ML20153C182

Insp Repts 50-369/85-41 & 50-370/85-42 on 851121-1220. Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Procedure PT-1-A-4200-28 Re Slave Relay Test Causing Inadvertent ESF Actuation

ML20153C182
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	02/07/1986
From:	Brownlee V, William Orders, Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153C172	List: ML20153C167 ML20153C174 ML20153C182
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.1, TASK-1.C.2, TASK-1.C.3, TASK-1.D.2, TASK-1.F.2, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.K.3.01, TASK-2.K.3.05, TASK-2.K.3.10, TASK-TM 50-369-85-41, 50-370-85-42, NUDOCS 8602180322
Download: ML20153C182 (7)

See also: IR 05000369/1985041

Text

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p3 #EOg UNITED STATES

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• o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

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n REGION 11

101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

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f . ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

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Report Nos: 50-369/85-41 and 50-370/85-42

Licensee: . Duke Power. Company

'422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station

Docket Nos: 50'-369 and 50-370

License Nos: NPF-9 and NPF-17

Inspection at McGuire Nuclear Station near Huntersville, North Ca'rolina.

Inspection on November 21 through December 20, 1985.

Inspectors: =

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N te/ Signed

Approved by:  !/441 37quv f/ ~)[fD

VP Bropilee, Acting Section Chief Ddtd Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved 240 hours0.00278 days <br />0.0667 hours <br />3.968254e-4 weeks <br />9.132e-5 months <br /> on site in.the

areas of operations, surveillance testing'and maintenance activities.

Results: One violation'- failure to follow procedure.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• T. McConnell, Plant Manager

B. Travis,. Superintendent of Operations

• D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance

• B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services

L. Weaver, Superintendent of Administration

M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling

E. McCraw, License and Compliance Engineer

• D. Mendezoff, License and Compliance Engineer

• D. Marquis, Performance Engineer

R.. White, IAE Engineer

R. Branch, Site QA Supervisor

• S. Grier, IAE Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

technicians, operators, mechanics, security' force members, and office

personnel.

• Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 30, 1985, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify

as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the

inspectors during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matter

-(Closed) Violation 50-370/84-35-01: Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

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Criterion.V and XI. The licensee's response to this violation was examined.

Jumpers were installed as required and the governing procedures were changed

to include a step for testing a decreasing Tavg input signal. The loop

-circuit operation with a decreasing Tavg input signal was tested to verify

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that the Overpower Delta-T (0 PAT) setpoint responded correctly to a

decreasing Tavg input. In addition, training was implemented to be covered

with all IAE technicians. Other process control system procedures were

reviewed for consistency and uniformity in accordance with a methodology

guideline developed for the Process 7300 system. Adequate corrective action

has been completed. This. item is closed.

(Closed) Violation 50-370/84-35-02: Violation of TS 3.3.1 requiring 0 PAT

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Reactor Trip System Instrumentation operability and TS 3.0.3 which

prohibits placing the unit in a Mode in which the specification does not

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apply _when a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) is not met. Adequate

measures have been implemented to ensure the operability of Channels I and

IV of the OPAT. Reactor Trip System. This.. item is closed.

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(Closed): Violation 50-370/84-35-03: Violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 which : requires that current written approved procedures be estab-

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lished, implemented and maintained. A review of some post trip reviews-

conducted since this occurrence has not detected any deficiencies.- The

licensee .has provided adequate corrective action and has - an effective

. program in place. This item is closed.

(Closed) Violation 370/85-24-02: Failure to adhere to the requirements of-

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria -XVI in that corrective action was not

. implemented in. a timely manner following~ a QC discovered violation of the

electrical J separation of certain Unit 2 safety related cable. Adequate

corrective actions have been taken. This item is closed.

4. Unresolved Items

=No unresolved items were identified during this report period.

5. Plant Operations

The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period, to-

v'erify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room

logs, shift supervisors logs,~ shift turnover records and equipment removal

and restoration records .were -routinely perused. Interviews were conducted

-with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and perform-

ance personnel.

Activities within the control room'were monitored during shifts and at shift ~

changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in

applicable - station administrative directives. The complement of licensed

personnel on each shift. met or exceeded the minimum required by technical

specifications.

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(Plant-tours' taken during the reporting period included but'were not limited

to,the turbine' buildings, auxiliary building, units 1 and 2 electrical

equipment rooms, units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms,'and the station yard

zone inside the protected crea.

