ML20207T807

Insp Repts 50-321/86-43 & 50-366/86-43 on 861220-870123. Violation Noted:Failure to Adequately Test Alarm Setpoints for Unit 2 Hydrogen Recombiner Sys

ML20207T807
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	03/10/1987
From:	Cantrell F, Holmesray P, Nejfelt G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T777	List: ML20207T776 ML20207T791 ML20207T807
References
50-321-86-43, 50-366-86-43, NUDOCS 8703240362
Download: ML20207T807 (5)

See also: IR 05000321/1986043

Text

' UNITED STATES

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o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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j- 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

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Report Nos.: 50-321/86-43 and 50-366/86-43

Licensee: Georgia. Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

, Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 '

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Inspection Conducted: December 20, 1986 - January 23, 1987

Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley Georgia ^

Inspectors: O d .3 / C

PeterHolmes-Ray,SenYppesidentInspector > Date Srgned

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Gregaty.M.Nejfelt,ResiKntIfspector '

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Approved by: w

Floyd S. Cantrell, Chief, Prd

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Date Signed

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SUMMARY

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Scope: This routine inspection was conducted- at the site in the areas of

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verification,

Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification and Surveil. lance? Observation, and

Reportable Occurrences. '

Results: A previously unresolved item was upgraded to a violation. The item was

for failures to adequately test alarm setpoints for the Unit 2 hydrogen

recombiner system (paragraphs 3 and 7).

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

J. T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch

• H. C. Nix, Plant Manager

• D. Read, Plant Support Manager

H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager

• J. Lewis, Operations Manager (Acting),

• P. E. Fornel, Maintenance Manager

• T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager

R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

C. Coggin, General Support Manager

M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager

• 0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Acting)

C. T. Moore, Training Manager

• S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members and office personnel.

NRC Management On Site During Inspection Period:

F. S. Cantrell, Chief, Project Section 28, DRP (on January 16,1987)

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 23, 1987,

with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not

identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by

the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee acknowledged the

findings and took no exception.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-321/86-15-01) - Inoperability of the Unit 1

"1A" Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Charcoal Filter. This item is upgraded

to a violation (50-321/86-43-01).

(0 pen) Violation (50-321/86-43-01) - Inoperability of the Unit 1 "1A" SBGT

Charcoal Filter. This item was previously an unresolved item (50-321/86-

15-01).

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-366/86-40-01) - Unit 2 Hydrogen Recombiner

Trouble Alarm Setpoints. This item is upgraded to a violation (50-366/

86-43-02).

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4. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.

Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the

plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control

room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints.and recordings,

status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and

switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for

operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet

entries, control room manning, and access controls. This inspection

activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their

supervisors. Weekly, when on site, selected engineering safety feature

(ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by

verifying the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply

breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrica-

tion, cooling, and general condition.

General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions

of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside

areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-

tions, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plart

conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress,

radiation protection controls, physical security, prc'_'.em identification

systems, and containment isolation.

In the area of housekeeping the units were found to be in good condition.

Also, the effort to decontaminate the units diagonals appeared to be effec-

tive, since unrestricted access to all levels in these areas was nearly

achieved.

In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a

review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of

various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily

activities to include: protected and vital access controls, searching of

personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of

visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance

activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for

adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical

specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the

actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and

adherence to the appropriate quality controls.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. PlantModification(37700)

The inspectors observed the performance of selected plant modification

design change requests (DCRs). The observation included a review of the DCR

for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verifica-

tion of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the

actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the

system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability

based upon the acceptance criteria.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Surveillance Testing Observations (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances. The

observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,

conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument

calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal

from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and

review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.

It was confirmed by the licensee that none of the hydrogen recombiner

trouble alarm setpoints (e.g., recombiner - high temperatures, inlet high

pressure, gas flow rate, and drain line level) were procedurally verified.

A procedural revision is being developed by the licensee to test these

alarms. Also, the surveillance frequency for the hydrogen recombiner

transmitters, temperature switches, and pressure switches was revised from a

5 year to a 18 month interval. Past efforts by the licensee to increase

surveillance frequencies of instrumentation associated with technical

specification requirements failed to identify this surveillance deficiency.

The failure to test the Unit 2 hydrogen recombiner trouble alarm setpoints;

and- to test associated transmitters, temperature switches, and pressure

switches within an 18 month interval is considered violation (50-366/

86-43-01).

8. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve

and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions are randomly verified

both locally and in the control room to verify that the lineups were in

accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material

conditions were satisfactory.

As documented in licensee event report (LER) 50-321/86-07 and material

subsequently reviewed by the inspector, the "1A" SBGT charcoal filter was

inoperable from about November 24, 1985 to March 11, 1986. Water leaking

from the fire protection deluge system saturated the charcoal filter bed;

and made the charcoal incapable of removing radioactive iodine, as designed.

Water leaking from a fire protection deluge drip check valve on November 24,

1985, provided plant operators with sufficient information to indicate the

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degradation of the filter may have occurred. However, no corrective action

occurred until the regularly scheduled surveillance (42SV-T46-003-1) was

performed on March 11, 1986. Upon discovery, the charcoal filter was

replaced; and plant operators were informed of this problem. The mainten-

ance training materials were revised to provide long term training to

prevent reoccurrence of this particular failure. As. stated in LER 50-321/

86-07; "Per section 5.3.3.3 of the Unit 1 FSAR, the SBGT trains each have

100% capacity and the effectiveness of one train is not altered by the loss

of the redundant train. The "1B" SBGT train, as well as the two Unit 2 SBGT

trains ("2A" and "2B") remained operable during this event. If SBGT train

"1A" had been required to operate during the time its filter bed was wet, i

the "1A" train may not have removed a satisfactory amount of methyl iodine  !

(if present) which would have resulted in annunciation in the main control

room of the radiation monitor in the "1A" train's discharge air duct.

Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not adversely affected

by this event."

This unresolved item (50-321/86-15-01) - Inoperability of the Unit 1 "1A"

Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Charcoal Filter, remains open since this item

is being considered as an additional example in another escalated enforce-

ment action currently under review.

9. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

One new Licensee Event Report (LER) (50-321/86-043) was received in this

reporting period. This _ LER committed to providing additional information

concerning a reactor scram caused by a recirculation scoop tube failure by

February 2,1987. Events, which were reported immediately, were also

reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were

being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consideration.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Temporary Instructions

The actions of Temporary Instruction 2515/80, Data Collection for the

Performance Indicator Trial Program, were completed in June of 1986 and this

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item is closed.

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