IR 05000309/1985098
| ML20236L045 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1987 |
| From: | Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Randazza J Maine Yankee |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236L048 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8708100107 | |
| Download: ML20236L045 (3) | |
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AUG 0 31987 Docket No. 50-309 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company )
ATTN: Mr. J. B. Randazza Vice President Nuclear Operations l 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 l
Gentlemen: i Subject: Systematic Assessment of Licerisee Performance (SALP) Report N /85-98 This refers to the evaluation of the nuclear facility operated by Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company conducted by the Region I staff on March 31, 198 This re-port was discussed in a meeting held on May 12, 1987, at Reg *on I, King of Prussia, ,
Pennsylvani '
The list of attendees is attached as Enclosure 1. The NRC Region I SALP Report is provided as Enclosure 2. Our letter of April 29, 1987, (Erclosure 3) forwarded the SALP Board Report and solicited comrrents within 30 days of the May 12 meetin Your response of July 1, 1987 (Enclosure 4) has been reviewed. Based on this re-sponse and dialogue during the May 12 meeting, no changes to the SALP Board Report are considered appropriat Our overall assessment of your facility ope ation is that your initiatives have resulted in improved performance and that there is effective management attention and involvement oriented toward nuclear safety in all functional areas evaluate Specifically, management action has resulted in five Category 1 assessments and an improving trend in two other categories. We encourage your continued management t
attention to provide for feedback and ongoing evaluation of your initiative We consider that our meeting and interchange of information was beneficial and improved our mutual understanding of your activities and the regulatory progra No reply to this letter is require Your actions in response to the NRC System- ,
atic Assessment of Licensee Performance will be reviewed during future inspection l'
of your licensed facilit l Your cooperation is appreciate !
Sincerely, Ortstua1 Signed Bys h/h 7 William T. Russell
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Regional Administrator 8708100107 e70003 PDR ADDCK 05000309 A G PDR U i
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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 2 AUG 0 31987
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Enclosures:
SALP Management Meeting Attendees Region I SALP Report 50-309/85-98 Region I Letter, W. Russell to J. Randazza dated April 29, 1987 Maine Yankee Letter, G. Whittier to W. Russell dated July 1, 1987
REGION I==
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 50-309/85-98 MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION ASSESSMENT PERIOD: NOVEMBER 1, 1985 to JANUARY 31, 1987 BOARD MEETING DATE: MARCH 31, 1987
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS Overall Summary The SALP Board assessment confirmed a continuation of a strong management I overview of daily plant activities with emphasis on safe operation l Most notable were the high performance levels noted in tne following functional areas: plant operations, surveillance, emergency preparedness, security, and training and qualification effectivenes Licensee management exhibited a thorough approach in troubleshooting, assignment of responsibilities, tracking, and resolution of individual problem Strong individual performance was evidenced by the lack of personnel errors in all area Significant licensee initiatives were noted during this assessment period including improved communications through morning plant management meet-ings, replacement and/or upgrading of major plant components, a compre-hensive surveillance program augmented by prompt reaction to degraded surveillance results, a program for the elimination of copper sources in the condensate and feedwater systems, and utilization of the Quality Assurance group to aid in improving overall performance. Based on recent observations, an improving trend was noted in licensing activitie Notwithstanding the above, there were eight plant trips, three unplanned shutdowns and approximately eighteen power reductions / limitations during this assessment period. This high incidence of such occurrences was primarily the result of balance of plant component failures, equioment performance difficulties, or for the performance of maintenance activi-ties. Such performance by balance of plant equipment indicates that im-provements are needed in the material condition of the plant through measures such as more aggressive preventive maintenance, reviews of the effects of aging on plant components, component replacement, or system ;
redesig The radiological controls area was characterized by inconsistent perform- !
ances While several initiatives indicated strong performance, the re-sponse to other situations varied in effectivenes Additional efforts in this area are warrante ,
As a result of this assessment, NRC activities in Category 1 functional areas are eligible for reduced inspection effort. We will consider the level of performance and initiatives to address identified shortcomings in our prioritization of the inspection program for the facilit i L
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B. Background Licensee Activities At the beginning of the assessment period the facility was operating at 76 percent power and increasing load following the cycle 9 re-fueling outage and some equipment problems experienced during start- l up following that outage. Between November 4 and 6, 1985, the plant reduced power several times because of high stator gas differential )
i temperature in the main generator. The plant tripped on November 1 6 from 81 percent power on loss of load. This was the result of '
a failure of the turbine-driven feedwater pump recirculation valve j controlle On November 7 the plant was returned to power opera-tions reaching full power on November 15. Power was reduced on November 15 and 22 to clean main condenser waterboxes and repair l reactor protective system (RPS) temperature detectors. The plant tripped on November 22 when the turbine generator control system failed. Power operations were resumed on November 24. A power j reduction was made on November 26 to remove the turbine driven 1 feedwater pump from service following problems with the recircula- l tion valve controlle On December 4, power was reduced due to a dropped control rod as- l sembly. On December 24, plant power was reduced to repair a I hydraulic oil leak on a turbine governor valv Power was reduced on December 28 and 31 in order to backwash debris from the main condenser waterboxes. On January 3, 1986 the plant reduced power to place the turbine-driven feedwater pump in servic On January 4 the plant was manually tripped when an administrative limit on condenser differential pressure was reached. The differ- !
ential pressure condition was the result of the operator securing ;
the wrong circulating water pump. The plant was returned to power l operations on January 5. During early 1986, a number of power re-ductions to 75 percent were required due to fouling, tube leakage and eddy current testing of the main condenser. These occurred on January 12, 13, 17, 25 and February Reactor power was reduced below 15 percent on February 15 for tur-bine governor valve limiter maintenance. Full power was resumed on February 1 Because of main generator hydrogen leakage, power i was limited to 83 percent on February 19, and a plant shutdown was performed on February 21 to correct the hydrogen leakage.
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l The plant was taken critical on March 11 and from March 14 a limit l of 98.8 percent power was maintained due to concerns over generator
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vibrations. The plant was shut down on April 16 in order to balance and shim the main generator. Upon return to power on April 17, while switching from electric driven main feedwater pumps to the turbine-driven main feedwater pump, the plant tripped from 55 per-
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cen High level in a steam generator caused a turbine and reactor tri The licensee identified the problem as the speed controller for the steam-driven main feedwater pum The plant remained in shutdown until April 18 to repair a inverter which grounded on April 1 ,
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The plant reduced power on April 24 for routine surveillance of turbine valves. On April 27, the plant reduced power to 72 percent and switched to electric driven main feedwater pumps after observing problems with the steam-driven feedwater pump controller. The plant returned to 97 percent power (the maximum' power while running elec- l tric driven feedwater pumps) and with the exception of a brief re- l duction in power on April 29 because of grid problems, remained at that power until May 2 Two power reductions on May 28 and 31 were required for steam leak repair and repairs to the heater drain tank level controller. On June 12, a rupture disk failure resulted in the inadvertent closure
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of a steam generator excess flow check valve (EFCV) and a reactor trip on low steam generator level. Following startup on June 13, i power was limited due to chloride cleanup. Power remained at 85 !
i percent while investigations were being conducted on the EFCV rup-ture disk failure. The plant was shut down on June 30 to replace l the rupture disks and to perform eddy current inspections of main
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tional problems with a low pressure turbine which extended the shut- )
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down until July 18. The plant was phased on the grid July 19 and power was increased in increments to full power on July 2 ;
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On August 1, a power reduction was initiated to facilitate the j isolation and repair of an electro-hydraulic control oil leak. Full l power was resumed on August 3. An automatic reactor trip occurred l
on August 10 on low level in a steam generator due to a failure of
- 1 inverter. A startup was performed on August 11 and the plant l was returned to full power on August 13.
