IR 05000309/1992021
| ML20128A620 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1993 |
| From: | Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128A490 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-92-21, NUDOCS 9302020268 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20128A620 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 Report 92-21 License DPR 36..
Inspection At:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant Wiscasset, Maine (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company)-
Conducted:
November 20 through December 31,1992 Inspectors:
Charles S. Marschall, Senior Resident inspector William T. Olsen, Resident Inspector Albert E. MacDougall, Reactor Engineer
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Approved:
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W. NiazarusMief, Reactor Project Section 3D SCOPE Resident inspection of operations, radiation protection,. maintenance / surveillance, security, engineering / technical support, and safety assessment / quality verification.
OVERVIEW Plant Ooerations Operators safely performed daily plant maneuvers throughout the inspection period, including a shutdown on December 10, and a startup on December 13.
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During a containment inspection, inspectors found generally good housekeeping and material condition, The Plant Shift Supervisor demonstrated good safety perspective and a
questioning attitude in evaluating the operability of a Component Cooling Water valve that controls flow to the generator hydrogen cooler.
Maintenance and Surveillance Plant staff safely and professionally completed several maintenhnce and surveillance activities. The inspectors observed good use of procedures to control the activities. Some weaknesses were noted in planning and preparation of the work package for charging system flow control valve CH-F-38.
Security The security staff effectively implemented the requirements of the security plan and implementing procedures except for an isolated failure to adequately search a package
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entering the protected area.
Encineerine and Technical Support Engineering and technical support staff supported safe plant operation throughout the inspection period. The inspectors concluded that Maine Yankee had effectively implemented the requirements for cable separation. Engineering contributed high quality support for the operability determination of the Component Cooling Water valve. However, failure to insure adequate verification of a December 1989 Stone 930202026a 930125
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PDR ADOCK 05000309'
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(Overview Continued) ~
and Webster design review of the CCW system was. a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix ~B,
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Criterion Ill. - Inspectors closed an.open item associated with the cause of the April'19911 main transformer failure, Safety Assessment and Ouality Verification The plant manager insured prompt and'
appropriate action in response to the discovery of a Moisture Separator Reheater drain line -
leak. Maine Yankee issued a voluntary Licensee Event Report to insure industry awareness
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of possible safety consequences due to crosion/ corrosion of steam generator _feedwater nozzles and moisture separator'eans.
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TABLE OF CONTFNI'S O V ER V I EW....................... -........................ i.
TA BLE OF CONTENTS...............................
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OPERATIONS I
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1.1 Reactor Containment Bi Weekly Inspection (71707)
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l.2 Operability Determination (71707)......................... I
1.3 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)............, 2 2.
M AINTENANCE/ SURVEILLANCE,........................... 2 2.1 Maintenance Observations (62703)......................... 2 2.2 Surveillance Observations (61726)......................... 3 3.
S EC U R IT Y....................
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4-3.1 Search Procedure Weakness (71707)........................ 4 4.
ENGINEERING /TECIINICAL SUPPORT........................ 5 4.1 Cable Separation (71707)
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4.2 Review of Design Basis Evaluation (71707)
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4.3 (Closed) Open item 50 309/91-080-001, Cause of Main Transformer Fail u re (71707).......,........................,..., 8
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SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION.,,,............. 9 5.1 Moisture Separator-Reheater Drain Line Leak (40500)............. 9 5.2 Voluntary Licensee Event Report (LER) (40500)..._,...........
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AD M I NISTR ATI VE.....................................
6.1 Person s Contact ed..................................
6.2 Summary of Facility Activities..........................
6.3 Plant Management Changes............................
6.4 Ir.terface with the State of Maine.........................
6.5 Ex i t M ee ti n g.....................................
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DETAILS t.
