ML20153C182
| ML20153C182 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/1986 |
| From: | Brownlee V, William Orders, Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153C172 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.1, TASK-1.C.2, TASK-1.C.3, TASK-1.D.2, TASK-1.F.2, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.K.3.01, TASK-2.K.3.05, TASK-2.K.3.10, TASK-TM 50-369-85-41, 50-370-85-42, NUDOCS 8602180322 | |
| Download: ML20153C182 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1985041
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
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Report Nos: 50-369/85-41 and 50-370/85-42
Licensee: . Duke Power. Company
'422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station
Docket Nos:
50'-369 and 50-370
Inspection at McGuire Nuclear Station near Huntersville, North Ca'rolina.
Inspection on November 21 through December 20, 1985.
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Inspectors:
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W. Orddrs, S Tor esidenf 4nspector
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Approved by:
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VP Bropilee, Acting Section Chief
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Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
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Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved 240 hours0.00278 days <br />0.0667 hours <br />3.968254e-4 weeks <br />9.132e-5 months <br /> on site in.the
areas of operations, surveillance testing'and maintenance activities.
Results:
One violation'- failure to follow procedure.
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REPORT DETAILS
- 1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- T. McConnell, Plant Manager
B. Travis,. Superintendent of Operations
- D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance
- B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services
L. Weaver, Superintendent of Administration
M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
E. McCraw, License and Compliance Engineer
- D. Mendezoff, License and Compliance Engineer
- D. Marquis, Performance Engineer
R.. White, IAE Engineer
R. Branch, Site QA Supervisor
- S. Grier, IAE Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
technicians, operators, mechanics,
security' force members, and office
personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 30, 1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not identify
as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matter
-(Closed) Violation 50-370/84-35-01: Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion.V and XI. The licensee's response to this violation was examined.
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Jumpers were installed as required and the governing procedures were changed
to include a step for testing a decreasing Tavg input signal.
The loop
'
-circuit operation with a decreasing Tavg input signal was tested to verify
that the Overpower Delta-T (0 PAT) setpoint responded correctly to a
decreasing Tavg input.
In addition, training was implemented to be covered
with all IAE technicians.
Other process control system procedures were
reviewed for consistency and uniformity in accordance with a methodology
guideline developed for the Process 7300 system.
Adequate corrective action
has been completed. This. item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 50-370/84-35-02: Violation of TS 3.3.1 requiring 0 PAT
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation operability and TS 3.0.3 which
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prohibits placing the unit in a Mode in which the specification does not
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apply _when a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) is not met.
Adequate
measures have been implemented to ensure the operability of Channels I and
IV of the OPAT. Reactor Trip System.
This.. item is closed.
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(Closed): Violation 50-370/84-35-03:
Violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 which : requires that current written approved procedures be estab-
lished, implemented and maintained.
A review of some post trip reviews-
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conducted since this occurrence has not detected any deficiencies.-
The
licensee .has provided adequate corrective action and has - an effective
. program in place. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 370/85-24-02:
Failure to adhere to the requirements of-
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria -XVI in that corrective action was not
. implemented in. a timely manner following~ a QC discovered violation of the
electrical J separation of certain Unit 2 safety related cable.
Adequate
corrective actions have been taken.
This item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Items
=No unresolved items were identified during this report period.
5.
Plant Operations
The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period, to-
v'erify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room
logs, shift supervisors logs,~ shift turnover records and equipment removal
and restoration records .were -routinely perused. Interviews were conducted
-with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and perform-
ance personnel.
Activities within the control room'were monitored during shifts and at shift ~
changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in
applicable - station administrative directives. The complement of licensed
personnel on each shift. met or exceeded the minimum required by technical
specifications.
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(Plant-tours' taken during the reporting period included but'were not limited
to,the turbine' buildings, auxiliary building, units 1 and 2 electrical
equipment rooms, units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms,'and the station yard
- zone inside the protected crea.
During the plant: tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equip-
ment status and' radiation control practices were observed.
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' Unit 1 Operations
McGuire Unit 1. began the reporting period recovering from a loss of feed-
water induced ' reactor trip discussed in last month's . report.
-A reactor
startup was commenced at 3:13 a.m. on November 20.
The reactor was critical
at 3:30 a.m. and the generator was placed on line at 4:46 a.m.