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On October 9, a planned 36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> power reduction to 75 percent was I
' initiated to perform maintenance on a traveling water screen. The I reactor was manually tripped on October 19 to prevent equipment damage caused by induced current in the main transformer isophase bus ducts. Repairs were completed and a startup was performed the same day. On November 7, the plant reduced power to approximately 60 percent in support of maintenance of a distribution substatio On November 15, a reactor trip occurred. The cause of the trip was a loss of the steam driven feedwater pump due to low lube oil pres-sure. A plant startup was conducted using the electric driven feedwater pumps on November 16 and power was returned to 97 percent on November 18.
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On December 2, the plant determined that the control room breathing air system did not provide the required flowrate and began a shut-down. One train of the breathing air system was returned to service and the plant shutdown was terminated with power at 35 percen l Power was increased to 100 percent on December 5. The plant re-mained at 100 percent power until January 3, 1987 when power was reduced to 75 percent for turbine valve testin Cycle 9 coastdown operations began January 22 and power was at 95 percent at the end I of the assessment period on January 31, 198 . Inspection Activities During this assessment period there were two NRC resident'
inspectors assigned to the site. There were two team inspec-tions in the quality assurance area and one in the radiological controls area. There were a total of 3477 inspection hours, or 2782 hours0.0322 days <br />0.773 hours <br />0.0046 weeks <br />0.00106 months <br /> on a annualized basi l l
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. Facility Performance Analysis Summary Last Period This Period (7/1/84 - (11/1/85 - Recent l Functional Area 10/31/85) 1/31/87) Trend Plant Operations 2 1 Radiological Controls 2 2 Maintenance 2 2 Surveillance 1 1 Fire Protection 1 N/A**
l Emergency Preparedness 1 1 Security and Safeguards 1 1 Outages 2 N/A*** Assurance of Quality * 2 Improving Licensing Activities 2 2 Improving Training and Qualification *
Effectiveness Engineering Support **** ****
- Assurance of Quality, Training and Qualification Effectiveness, and Engineering Support are three areas which were not formerly assessed, but are now treated as separate functional area **This area was not evaluated as a separate functional area during this assess-ment period. Pertinent observations are covered in other appropriate functional area .
- There were no major planned outages during this assessment period; observations regarding unscheduled outages are contained in the Maintenance functional are **** Engineering Support is now considered as a separate functional are Due to limited staff observations in this area, pertinent comments are included in each of the functional area _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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s D. Unplanned Shutdowns, Plant Trips and Forced Outages Power Root Functional Date Level Description Cause Area 11/06/85 81% Loss of the steam driven Aging Maintenance feedwater pump following failure of the recirculation valve controller led to a reactor trip on loss of loa /22/85 69% Failure of the main generator Unknown turbine control system caus-ing reactor trip because of turbine trip (loss of load).
i 01/04/86 75% Shutdown to prevent equipment Personnel Operations damage when an administrative Error limit on condenser differen- (inattention pressure was reache to detail)
02/21/86 84% Plant shutdown to repair Inadequate Maintenance hydrogen leakage from main Corrective j generato Maintenance !
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99% One day shutdown for balanc- Inadequate Maintenance l ing of the main generato Corrective J Maintenance 04/17/86 55% The speed controller for the Aging Maintenance steam driven feedwater pump failed causing reactor trip on high level in #3 steam ,
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06/12/86 99% Rupture disk failure on the Component Maintenance I excess steam flow check valve Failure Due caused a reactor trip on low To Inadequate SG leve '
Preventive Maintenance 06/30/86 85% Plant shutdown to upgrade Inadequate Maintenance excess flow check valve rup- Corrective ture disks and Eddy Current Maintenance testing of the main condense Outage was extended when seal problems in the low pressure turbine were detecte l !
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Power Root Functional )
Date Level Description Cause Area
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08/10/86 99% Failure of #1 inverter led Aging Maintenance to a reactor trip on low SG leve /19/86 100% Shutdown to prevent equipment Personnel Maintenance damage when isophase support Installation structure was discovered Error glowing re /15/86 100% Loss of lube oil pressure at Inadequate Maintenance the steam driven feedwater Preventive pump caused a trip of the Maintenance feedwater pump resulting in j
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a reactor trip on loss of l
loa Note: The root causes in this Table reflect the opinion of the SALP board based on the inspector (s) description of the event and may, in certain instances, differ from the LER.
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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS Plant Operations (1655 hours0.0192 days <br />0.46 hours <br />0.00274 weeks <br />6.297275e-4 months <br />, 47%) Analysis j The last SALP report rated performance in the Operations area as Category 2 with an improving trend primarily as the result of strong (
management overview of daily plant activities. During this assess- ,
ment period, two resident inspectors were assigned to the site and !
were responsible for the majority of inspe'ction effort in the j Operations are ;
The licensee continues to exhibit strong performance in the Opera- [
tions Area which reflects aggressive management overview of a well j trained highly qualified staf The fundamental corporate goal is 1 safe operations and successive layers of management are accountable for achieving that goal. Morning Managers meetings are the primary mechanism used to focus and direct the staff. The Plant Shift Supervisor attends these meetings to provide input about any opera-tional concerns and coordinate scheduling of daily activities. All aspects of plant operations are discussed in an open atmospher ,
A number of systems such as Morning Meeting minutes, Plant Inforna- l tion Reports, and Unusual Occurrence Reports are utilized to keep personnel aware of plant conditions and operational occurrence These systems are reviewed weekly at the Morning Managers meeting for completeness and resolution of issues. When sitcations arise !
that are not well understood, individual assignments are made for ,
collecting and documenting all related information in an attempt I to understand and resolve the problem. That information/ resolution I is then reviewed either at a Morning Meeting or during a Plant i Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting. Information concerning problem tracking and resolution is widely distributed through the use of Morning Meeting Minutes or Plant Information Reports. This results in a well informed, coordinated plant staff focused on safe plant operations and problem resolutio The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) provides an effective review function. The licensee's initiative to use a Procedure Sub-committee has resulted in'a timely, thorough review of procedure y changes and allowed PORC to concentrate on additional issues. PORC t routinely uses Special Meetings to review Operational events and j the results of special reviews of unique or unusually challenging {
problems. PORC reviews are thorough, detailed and timely; there is good participation and strong leadershi (
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Senior Corporate Management is frequently involved in plant opera-tions through routine plant visits and attendance at selected Morn-ing managers meeting Additionally, management development and planning sessions are periodically held throughout the year to j
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measure plant performance in achieving the goals and objective Particular attention has been given in these meetings to the number of trips, shutdowns, and power reductions / limitations due to equip-ment failur Plant operators are quick to recognize adverse trends and take ac-tion to resolve them. Alert and timely response by plant operators has prevented instrument / equipment failures such as feedwater con-trol system failures from affecting plant status. The plant opera-tors are professional in appearance and maintain an inquisitive attitude. Operators roctinely coordinate ' plant evolutions with other departments such us Engineering and Maintenance. The plant demonstrated their conservative approach to resolving technical issues when they delayed a piant startup pending repairs to an in-verter in April, 198 Control room noise and distractions have been red.aed through the !
