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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20153B0531998-09-16016 September 1998 Special Rept:On 980817,errors in Implementation of Selected Licensee Commitment Testing Requirements on Fire Protection Sys Instruments,Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Interpretation of SLC Requirement.Will Revise Procedures ML20236M9151998-07-0707 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980611,determined That Required Firewatch Patrol Had Been Missed.Caused by Firewatch Being Performed on Wrong Unit Due to Human Error.Employee Was Verbally Counseled on Firewatches & Documentation Was Corrected ML20236G4451998-07-0101 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980618,declared Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Meet TS Definition of Channel Calibr.Will Revise Selected Licensee Commitment ML20248K1431998-06-0202 June 1998 Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Shrinkage of Foam & Improper Installation During Construction of Plant.Posted Fire Watches & Repaired Firestop F-AX-348-W-134 ML20247H5351998-04-12012 April 1998 Special Rept:On 980415,missed Insp of Fire Hose Caskets Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Transferring Info from One Procedure to Another.Planned Rev of Applicable Procedure to Include Gasket Insp at Appropriate Frequency ML20216B0211998-04-0606 April 1998 Special Rept:On 980325,determined That Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Being Inoperable for Greater than Thirty Days.Caused by Incorrect Testing.All Channels of Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Tested Utilizing Revised Test Method ML20217K9271998-03-26026 March 1998 Special Rept:On 971229,procedure Step for Closing Safety Injection Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Valve Was Inadvertently Skipped.Caused by Injection of Water Into RCS from Rwst.Simplified Procedures & Discussed Event ML20216D5641998-03-0505 March 1998 Special Rept:On 980204,discovered That Fire Detection Panel Was Apparently Not Communicating W/Several Local Fire Detectors.Caused by Faulty Computer Sys Cards.Replaced Four Computer Cards in Sys ML20202C4701998-02-0505 February 1998 Ro:On 971228:Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 6 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Excessive Static on Channel. Caused by Loose Connection.Work Order Has Been Written to Pursue Repairs ML20138E6851997-04-24024 April 1997 Special Rept:On 970318,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 13 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Sporadic Electical Static.Channel Was Removed from Svc & Entered Into TS Action Item Logbook as Inoperable ML20149M7251997-01-20020 January 1997 Special Rept:On 961209,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring (Lpm) Sys Channel 20 Declared Inoperable Due to No Signal Being Received from Field.Lpm Channel 20 & 22 Operable & Providing Monitoring Coverage for Primary Side of 1D S/G ML20134K4901996-11-0606 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961009,selective Licensee Commitment for Operability of Fire Protection Sprinkler Sys Not Maintained. Continuous Fire Watch Established within One H Following Identification of Incorrect Remedial Action ML20134H1331996-11-0404 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961004,Unit 1B DG Failed Due to Failure of Motor Operated Pot,Electronic & Mechanical Governor,Governor Droop Relay & Mechanical Binding of Fuel Rack Control Linkage.Dg Procedures Will Be Revised ML20113A1801996-06-17017 June 1996 Special Rept:On 960521,declared Detectors A01 for Zone 69 & A04 for Zone 60 Inoperable Because Detectors Effectively Isolated from Area in Intended Protection.Detectors Relocated,Tested & Declared Operable on 960524 ML20100H9801996-02-20020 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960111,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Channel 21 Declared Inoperable,Due to Spurious,Unexplainable Electronic Bursts.Work Request Initiated to Pursue Corrective Action ML20100H9751996-02-20020 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960111,Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 7 Declared Inoperable,Due to pre-amp Bias Voltage Indicating Zero Volts Twice During Previous Seven Days.Work Request Written to Pursue Corrective Action ML20097F5011996-02-11011 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960102,Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 17 Was Declared Inoperable.Two Other Channels Operable & Providing Coverage Against Loose Parts ML20096E7731996-01-12012 January 1996 Special Rept:On 951214,unit 2 DG Valid Failure Occurred. Caused by Fuel Line Fitting Backing Off from Cylinder Head Connection,Which Resulted in Fuel Oil Leakage.Dg Successfully Started,Run & Declared Operable on 951215 ML20096A8761995-12-18018 December 1995 Special Rept:On 951120,during Periodic Surveillance Testing, Lpms Channel 5 Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Preamp Bias Voltage Indications.Work Request 95048483 Initiated to Perform Corrective Maint During Unit 1 Cycle 9 ML20094Q5811995-11-13013 November 1995 Special Rept:On 951014,auxiliary Bldg Filtered Exhaust Sys Pump Room