OPERATIONS On a daily basis, inspectors verificci adequate staffing, appropriate access control, adherence to procedules and Limiting Conditions for. Operation, operability of protective systems, status of control room annunciators, status of radiation monitors, emergency powcr source
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operability, and opemSility of the Safety Parameter Display System (SpDS), Each week, the inspectors verified operability of selected Engineered Safety Features (ESP) trains and assessed the condition of the plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety. The inspectors performed biweeldy review of a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, portions of the containtnent isolation valve lineup, the posting of notices to workers and operability of selected ESF trains. The.spectors evaluated plant housekeeping and cleanliness, 1.1 REACTOR CONTAIN51ENT Ul-WEEKLY INSPECTION On November 24, the inspectors accompanied station auxiliary operators (AOs) during a-routine bi-weekly reactor containment building inspection. The AOs were accompanied by a radiation protection technician. The reactor containment building was generally well maintained except that tbc AOs found several tools and debris from packing material in the containment air compressor area and the lowerlevel walkway. The conditions were promptly corrected.
1.2 Operability Detennination (SCC-T-227)
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On December 13, during a plant startup, operators discovered that valve SCC-T-227 had excessive leakage when closed. The valve, a Fisher type 7600 air operated butterfly valve, controls flow of Secondary Component Cooling water (SCCW) to non-safety related main generator hydrogen coolers during normal plant operation. In the event of a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) a solenoid valve in the air supply line de-energizes, causing SCC-T-227 to close. The purpose of closing SCC-T-227 on a CSAS is to insure that safety _
related components particularly the Residual Heat Removal heat exchanger cooled by
' SCCW, receive sufficient SCCW Cow to remove heat loads following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Realizing the safety related function of the valve, the Plant Shift Supervisor (PSS) initiated an operability determination and requested that maintenance
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investigate the cause of the excessive leakage. Instrument and controls (I&C) technicians adjusted the valve controller, reducing leakage from approxiinately-400 gpm to 225 gpm.
Corporate Engineering Department staff infornied the PSS that an evaluation of SCCW heat
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removal capacity following a LOCA assumed no flow through the components isolated by..
SCC-T-22~7. As a result, the PSS declared SCC-T-227 and the associated train 'of RHR -
inoperable. Since reactor power was less than 2%, Technical Specilication 3.6 required one.
operable RHR train for plant operation with reactor power less than 2%,- and the RHR train cooled by PCCW remained operable, the PSS concluded that conditions required by conditions required by Technical Specification 3.6 had been met.
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The inspectors concluded that the PSS demonstrated good safety perspective and a questioning attitude in his determination of SCC-T-227 operability. His actions insured safe plant operation. Refer to section 5.2, below, for additional discussion of SCC-T-227.
1.3 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown During the inspection period, the inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of portions of the Service Water system components to verify their operability. The inspectors verified that system lineup matched plant drawings and the as built con 6guration. They looked for equipment conditions that might degrade plant performance, such as incorrectly installed valves, gross packing leakage, bent stems, or missing handwheels. The inspectors veri 6ed that hangers and supports were correctly installed and maintained in addition, the inspectors assessed cleanliness, housekeeping, and general system material condition, i
Tae in:;pectors found only minor labeling discrepancies, and determined that plant staff generally maintained the Service Water system in good condition. The inspectors concluded that, based on the components inspected, the Service Water system was capable of
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performing its intended function.
2.
MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE The inspectors observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and maintenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radiological controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and reportability per Technical Speci0 cations.
2.1 Mnintenance Observations The inspectors observed the following maintenance during the inspection period:
Work Order (WO) 92-1237, repair of primary component cooling water valve
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PCC-507,
WO 92-6864, FN-17-2 electrical trouble shooting,
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WO 92-6959, emergency diesel generator IB preventive maintenance,
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WO 92-2554,- corrective maintenance of charging Dow control valve CH F-38.
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WO 92-6472, troubleshoot and repair Decontamination Booth WO 92-6177, disassemble, inspect and repair swing check valve FS-7, in
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accordance with station procedure 5-55-7.
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The inspector reviewed corrective maintenance of charging flow control valve CH-F-38.
The scope of the original work order was to troubleshoot the improper response of CH F-38 to its control signal. On November 30, the technicians detennined that the electric to
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pneumatic (FJP) positioner was stick'mg, and a revision to the work order was written to-replace the positioner. During the work to replace the FlP, the technicians suspected that a problem with the positioner feedback arm may have caused the positioner to fail.
To perform the maintenance, the standby charging pumps were placed in pull to lock and the normal charging and letdown flow path were isolated. As a result, operators entered technical specification action statement 3.6B, and placed alternate charging and letdown in service. The inspector observed the operators change from normal to alternate charging and letdown. The operators followed the procedure and demonstrated familiarity with the evolution and the expected response of the plant.