use of a work processing area near the control room entrance. The effect of this area has been better control over access to the con-trol room.
l Maine Yankee utilizes a six crew rotation. Plant Shift Supervisors i are rotated into the Operations Staff for six month assignments in l order to coordinate procedure reviews and special projects. An
- additional position in support of operations on the plant staff has
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been authorized and fille Plant corrective actions and followup for operational events are thorough. When situations arise that are not well understood, the plant utilizes a variety of methods to identify and correct those problems including matrix tracking of symptoms and their closecut, i dedicated technicians for troubleshooting and the use of system log l books to track observed causes and effects. Corrective actions are l
also persistent. When the cause of the excess flow check valve rupture disk failures was thought to be corrected by controlled cleanliness and torquing, the plant continued to investigate other options. As a result, contact sticking of the associated air com-pressors along with an out of tolerance relief valve were ultimately determined to be the root,cause of the rupture disk failur Plant housekeeping has improved. The plant has released approximately 30 percent of formerly radiological controlled areas for unrestricted access. Considerable effort was expended to plan for the storage of refueling tool Storage of equipment throughout the plant has improved during this assessment period through the use of dedicated storage areas and individual cleaning area assignment i
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One minor violation involving operation of an 'nstrument valve b an unauthorized licensee engineer was observed, This evolution ,
should have been controlled by Operations and is considered an i isolated inciden The plant scram rate was 0.9 scrams per 1000 critical hours. One I of the scrams was caused by operator error when the wrong circulat-ing water pump discharge valve was closed following maintenanc The operator was quick to recognize his mistake and inserted a manual scram when condenser differential pressure reached an ad-ministrative limit. One other partial activation of the engineered 4
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safety features system was attributed to operator error when the wrong switch was manipulated during a post scram recovery. Although {
these two instances were the result of operator error, the root {
cause can be attributed to Human Factor Engineering (similar -
switche,s performing similar functions in close proximity),
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The plant has instituted a Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES)
for the review of events and identified deficiencies. The goal of i this system is to identify and correct potential problems through l l the review of deficiencies prior to those problems contributing to l I
operational event This program has received management support I based upon the extent of the training conducted and the low thres- f hold of deficiencies reviewed under this syste Generally the quality of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) continues '
I to improve. Maine Yankee's discussion concerning failure mode and ( manufacturer information in LERs is good. Areas for LER improvement include assessment of safety consequences and corrective action In general, Maine Yankee LERs are judged to be average when compared to other licensee f l In summary, safe operations continued to receive effective manage-
) ment and staff attention. The overall performance level by the operations staff was hig . Conclusion Category .
3. Board Recommendation Non ._ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
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B. Radiological Controls (382 hours0.00442 days <br />0.106 hours <br />6.316138e-4 weeks <br />1.45351e-4 months <br />, 11%)
l Analysis In the previous assessment period the licensee was rated Category 2 with t weaknesses noted in the airborne sampling program, personnel contamina- l tion control, sorting of low level waste, and compli6 ace with Radiation '
Work Permit (RWP) requirements. During this assessment period, there were six inspections by Region I Specialists in the following areas:
three radiation protection inspections, one post accident sampling system inspection, one non-radiological chemistry insp'ection and one transporta-tion inspection. The resident inspectors also reviewed selected program area The licensee has initiated a number of program, policy and procedure up-grades during this assessment period to improve the Radiological Controls !
Program. Upgrades included the redesign of the radiological controls j l
check point, development of the Radiological Controls Improvement Program I and rewrite and reissuance of the Radiation Protection Manua The Radiological Controls Improvement Program has been introduced to identify, track, analyze and resolve radiological incident Monthly reports are issued to management to track progress. Management support of this program has been firm and severe disciplinary action has been taken in a few instances for violations of plant procedures. The result has been better adherence to radiological control requirements as evi-denced by fewer violations and internally identified deviations. There i
is evidence of corporate and site management involvement including fre-quent meetings, use of feedback and tracking mechanisms, assessment of activities, etc. with very tight control at all levels. Decision making authority regarding radiological controls programs occurs at the depart-ment manager level or higher reflecting the high level of management attention to this are The licensee has been conducting an effective program for liquid and gaseous effluent contro Releases were made in accordance with proce-dures and Technical Specifications requirements. Semiannual Radioactive
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I Effluent Release Reports were comprehensive, accurate and indicate that '
l releases are well below all regulatory limit Effluent control instru-l ments were maintained and calibrated in accordance with regulatory re-quirements, and ventilation systems were maintained and tested as re-quired. Procedures related to the above areas were found to be adequat There was an unplanned release of noble gas to the atmosphere as the result of a leaking flange. Although this release was a small fraction of regulatory limits, it was preventable. The licensee should conduct a review of plant systems and identify other potential release paths and take action to prevent such unplanned release There was significant progress in radwaste volume reduction activities in 1986 including a 47% volume decrease, construction and use of new waste facilities, and the development of a plan to dispose of the rad-t
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waste backlo The licensee's program for transportation of solid radio-l active waste was adequate with regard to the selection of packaging, i
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training of personnel, low level waste storage, and use of and adherence .
to procedure I i
The licensee's ALARA program is well documented and effective at all levels of the organization. The ALARA program is controlled and directed by the ALARA Committe This committee includes many of the PORC members as well as members of the Radiation Protection staff and provides input to the Plant Manager. The licensee's exposure goal for 1986, a non-outage ,
year, was 200 man-rem. Actual exposure of 92 nian-rem reflects good con-trols in this are The ALARA program will be reviewed during the up-coming refueling cutag Although there were no major weaknesses or programmatic violations iden- l tified, several areas need additional licensee attentio Long term records such as dosimetry, training, and physicals are generally complete; however, short term records such as radiological surveys and air samples ;
to support RWPs were, at times, incomplete or not retrievable. Training W for self-nionitoring by personnel was inadequate in that it did not pro- '
vide adequate instructions for some survey equipment. Previous techni- j cian experience credit may not be in conformance with industry standards ;
in some case The comparatively small size of the licensee's staff i appears to limit the ability to react to change '
- There were some weaknesses noted in the chemistry program including a j lack of a measurement quality control program, inadequate equipment to ;
support sulfate analysis, and failure to retrain chemistry technician Little progress has been made in resolving three of nine open issues in j the chemistry area for the post accident sampling system. The licensee j has taken major steps to resolve these chemistry issues including staff- )
ing improvements and hardware change The licensee's reaction to non-routine radiological situations varies l in effectiveness. Most notable was the sand removed during repairs to {
underground piping within the radiologically controlled area. A portion i of the sand was released into the owner controlled area and was subse- i quently returned to the rMiologically controlled area when it was found l partially contaminated. wetter surveys of the sand could have prevented ;
its initial release. More agg'ressive followup of earlier indications ;
of the contamin6 tion problem (some sand material in the pile above back- '
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ground and employee identification of a potential probleri could have l
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achieved more timely problem resolution. In contrast, the licensee used i a technically sound and conservative approach in handling and removing I i potentially contaminated ceiling tiles from the controlled area, l In summary, although there were many areas of strength and no major pro- l grammatic deficiencies observed in this functional area, there were several areas where improvements could be realize !