The unit
. reached 100% power at 3:18 p.m.
and remained at or about 100% power
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throughout the reporting period.
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Unit 2 Operations
McGuire Unit 2 began the reporting period in Mode 1 operating at 100% power
and remained at 100% power until December 11, 1985.when the unit was
shutdown to effect repairs to the D steam generator which was leaking
approximately 150 gallons per day.
This leak had been detected for some
time but remained less than 100 gallons per day until December 7, when a
step increase in the primary to secondary leak rate was detected.
The unit
remained shutdown in Mode 5 throughout the duration of the reporting period.
A total of 50 row 1 U-tubes in the D steam generator were plugged.
As a
result of leak testing and eddy current testing 8 tubes met the criteria for
plugging.
The remaining 42 tubes were plugged because of indications that
suggested that pitting could be a problem in the failure.
6.
Design Changes and Modifications
The inspectors reviewed the process established by the utility to assure
that design changes and modifications (NSM's) are- being developed and
processed in accordance with the requirements of the TS and 10 CFR 50.59.
Specific attributes reviewed were:
review and approval was performed in
accordance with established procedures; post modification testing was
performed where Specified; associated procedure changes were made as
required; as-built drawings were changed to reflect the NSM's; training on
the NSM's was being provided to the operations personnel in a reasonable
timeframe depending on the NSM; and, changes are planned to be'on or were
listed on the required 10 CFR 50.59 annual report'to the NRC.
In addition, the licensee's progr'am for temporary modifications, lifted
leads and jumpers was reviewed to verify:
procedures are established to
require the review and approval in accordance with TS and 10 CFR 50.59;
detailed procedures are used when installing these modifications; a formal
record is maintained of these modifications; testing is required for the
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modifications where required; and periodic reviews are conducted to confirm
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that the temporary modification is still needed.
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The specific NMS's reviewed were as follows:
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MODIFICATION
DESCRIPTION
MG 01223
Replace trip overload heaters with shorting bars
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MG 01534
Re-arrange NS system panel
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MG 01705
Rotate or replace valves 1 CA-22, 26, 31
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MG 20285
Modify the control circuit design of the main reactor
trip breakers
MG 20S51
Install temperature sensors upstream of CA check
valves
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
NUREG 0737 Review
The following NUREG 0737 action items were reviewed to determine the status
of implementation.
It was determined that all the items are currently
active in NRC. headquarters for various reasons. Although most of the items
have been physically implemented at McGuire, they will not be closed out
until headquarters review is complete.
The items were reviewed for both
units and are as detailed below:
Item
I.C.1.1.
Small Break LOCA Procedures Review
I.C.2.B.
Inadequate Core Cooling Procedures Review
I.C.3.B.
Transients and Accidentu Procedures Review
I.D.2.3
S.P.D.S.
II.F.2.4.
Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation
II.K.3.1.B
PORV Isolation
II.K.3.5.B
Auto Trip of Reactor Coolant Pump
II.K.3.10
Anticipatory Reactor Trip
8.
-Solenoid Valve Sealing
On September 19, 1985, station personnel. determined that an environmentally
sealed solenoid valve located inside the containment building haj failed due
to moisture entering the electrical cover.
The moisture had entered the
enclosure by seeping between the. electrical conductors and through the
potting seal.
The potting compound had not sealed around each of the ten
individual conductors because of the arrangement of the wire bundle.
The
failed solenoid valve is required to be operable after a loss of Coolant
Accident (LOCA) to obtain containment gas samples.
In accordance with
TS 3.6.4.1 the failed solenoid valve was declared inoperable.
The four solenoid valves affected were originally installed by the Construc-
tion Department.
The installation was to be in accordance with McGuire
Installation Specification MCS-1390.01-00-0068 (Cable Termination Sealing
Inside Containment and Doghouses).
The valves are shipped by the manufac-
turer with test leads provided for bench testing only.
These leads are not
intended for final installation.
To utilize all of the valve limit switches
and functions, ten wires would have to be connected to the valve.
In the first case of the solenoid valve 1MISV686d failure, the vendor
supplied wiring had been removed and replaced with approved control cable
wiring connected to all ten terminals.
The ten wires passed out through a
3/4 inch conduit fitting where the Scotchcast 9 epoxy resin had been filled
in around the conductors.