The technicians reviewed the valve work history and noted the same types of problems in May 1990 and July 1992. The work order of May 1990,2263-90DR, had a diagram that showed the feedback arm slightly bent and recommended that spacers be installed on the arm to correct the problem. A new FJP positioner was installed, but the problem with the spacers was apparently not corrected. In July 1990, the same problem with the control signal was noted and the FJP positioner was again replaced. However, the problem with the missing spacers was not corrected. On December 4th, the technicians installed the spacers and successfully tested CH F-38.
The inspector questioned operators concerning the' operability of CH-F-38 since it is required to close during a safety injection actuation signal. The operators satisfactorily performed a partial stroke test, per routine ECCS testing procedure 3-1,2.4, and a full closing stroke test to verify the operability of the valve.
The inspector concluded that the planner conducted insufficient research in preparing the work package. A thorough review of the valve history was not conducted prior to starting the job. Site engineering was not involved in the early stages of the repair effort. This led-to several revisions to the work package and exceeding the man-rem budget for the job.
Additionally, the failure analysis performed as part of the earlier work requests did not identify the root cause of the E/P positioner failures.
In summary operations and maintenance properly controlled the observed maintenance
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activities. However, the planning and preparation of the work package for the repair of CH-F-38 could have been more thorough.
2.2 Surveillance Observations On December 8 and 9, Maine Yankee instrument and controls technicians performed routine monthly surveillance testing of the reactor protection system. The inspector observed portions of the Power Range Safety Channels and Reactor Coolant Flow surveillances. Plant staff used the following procedures:
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3-6.2.2.0, Monthly Instrument Surveillance Tests,-
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3-6.2.2.2, Reactor Coolant Flow. -
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The instrumentation and controls (l&C) technicians performed the surveillance testing in a professional manner and maintained excellent communications with operations personnel-throughout the observed portion of testing. The inspector determined that Maine Yankee is capable of performing and controlling complex testing in a safe and efficient manner while the station is at power.
In general, the inspectors observed good use of procedures to control maintenance and surveillance activities during this inspection period.
3.
SECURITY The inspectors verified that security conditions met regulatory requirements, the requirements of the physical security plan, and complied with approved procedures. The checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory measures when required. No discrepancies were identified.
3.1 Search Procedure Weakness On December 24, a Maine Yankee employee brought an unopened, gift-wrapped bottle of-I wine into the protected area as a Christmas present. Recognizing a breach in company policy, a supervisor immediately took the employee and the wine to the security office. The employee admitted receiving general employee training concerning the prohibition against bringing alcoholic beverages into the station protected area. However, the individual had not considered this when the present was brought to the station as it was not intended to be consumed there. The inspector concluded that the individual did not willfully violate the station security plan requirements. However, the failure of security officers to detect and -
prevent alcoholic beverages from being brought into the protected area is a violation of the NRC approved station security plan and implementing procedures. There is no requirement to verify the contents of containers; however, in this case, the size and packaging of the bottle should have aroused suspicion.
The security department immediately issued additional instructions and retrained all station security _ officers in the identification of these types of containers. In addition, a memorandum was issued to all station personnel and contractors which reiterated the station Fitness for Duty policy. The individual _who brought the bottle of wine into the protected area was subsequently given a letter of reprimand for the infraction.
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The inspector determined that the licensee-identified violation was an isolated incident, r !
the licensee immediately took corrective action. The inspector concluded that the employee and security staff did not willfully violate xcurity requirements. The inadequate search and the presence of the wine in the protected area was not reportable. Since the bottle of wine was not opened while on station property, there was no safety significance. As a tesult, this violation will not be subject to enforcement action because licensee efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in section Vll.B.(2) of the enforcement policy.
Maine Yankee supervisory personnel demonstrated excellent understanding of the issues associated with this event and displayed prompt, effective and comprehensive actions to resolve the problems. Plant management recognized an opportunity to improve security-related General Employee Training.
4.
ENGINEERING /TECilNICAL SUPPORT 4.1 Cnble Separatinn The inspector reviewed construction design documents and cable schedule diagrams, and conducted walkdowns of the cable spreading room, cable vault, switchgear room, Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB), and control room to ensure electrical cables of redundant safety related equipment were properly isolated.