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2. Conclusion Category . Board Recommendation Licensee Review staff to determine if its size contributes to deficiencies noted in this are ME Evaluate chemistry program change l
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C. Maintenance (447 hours0.00517 days <br />0.124 hours <br />7.390873e-4 weeks <br />1.700835e-4 months <br />, 13%) ' Analysis The previous SALP rated this area category 2 as a result of good 1 overall management control. The resident inspectors provided coverage of this area during routine inspections. Regional inspec-tors provided input for areas they observed during specialist in-
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The Maintenance Department is composed of an experienced, well
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qualified staff. Management is actively involved in the prioritiza-tion of maintenance activities through the morning managers meetin During these meetings, input from the Operations Department is re-ceived and Plant Engineering Department assistance is requested as necessary. Weekly planning sessions provide for advanced coordina-tion of surveillance and preventive maintenance. During this as- l sessment period there were no significant violations identifie The Deficiency Report / Repair Order (DR/RO) system utilized by the licensee is an effective and comprehensive system for identifying, reviewing and correcting off normal conditions. All design changes i and most preventive maintenance items are implemented through the i DR/R0 system. All DR/R0s get Engineering and Quality Assurance Department review l
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i The Maintenance Department supplies Outage Coordinators to oversee the repair efforts during outages. This is a good practice in that it releases the Plant Shift Supervisor to concentrate on plant evolutions and status. The plant maintains a prioritized work list including items scheduled for unplanned outages which is aggres-sively pursued. Coordination and scheduling of additional outage time was thoroughly planned and reviewed by the licensee. This has resulted in effective utilization of outage tim The Maintenance Department has taken advantage of redundant plant design features including installed spare components to conduct on-line preventive maintenance on major equipment, such as, spray pump motors, low pressure safety injection pump motors, condensate pumps and high pressure drain pump The overall effect is better utili-zation of planned outage tim The licensee has embarked on several long term programs to increase !
the reliability and safety of the plan One particularly effective program for the reduction of chloride intrusion problems associated with the Main Condenser was the replacement of the waterboxes with titanium waterboxes. Although at least 3 power reductions were necessary in January and June 1986, due to chlorides, the problem was eventually identified and corrected. Recent operational data l i
indicate no chloride intrusion from the main condenser. In addition, t l
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0 the licensee continues its program for elimination of copper com-ponents in the feedwater system. Upcoming replacement of two sets of feedwater heaters will result in the elimination of 80 percent of copper components from the feedwater syste A spare reactor coolant pump motor is already in use as a replacement allowing for routine preventive maintenance on the out of service moto Staffing level and training appear to be adequate in the maintenance are During heavy work load periods additional resources are con-tracted. Backlogs of outstanding work orders are trended and action taken to resolve problem areas. Some mechanical maintenance proce-dures rely primarily on the technicians experience; however, no deficiencies have been identified as a result of these generic pro-cedures. In fact, maintenance technicians are knowledgeable in their field. The licensee has begun a program of converting technicians experience into plant procedure Of the eight reactor trips and three unplanned shutdowns this period, all but two were attributable to component failures or unscheduled maintenance. Two trips involved electronic controllers for the feedwater system. The licensee has a Comprehensive Reliability Study underway which addresses the replacement of these controllers
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for which repair parts no longer exist. Some controllers have al-ready been replaced. Additional recommendations for upgrades of other feedwater equipment are scheduled for the upcoming outag One trip was attributed to a failure of an inverte Age of the inverter was a contributor to its failure. One trip appears to be random failure of the turbine control circuit. One manual trip occurred due to faulty installation of the grounding device on the isophase buswork. One trip was due to the loss of the operating steam driven feedwater pump. A combination of lube oil system leaks and a loose electrical contact were the cause of the trip. One trip attributed to the Excess Flow Check Valve (EFCV) had a number of root causes including a corroded / sticking relay in an associated air compressor controller and an out of tolerance relief valve for the air compresso Aggressive followup and root cause determina-tion resulted in the identification of several of these problem In addition to the above, there were numerous (approximately eigh-teen) power reductions and limitations for a variety of maintenance related tasks and equipment difficulties as summarized in Section II Most of the unplanned trips, shutdowns, and power reductions /limita-tions were either the direct result of component failure, due to equipment performance difficulties or for the performance of main-tenance related activities. This high incidence of such occurrences indicates that equipment (primarily balance of plant) performance at Maine Yankee requires further attention to trend performance in order to establish root causes to deal with problems in a
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proactive wa This high number of trips / shutdowns / power reductions resulted in other undesirable but related consequen-ces such as added challenges to safety systems and increased stress for the operating staff due to the needs for added power !
maneuvering and plant monitorin J In summary, no programmatic problems were observed during the per-formance of maintenance activities. Improvements in the material condition of the plant are needed through measures such as more aggressive preventive maintenance, reviews of the effects of aging on plant components, component replacement, or system redesig ]
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Category . Recommendation a Licensee:
Conduct a review of trends of balance of plant equipment performanc NRC:
Schedule a special inspection of the balance of plant equipment performance per Temporary Instruction 2515/8 i l
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l D. Surveillance (337 hours0.0039 days <br />0.0936 hours <br />5.57209e-4 weeks <br />1.282285e-4 months <br />, 10%) Analysis The last SALP appraisal rated this area a Category 1 based upon a well implemented progra The Resident Inspectors reviewed this area during routine inspections and Regional Inspectors reviewed surveillance in their respective areas as a part of specialist inspection The licensee's surveillance program is detailed under the Compre-hensive Equipment Performance (CEP) progra Under this program the Technical Specification (T.S.) required surveillance.are in-cluded under the License Enforced Surveillance (LES). This area encompasses T.S., Inservice Testing, Inservice Inspection and Code required surveillanc Each department maintains their surveil-lance schedules with coordination of multiple surveillance for the same equipment provided during the Morning Managers Meeting and Weekly Planning Meetings. The CEP also contains the Preventive l Maintenance (PM) program, Production Optimization Program (POP) and the Operations Routine Instrumentation Surveillance Program (0RIS).
In addition to these, the Supplemental Equipment Reliability Program (SERP) trends equipment performance and provides monthly reports for management review. The combination of these programs in the CEP provides not only a system which verifies and assures equipment operability but also trends and reviews equipment performance to detect potential problems. The overall affect is a well run program which provides timely information on plant equipment. One Technical Specification required surveillance was late this period but this is considered an isolated instance. The licensee's review detected and corrected the conditio The licensee's reaction to failed surveillance is conservativ As an example, the licensee developed a set of acceptance criteria for the containment personnel access hatch. When the access hatch failed the pressurization test, the licensee tagged the hatch to i restrict use. A special PORC meeting was called to discuss the '
surveillance results, operability of the hatch and required correc- l tive action. The resultant corrective maintenance and retest in accordance with PORC direction was timel l Surveillance are conducted by various licensee departments includ- )
ing Engineering, Operations, Maintenance and Technical Suppor '
Personnel in all departments are knowledgeable of surveillance re-quirements and the plant equipment involved. A review of surveil-l lance activities during Generic Letter 83-28 Followup Inspection -
(86-07) identified well written, comprehensive procedures and a well informed Quality Control oversight functio i i
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One LER was issued as a result of an inquiry into a surveillance testing procedure. During a routine review of the Control Room Breathing Air Surveillance procedure, which only checked equipment operability, an observant operator recommended monitoring the re-quired air flow. When test results revealed a discrepancy between this air flow and refueling interval data, the licensee declared the system inoperable and began a plant shutdow An Engineering review identified the installed check valves as the source of an excessive pressure drop. Replacement of the check valves terminated the plant shutdown. This timely effective resolution of a self- ,
identified problem is indicative of the licensee's conservative I l
approach to problem resolutio One minor violation identified during this assessment period was that some surveillance readings were marginally outside of the ac-ceptance criteria and some completion dates for portions of sur- l veillances were not recorded. Although the cause of the out of tolerance readings was the result of an indication problem with the instrument, more attention to detail in the review of completed surveillance would have found the proble In summary, with the exception of the relatively minor problems discussed above, the surveillance program was particularly well ru Surveillance were generally accomplished with no adverse impact on the plant such as trips, inadvertent ESF actuations, or equipment rendered inoperable. Personnel involved in surveillance exhibited good coordination with operations and knowledge of equipment /proce-dure The surveillance program was effective in demonstrating equipment operabilit l l
