IR 05000309/1985032
| ML20140B105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1986 |
| From: | Elsaser T, Elsasser T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140B079 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.A.1.3, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-2.K.3.01, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM 50-309-85-32, NUDOCS 8601230457 | |
| Download: ML20140B105 (9) | |
Text
-
._
_ _,
_
.-
-
-
-
-
.. -
_ _.
_ -
.
,
,
d
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
Docket / Report 50-309/85-32 License: DRP-36 s
,,
Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 83 Edison Drive
Augusta, Maine 04336 Facility Name: Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station l
Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine j
Dates:
November 1 - December 13, 1985
'
,
Inspectors:
C. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector J. Roberts Re ident Inspector
,
Approved by:
/
8-N
mf f
'
T. Elsassqe,,9hief, Reactor Projects Section 3C Date Summary:
November 1 - December 13, 1985:
Inspection Report 50-309/85-32 Areas Inspected:
Routine, regular'and backshift inspection by the Resident In-spectors of the control room, accessible parts of plant structures, plant opera-
,
tions, radiation protection, physical security, fire protection, plant operating records, maintenance, surveillance, open items, and reports to the NRC.
Inspection hours totaled 139.
Results:
During the period the licensee took required actions for identification.
'
and tracking of failed fuel detected after startup from the refueling outage (Section 4).
Two plant trips occurred as a result of secondary plant equipment
,
failures (Section 3).
The need for improvement in compliance with Radiation Work
Permits is necessary as indicated by two allegations concerning respirator usage (Section 7).
No violations were identified during this report period.
,
!
8601230457 860114
,
PDR ADOCM 05000309
'
O PENT i
<,
. - -
- - _.
-... _..
_ _.-
_ _,
,
. - -
.,.
A'
ef
,
b
.
,
s
%
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Withir,this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various lacensee personnel, including reactor operators, maintenance and survei7 lance technicians, and the licensee's management staff.
2.
S9mmary of Facility Activities
' On November 1,19A5 the plant was at 77 percent power with the main turbine in' manual control because of problems with the turbine control circuit.
Ad-dicionally, loop 2' cold leg temperature (Tc) was experiencing problems with
\\ a high resistance connection to the RTD and the Refueling Water Storage Tank
!(RWST) was being cleaned to remove sodium.
The plant was loading at 1% an hour' coming out of the cycle 8-9 refueling outage. On November 4, the plant t reduced pcwer to 94 percent because of high stator gas temperatures on the main generator.
On November 5, the plant reduced power to 89% for high stator
'
gas temperature.
On November 6, 1985, the plant tripped at 11:28 a.m. when the recirculation valve for the steam driven feedwater pump (P-2C) failed open.
The result was a low suction pressure trip of P-2C which caused a turbine and reactor trip.
All systems functioned normally.
The reactor was taken critical later the same day.
The plant reached 97% power on November 15.
The plant detected an increase in radiation monitoring readings on November
'-
19, 1935, and subsequent chemical analysis of primary coolant showed a small fuel leak. On November 22, the plant tripped because of a failure of the main turbine electro-hydraulic control (EHC) system.
The plant was in the process of reducing power in ordee to come off line and make repairs to the EHC system and the temperature detectors for the Reactor Protective System.
The reactor was_taken ceilical on November 23 after maintenance and returned to power operptions.~
,
!
-
The plant attained 75% power en November 26 and then reduced power to place the electric driven feed pumps in service.
On November 28, the plant reached 97% power,<the maximum power with two electric driven feed pumps running.
During Control Element Assembly (CEA) exercise surveillance on December 4,
- 1935, CEA #19 became mispositioned and required reducing power.
The problem yas trac 3d to a faulty reed switch.
The plant returned to 97% power and re-mained,there for the remainder of this report period.
i 3.
Review o_f Plant Operations Theinshectorreviewedplantoperationsthroughdirectobservationthroughout the reporting period.
Except as noted below, conditions were found to be in compliance with the following licensee documents:
Maine Yankee Technical Specifications
--
s k
l i
,
_
.
-
3-
,
~
.
Maine Yankee Technical Data Book
-
--
Maine Yankee Fire Protection Program
--
e Maine Yankee Radiation Protection Program
'
--
Maine Yankee Tagging Rules
--
Administrative and Operating Procedures
--
a.
Instrumentation
-
Control room process ihstruments were observed for correlation between i
channels and for confoimance'with Technical Specification requirements.
No unacceptable conditions in process instrumentation were identified.
"
b.
Annunciator Alarms $
The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledged.