The FSAR, section 8.3.7.5 states that cables for redundant equipment or separate instrument channels are required to be separated from each other. Maine Yankee Standard (MYS)
2957, " Criteria for Identification and Separation of Electrical Cables", describes the details concerning how cable separation is achieved. For example, safety related power cables originating from bus number 5 or from bus number 7 are required to be separated from safety related cables originating from bus number 6 or bus number 8. Safety related control cables originating from motor controllers connected to bus number 7A are required to be separated from safety related control cables originating from motor controllers connected to bus number 8A. All direct current power cables from each battery to its respective busses and from each bus to its respective vital bus inverter are required to be separated, one battery system from another. The FSAR section 8.3.7.6 and MYS 2957 also described the following acceptable methods of maintaining cable separation:
In separate exposed rigid metal conduit following separate routes where practical.
- In separate concrete encased plastic or metal ducts in the same duct bank.
- In separate cable trays with horizontal separation. The tray sides are considered
adequate barriers.
In separate cable trays separated vertically by solid tray covers.
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In separate single barriered sections of the same tray.
The inspector reviewed construction erble schedule diagrams and identified which cables originated from the various safety related busses. Individual cable identification numbers were marked on yellow (safety related) or white (non safety related) tags attached to the cables at various locations. The inspector checked various cable raceways in the cable spreading room and cable vault and verified that cables with numbers from redundant safety related busses were properly separated. The inspector traced cable 138PH1,4160V power-cable from emergency bus 5 to charging pump P-14A, and cable 156PH1,4160 V power cable from emergency bus 6 to charging pump P-14S. The inspector also traced control
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power cable 120 PL 93 from MCC 8A to the control room benchboard for charging pump isolation valve (HCV 302), and control power cable 105PL96 from MCC 7A to control room benchboard for charging pump isolation valve HCV 303.
The inspector identified the following potential problems during the plant walkdown:
125VDC cable 18222 and 1B221 associated with battery bus 4 were not separated
from 125VDC cables IB 126 and IB 128 associated with battery bus 3.
- The selected sample of power cables were not separated from each other for a length of approximately 6 feet.
- Two cable trays had barriers that did not extend the entire length of the cable tray.
These issues were discussed with the responsible system engineers, and the licensee conducted evahiations to determine their safety significance.
The licensee verified that the cables from battery bus 4 do not share the same raceway or floor sleeve as cables from battery bus 3. However, the area of concern was the transition from the cable raceway to the floor sleeve ( a total distance of about 4-1/2 feet). In this area the cables were in the same group of cables and were separated by approximately 3-6 inches of air. The licensee evaluated the adequacy of the transition area and verified that the separation was acceptable. Nonetheless, the licensee installed a barrier to provide additional physical separation for the cables. The inspector concluced that this action was appropriate.
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The licensee conducted a technical evaluation (TE 456-92) to determine if the 5KV-interkx:ked-armored cable satisfied the cable separation requirements for the charging pump-cables found contacting each other. The engineering evaluation showed that the 5KV cable construction (fire retardant tapes, aluminum armoi, and PVC armor jacket) provided its own -
physical separation of greater ?han 90 mils, The typical aluminum tray barrier provided -
approximately 75 mils of separation between redundant trains of cable. Based on this analysis, the licensee determined that the existing configuration fulfilled the intent of
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separation and that the charging pumps were operable. The inspector agreed with the licensee's determination that the armor on the power cables provided adequate physical separation.
The inspector identified two cable trays that did not have barriers that extended the entire length of the cable tray. The inspector was concerned that by not extending the barriers, a situation was created where the cables were only separated by air and not a physical barrier.
Due to the configuration and location of the trays in question, a construction note on drawing Il50-SE-122D which stated " barriers in horizontal trays in the cabic spreading roorn to be continuous with trays entering from the turbine building and PAB" did not apply. Based on this fact and field verification, the licensee determined that the cable tray barriers identified did not have to extend the entire length of the tray. The inspector agreed with this determination.
Overall, the inspector concluded that safety related cables were separated as described in MYS 2957 and the FSAR.