Heater Declared Inoperable Due to Blown Fuse & Not Restored to Operable Status within 7 Days Per Ts. Technical Investigation Will Be Performed ML20094B8291995-10-25025 October 1995 Special Rept:On 950919,loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 1 Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Preamp Bias Indication. Work Request Written to Investigate & Repair Channel ML20098A4641995-09-19019 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950817,Unit 2 Lpms Channel 12 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Channel Sensor Failing Acceptance Criteria During Performance of PT/O/A4600/03 ML20092G6041995-09-14014 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950815,CNS Unit 1 DG 1A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Main Bearing High Temp Trip Signal.Caused by Failed Splice Installed in Circuit for RTD 1LDRD5630.New RTD Installed in Main Bearing 5 ML20086H1401995-07-12012 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950615,Channel 4 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Noise Uncharacteristic of Healthy Channel Detected Via Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring Sys.Corrective Maint Will Be Performed During 1EOC9 Outage ML20086H1431995-07-11011 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950608,Channel 13 Was Declared Inoperable. Trending of Bias Voltage & Background Rms Evaluated to Conclude Channel Was Experiencing Periodic Failures. Corrective Maint Will Be Performed During 1EOC9 Outage ML20086C6441995-06-29029 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950523,Unit 1 Train a Fuel Handling Ventilation Filter Heaters Declared Inoperable.Evaluation Done to Determine Fault ML20085M4061995-06-20020 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950501,lower Rv Tube 4 Was Declared Inoperable ML20084N7271995-05-25025 May 1995 Special Rept:On 950425,valid Failure of DG 1A Occurred. Caused by Jacket Water Thermostatic Control Valve Sticking in Position Which Reduced Engine Cw Flow Through Heat Exchanger.Thermostatic Cv Internals Removed & Replaced ML20082L2711995-04-17017 April 1995 Special Rept:On 950308,Unit 2 Cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable & Remained Inoperable Greater than 10 Days ML20081D4851995-03-13013 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950211,actuation of PORV 1NC32B Occurred. Procedure OP/1(2)/A/6100/02 Revised to Require More Emphasis on Monitoring Pressure Indication During Sensitive Evolutions ML20080Q8701995-03-0202 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950202,Unit 1 DG 1B Invalid Failure Due to Overcurrent Breaker Trip During Governor Troubleshooting ML20149H7821994-12-20020 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941129,discovered That Selective Licensee Commitment (SLC) for Visual Insp of Fire Rated Assemblies Exceeded Due to Misinterpretation of Requirements of SLC 16.9-5.Fire Barriers Visually Inspected ML20078R0021994-12-12012 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941103,Channel 3 (Upper Rv a) Declared Inoperable.Caused by Channel Sensor Failure of Acceptance Criteria During Performance of PT/0/A/4600/03.Repair Planned for End of 2EOC7 Outage Due to Containment Entry Required ML20078K7361994-11-17017 November 1994 Special Rept on 941021,DG 1A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Main Bearing High Temp Trip.Operability Performance Test Successfully Completed & Engine Declared Operable on 941022 ML20149G8041994-11-0101 November 1994 Special Rept:On 940922,CNS,Unit 2 Cathodic Protection Sys Declared Inoperable & Remained Inoperable for Greater than 10 Days.Wo 94080948-01 Initiated to Replace Prepackaged Anode Well 1.WO Scheduled for 941114 ML20076F3191994-10-0404 October 1994 Special Rept:On 940908,valid Failure of D/G 1A Occurred Due to Air Start Valve Sticking Open.Maint Procedure MP/0/A/7650/99 Revised,New Air Roll Criteria Developed & Sixteen Starting Air Valves Replaced ML20072P4251994-08-23023 August 1994 Ro:On 940719,channel 9 (S/G a Channel 2) Declared Inoperable.Work Request Was Generated to Repair Channel During Future Outage of Sufficient Length Since Containment Entry Required for Work ML20072E5961994-08-15015 August 1994 Special Rept:On 940715,inoperability of Unit 2 Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring System Channel 4 & 6 Occurred.Caused by Leds Not Lighting During Performance of PT/0/B/4600/03. Work Orders 94051250-01 & 94051251-01 Initiated ML20071N7441994-07-28028 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940711,delta-t Channel on Chart Recorder Found to Be out-of-tolerance Due to Drifting of Analog to Digital (A/D) Converter Card.A/D Card Replaced & delta-t Channel Chart Recorder Declared Operable ML20071N8511994-07-28028 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940711,main Steam Relief Valve Exhaust Monitors Declared Inoperable Due to Engineering Calculation Concerns.Engineering Calculation CNC-1229.00-00-0047 re-performed Using EPA-400 Methodology ML20070K0191994-07-18018 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940630,re Inoperability of Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 2EMF12.Work Request 94026262 Generated to Reattach 2EMF12 to Main Steamline.Work