During the plant: tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equip-

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ment status and' radiation control practices were observed.

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' Unit 1 Operations

McGuire Unit 1. began the reporting period recovering from a loss of feed-

water induced ' reactor trip discussed in last month's . report. -A reactor

startup was commenced at 3:13 a.m. on November 20. The reactor was critical

at 3:30 a.m. and the generator was placed on line at 4:46 a.m. The unit

. . reached 100% power at 3:18 p.m. and remained at or about 100% power

throughout the reporting period.

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Unit 2 Operations

McGuire Unit 2 began the reporting period in Mode 1 operating at 100% power

and remained at 100% power until December 11, 1985.when the unit was

shutdown to effect repairs to the D steam generator which was leaking

approximately 150 gallons per day. This leak had been detected for some

time but remained less than 100 gallons per day until December 7, when a

step increase in the primary to secondary leak rate was detected. The unit

remained shutdown in Mode 5 throughout the duration of the reporting period.

A total of 50 row 1 U-tubes in the D steam generator were plugged. As a

result of leak testing and eddy current testing 8 tubes met the criteria for

plugging. The remaining 42 tubes were plugged because of indications that

suggested that pitting could be a problem in the failure.

6. Design Changes and Modifications

The inspectors reviewed the process established by the utility to assure

that design changes and modifications (NSM's) are- being developed and

processed in accordance with the requirements of the TS and 10 CFR 50.59.

Specific attributes reviewed were: review and approval was performed in

accordance with established procedures; post modification testing was

performed where Specified; associated procedure changes were made as

required; as-built drawings were changed to reflect the NSM's; training on

the NSM's was being provided to the operations personnel in a reasonable

timeframe depending on the NSM; and, changes are planned to be'on or were

listed on the required 10 CFR 50.59 annual report'to the NRC.

In addition, the licensee's progr'am for temporary modifications, lifted

leads and jumpers was reviewed to verify: procedures are established to

require the review and approval in accordance with TS and 10 CFR 50.59;

detailed procedures are used when installing these modifications; a formal

record is maintained of these modifications; testing is required for the

l modifications where required; and periodic reviews are conducted to confirm

l that the temporary modification is still needed.

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The specific NMS's reviewed were as follows

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l MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION

MG 01223 Replace trip overload heaters with shorting bars

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l MG 01534 Re-arrange NS system panel

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MG 01705 Rotate or replace valves 1 CA-22, 26, 31

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i MG 20285 Modify the control circuit design of the main reactor

trip breakers

MG 20S51 Install temperature sensors upstream of CA check

valves

No violations or deviations were identified.

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7. NUREG 0737 Review

The following NUREG 0737 action items were reviewed to determine the status

of implementation. It was determined that all the items are currently

active in NRC. headquarters for various reasons. Although most of the items

have been physically implemented at McGuire, they will not be closed out

until headquarters review is complete. The items were reviewed for both

units and are as detailed below:

Item

I.C.1.1. Small Break LOCA Procedures Review

I.C.2.B. Inadequate Core Cooling Procedures Review

I.C.3.B. Transients and Accidentu Procedures Review

I.D.2.3 S.P.D.S.

II.F.2.4. Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation

II.K.3.1.B PORV Isolation

II.K.3.5.B Auto Trip of Reactor Coolant Pump

II.K.3.10 Anticipatory Reactor Trip

8. -Solenoid Valve Sealing

On September 19, 1985, station personnel. determined that an environmentally

sealed solenoid valve located inside the containment building haj failed due

to moisture entering the electrical cover. The moisture had entered the

enclosure by seeping between the. electrical conductors and through the

potting seal. The potting compound had not sealed around each of the ten

individual conductors because of the arrangement of the wire bundle. The

failed solenoid valve is required to be operable after a loss of Coolant

Accident (LOCA) to obtain containment gas samples. In accordance with

TS 3.6.4.1 the failed solenoid valve was declared inoperable.

The four solenoid valves affected were originally installed by the Construc-

tion Department. The installation was to be in accordance with McGuire

Installation Specification MCS-1390.01-00-0068 (Cable Termination Sealing

Inside Containment and Doghouses). The valves are shipped by the manufac-

turer with test leads provided for bench testing only. These leads are not

intended for final installation. To utilize all of the valve limit switches

and functions, ten wires would have to be connected to the valve.

