IR 05000309/1989006
| ML20245H905 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1989 |
| From: | Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245H893 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-89-06, 50-309-89-6, NUDOCS 8905030570 | |
| Download: ML20245H905 (7) | |
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f-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Report.No.:
50-309/89-0
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License No.:
DPR-36~
l Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power 83 Edison Drive
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Augusta, Maine 04336
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. Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Conducte'd:
March 1, 1989 to April 7, 1989 Inspectors:
Cornelius F. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector RpardJ.Feudenberger,ResidentInspector Approved By: //
Nl@
YY Ebwell E. Tr #p, Chief f
Dhte Reactor Projects Section No. 3A Summary:
Inspection on March 1 thru April 7, 1989 (Report Number 50-309/89-06
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Areas Inspected:
Routine resident inspections of plant opera.tions including:
.f followup on previous inspection findings, review of special reportr, licensee q
event followup, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, j
physical security, radiation protection and fire protection.
Results:
The inspectors concluded that the plant continues tu be operated safely.. The preplanning associated with the control element drive mechanism j
cooling fan replacement was particularly well done (Detail 5).
The critical review that the fire protection program is receiving was considered a good initiative (Detail 3).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Within this rwort period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance tech-nicians and the licensee's management staff.
2.
Summary of Facility Activitig The facility was operating at full power at the beginning of the report period.
Power was reduced to ninety percent on March 25 for routine sur-veillance testing of the Main Steam Excess Flow Check and Turbine Valves.
The plant was returned to full power later that day.
A plant trip occurred on April 5 due to an inadvertent actuation of the fault relayirig associated with 345 kilovolt (KV) breaker KG1 during breaker testing in the 345 Kil yard. The plant was returned to power operation later the same
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day and remained there for the rest of the report period.
Inspections were conducted by Region 1 based specialist inspectors during
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the week of March 6,1989, in the Emergency Preparedness area and during the week of March 20, 1989, in the Security Area. On March 29, 1989, an NRC/ licensee Enforcement Conference was held in the Region I office to discuss the findings of a team inspection of the Vendor Interface and
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Procurement area in 1988 (Inspection Report No. 50-309/88-200).
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3.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings Fire Protection As discussea in previous inspection reports, the licensee is updating the fire protection program including a detailed review of fire protection procedures. The review identified that procedure 3.1.9, Fire Pump Test-ing, which is performed weekly, included a step to cycle major valves in the fire water system on a yearly basis. Tne valves are verified to be in their appropriate position as part of the weekly surveillance.
On March 29, 1989, a licensee review of completed Fire Pump testing proced-ures indicated that the requirtd cycling of the valves had not been com-pleted since May of 1986. The valve checklist was reviewed and updated to assure all valves rcquired to meet the requirements of Technical Specifi-cation 4.12.F.1 were cycled and vulve cycling was completed the same day.
The inspector discussed the issue with the Fire Protection Coordinator.
All of the valves were found to be operable.
Corrective action also
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included removing the requirement to perform the annual cycling of the valves from the fire pump test procedure and including the requirement in a procedure which is performed annually.
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The safety significance of the issue was minimal due to the fact the valves had been verified to be in their correct positions and therefore l
the operability of the sprinkler systems was not affected. Also, when the valves were cycled, all were found to be operable. The inspector had no further questions pertaining to this issue.
The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's review and update of the fire protection program in future inspections.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (IP 71707)
On a daily basis, during routine facility tours the following were checked:
manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LCO's, instrumentation, recorder trace >, protective systems, control room annun-ciators, radiation monitors, emergency power source operability, operabil-ity of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), control room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating orders. On a weekly basis, selected Engineered Safety Features (ESF) trains were verified to be operable. The condition of the plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety were assessed. On a biweekly frequency the inspector reviewed a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup and the posting of notices to workers.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also evaluated.
The inspector observed selected phases of the plant's operations to deter-mine compliar e with the NRC's regulations. The inspector determined that the areas int
'ed and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safety ha.
v a the public or plant personnel.
The following are noteworthy area. the inspector reviewed:
a.