4.2 Review of Design llasts Evaluntion in December 1989, Stone and Webster completed an analysis of the heat removal capacity of the Maine Yankee Component Cooling Water systems in response to a LOCA. The analysis assumed that, in the event of an accident, no SCCW was supplied to the main generator hydrogen coolers. As discussed in section 1.2, above, on December 13, plant staff discovered that SCC-T-227 permitted 400 gpm leakage in the as-found closed condi ion.
t Although maintenance reduced the leakage to 220 gpm by operator adjustment, the PSS determined that SCC-T-227 could not perform its assumed safety function of isolating the hydrogen coolers. Engineering personnel provided critical information to the PSS, allowing him to reach the appropriate decision. In addition, engineering subsequently performed an analysis that concluded the valve, and the safety related components cooled by SCCW, remained operable for SCC-T-227 leakage of not greater than 400 gpm, for restricted Service Water (SW) temperatures. Based on the revised calculation, SW inlet temperature could not exceed 73*F for operation using the small SCCW heat exchanger, or 83*F using the large SCCW heat exchanger. Previously, SW temperatures were limited to 80*F for the small CCW heat exchanger, and 90 F for the large heat exchanger. The engineering calculation incorporated conservative assumptions, and demonstrated the SW and SCCW capacity.to provide required cooling under accident conditions. In December 1989, however, Maine Yankee did not adequately review the Stone and Webster analysis to verify the validity of the assumptions in the analysis. Maine Yankee management indicated that the Fisher 7600 series butterfly valve was not designed to be leak tight in the closed position. Since the S&W calculation was completed, operators have been sensitive to the affect of service water temperatures on SCCW heat removal capacity. Operator practice is to avoid SCCW operation, using the small heat exchangers, during periods of peak SW temperature. Due to the nature of tidal flow in the vicinity of Maine Yankee, peak SW temperatures typically occur on very hot, sunny afternoons when incoming tidal flow absorbs heat from the mud I
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flats. Peak temperatures reached under these conditions last for only a few minutes. - Based'
on corporate knowledge, the highest SW temperature ever experienced was 78'F. The i revised engineering calculation demonstrated, based on the known history of service water temperatures, that it is very unlikely that the plant operated with insufficient SCCW cooling capacity between _ December 1989 and December 13, 1993. The Operations Manager placed a note in the night orders regarding the 83*F SW inlet temperature limit, and the licensee made a temporary change to the service water operating procedure.-
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires that licensees establish measures to provide for verifying the adequacy of design reviews. Failure to adequately :
review the December 1989 Stone and Webster calculation is a violation which could have led to operation without adequate LOCA heat removal capacity between December 1989 and December 1993 (VIO 50-309/92-021-001).
4.3 (Closed) Open Item 50-309/91-080-001, Cause of Main Transformer Failure On April 29,1991, electrical failure of main transformer X-1 A resulted in a plant trip and a hydrogen fire in the main generator leads area. The Accident Investigation Team considered the cause of the main transformer failure an unresolved item. Maine Yankee contracted Power Technologies, incorporated (PTI), to perform an analysis of the transformer failure.
The PTI report, completed January 23,1992, and made available to the resident inspectors in December 1992, concluded that:
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the transformer fault initiated as a high voltage to low voltage winding fault,
the transformer low voltage winding and generator stator potential was elevated to e
nearly the high voltage mid point potential, and, the generator neutral bus faulted to ground due to fault voltages in excess of the e
air-side insulation withstand strength.
These conclusions compare favorably with the facts presented in NRC Inspection Report 50-309/91-80. The PTI report also concluded that the root cause of the transformer failure could not be determined with certainty due to the condition of the core and coils. However, the report supplied the following list of potential root causes with the associated assessments of probability:
" Stress caused by high internal winding transient voltages continues as one of the:
more probable root causes - the outer HV winding inner layer as well as the crossover would be affected by the voltages resulting from this mode of oscillation."
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" Damage, contamination, and/or error during manufacturing could not be observed
and thus cannot be confirmed, but cannot be summarily rejected. Lack of quality.
control impulse as part of the factory acceptance tests leaves the possibility of damage within the winding layers that could escape the scruany of the low frequency tests."
" Operating conditions, levels of dissolved nitrogen and risks of free gas evolution, e
and maintenance actions, including maintenance of the gas regulating system, are given low weight as potential root causes, that neither appears to have contributed directly to the failure."