2. Conclusion Category . Recommendations Non .
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, Emergency Preparedness (100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, 3%) Analysis i During the previous assessment period the licensee was rated Cate- .
gory 1. During this assessment period, one routine announced in- ,
spection was conducted during the licensee's partial scale emergency !
exercise on September 23, 198 !
Prior to the exercise, discussions with the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Corporate management representation, and Exercise Con-trollers indicated a high level of upper level management involve-ment in controlling and assuring quality in emergency preparednes .
Two areas requiring licensee attention were identified by the NRC during the Emergency Exercise. The first, which was identified -
by the licensee, was the coordination and flow of information be- I tween the Control Room, Technical Support Center and Emergency Operating Facility. The second was the implementation of an iodine I source term prediction capability, a previously identified defi- l ciency. The licensee has addressed each of these areas but they l have not been ecaluated by the NRC during an exercise. These prob- i lems do not imp c on the licensee's ability to protect the heahh I and safety of the publi {
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Emergency positions are identified, and authorities and responsi-bilities are well defined. Vacant key positions in the emergency organization are filled on a priority bases. The training and l qualification program makes a positive contribution, commensurate with procedures and staffing to understanding of work and adherence I to procedures with few personnel error The licensee's audits of the emergency preparedness program were found to be complete, timely, and thorough. The licensee's Emer-gency Plan (EP) and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs)
are well stated, controlled, and explicit. Changes to the EP and '
EPIPs receive timely, thorough, and technically sound reviews. The Plant Operations Review Committee also maintains direct involvement in program changes and approves revisions to the EP and EPIP Procedures and policies are closely followed. Corrective action is generally effectiv *
The licensee's responses to previously identified items demonstrates a clear understanding of issues raised. The resolution of issues routinely exhibit a conservative approach when a potential for safety significance exist Responses from the licensee concerning 4 7 solution of open items and NRC issues are technically sound, thorough, and timely in almost all case In summary, the licensee has implemented a strong, effective emer-gency response progra The two deficiencies noted last year will be reviewed during the upcoming exercis _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _
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i i. . Conclusion Category . Board Recommendations Non .
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F. Security and Safeguards (149 hours0.00172 days <br />0.0414 hours <br />2.463624e-4 weeks <br />5.66945e-5 months <br />, 4%) Analysis During the last assessment period, this area was rated a Category !
I based on a quality program and prompt, thorough corrective action During this assessment period, there was one specialist inspection of this area in addition to routine resident inspector coverag During this assessment period, the licensee's overall performance in the area of security remained essentially consistent with the previous assessment perio Corporate management involvement in the program remained evident by the on-site presence of the Director of Security. The incumbent is responsible for licensee oversight of program implementation, program implementing procedures, security force training and, through a proprietary site supervisor and a contractor supervisor, for the contract security force performance ;
and routine, day-to-day operations. This oversight provides the licensee with necessary and current knowledge regarding overall program performance and demonstrates the licensee's intention to maintain cognizance of program implementatio Program implementing procedures and instructions are updated, when required, to provide the security force with current, clear and concise direction Primary procedures and instructions are re-viewed and approved by the Plant Operating Review Committee in an effort to preclude any adverse impacts on plant scfety. Feedback from routine program implementation is promptly integrated into procedures, instructions and the training program. This is indi-cative of the licensee's desire to implement an effective security program without compromising safe plant operation The training program is administered by two, full-time, experienced instructors. Lessons plans have been developed, are current, and reflect the commitments in the NRC-approved program plans. Training facilities are adequate and instructional aids are utilized. All security related facilities, e.g. , guard house, alarm stations, and office areas, are well maintained, orderly and clean. Members of the security force were found to be generally knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities when interviewed by NRC personne The security program is well supported by other plant functional groups and personnel, and frequent and effective communications among security and the other plant groups are evident by the lack of interface problems during this assessment period. This program support is also reflected by the high morale of the security force l and the dedicated and professional attitude they exhibit in carrying out their dutie !
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The turnover rate in the security force remains low and staffing appears to be adequate, as indicated by the limited use of overtime.
l
' All aspects of the program are maintained reasonably curren Authority and responsibilities for all members of the security group
! are clearly defined and well disseminate The licensee submitted two security event reports pursuant to 10 l CFR 73.71(c) during the assessment period. Each report identified
'
security computer malfunctions. The licensee took appropriate com-pensatory action for each event and in each case, the security re-ports were clear, concise and adequate for'NRC analysis. Because I of the age of the security computer and related equipment, the lic-l ensee is experiencing more frequent malfunctions that have neces-
! sitated increased maintenance. While neither the maintenance nor
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' the compensatory measures appear to have become burdensome, the licensee should closely monitor the situation to avoid program de-gradation in the futur One concern about meeting NRC requirements occurred during the as-sessment per' d from three separate incidents in which security force membe ailed to identify encroachment into a plant isolation zone. Whih iividually these incidents were not significant, collectively, y may be indicative of inattention to detail on the part of security and plant personnel about maintaining clear isolation zones. This required management attentio The licensee initiated prompt and effective corrective actio No revisions to the licensee's security program plans were submitted to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.54(p) or 10 CFR 50.90 during this assess-ment period. However, the licensee failed to respond to the Mis-cellaneous Amendments to 10 CFR 73.55, codified by NRC on August 4, 1986, and requiring that by December 2, 1986, licensees transmit to the NRC changes to safeguards plans describing how the miscel-laneous amendments would be met. The licensee stated that this was an oversight and that the required response would be submitted as soon as possible. While this is considered to be an isolated case, it may indicate that the licensing group does not maintain full awareness of Safeguards licensing issues and, therefore, management attention is warrante In summary, the licensee has sustained its previous performance ,
level in the area of security during this assessment perio Two ;
minor issues (isolation zone and miscellaneous amenaments) were identified that should receive further management attentio There is evidence that the licensee's efforts to maintain a high quality security program are continuin ___ .
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2. Conclusion Category . Board Recommendation b'o ne.