Request Completed on 940701 ML20069H0861994-05-31031 May 1994 Special Rept:On 940501,Unit 2 DG 2A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Right Bank Turbocharger Vibration Trip.Based on Cooper-Enterprise Recommendations,Procedure Changes Made to Calibr Procedures for All Four DGs ML20065K5011994-04-13013 April 1994 Special Rept:On 940314,invalid Failure of Diesel Generator 1B Occurred Due to Output Tripping During Calibration of Electronic Governor.Dg 1B Started Successfully on 940315 & Declared Operable ML20064G2911994-03-15015 March 1994 Special Rept:On 940203,SG Channels 9 & 11 Declared Inoperable.Channels Failed to Meet Band Limited Rms Acceptance Criteria During Performance of 18 Month Channel Calibr Test.Work Request Written to Repair Channels ML20064G2771994-03-0707 March 1994 Special Rept:On 940125,Channels 6,7 & 10 Were Declared Inoperable.Channels Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria During Performance of 18 Month Channel Calibr Test.Work Request Written to Repair Channels 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9561999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C9111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20203A2581999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of TR DPC-NE-3002-A,Rev 2, UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology. Rept Acceptable. Staff Requests Duke Energy Corp to Publish Accepted Version of TR within 3 Months of Receipt of SE ML20204C9161999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K8711999-01-13013 January 1999 Inservice Insp Rept for Unit 2 Catawba 1998 Refueling Outage 9 ML20199E3071998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20205E9441998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 10CFR50.59 Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2, Containing Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of Ses.With ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20203A4101998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-25, Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr ML20203A4041998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 14 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 11 Colr ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20199E3221998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised MOR for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20198E3151998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20195E5521998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198E3261998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154M7661998-10-12012 October 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
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Ekike(burr Company I
W w n R.Ak D w x JR Catauha Nudear Generation ikpartinent lice President 4SM Concordhbad (8W)33132% Ottice
)brk. SCTJ76 (8W)S3]JL% Fax I
DUKEPOWER November 4, 1996 l
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 l
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-413 Special Report Valid Failure of Diesel Generator 1B Pursuant to Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2, attached is a Special Report concerning the Unit 1 Diesel Generator (DG 1B) valid failure which occurred on October 1, 1996.
Sincerely, W. R. McCollum, Jr KEN \DGlB1004.96 Attachment xc: SD Ebneter, Regional Administrator l
RJ Freudenberger, SRI PS Tam, ONRR l
I T6:22'l t 130005 t
) 9611130540 961104 I PDR ADOCK 05000413 S PDR nnara, m w-
9 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION l DOCKET NO. 50-413 DIESEL GENERATOR 1B VALID FAILURE DUE TO A MECHANICAL BIND IN THE FUEL CONTROL ROD LINKAGE ASSEMBLY PIP 1-C96-2697 ]
A valid failure of the Unit 1B Diesel Generator (DG 1B) occurred at 1535 10/04/96. This failure occurred when the generator was being paralleled to the grid. The DG became unstable during a load increase to a point where the generator breaker tripped on overcurrent. DG 1B was being l run for its required monthly operability test when this failure occurred (Start #1134). This is the first valid failure in the last 20 and 100 valid starts. The DG 1B remains on a 31 day test frequency. DG 1B was successfully started, run, and declared operable on 10/06/96 (Start
- 1137). DG 1B was unavailable for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> due to this failure.
Background Information The design basis of the DG is to provide emergency AC power i in the event of a loss of cooling accident (LOCA) and/or loss of offset power (LOOP). The generator is designed with an overcurrent trip to ensure equipment damage does not occur when an overcurrent condition arises during testing of the i DG. The trip is bypassed on emergency starts and only functions when the DG is paralleled to the essential bus. ,
When the trip is actuated, the generator output breaker opens )
and the engine returns to an unloaded operating condition.
The protective relaying functioned as designed during the i failure which occurred on the 1B DG. Although generator l breaker trip on overcurrent is a non-emergency trip, the failure is classified as valid because the DG was in an unstable condition due to a load swing which prevented the I periodic operability test from being completed.