These conditions were discussed with shift personnel who were knowledgeable of t.he alarms and actions required.
Operator re-sponse was verified to be in accordance with procedure 2-100-1, Response to Panalarms, Revision 5.
During plant inspections, the inspector observed the condition of equip-ment associated with various alarms.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
c.
Shift Manning The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the operating requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, both to the number and type of licenses.
Control room and shift manning were observed to be in conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.
d.
Radiation Protection Controls Radiation Protection control areas were= inspected.
Radiation Work Per-mits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents, as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was inspected.
Proper posting and contbol of radiation and high radiation areas was re-
- viewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing of appropriate
. personnel monitoring devices.
There were no unacceptable conditions identified.,.
e.
Plant Housekeeping Controls Storage of material and comporitats w.,
observed with respect to preven-tion.of fire and safety hazards.
Plant housekeeping was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
.
There were no unacceptable conditions identiffed.
- s
,
'
t _
.
.
f.
Fire Protection / Prevention The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipment.
Combustible materials were being controlled and were not found near vital areas.
Selected cable penetrations were examined and fire barriers were found intact.
Cable trays were clear of debris.
No abnormal conditions were identified.
g.
Control of Equipment
'
During plant inspections, selected equipment under safety tag control was examined.
Equipment conditions were consistent with information in plant control logs.
h.
Plant Trips The plant experienced a trip on November 6, 1985 when the recirculation valve for the steam driven feedwater pump (P-2C) failed open.
This re-sulted in a low suction pressure trip of P-2C which caused a turbine trip and reactor trip.
All other systems functioned normally.
-
On November 22, while reducing power for a planned maintenance outage, the turbine manual control system failed which resulted in the rapid opening of all four governor valves.
The reactor tripped on variable overpower.
A failed circuit card was replaced to correct the problem.
Additional maintenance was performed on the turbine limiter control cir-cuit which had previously failed.
All other syctems functioned normally.
4.
Fuel Leakage On November 19, 1985, the licensee detected an increase in containment gaseous and air particulate activity levels on the installed Radiation Monitoring System. An investigation was conducted.
Chemistry samples of the primary coolant showed an increase in fission product activity.
Sampling frequency was increased and trending of chemistry results was commenced.
Letdown flow was adjusted to increase purification flow.
Maine Yankee's Technical Specifications set a limit on Reactor Coolant System Activity. The most limiting case requires a reactor shutdown if the primary coolant activity is greater than 1.0 micro Ci/gm Dose Equivalent Iodine 131 (I-131) for more than 48 continuous hours.
Dose Equivalent I-131 is defined
~
as that concentration of I-131 which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of Iodine 131, 132, 133, 134 and 135.
This limitation on specific activity ensures that the resultant 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> dose at the site boundary will not exceed an appropriately small fraction of the Part 100 limit following a steam generator tube rupture.
The licensee dis-cussed the results of their analysis with the fuel manufacturer and the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC).
They concluded that some s1all leak had de-
.
veloped in the fuel.
The best estimate for the number of fuel rods affected I
was from 1 to 40 pins.
There are 196 fuel pins in each bundle and 217 bundles
._ _
_
_
.-
- -----_
'
.
1 make up the core.
Because of the absence of long lived fission product ele-ments, it is believed th.;t the leaking fuel is new fuel (or one eight year old bundle from the center position in the core).
The highest activity level in the reactor coolant was 62% of the 1.0 micro Ci/gm dose equivalent iodine.
Following the plant trip on November 22, dose equivalent I-131 peaked at 94% of the 1.0 micro Ci/gm dose equivalent iodine (a peak in this parameter is expected after a plant trip due to temperature changes in the core).
By the end of the inspection period, the dose equiva-lent iodine was averaging approximately 15% of the 1.0 micro Ci/gm limit.
The licensee plans to continue monitoring coolant activity levels and plant
,
radiation levels.
During the next refueling outage, the fuel bundles will be sampled to identify the leaking fuel pins and remove them.
The inspector will continue to follow the licensee's actions in this matter (IFI 50-309/
,
'
85-32-01).
5.
Review of License Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed the following LERs to verify that the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector had previously verified that appropriate
corrective action was taken or responsibility assigned and that continued operation of the facility,2s conducted in accordance with Technical Specifi-
,
l cations and did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
N; discrepancies were identified.
LER NO.
SUBJECT 85-09 Steam generator pressure sensing line root valves not fully i
open.
85-10 RPS Channel Design Error.
85-11 ECCS train inadvertent activation during shutdown.
85-12 Fire system sprinklers isolated without required fire watch.