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G. Assurance of Quality (407 hours0.00471 days <br />0.113 hours <br />6.729497e-4 weeks <br />1.548635e-4 months <br />, 12%) Analysis Management involvement and control in assuring quality is being considered as a separate functional area in addition to being one of the evaluation criteria in the other functional area The various aspects of quality assurance (QA) program requirements have been discussed as an integral part of each functional area and the respective inspection hours for quality assurance activities are included in each one. The hours listed ab' o ve reflect specific in- ,
spections of the QA program. This discussion is a synopsis of the assessments relating to the assurance of quality for activities in quality assurance and other functional area The assurance of quality is the stated responsibility of each employee of Maine Yanke All personnel are encouraged to perform their work activities in a quality fashion as evidenced by the low number of personnel error related event Pride in a job well done is reflected throughout plant personnel. Employees are also encouraged to report any indication of differences between expected plant parameters and observed operating conditions that may suggest a potential proble Plant resources are directed at understanding these differences. First line supervisors frequently review in-progress work. The overall effect is quality job performance at all levels within the licensee organizatio t Plant Management encourages feedback on methods to improve existing practice Management reviews operational problems and deficiencies during the Morning Managers Meetings and develops lessons learne Followup corrective action is implemented as a result of these re- )
views. The plant uses several methods to identify, track and close- I out these issues including matrix tracking of probable causes and individual action item assignments. Corporate management support for quality is evident through their participation in the details of daily operations and their support of corrective action followu The QA/QC organization plays an active role in the assurance of qualit In addition to normal QA/QC reviews, inspections, and monitoring activities, a s'tructured independent inspection program has been implemented. These inspections are scoped, planned, and scheduled for a more thorough verification. To increase the effec- i tiveness of these inspections, the inspector / auditor is authorized I to modify and increase the scope of the planned inspection. This .
results in meaningful inspection findings which receive management l closeout support. The technical knowledge level of QA/QC personnel was found to be high as evidenced by NRC first hand observation *
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QA/QC personnel possess experience from other departments including Operations and Engineering. Changes in the QA/QC organization have resulted in an effective utilization of knowledgeable resource The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) is involved in the re-view of operational data, Engineering Design Change Requests, and other pertinent information. Special PORC meetings are frequently utilized to review timely data and operational problem PORC meetings are characterized by an open and free exchange of informa-tion and questions. Through their reviews, PORC plays a key role in the assurance of qualit l Every two weeks the QA/QC managers and the plant management meet to review QA/QC activitie All deficiencies, corrective actions and responses are reviewed and trended. Additionally, Plant Manage-ment requests QA/QC involvement in observed problem areas. As a result, the QA/QC organization is involved in routine plant activi-ties, not as strictly compliance, but to determine better methods and controls for areas reviewed. Management effectively utilizes QA/QC to improve performance, not just to identify failures to meet commitment One violation was identified for a lack of administrative controls applied to the review of concrete block walls. Because of this lack l of controls, the inspections of block walls conducted in 1980 failed
!
to identify all block walls covered by Bulletin 80-11. Further attention to one-time plant walkdowns appears to be warranted.
1 In summary, there is evidence of assurance of quality at all levels in the conduct of work activities at Maine Yankee. Management effectively uses various mechanisms including QA/QC in initiatives to improve overall performanc . Conclusion Category 2, Improving Trend 3. Board Recommendation Non _ ----.__ _--_______ _ - -
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H. Licensing Activities Analysis During the last assessment period this area was rated as Category 1 2. Strengths included management's support and participation in licensing matters and a weakness was identified in that the licen- i see's responsiveness varied widely on different issue !
During the present rating period, the licensee's management demon- .
strated active participation in licensing a'ctivities and kept I abreast of all current and anticipated actions. During the Seismic Design Review, there was consistent evidence of excellent' prior planning and assignment of priorities. In general, submittals re-flected good quality and proper management control to assure qualit Throughout this assessment period the licensee has dedicated re- j sources to address open licensing issues. As a result, a signifi- 4 cant reduction in the backlog of open issue has been realize The licensee's management and its staff demonstrated technical !
understanding of issues involving licensing actions. For the I majority of licensing actions, the licensee's submittals were tech- l nically sound, thorough, and well referenced. They generally ex- !
hibited conservation when considering safety significanc When information became available that indicated some non-conserva- 1 tive axial power shapes were possible under the present reload i analysis, the licensee was quick to adopt administrative controls !
and brief the staff on the impact on the Loss of Coolant Analysis l (LOCA). As a result, the issue was efficiently resolved. The lic- I ensee's reload analysis was handled by Yankee Atomic Electric Com-pany (YAEC) and was of high quality. YAEC personnel were utilized )I for a variety of engineering and analysis functions. They were available as needed for other special engineering disciplines, such as, Fire Protection and Seismic Design. The combination of the the licensee's and YAEC's staff demonstrated their capacity to produce quality engineering product i The licensee's timeliness widely on different issues,and For
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responsiveness example, thecontinued submittalto forvary Tech-nical Specification change for limiting overtime was listed in the last SALP report as being significantly delayed by the license This issue remained open throughout this SALP period despite per-sistent efforts by the NRC to close the issue. Resolution of De-mineralized Water Storage Tank (D'.J^T) level alarm and Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation (ICC1) were similarly difficult to achieve due primarily to timeliness and responsiveness problems with the licensee. There were other examples of good responsiveness and l timeliness to resolve questions on licensing submittals, such as, '
Large Break LOCA and Spent Fuel Pool Reanalysis, Although the I
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licensee's responsiveness and timeliness has improved during the l latter part of this assessment period, the licensee needs to review these issues to ensure difficulties that led to stale-mates as described above are completely resolve As mentioned above, the licensee's response to the ongoing Seismic Design Review was excellent. This included not only th9 areas of !
making information available to consultants and reviewets and as- l
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sisting with inspections, but also the licensee's willingness to I make hardware changes to improve the plant. The licensee's initi-atives and efforts in this area were beyond regulatory requirement In summary, the licensing functions for Maine Yankee are carried out in an effective manner. Better coordination and direction of licensing activities to provide better responses should be pursue In general, the licensee's performance in the latter part of the i period exhibited a willingness to be responsive and improve perform- l anc i
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2. Conclusion l Category 2, Improving Tren . Board Recommendation Non .
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I. Training and Qualification Effectiveness Analysis During this assessment period, Training and Qualification Effective-l ness is being considered as a separate functional area for the first time. The various aspects of this functional area have been con-sidered as an integral part of other functional areas and the re-spective inspection hours have been included in those section Licensed Operator Training Program continues to receive full support of managemen The two license operator exams this period resulted in a 100 percent pass rate with nine Senior Reactor Operator lic-enses, three Reactor 0perator licenses and one Instructor Certifi-cation. License training is available to the Nuclear Shift Engi-neers (STA) and one third of the engineers currently fulfilling the Shift Engineer Function hold SR0 license The licensee sets high initial qualification standards by requiring )
all newly hired Auxiliary Operator candidates possess a Bachelor l Degree in Engineering or Science. This policy was effectively im- l
)
l plonented this SALP period. A Trcining Review Board is utilized i to review potential license candidates and review and track a can-didate's progress in the license training program. The Training Review Board provides prompt direction to the training progra ]
The site specific simulator was effectively utilized for license candidates training, requalification training and verification of the new Zmergency Operating Procedures which were implemented this assessment period. Emergency Plan drills are run in real time on l
the simulator providing realism not formerly achievable. New or !