On March 24, 1989, the inspector noted a new style contamination control device which was being installed on safety class valves asso-ciated with the High Pressure Safety Injection System. The devices consisted of clear plastic (lexan) held in place around the valve yoke area with stainless steel hose clamps. The devices appeared to be an improvement over other devices used to control contamination caused by leaking valves.
However, the inspector was concerned that no administrative controls were in place to limit the use of the devices to a temporary installation. The devices were installed on valves which had not been identified as leaking valves, by the issu-ante of a Discrepancy Report (DR) or any other means.
The Plant Engineering Department (PED) had reviewed the installation of devices and provided a memo which addressed the use of the devices on the high pressure safety injection valves. The PED review indicated that the devices should not pose a problem. Also included ir the memo was a list of questions which engineering would typically review to as-sure the system on which the device was installed was not adversely affected.
The inspector was concerned that initial evaluation for suitability of the device would be made by the Radiological Control Technicians installing the devices instead of the Engineering Department.
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The inspector also identified a discrepancy between the criteria used
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to initiate a DR for leaking valves by the Operations Department and the Radiological Controls Department.
Prior to initiating a DR for an ' apparently leaking valve, Operations Department personnel clean the boron build up from the valve and enter the valve on a list to be checked, Several days later the valve is checked to determine if the valve is actively leaking.
If it is, a DR is initiated. Radiologi-cal Controls Department personnel were initiating DR's on any valve with boron buildup.
The above observations were discussed with licensee management of the Operations, Radiological Controls and Plant Engineering Department.
This issue was discussed at a department interface meeting which resulted in the removal of the currently installed devices and the establishment of controls to ensure engineering review of the instal-lation of such devices on a case-by-case basis in the future. Also, the devices will only be installed on actively leaking valves using the criteria that the Operations Department had established.
The inspector considered these changes to be appropriate to control the use of contamination control devices in the future. The inspec-i tor had no further questions.
b.
The plant tripped from 100 percent power on April 5,1989 at 11:35 a.m.
The plant responded normally and all systems functioned as designed. The cause of the trip was main generator relaying / loss of load.
The plant conducted a review of trip and attributed the cause to a surveillance test being conducted by Central Maine Power (CMP)
company personnel.
CMP conducts routing testing of the breakers in the 34,5 Kilovolt (KV) switchyard. During the surveil-lance, the breaker failure relay sensed a problem with breaker KG-1 and tripped adjacent breakers KG1/375 and K378-1.
Once these breakers opened, the plant was isolated from the grid and the plant tripped.
CMP review of the surveillance test indicated that the replacement of a lead at the conclusion of the test caused the fault signal. Stray capacitance in this lead was the identified cause.
CMP decided to leave the lead disconnected until further testing under similar con-ditions could be conducted.
The plant also initiated their own review of CMP test procedures to assure that testing which could impact on the plant was adequately controlled.
While the plant was shut down, the licensee conducted corrective maintenance on the control rod drive cooling fans. The licensee took advantage of the reduction in neutron dose rates in the vicinity of the fans while the plant was shut down. The plant was restarted on April 5, and returned to full power the following day. The inspector had no further questions.
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5.
Plant Maintenance (IP 62703)
l The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and main-tenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radio-logical controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and reporta-bility per Technical Specifications.
The following maintenance evolutions were reviewed:
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Discrepancy Date Report Number Description 3/30/89 89-0376 E-91-A Safeguards pumps seal leak off cooler
inspection.
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f 4/03/89 89-1535 Replacement of Control Element Drive Mech-anism cooling fans.
During this inspection period, the licensee piaced the maintenance depart-ment on 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> shif ts in order to reduce the backlog of open DR's. The
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backlog of open DR's had been increasing in recent months due in part to
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higher priority maintenance items. The licensee tracking system maintains the current status of all DR's.
These DR's are broken down into several different categories including those awaiting plant conditions (such as plant shutdown), those awaiting replacement parts and those ready to be l
worked.
When the ready to be worked number of outstanding DR's reached 400, the licensee decided to increase the normal work hours in order to aid in reducing this number.
