ML20217K927

From kanterella
Revision as of 14:02, 1 March 2021 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Special Rept:On 971229,procedure Step for Closing Safety Injection Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Valve Was Inadvertently Skipped.Caused by Injection of Water Into RCS from Rwst.Simplified Procedures & Discussed Event
ML20217K927
Person / Time
Site: Catawba Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/26/1998
From: Gordon Peterson
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9804070336
Download: ML20217K927 (4)


Text

-

,b rm Duke Power Company A kk Emp Gem s

Cetau4n Nudear Station

- mW 4800 Concord Road York. SC 29745 Go,y R. No,een (803)83M251 omct Mce Pmident (803) 831-3426ax March 26, 1998 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC- 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Duke Energy Corporation' Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-413

-Special Report Emergency Core' Cooling System Injection into the Reactor Coolant System i

_This Special Report provides information concerning an injection of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)into the Reactor Coolant System which occurred while Unit 1 was in Mode 4,tHot Shutdown, on' December 29, 1997. Technical Specification 3.5.3, which is applicable in Mode 4, requires that in the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days which describes the circumstances of'the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its'value exceeds 0.70. This Special Report'is being submitted to fulfill this Technical Specification requirement.

Description of' Event

'On December 29, 1997, Unit 1 was in Mode 4, Hot Shutdown.

The plant was preparing to enter Mode 3, Hot Standby,,at the conclusion of the End of Cycle 10 Refueling Outage.

Preparations were in progress to fill a Cold Leg Accumulator using Safety Injection Pump 'A' per existing plant The Control Room Operator briefly suspended the

. procedures.

Cold Leg Accumulator fill alignment process to allow a non-licensed operator.to perform a local pump inspection. When g the alignment process was resumed, a procedure step for N '

closing the Safety Injection Pump Cold Leg Injection

-Isolation' Valve was inadvertently skipped. At approximately ,/

Se 9004070336 990326 PDR ADOCK 05000413 -

S PDR-

r 4

U.S., Nuclear Regulatory Commission

+ 'Easch 26, 1998 Page 2 0017 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> on December 29, 1998, when the Safety Injection Pump was started in a subsequent step, water was injected into the Reactor Coolant System from the Refueling Water Storage Tank, rather than into the Cold Leg Accumulator as intended. Control Room operators recognized the error and secured the Safety Injection Pump at approximately 0022 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />.

During'the injection,' pressurizer level increasert by approximately 40%. The in-surge of'relatively cool water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank caused pressurizer temperature to decrease initially. During the subsequent actions to return temperature to its initial value, the pressurizer heatup rate exceeded the Technical Specification 3.4.9.2 limit of 100 degrees in any one hour.

In accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.2, an engineering evaluation was performed to determine the effects of the transient on the structural integrity of the pressurizer. The evaluation concluded that the pressurizer still met all of-the existing design requirements and was operable.

Corrective actions planned as a result of this event include:

1. Discussion of this event in Operations Proficiency discussions;
2. Simplification of the procedure for filling cold leg accumulators to create one section to be used when Reactor Coolant System pressure is greater than 1600 psig (above discharge pressure _of Safety Injection Pump) and a separate section to be used when pressure is less than 1600 psig (which was the case in this event); and
3. Development of a generic training lesson plan for mitigating temperature transients caused by pressurizer level changes and mass in-surge additions.

Additional Information This is the first actuation. cycle to date involving injection through the 10-inch Accumulator Safety Injection nozzles. The current value of the usage factor for the nozzles affected by this event is less-than 0.70.

U.S., Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. Maich 26, 1998 Page 3 Questions regarding this Special Report should be directed to M.H. Chernoff at (803) 831-3414.

Ver ruly yours,

/%llt, G. Peterson l

l

l l-'..

i

l. U.S., Nuclear Regulatory Commission i . 'Masch 26 , 1998 Page 4 XC:

L. A. Reyes-

, U. S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth.St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 i

P. S. Tam

, NRC-Senior Project Manager (CNS) l U.'S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-14H25 Washington, DC 20555-0001 D. J. Roberts Senior Resident Inspector (CNS)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Catawba Nuclear Site l 4 i

l l

1 l

l 4

j