ML20210S849

Forwards Safety Insp Repts 50-266/86-18 & 50-301/86-17 on 860908-11.No Violations Noted.Exercise Weaknesses Encl. Plans for Corrective Action Requested within 45 Days of Ltr Date

ML20210S849
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	10/01/1986
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
Shared Package
ML20210S854	List: IR 05000266/1986018 ML20210S849
References
NUDOCS 8610080236
Download: ML20210S849 (3)

See also: IR 05000266/1986018

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0CT 01 1998

Docket No. 50-266

Docket No. 50-301

~ Wisconsin Electric Power Company

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-ATTN: Mr. C. W. Fay

Vice President

Nuclear Power Department

231 West Michigan, Room 308

Milwaukee, WI 53201

Gentlemen:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by J. Foster and other

representatives of this office on September 8-11, 1986, of activities at the

Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, authorized by NRC Facility

Operating Licenses No. DPR-24 and No. DPR-27, and to the discussion of our

findings with Mr. J. Zach and others of your staff at the conclusion of the

inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during

the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective

examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and

interviews with personnel.

No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this

inspection.

However, weaknesses were identified which will need corrective action by your

staff. These weaknesses are summarized in the Attachment to this letter.

" Exercise Weaknesses." As required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F, any

weaknesses that are identified must be corrected. Accordingly, please advise

us within 45 days of the date of this letter of the corrective action you have

taken or plan to take, showing the estimated date of completion with regard to

these exercise weaknesses.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of

this letter, and the enclosures, will be placed in the NRC Public Document

Room.

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Wisconsin' Electric Power Company 2

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

W. D. Shafer, Chief

Emergency Preparedness and l

Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosures:

1. Exercise Weaknesses

2. Inspection Reports

No. 50-266/86018(DRSS); and

No. 50-301/86017(DRSS)

cc w/ enclosures:

J. J. Zach, Plant Manager

DCS/RSB (RIDS)

( Licensing Fee Management Branch

Resident Inspector, RIII

John J. Duffy, Chief

Boiler Section

Mary Lou Munts, Chairperson

Wisconsin Public Service

Commission

W. Weaver, FEMA, Region V

D. Matthews, OIE, EPB

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EXERCISE WEAKNESSES

1. The site manager departed the TSC, arrived at the E0F and returned to the

TSC (due to the exercise scenario requiring evacuation of the E0F). The

Site Manager's location, and change of location was not logged on any

status board nor announced. Therefore it was not clear to the observer

who was in control at all times. This is an Open Item (266/86018-01; l

301/86017-01 (Paragraph 5.b.).

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2. The responsibility to maintain the events log and the entry team status

board (these are maintained in the TSC) was not assigned to one individual,

and the entry team status was significantly out of date in the latter

stages of the exercise, and contained entries which were incorrect. It

was also noted that EPIP 6.5 " Technical Support and Operational Support

Center Activation" does not deal with the OSC elsewhere than in the

document's title. Licensee attention is needed in this area, to

proceduralize, to the extent possible, OSC actions, including activation,

tracking of teams, and dose tracking / projection for team members. This

is an Open Item (266/86018-02; 301/86017-02) (Paragraph 5.c.).

3. Plant procedures require that the thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) be

worn beneath the outer layer of protective clothing (to prevent contamina-

tion of the device). Since the TLD is almost universally attached to the

identification / access card, the access control card was not accessible by

the entry team for use in card readers. This prevented the turbine

building team from gaining quick access to the cable room. This is an

Open Item (266/86018-03; 301/86017-03) (Paragraph 5.c.).

4. The health physics team sent to the turbine room was not sufficiently

protected from the environment predicted by the exercise scenario (water /

steam and contaminants from steam generator tube leakage). Canvas hoods

and canvas shoe covers were provided. Also, good health physics practice

indicates that more than one (unprotected) survey instrument should be

taken by an entry team, especially when entering a hostile environment.

This is an Open Item (266/86018-04: 301/86017-04) (Paragraph 5.c.).

5. A single radiation control point was established at the door to the

turbine building (door 116) and the TSC/0SC area. It is unlikely that

positive radiation control could have been maintained at this point due

to conditions experienced during the exercise. There was a strong inflow

of air present when the door was open. Also, if an individual were to

have been found to be contaminated, he would have to pass the checkpoint

to reach the nearest shower (for decontamination). Loss of radiation

control at a checkpoint so located would have compromised nearby sample

analysis and counting rooms and the TSC/OSC. This is an Open Itein

(266/86018-05; 301/86017-05) (Paragraph 5.c.).

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