In the first case of the solenoid valve 1MISV686d failure, the vendor

supplied wiring had been removed and replaced with approved control cable

wiring connected to all ten terminals. The ten wires passed out through a

3/4 inch conduit fitting where the Scotchcast 9 epoxy resin had been filled

in around the conductors. The wires had formed a bundle in the center of

the potting material and did not allow the resin to seal around each

conductor in the center of the bundle. The installation specification

states " Ensure that the Scotchcast 9 completely seals around each individual

conductor in the cable". This deficient seal was not detected by either the

installers or the Quality Control (QC) inspectors. The ten wires ran to a

j pull box where only two coil wires were actually connected.

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Valve 1MISV6870 was connected the same as 1MISV6880 with ten wires going to

a pull box and only two wires being used. There was no moisture located

near this valve and the only repair action taken was to replace the seal and

wiring and install only two wires into the solenoid housing.

The Train B solenoid valves 1MISV6910 and 1MISV6920 were apparently

connected to the vendor supplied leadwires. These leadwires were not

intended for final installation according to the vendor's manual but the

Duke drawings used by the installers did not indicate that these wires were

not suitable for use. The seals around these solenoid valves were rewired

and resealed with only -two wires entering the enclosure. There were no

signs of moisture in or around these two valves.

The Unit 2 solenoids used in this application were visually inspected to

determine if they were correctly sealed. These four solenoid valves did not

have pull boxes installed. The three conductor field cables connected to

the valves were routed directly into the top of the solenoids which means

that only three wires entered the electrical enclosure. With this method of

cable termination, Station and Design Engineering personnel believe that an

adequate seal was made around the three wires.

This installation and inspection problem is apparently limited to Valcor

Model 526 Solenoid Valves used in only five applications inside the Unit 1

Containment Building. The technique of installation used by a particular

crew or foreman may have contributed to the lack of an adequate seal around

the electrical conductors.

This item will be maintained as an Inspector Followup Item (369/85-41-01)

pending a determination of the extent of the installation problem.

9. Surveillance Testing

The surveillance tests below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector

to ascertain' procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with

applicable TS. The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that

current written approved procedures were available and in use, th'at test

equipment in use was . calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, system

restoration completed and test results were adequate.

PT/0/A/4208/01 NS Heat Exchanger Perf Test

PT/1/A/4252/018 MD CA Pump 1B Perf Test

PT/1/A/4403/01B RN Pump Performance Test

PT/2/A/4208/01A NS Pump 2A Perf Test

PT/2/A/4208/01B NS Pump 2A Perf Test

10. ESS Actuation

On December 12,1985, Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when performance

technicians who were performing slave relay testing on "B" train SSPS

inadvertently actuated on "A" train relay, which energized train "A" LOCA

loads. All "A" train LOCA loads started except the "A" diesel generator and

the "A" RN pump which were out of service at the time.

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The technicians were . performing section 12.51 of procedure PT-1-A-4200-28,

Slave Relay Test. Step 12.54 energizes relay K608 which starts DG 18. No

, train "B" loads are energized due to the sequencer having~ been placed in

" Test" in step 51.2. In this particular instance, steps 51.1-3 had been

performed as required, however the technicians then proceeded to cabinet

STC-A instead of STC-B, energized relay K608 for train "A" which energized

the train "A" sequencer, and the train "A" LOCA loads. Although the loads

energized, there was no actual injection because there was no LOCA signal

present. The loads were de energized and placed back in standby with no

deleterious effects.

This incident was reported to the NRC at 12:24 p.m. that same afternoon.

For more infomation pertaining to this event, refer to McGuire Unit 1

Non-Routine Event Report 85-58. The associated LER has yet to be written.

Inasmuch as the procedure clearly specified the cabinet and switch number,

and since the cabinet is clearly identified, the above incident is an

example of failure to follow procedure, and is a Violation of TS 6.8.1.a.

(369/85-41-02).

11. Open Items Review

The following items were reviewed in order to determine the adequacy of

corrective actions, the implications as they pertain to safety of opera-

tions, the applicable reporting requirements, and licensee review of the

event. Based upon the results of this review, the items.are herewith

closed.

50-369 50-370

LER 84-01 -LER 85-47

LER 84-23 LER 85-03

LER 85-06 LER 85-04

LER 85-07 LER 85-06

LER 85-19 LER 85-08

LER 85-24' LER 85-13

LER 85-26 LER 85-17

LER 85-32 LER 85-19

LER 85-21

LER 85-22

LER 85-23

LER 85-26

LER 85-29