85-13 DP Transmitters improperly installed and maintained for en-vironmental qualification.
i 85-14 Type A test failure due to integration of Type C test.
85-15 SIAS "A" Train actuation.
85-16 Reactor Trip due to low Steam Generator level.
-
!
'
.
....r.
--m-
_
---,%
,, _ - -
,
_
-
,-,,,-,.,,--,n,,
,
,f------4-y,-,
t.--m,,,,,c,,
~cm
~,--
-.
.
. _.
.-
.
,
.
...
.
.
.-
-
,
>
.
LER NO.
SUBJECT l
85-17 Two plant trips resulting from spurious closure of Excess Flow Check Valves.
i
85-18 Plant trip on turbine driven feed pump recirculation valve controller failure.
6.
TMI Action Plan Items (NUREG-0737)
!
a.
I.A.1.3 (closed) Shift Manning.
The intent of this item is to limit the amount of overtime that plant operators are allowed in order to maintain an alert shift crew and to require a minimum shift crew size.
The lic-ensee has developed procedures to conform with the minimum crew size consistant with 10 CFR 50.54.
The inspector reviewed the overtime hours worked by operators for the past year and found them to be csistant with NRC guidance.
The licensee submitted Technical Specifioation Pro-
posed Change 109 on September 26, 1984 to address crew overtime.
This proposed change is under review by NRR.
This item is closed.
!
!
b.
II.B.2.3. (closed) Plant Shielding.
Maine Yankee has completed the shielding analysis and modifications associated with this item.
Inspec-tion Report 83-08 contains the details of the onsite review by the NRC.
The environmental qualification reviews required by this item have been superceded by 10 CFR 50.49 and will be reviewed during upcoming Environ-mental Qualification inspection.
This item is closed.
!
c.
II.K.3.1.b. (closed) Auto PORV Isolation.
A safety evaluation report dated October 4,1983 concluded that "the requirements of NUREG-0737 Item II.K.3.2 are met with the existing PORV safety valve and reactor high-pressure trip set points and that an automatic PORV isolation system is not required for Maine Yankee.
This item is closed.
d.
III.D.3.4. (closed) Control Room Habitability.
In order to assure that control room operators will be adequately protected against the effects of accidental releases of toxic and radioactive gases the licensee com-mitted to the following actions:
--
automating of the control room breathing air supply.
providing sufficient self-contained breathing apparatus for use by
--
,
j control room personnel.
establishing proper procedures and operator training to assure
'
--
appropriate response to toxic chemical conditions.
A safety evaluation dated March 1,1983 concluded that with the inclusion
,
j of the previously identified modifications, the design meets the criteria identified in Item III.D.3.4 of NUREG-0737 and is acceptable.
The in-spector verified completion of the licensee's commitments and found no discrepancies.
This item is closed.
,
- _
,. - _. _. _,
-e
,.. ~.
..,,
.__
.
._
,
..
...
_ _.
-__
,,, _., -
-
.
.
4 7.
Allegation Follow Up The inspector received two allegations concerning an incident during which five contractor personnel were found working in a respirator required area without respirators.
The first alleger said that the contractor had been involved in a number of recent violations of plant Health Physics procedures and that corrective action had not been sufficient.
The second allegation was from an individual involved in the respirator incident who alleged that the control provided by the licensee and the Health Physics department was insufficient to protect the contractors from poter.tially receiving an un-
,
necessary amount of radiation exposure.
The inspector reviewed the events of September 24, 1985 when the contractors were found in the respirator area.
Interviews were conducted with the per-sonnel involved including both the contractor and licensee managers.
Records of training and whole body counts were reviewed. The following are the re-sults of the investigation.
The contractor personnel were providing insulation services for the refueling outage.
Training records showed they had received General Employee Training which included Radiation Protection and Radiological Health and Safety train-ing.
The contractor provided services throughout the outage including in-sulation removal and installation.
The contractors had worked in the loop areas of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and were accustomed to using respirators for radiation jobs as well as breathing protection for asbestos insulation jobs.
The licensee also contracts Health Physics (H.P.) services during refueling outages.
These H.P. Technicians are used to supplement the Maine Yankee staff.
They are familiar with Maine Yankee procedures and were also used throughout the outage.
J On September 24, 1985 at approximately 7:15 a.m., five insulators entered containment using Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 85-8-137. Worker instructions on the RWP stated that no work was allowed in the loop areas without specific work site surveys and-that H.P. technicians determine the need for respirators based upon survey results.
The insulators were bringing insulation pads into containment for installation on the main coolant loop. The insulation had been removed earlier in the outage in order to support Steam Generator (S/G)
eddy current inspection.