The wires had formed a bundle in the center of
the potting material and did not allow the resin to seal around each
conductor in the center of the bundle.
The installation specification
states " Ensure that the Scotchcast 9 completely seals around each individual
conductor in the cable".
This deficient seal was not detected by either the
installers or the Quality Control (QC) inspectors.
The ten wires ran to a
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pull box where only two coil wires were actually connected.
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Valve 1MISV6870 was connected the same as 1MISV6880 with ten wires going to
a pull box and only two wires being used.
There was no moisture located
near this valve and the only repair action taken was to replace the seal and
wiring and install only two wires into the solenoid housing.
The Train B solenoid valves 1MISV6910 and 1MISV6920 were apparently
connected to the vendor supplied leadwires.
These leadwires were not
intended for final installation according to the vendor's manual but the
Duke drawings used by the installers did not indicate that these wires were
not suitable for use.
The seals around these solenoid valves were rewired
and resealed with only -two wires entering the enclosure.
There were no
signs of moisture in or around these two valves.
The Unit 2 solenoids used in this application were visually inspected to
determine if they were correctly sealed.
These four solenoid valves did not
have pull boxes installed.
The three conductor field cables connected to
the valves were routed directly into the top of the solenoids which means
that only three wires entered the electrical enclosure.
With this method of
cable termination, Station and Design Engineering personnel believe that an
adequate seal was made around the three wires.
This installation and inspection problem is apparently limited to Valcor
Model 526 Solenoid Valves used in only five applications inside the Unit 1
Containment Building.
The technique of installation used by a particular
crew or foreman may have contributed to the lack of an adequate seal around
the electrical conductors.
This item will be maintained as an Inspector Followup Item (369/85-41-01)
pending a determination of the extent of the installation problem.
9.
Surveillance Testing
The surveillance tests below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector
to ascertain' procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with
applicable TS.
The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that
current written approved procedures were available and in use, th'at test
equipment in use was . calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, system
restoration completed and test results were adequate.
PT/0/A/4208/01
NS Heat Exchanger Perf Test
PT/1/A/4252/018
MD CA Pump 1B Perf Test
PT/1/A/4403/01B
RN Pump Performance Test
PT/2/A/4208/01A
NS Pump 2A Perf Test
PT/2/A/4208/01B
NS Pump 2A Perf Test
10.
ESS Actuation
On December 12,1985, Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when performance
technicians who were performing slave relay testing on
"B" train SSPS
inadvertently actuated on "A" train relay, which energized train "A"
loads.
All "A" train LOCA loads started except the "A" diesel generator and
the "A" RN pump which were out of service at the time.
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The technicians were . performing section 12.51 of procedure PT-1-A-4200-28,
Slave Relay Test.
Step 12.54 energizes relay K608 which starts DG 18.
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, train "B" loads are energized due to the sequencer having~ been placed in
" Test" in step 51.2.
In this particular instance, steps 51.1-3 had been
performed as required, however the technicians then proceeded to cabinet
STC-A instead of STC-B, energized relay K608 for train "A" which energized
the train
"A" sequencer, and the train "A"
LOCA loads.
Although the loads
energized, there was no actual injection because there was no LOCA signal
present.
The loads were de energized and placed back in standby with no
deleterious effects.
This incident was reported to the NRC at 12:24 p.m. that same afternoon.
For more infomation pertaining to this event, refer to McGuire Unit 1
Non-Routine Event Report 85-58.
The associated LER has yet to be written.
Inasmuch as the procedure clearly specified the cabinet and switch number,
and since the cabinet is clearly identified, the above incident is an
example of failure to follow procedure, and is a Violation of TS 6.8.1.a.
(369/85-41-02).
11. Open Items Review
The following items were reviewed in order to determine the adequacy of
corrective actions, the implications as they pertain to safety of opera-
tions, the applicable reporting requirements, and licensee review of the
event.
Based upon the results of this review, the items.are herewith
closed.
50-369
50-370
LER 84-01
-LER 85-47
LER 84-23
LER 85-03
LER 85-06
LER 85-04
LER 85-07
LER 85-06
LER 85-19
LER 85-08
LER 85-24'
LER 85-13
LER 85-26
LER 85-17
LER 85-32
LER 85-19
LER 85-21
LER 85-22
LER 85-23
LER 85-26
LER 85-29