The 1B diesel generator breaker (1ETB-18) tripped as load was increased as the DG was paralleled to the grid. During this activity, the load on the generator began to swing to a point where the overcurrent trip setpoint was reached.
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION
! DOCKET NO. 50-413 l DIESEL GENERATOR 1B VALID FAILURE t
DUE TO A MECHANICAL BIND IN THE l FUEL CONTROL ROD LINKAGE ASSEMBLY PIP 1-C96-2697 Evaluation The following failure modes were evaluated as potential root causes for the 1B DG valid failure:
- 1. Motor Operated Pot failure
- 2. Electronic Governor failure (EGA)
- 3. Mechanical Governor failure (EGB)
- 4. Failure of the Governor Droop (UPR) Relay
- 5. Mechanical binding of the fuel rack control linkage
- 1. The Motor Operated Pot is part of the DG electric governor system. The purpose of the pot is to provide a speed reference signal. The pot is used to raise and lower speed during unparalleled operation and load during paralleled operation. In the failure mode, if there is a ' dead' spot on the potentiometer, a speed signal would be sent to the governor but would not be
, recognized. This could cause the load swings that were l observed prior to the generator output breaker tripping on overcurrent.
Extensive testing was performed on the motor operated pot which included exercising the pot through full range of motion while monitoring output voltage with a chart I recorder. This device did not show any indication of failure. The vendor was contacted, and agreed that'the testing was satisfactory and indicated the pot was operating as designed. Conservative decision making was utilized and the pot was replaced to eliminate this as a potential root cause. The vendor also stated that it was highly unlikely that a failure of the motor operated pot would be sporadic.
- 2. The Electronic Governor (EGA) was replaced on 08/11/96 (Work Request 96032980) as a result of a similar load swing that occurred during performance of the maintenance break-in runs prior to returning the 1B DG l to operable status. The data from this load swing j indicated that the EGA was not controlling load as designed. The electronic governor was successfully .
retested following replacement. The failure which occurred on 10/04/96, was preceded by the same load swing as evidenced prior to replacement of the new EGA l 2 i
l CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION l DOCKET NO. 50-413 DIESEL GENERATOR 1B VALID FAILURE DUE TO A MEOHANICAL BIND IN THE I 1
FUEL CONTROL ROD LINKAGE ASSEMBLY PIP 1-C96-2697 l i !
l governor. The EGA is not believed to be a root cause of this problem since load swings continued with the new governor. The vendor agreed that the load swing which is being observed on the 1B DG is not due to the EGA controller.
l 3. The Mechanical Governor (EGB) is designed to control l
load if the Electric Governor fails. The EGB begins to
! control load when engine speed reaches 61.3 HZ and the EGA controls load up to that speed. The failure mode that possibly exists is that the EGB is taking control I of the engine during parallel operation when the frequency is locked at the grid frequency of 60 Hz. The vendor which was contacted stated this is not possible.
The vendor also stated that if the EGB were to fail it would occur at all loads. The load swings that have occurred on the 1B DG have always been at 3000 - 4000 kW. The first time the load swings occurred, the EGA was controlling and not the EGB mechanical governor. This indicated that the mechanical governor was not part of '
! the load swing problems.
j The EGB governor is a hydraulic piece of equipment which i requires oil to be changed every refueling outage. ;
Following the oil change, the governor is vented by maintenance personnel. The vendor was asked if trapped air in the mechanical governor could cause the load to swing. The vendor explained that the EGB component is self-venting and that a load swing due to an non-vented governor had never been observed. Another piece of data which was used to rule out this item as a potential root I cause, was that when the generator breaker tripped on overcurrent and engine speed exceeded the setpoint for j the EGB governor, the engine was returned to stable l frequency when the EGB governor took control.
- 4. A vendor field service representative from Woodward l Controls was also consulted- about the load swing
( problems. The Woodward rep mentioned that another utility had had a recent problem when the governor droop relay for the governor failed causing the governor to switch from the droop mode of operation to the isochronous while paralleled. The Governor Droop Relay l 3 l
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50-413 DIESEL GENERATOR 1B VALID FAILURE DUE TO A MECHANICAL BIND IN THE FUEL CONTROL ROD LINKAGE ASSEMBLY PIP 1-C96-2697 (UPR) was checked in our DG control panel and no problems were identified with its operation.