The temporary platform erected for access to the primary manway on #3 S/G was a respirator required area.
The job supervisor contacted the H.P. technician in containment and discussed what areas were accessible.
The H.P. technician informed the inspector that he told the supervisor that loop 3 platform was contaminated and a respirator area.
Further, the H.P. technician told the supervisor limited work could be performed in the loop 3 cubical without respirators as long as no actual work took place on the containment platform.
Interviews with the H.P. tech-nician indicated that the contractors were told loop 2 was accessible without respirators since the primary manway was closed and the platform was decon-I I
- - - - - - - -.
.
- - -,
-
---
-n,rw
- -,
. ~ - - - -
-.,
,-n
-,,-,
- -,,, -~
-w,-. -
-- - -
, - ~
. __. _
.
___
__
_ _ _
_
__.
.
-.
_
!'
.-
.
.
!'
taminated.
The H.P. technician monitored the work that the insulators were performing.
The insulators were bringing pads into containment, loading the i
,
'
elevator and removing the pads from the elevator in the lower level of con-tainment. At approximately 8:30 a.m. the H.P. technician called the insula-
tors out of the loop 3 area because another team was preparing to torque the primary manway cover on loop 3.
The H.P. technician assumed the insulators i
{
were in the designated non respirator areas of loop 3.
He did not check to see exactly where the five insulators were working.
The H.P. technicians changed shifts at 9:00 a.m.
At approximately 10:00 a.m. the insulators returned to containment.
They told i
the H.P. techniciaa they were going to continue the job they had started in the morning using the same restrictions.
At approximately 10:30 a.m., the
!
H.P. on duty was making a tour of the loop 3 area and found the insulators l
working on the platform for loop 3 (respirator area). The. insulators were
!
not wearing respirators.
The H.P. technician told the insulators to leave containment and alerted the H.P. Checkpoint that the five individuals were found in the respirator area.
Three of these individuals were found to have slight surface contamination which was removed by washing (1500 cpm on mus-tache, 100 cpm on eye and 150 cpm on cheek).
All five insulators were given whole body counts and no uptake of radiation was found.
i The inspector interviewed the insulators who said they were given permission to enter loop 3 from the first H.P. technician and that the platform was not
.
a posted respirator area.
The inspector was unable to verify either of these
'
points.
The H.P. technicians stated that the insulators had been the source of prob-l lems throughout the outage because there were frequent minor problems with access control, radiation exposure control and radiation limits. The inspec-
'
tor determined that even though the H.P. technicians were finding these prob-
.
lems, they were not documented and plant managers were not informed of these
.
problems.
Further, the H.P. technicians chose to correct the problem and
!
,
allow the insulators to continue to work.
After the respirator problem was l
identified, management was informed of the day-to-day problems that the H.P.
technicians were finding.
Had the H.P. technicians tracked these problems
!
as they were identified, a trend might have been identified prior to the j
respirator incident.
l The inspector concluded that the insulators were in error when they began work
in the respirator area of loop 3.
The insulators claimed the area was not
'
posted, however, the insulators were transporting awkward insulation pads (approximately 6 ft. by 2 1/2 ft. by 4 inches) which could have prevented them
!
from seeing the posting. Additionally, all three loop areas look identical.
l Without a conscious effort to correctly identify the loop being entered, i
someone unfamiliar with the plant could make an error.
f
!
The licensee conducted an investigation into this incident documented under Radiological Incident Report 85-5.
The inspector reviewed this Incident Re-port.
Immediate corrective action taken by the licensee, in addition to those
__, _
_ _. _. _. - - _ _ _. _
.
.
_ _ _
..
..
.
-..
-..
.
.
.
-
-
--
.
.
.
.
.
.
'
1 above, included the assignment of a H.P. " Coordinator" (an individual knowl-edgeable in Maine Yankee H.P. practices) to assist the insulation contractors during jobs associated with radiation.
The licensee and the insulation con-tractor conducted several meetings and stressed the importance of RWP com-pliance.
As a result of these meetings, the contractor made several changes to assure compliance with Maine Yankee's procedures.
The H.P. technicians were also instructed to report any repeat problems with contractors to Maine Yankee management.
The licensee identified other long term corrective action including improvements in the training provided in RWP compliance and a
periodic review of long term RWP requirements.
,
!
This item is closed.
8.
Exit Interview Meetings were held periodically with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
l
,
i
!
'
.
i
+
i i
l i
i I
l
,
i l
i f
-
..
.
.
.
.
.
...
.. -
-
-.
.