The Control Element Drive Mechanisms CEDM's provide cooling air from three fans located on the refueling floor of the containment building. Two fans are normally in operation.
After the failure of one fan (FN-43-1) on March 14, 1989, the licensee identified that a second fan was operating with a bearing which exhibited higher than normal vibration. A temporary vibration measuring device was installed and operators were provided detailed guidance on appropriate responses should the second fan fail.
Had all the fans failed, there is the possibility of equipment damage to the Control Element Drive Mechanism Coil stacks, however, the Controi Ele-ment Assemblies would be capable of performing their safety function.
The licensee made preparations to replace the failed fan at power, including the staging of materials and tools, ALARA reviews and detailed planning of
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the fan replacement evolution.
The inspector attended one of the initial l
planning meetings. The meeting included individuals from both management l
I and craft of the maintenance and radiological controls departments.
The industrial safety and ALARA coordinators were also present.
The group brainstormed and developed several ideas to reduce the time necessary to complete the tasks, thereby reducing radiation exposure.
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The licensee chose to not replace any of the fans unless the second fan failed. The fan replacements were added to the unscheduled shutdown list.
On April 5, the plant tripped. Two CEDM cooling fans were replaced later that day in order to take advantage of-the significant reduction in the radiation fields in the area of the fans.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's efforts which included the performance of detailed plan-ning, designing of appropriate shielding, and prestaging tools and mate-rials were valuable elements for maintaining alternatives for the replace-ment of the CEDM cooling fans.
The inspector had no further questions, 6.
Surveillance Testing (IP 61726)
The inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and LC0's, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution.
The following surveillance were reviewed:
Date Procedure Number Title 3/6 3.1.5 Emergency Feedwater Pump Test i
3/8 3.1.20 Safeguards Valve Testing No significant concerns were identified.
7.
Observation of Physical Security (IP 71707)
Checks were made to determine whether security conditions mec regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compen sato ry measures when required.
No significant concerns were identified.
8.
Radiological Controls (IP 71707)
Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-ing period. Areas reviewed included Organization and Management, external radiation exposure control and contamination control.
Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control proced-ures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observed.
Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradiological point s throughout the facility were taken by the inspector.
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A new-frisking policy was implemented by the licensee on March 29, 1989, in order to improve the contamination control program. Frisking stations were established at eight (8) locations throughout the radiation control
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. area (RCA) of the plant.
Personnel are now required to perform hand and foot frisks prior to exiting to the outside from any building in the RCA, and immediately af ter exiting to the outside from any building in the RCA, and. immediately after exiting any posted contaminated area.
In order to facilitete implementation of the new frisking policy, a memo was distrib-uted to. all. plant piersonnel, maps showing the location of the frisking stations were posted at the Health Physics Checkpoint and Radiation Work Permit (RWP) briefings were revised to include instructions on f ri sker locations and use.
The inspector observed plant personnel properly performing hand and foot frisks at the newly established locations.
The inspector considers the revised frisking policy an improvement to the contamination control program.
9.
Licensee Self-Assessment (IP 40500)
The inspector reviewed the variety of systems that the licensee employs to
conduct self assessments.
As a part of this inspection, the inspector
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reviewed selected licensee event reports (LERs) and oversight activities.
Selected Committee meeting minutes for the Plant Onsite Review Committee (PORC) meetings were reviewed and the quorum and frequency' requirements of the Technical Specifications were verified.
PORC nieetings and PORC Pro-cedure Subcommittee meetings were attended.
The discussions of issues were lively and involved all members. Membership appeared well prepared for the meetings.
The licensee also utilizes a variety of techniques to monitor the perform-ance of the control systems and affect changes to those systems for iden-tified problem areas. Through the Morning Managers Meeting, daily events are reviewed and analyzed.
Specific corrective actions are assigned and then followed through tracking systems which are reviewed by the PORC.
The inspector will continue to review selected tracking systems in future inspections.
10.
Exit Interview (IP _3_0_703)
Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the ' inspection scope and findings.
A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection. The licen-see did not identify 2.790 material.
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