revised procedures are practiced on the simulator prior to imple-mentation, such as, late in life power reductions and turbine valve
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I testing utilizing the steam dump system. Maine Yankee is presently installing a simulator for the remote shutdown panel in order to provide specialized training on its use. As an indication of the licensee's commitment to training, changes to plant equipment are usually reflected in the site simulator within six months of imple-mentatio The licensee's Specialty Training provides training for Maintenance, Chemistry, Radiological Controls Technicians, General Employee Training and Technical Training. The training program for techni-cians generally involves classroom lectures. Future plans call for a combination of classroom instruction, in plant evaluations and exams. Throughout this assessment period, technicians have been observed to be knowledgeable and capable of required job skill The lack of plant trips or LER's attributed to personnel errors by plant technicians is a significant decrease from the last assess-ment period which included five (5) maintenance personnel error __ _ __ ____
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Additional positions in the maintenance department have been author-ized to assist in the observation of work practices and qualifica-tion of personne The licensee continues to pursue the training program accreditation through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0). All ten training programs have completed the Self Evaluation Review process by the licensee. An INP0 team visit has reviewed the Senior Reactor Operator, Reactor Operator, Auxiliary Operator and Radiation Control Technician training programs and accredita, tion is expected soo Other programs are scheduled for INP0 team evaluation later this year. The pace of the licensee's efforts in this area have been slow; however, the licensee continues to implement all aspects of the training progra Through the use of the Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES),
the licensee conducts reviews of plant events and potential event Lessons learned from these reviews are returned to the Training Department for incorporation into the Training Program. A review of plant events revealed no training deficiencies. However, two events required further evaluation because both resulted from operation of the wrong control switch. In each case, similar switches providing the same function are located in close proximity to each other. Thus, these events appear to be more closely related to problems with layout (human factors considerations) rather than training. The licensee is evaluating corrective actio In summary, personnel exhibited good job knowledge with few per-formance problem Licensee standards and success in qualifying operations personnel was particularly noteworthy; good use was made of the simulator. Use of a remote shutdown panel simulator is a good initiativ . Conclusion Category . Board Recommendation
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None.
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. Supporting Data and Summaries Investigations and Allegations Review There were four allegations reviewed during this SALP period. The first two involved contractors working in a respirator area without respirator ,
l The third involved the manner in which ceiling tiles were disposed from the radiologir.al portion of the plant. The fourth was involved with the qualification of the computer section head. All allegations were close No significant health or safety were identified Escalated Enforcement Actions Civil Penaltie None Order None j
l Licensee Conferences Held During Appraisal Period l
On February 20, 1986, Region I Management met with Maine Yankee manage-ment to discuss SALP Report 85-9 Confirmation of Action Letters None Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's) Tabular Listing Type of Event Personnel Errors 1 Design / Manufacturing /Const/ Installation 4 External Cause - Defective Procedure - Component Failure 5 Other -
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Total 10 Causal Analysis The following sets of common mode events were identified: LER's 85-18, 85-19, 86-02, 86-03 and 86-05 are events due to component failures. Two LER's (85-18 and 86-02) were due to controller malfunctions in the feedwater syste _________ __ ,
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I j LER's 86-06, 86-07 and 86-08 involved design or installation deficiency. Two of these resulted in plant trips (LER 86-06 ;
and 86-07). l
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- Licensing Activities l l l NRR/ Licensee Meetings l May 7-8, 1986 First Peer Review Group Meeting concerning Seismic Design Margins Program )
t l
July 21-25, 1986 Seismic Design Margins Program l i i l August 25, 1986 Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation
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September 29,1986 Large Break LOCA Analysis Power Shape l September 30, 1986 Second Peer Review Group Meeting concerning I
Seismic Design Margins Program October 22, 1986 Large Break LOCA Analysis Power Shape !
November 18-19, 1986 Third Peer Review Group Meeting concerning Seismic Design Margins Program December 16, 1986 Large Break LOCA Analysis Power Shape December 19-20, 1986 Spent Fuel Pool Masonry Wall Failure Con-sequence Analysis Visits to Licensee or Licensee Contractor Facilities February 18, 1986 Management Meeting at Maine Yankee April 29, 1986 Participate in seismic Qualification of Equipment meeting in San Francisco, C May 7, 1986 Seismic Design Margins Program meeting in San Francisco, C June 10, 1986 Meeting in Framingham, MA concerning Seis-mic Design Margins Program June 13-14, 1986 Maine Yankee Plant Inspection
July 21-26,1986 Assist in Seismic Design Margins Review at Maine Yankee l
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August 1, 1986 Participate in Seismic Design Margins Pro-gram Peer Review Group Meeting in San Francisco, C I August 4-6, 1986 Maine Yankee Plant Inspection November 16-19, 1986 Peer Review Meeting at Maine Yankee December 18-19, 1986 Participate in Spent Fuel Pool Masonry Wall Failure Consequen.ce Analysis in Framingham, l MA.
I Commission Briefings l None Schedular Extensions Granted
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l None Reliefs Granted I
None I Exemptions Granted None License Amendments Issued / Denied December 31, 1986 License Amendment 86 Technical Specifications on RETS March 4, 1986 License Amendment 87 Technical Specifications on Monthly Operability of Turbine Driven i Auxiliary Feedwater Pump l l
March 17, 1986 License Amendment 88 Technical Specifications i on Auxiliary Turbine Driven Feedwater Pump to l be Operable During Operation '
May 27, 1986 License Amendment 89 Technical Specifications which add Manual Containment Isolation Valves and Blowdown and Body Vent Valves on Instrument Lines to List of Manual Combined Intermediate Valves that may be positioned under Administra-tive Controls September 11, 1986 Technical Specifications concerning Introduction of Peaking Factor Limit, Report - Denied i
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October 27, 1986 License Amendment 90 Technical Specifications which Incorporate Requirements for Iodine Spik-ing into Annual Report December 11, 1986 License Amendment 91 Miscellaneous changes to Technical Specifications for Clarification January 30. 1986 License Amendment 92 Technical Specifications for Higher Fuel Enrichment Emergency Technical Specifications Issued None Orders Issued None 10. Licensing Actions Open at beginning of period - 43 Number added during period - 28 Number closed during period - 43 Number open at end of period - 28 l
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TABLE 1 l
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION REPORT HOURS AREAS INSPECTED 85-31 58 Radiological Protection Activities 85-32 139 Routine Resident Inspection'*
85-33 27 Nonradiological Chemistry 85-34 74 PAT Followup 85-35 30 Radiation Protection 85-36 94 Routine Resident Inspection 85-37 N/A Operator Licensing Exams 86-01 293 Routine Resident Inspection 86-02 106 Block Wall Bulletin Followup 86-03 355 Routine Resident Inspection 86-04 37 Safeguards ;
86-05 307 Routine Resident Inspection 86-06 26 Transportation 86-07 135 ATWS l
86-08 286 Routine Resident Inspection ;
86-09 34 Radiation P,rotection 86-10 282 Routine Resident Inspection 86-11 32 Radiation Protection / Post Accident Sampling System 86-12 30 Fire Protection 86-13 235 Routine Resident Inspection 86-14 100 Emergency Preparedness T1-1 i
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REPORT HOURS AREAS INSPECTED j 86-15 .239 Routine Resident Inspection 86-16 N/A Operator Examinations 86-17 32 Safety Safeguards Interface 86-18 187 Routine Resident Inspection 86-19 115 Radiation Protection 86-20 108 Routine Resident Inspection .