"GIC (Geomagnetically Induced Current) as a root cause is given low weight owing
to the low values predicted for coil hot spot temperature rises due to saturation, but as the condition was present immediately prior to the fault, may have been contributory "
"During the 15 minute interval the pumps were off on April 25,1991, the predicted -
hot spot temperatures in the outer HV layers entered the threshold for gas evolution
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(140 *C) for possibly one minute. This is believed to be too short a time interval to
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lead to partial discharge and degradation of High Voltage winding insulation strength.
Pump shutdown is considered as a very unlikely contributor to the cause of failure."
The PTl report supplied detailed description of the inspections, simulations, and analyses that'
formed the bases for the conclusions cited above. Based on the information in the report, t'.is item is closed.
5.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION 5.1 Molsture Separator-Rcheater Drain Line Leak
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On December 10, a Maine Yankee contractor, working in the turbine building, observed water leaking from insulation surrounding the "A" Moisture Separator Rehater (MSR)
drainline. When station maintenance personnel removed the piping insulation, they found a small througl.-wall leak.
Station managerr.ent directed the plant to be taken off-line to allow ultrasonic testing (UT),
assessment.for crosion/ corrosion, and repairs of all affected system piping. The staff expanded the UT inspection.to include all MSR drain lines when they found wall thinning in the "A" MSR drain line. Maine Yankee engineering personnel identified wall thinning in the rame areas in all four MSR drain lines and this piping was replaced.
The station engineering department removed and analyzed the plant piping and identified the cause of the wall thinning as local corrosion. Engineering also verified that the drain lines-had appropriately been exempted from the erosion / corrosion control program based on low flow rates and other fluid condition.
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The inspectors concluded that the plant manager took prompt and appropriate action in response to discovery of the leak. The inspectors also concluded that engineering had appropriately excluded the MSR drain !ines from the erosion / corrosion program.
5.2 Voluntary Licensee Event Report (LER)
On December 23,1992, Maine Yankee issued Licensee Event Report 92-013-00, Failure of Steam Generator J-Tubes and Moisture Separator Cans. Maine Yankee issued the voluntary report to inform the nuclear industry of crosion-corrosion damage to steam generator internals with potential safety consequences. The report summarized the single phase erosion-corrosion of the J-tubes, the two phase erosion-corrosion of the moisture separator cans. Plant staff replaced 38 J tubes of a possible 84, and made repairs to all 294 moisture separator cans. The report also identifies the potential for pieces of the eroded components to cause damage to the steam generator tubes or tube sheets. When Maine Yankee discovered the erosion-corrosion during the 1992 refueling outage, a regional inspector reviewed Maine Yankee's actions. Details of the inspection are contained in NRC Inspection-Report 50 309/92-04, 6.
ADMINISTRATIVE -
6.1 Persons Contacted During this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various lkensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance technicians and the licensee's management staff.
6.2 Summary of Fncility Activities Maine Yankee operated at power throughout the inspection period, with the exception of a shutdown to repair moisture separator drain lines from December 10, to December 14. A Region I inspector conducted a routine security inspection from November 30 through December 3,1992.
6.3 Plant Management Changes Effective January 1,1993, Graham leitch became the Maine Yankee Vice President of Operations. Mr. Leitch, formerly Vice President, Limerick, filled the position that was vacant for about a year. - Maine Yankee management also implemented a program for -
rotation of station managers. Effective January 1,1993, Bob Nelson moved from Manager, Technical Support to Manager, Corporate Engineering. - Steve Nichols moved from manager, Plant Engineering Department to Manager, Technical Support Jim Hebert, formerly the -
Manager of the Corporate Engineering Department is presently the Manager, Licensing and.
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Engineering Support. Chris Shaw, who completed the Senior Operations Engineer Certification course (similar to STA training), resumed duties as Manager of the Plant Engineering Department.
6.4 Interface with the State of Maine Periodically, the resident inspectors and the onsite representative of the State of Maine discussed findings and activities of their corresponding organizations. No unacceptable plant conditions were identified; 6.5 Exit Meeting Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and fmdings, A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection.
During the inspection period the inspectors conducted backshift inspection on November 29 and December 2,14 and 17 and deep backshift on December 13 and 14.
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