and therefore considered the originally installed splices qualified. This is discussed in more detail in Paragraph 16.0.
The inspectors verified the adequacy of a selected sample of Raychem splices
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associated with pressure transmitters PT-1013A, B, C, D, and determined that the licensee's action was complete.
The licensee replaced the two terminal blocks in the containment sump level circuits (LT-307K and 308K ) with environmentally qualified Raychem
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splices.
In addition, the licensee verified that all of the originally
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installed terminal blocks for inside-containment instrumentation circuits were replaced with qualified Raychem splices.
Also, the EQ Master List and other related EQ documentation were accordingly updated to reflect the as-built configuration.
The licensee replaced the cables with unknown qualification status in i
Loop 2 RTDs (TE-121X,Y), and Loop 3 RTDs (TE-131X,Y) circuits. with environ-
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mentally qualified cable and installed Raychem splices in accordance with the station I&C Maintenance Procedure 6-01-1 entitled " Instrumentation and l
Control Corrective Maintenance." The licensee also updated the EQ diagrams to reflect the qualified status of the new cable, Raychem splices, and additional junction boxes.
The licensee conducted a 100% reverification of the EQ diagrams'against the plant drawings and concluded that the
as-built configuration was correctly delineated.
The inspectors reviewed the related discrepancy Reports Nos. 2982-87, 2983-87, 2984-87, and 2985-87 and determined that the licensee's action was adequate.
Based on the above, the licensee's action is considered complete. This
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item is closed.
However, during the period from November 30, 1985 to the
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time when these items were identified and corrected by the licensee, Maine Yankee did operate and continued to operate beyond November 30, 1985 with equipment (two terminal blocks in the containment sump level circuits and the electrical cable in the 4 RTD circuits) whose qualification was not established. The licensee was told that this is in violation of 10 CFR l
50.49 paragraphs (f) and (g) which requires each item important to safety
to be qualified by testing, operating experience or combination of analysis and test, and that this qualification must be established not later than November 30, 1985 (50-309/87-16-13).
Since these items were identified by the licensee and corrective actions i
were initiated promptly, and that these actions were verified by NRC
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inspectors to be complete, no technical responses or further technical actions are required from the licensee.
15.0 Licensee's Response to Information Notice 86-03 l
The licensee reviewed the applicability of IN 86-03, " Potential Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring." Accordingly, the licensee conducted a plant walkdown to identify deficient Limitorque motor valve operator wiring. The licensee j
inspected 23 Limitorque valve motors within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49, j
l and replaced all jumper wires on the limit switches and torque switches with Rockbestos Firewall SIS environmentally qualified wires.
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The inspectors randomly selected for review Discrepancy Report / Repair Order 0350-86 which implemented the Limitorque motor operated valve control wiring replacement for the HPSI HCV-311 located in the Primary Auxiliary Building.
The modification was conducted in accordance with the Plant Engineering Department Procedure 5-38-2, " Routine Corrective Maintenance," and tested in accordance with Procedure 5-18-3, "Limitorque Valve Operator Operational Test" prior to acceptance by the Operations for return to service.
The Repair Order package indicated that the QC hold points were observed and verified by the cognizant QC personnel as required by Procedure 5-38-2.
The inspectors physically inspected the control wiring in the Limitorque valve actuators identified below to verify the licensee's corrective action in response to NRC IN 86-03.
The new jumper wire, Rockbestos Firewall SIS, was positively identifiable in each case. Qualification for Rockbestos Firewall SIS cable was documented in the Maine Yankee QDR-0840.
The QDRs 0531-1 and 0531-2 incorporated the environmental qualification of the Limitorque MOVs installed in harsh environment inside and outside of the Maine Yankee Containment.
The Limitorque valve actuators inspected were:
HCV-146, Pressurizer Relief Isolation Valve (Inside Containment).
- HCV-311, HPSI Flow Control Valve (Inside Primary Auxiliary Building).
- HCV-333, Auxiliary HPSI Flow Control Valve, (inside Primary
Auxiliary Building).
Within the scope of this review, no deficiencies were identified.
16.0 Licensee's Response to Information Notice 86-53 In response to IN 86-53, the licensee performed a walkdown inspection of Raychem splices during the cycle 9/10 refueling outage in May - June 1987.
This inspection resulted in the issuance of LER 87-003-00, reporting I
certain splices for which the sleeve diameter was too large for one of the
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wires being spliced and the sleeve overlap was too short, relative to configurations that had been qualified by Raychem.
The sleeves were in-stalled in the early 1980s using Raychem instructions calling for WCSF-070-N sleeving on 18 AWG wire.
However, thermocouple, RTDs, and transmitters fitted with Conax seals have Kapton-insulated pigtails with a diameter as low as 0.057 inch, which is below the 0.07 inch maximum recover-diameter of WCSF-070-N sleeving.
Splices for 16 AWG Kapton-insu-lated pigtails were also in question, since that wire diameter is.069,003 l
inches.
Raychem later advised the licensee that they rounded it off to i
two decimal places and in fact the splice would be considered qualified l
with.065 inch wire.
The licensee took the following actions with regard to splices:
a.
All possibly deficient splices were replaced with fully qualified splices under Discrepancy Report (DR) 2976-87 originated on May 17, 1987 and Repair Order 2976-87 of the same date; the OR was l
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resolved on May 28, 1987, still during the refueling outage.
WCSF-050 shims were used to build up the Kapton-insulated pigtails to a diameter suitable for splicing.
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b.
A justification for continued operation was generated by the l
licensee based on Wyle Labs test report 17859-028 for Commonwealth
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Edison, which was made available through an industry group.
This
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report provided test data for a splice with a larger diametrical
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discrepancy than at Maine Yankee, with only 1/8 inch sleeve-to-insulation overlap.
Voltage and current measurements from the Commonwealth Edison Company test were shown to be acceptable for all l
Maine Yankee applications, which established the conclusion that the Maine Yankee splices were capable of being qualified.
c.
The QDR contained a June 25, 1987 internal memo addressing the above actions. An effort had been made to revise the QDR based on TVA test report 86-1995, also obtained through the industry group.
The j
TVA report was not fully integrated into the ODR, and the licensee i
stated the intention of revising the QDR again to base Raychem splice
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qualification on the newer and more comprehensive Commonwealth Edison test report.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in detail, taking into account IN 86-53.
It is concluded that the licensee took prompt and i
effective corrective action upon learning of the problem; that the splices, even though replaced, have been shown to be capable of being qualified; and that the documentation is being updated in a reason-able manner.
Within the scope of this review, no deficiencies were identified.
17.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or violations.
Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in Details, Paragraphs 5.0, 11.0, 12.3 through 12.10 and 13.1.
18.0 Exit Meeting The inspectors met with licensee corporate personnel and licensee representatives (denoted in Details, paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 13, 1987.
The inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection findings.
At no time during this inspection was written material given to the licensee.
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