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87-01 116 Quality Assurance Implementation i
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- Routine Resident Inspection - includes operational activities (logs, records, plant status); plant tours; physical security; housekeeping / fire protection; sur-veillance activities; maintenance activities; periodic and special reports; event follow-up; and, operational safet l l
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T1-2
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TABLE 2 INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY (11/1/85 - 1/31/87)
I MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION HOURS HOURS ANNUALIZED Percent Plant Operations 1655 1324 47
! Radiological Controls 382 305 11 Maintenance 447 358 13 Surveillance 337 270 10 Fire Protection and Housekeeping N/A -- -- Emergency Preparedness 100 80 3 Security and Safeguards 149 119 4 Outages N/A --
N/A Assurance of Quality 407 325' 12 l 1 Licensing Activities N/A --
N/A 1 Training and Qualification Effectiveness N/A --
N/A Total 3477 2782 100
- Allocations of inspection hours vs. Functional Areas are approximations based upon inspection report dat .
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l TABLE 3 j l
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY I MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION Number and severity Level of Violations j Severity Level I j
Severity Level I 0 Severity Level II O Severity Level III O I Severity Level IV 4 I Severity Level V 7 TOTAL 11- Violations vs. Functional Area By Severity Levels Severity Levels FUNCTIONAL AREAS I II III IV V j 1 Plant Operations 1 Radiological Controls 1 Maintenance 2 Surveillance 1 Fire Protection Emergency Preparedness Security and Safeguards 1 1 Outages j Assurance of Quality 1 3
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1 Licensing Activities l
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1 Training and Qualification 1 Totals 4 7 l
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Inspection Severity Functional Brief Number Requirement Levels Area Description 85-31 10 CFR 55 IV Training Chemistry Annual Retraining Appendix A not completed ANSI N1 ,
85-34 10 CFR 50 V Maintenance Lack of a Control Program Appendix B for Test Equipment ANSI N45.2.11, V QA An'chor bolt installation Sectior, miscalculation 10 CFR 50 V QA Unauthorized Drawings in Control Room TS Sec. 5. V QA Lack of Shelf Life Program for Chemicals 86-01 TS 5.8. '
V Operations Operations of Valve by an Unauthorized Person 86-02 10 CFR 50 IV QA Inadequate Masonry Wall !
Appendix B Survey Procedures 86-06 10 CFR IV Radiological Failure to list Radioactive i 20.311(b) Controls Nuclides in Shipment l 86-07 10 CFR 50 V Maintenance Lack of Calibration Control Appendix B Program for Dial Indicator 86-15 Security Plan IV Security and Violations of Isolation Zone Safeguards 87-01 10 CFR 50 V Surveillance Marginal Acceptance Values Appendix B and completion date .
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TABLE 4
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TABULAR LISTING OF LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION AREA Cause Code Total A ! E p E X l
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l Plant Operations 1 1 2
] Radiological Controls l Maintenance 1 5 6 Surveillance j Fire Protection Emergency Preparedness {
i Security and Safeguards Outages Assurance of Quality 2 2 1 Licen_ sing Activities 1 Training and Qualification Effectiveness Total 1 4 5 10 Cause Codes *(Assigned During NRC Review) Personnel Error Design / Man./Const./ Install ' External Cause Defective Procedures Component Failure ! Other LERs reviewed: 85-18 through 85-19 86-01 through 86-08
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TABLE 5 LER SYNOPSIS (85-18 to 86-08)
LER N SUMMARY DESCRIPTION CAUSE 85-18 Turbine Driven Feed Pump Recirculation Valve Controller Failure E 85-19 Turbine Control System Failure E 86-01 Manual Reactor Trip on Condenser Differential P'ressure A 86-02 Controller Malfunction Caused a Feedwater Flow Transient and E Subsequent Plant Trip on High Steam Generator Level 86-03 Plant Trip on Low Steam Generator Level Due to Excess Flow Check E Valve Closure 86-04 Emergency Feedwater Pump Inoperable Due to a Faulty Circuit B Breaker 86-05 Plant Trip on Low Steam Generator Level due to Static Inverter E Failure 86-06 Manual Reactor Trip Af ter Ground Connection Failure on Generator B Isophase Bus Duct 86-07 Plant Trip on Turbine Driven Feed Pump Low Control Oil Pressure B 86-08 Inoperable Control Room Breathing Air Trains B
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TABLE 6 MAINE YANKEE SALP HISTORY Assessment l l l l l Fire l l . l l l l l Period Ops RadCon Maint Surv Protect EP Sec Outage Lic Trng QA 9/1/80 - 6/30/81 l2 2 l 2 1 1 1 3 1 l 2 2 l I ( )j 8/1/81 - 7/31/82 3 2 l 2 2 1 2 2 --
2 --
l l 7/1/82 - 6/30/83 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 l k
7/1/83 - 6/30/84 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 j
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7/1/84 - 10/31/85 l2l 2 l 2 l 1l 1 l 1l1l 2 l2l l l l l
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UNITED STATES
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/pm atcoq% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ENCLOSURE 3 y,
e wf jg I
FIEGloN I 631 PAR K AVENUE
b [ KING OF PR USSI A, PENNSYLV ANI A 19406
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.....
/J ; S 0 1987 Docket No. 50-309 i i l l
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company ATTN: Mr. J.B. Randazza Vice President Nuclear Operations l 83 Edison Drive '
Augusta, Maine 04336 Gentlemen: '
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Subject: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report N /85-98 .
On March 31, 1987, the NRC Region I SALP Board reviewed and evaluated the perform-l ance of activities associated with the Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station from I 11/1/85 to 1/31/87. This assessment is documented in the enclosed SALP Board Re-
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por A meeting has been scheduled for May 12,1987, at 1: 00 p.m. at the Region 1 Office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania to discuss this assessment. That meeting is intended to provide a forum for candid discussions relating to the performance evaluation. Although we have identified areas for improvement, we fir.d that your overall performance har continued to improv At the meeting, you should be prepared to discuss our assessment and your plans to ensure improved or continued emphasis upon those activities which would nave a positive effect upon performance. In particular, because of the high number of trips, unplanned shutdowns, and power reductions / limitations due to component failure, equipment performance difficulties or for maintenance related activities, you should be prepared to discuss activities and initiatives to improve balance of plant equipment performance and reliability. Any other comments you may have i regarding our report may be discussed. Additionally, you may provide written com- !
ments within 30 days after the meetin l Following our meeting and receipt of your response, the enclosed report, your writ-ten response (if deemed necessary), and a summary of our findings and planned ac-tions will be placed in the NRC Public Document Roo Your cooperation is appreciate '
Sincerely, h9 William T. Russell Regional Administrator Enclosure: NRC Region I SALP Report No. 50-309/85-98 4 9e b^o+
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a Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 2 APR 2 91997
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cc w/ encl:
C.E. Monty, President l C.D. Frizzle, Assistant Vice President / Manager of Operations l J.H. Garrity, Plant Manager
! D.L. Anderson, Project Manager j G.D. Whittier, Licensing Section Head J. A. Ritsher, Attorney (Ropes and Gray)
Phillip Ahrens, Esquire Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR) ,
, Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) l l NRC Resident Inspector l State of Maine
!
Chairman Zech Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Carr i
bcc w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences) ]
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o enc 1) i DPRP Section Chief d M. McBride, RI, Pilgrim H. Eichenholz, SRI, Yankee P. Sears, LPM, NRR 1 J. Allan, RI K. Abraham, RI (2 copies) l D. Holody, RI J. Taylor, IE SALP Management Meeting Attendees Director, NRR INPO (Record Center, INPO)
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