- 5. The vendor felt that the load swing and resulting generator trip was a result of some type of mechanical binding in the fuel controlling linkage. Sticking in this linkage could cause the governor ^ to be unable to maintain stable load at the point where the sticking was occurring. The vendor recommended that troubleshooting efforts include a thorough investigation of the fuel rod linkage which is controlled by the governor output. Upon investigation by Maintenance it was discovered that the connecting linkage from the fuel rack to the fuel pump on the 7R cylinder was installed in a condition that covJd cause binding to occur.
The DG governor system is designed to maintain engine load by metering the amount of fuel oil provided to the engine. During normal operation when the engine is paralleled to the grid the electronic governor controls load by sending a signal to the output actuator which in turn controls fuel rod position. The motion of the fuel control rod determines the amount of fuel oil input ,
to the cylinders by the fuel oil pumps. The fuel j control rod is connected to the output of the governor i actuator. Linkage assemblies are connected from the individual cylinder fuel pumps to the fuel control rod l so that the fuel flow to the engine is controlled by the governor system. Each cylinder is tied together by the fuel control rod such that a problem with just one cylinder would effect the output load.
I The linkage assembly on the 7R cylinder was installed in such a manner that binding was occurring. The linkage I assembly is connected such that the assembly is at right angles to the fuel control rod. On the cylinder in CIuestion, both of the spacers / counter weights were installed on the same side of the ' assembly to fuel pump' connection. For this particular cylinder, one counter weight / spacer should have been installed between the fuel pump and fuel linkage assembly in order to ensure the fuel linkage was at a right angle with the control rod. The fuel control rod was disconnected from the governor actuator and exercised by hand with 4
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j CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION j DOCKET NO. 50-413 l DIESEL GENERATOR 1B VALID FAILURE DUE TO A MECHANICAL BIND IN THE l FUEL CONTROL ROD LINKAGE ASSEMBLY l PIP 1-C96-2697 the linkage assembly connected in each manner as I
described above. A point of binding was observed with the assembly connected in the as found condition. ;
I Per manufacturing drawing CNM-1301.00-0237, vol 2, sheet 02-371-04, note 5, "All linkage assemblies, regardless of the position shown, are to be set up with levers making a right angle with rod when they pass through the midposition of their ARC". The remaining cylinders on j the 1B DG as well as the other DGs were inspected to ensure the levers were at or near 90 with the fuel control rod. The inspection indicated that the 7R cylinder on the 1B DG was the only one that had a fuel linkage installed such that the required 90 angle could not be maintained through its range of motion.
i The probable cause for the load swing on the 1B DG which led to the overcurrent generator trip was due to mechanical binding in the fuel control linkage. As stated above, the fuel linkage assembly for the 7R l cylinder was installed in such a manner that binding !
could occur. The problem with binding is that when the j generator is at a specific load, the fuel control rod i
! will be at a corresponding position. If the required fuel rod position for a load is the point where the binding is occurring, the governor will begin to hunt because the demanded position cannot be met.
The fuel rod linkage assembly on the 7R cylinder would freely move through a full range of motion on an engine start and as load was increased because the output force i from the governor was sufficient to move the linkage assembly through the point where the binding was occurring. However, the governor output is determined by
- corresponding load (demand) on the DG. If the point j where the binding is occurring is the corresponding l position for the required load, the binding will l prevent this position from being obtained. Since the governor output does not change for a set demand, there is no output force to move the 7R fuel linkage assembly through the binding position. This is why the first load swing stopped when the Operator changed load on the generator. At the binding point, the correct fuel linkage assembly position for the 7R cylinder could not.
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i CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50-413 DIESEL GENERATOR 1B VALID FAILURE l_ DUE TO A NECHANICAL BIND IN THE FUEL CONTROL ROD LINKAGE ASSENBLY l PIP 1-C96-2697 i
be obtained which resulted in the 1B DG becoming l
unstable as the remaining cylinders attempted to l maintain the demanded load. This is why the load swing was not sporadic but was only occurring when the generator load was at the level which corresponded to l the binding position of the fuel linkage assembly. The i
load swing would continue to occur until the load on the
- engine was changed which in turn changed the demand on l the fuel.
The fuel rod linkage assembly was re-installed correctly to ensure binding did not occur. The 1B DG was started l and load was slowly changed throughout the range where
! the instability occurred to try and recreate the load ;
swings. The swings could not be recreated. ;
Conclusions Based on the data obtained from inspections on the 1B DG l coupled with information received from Woodward Controls, the i l probable root cause for the 1B DG valid failure was due to a J
! mechanical bind in the fuel control rod linkage assembly on the 7R cylinder. The linkage assembly had been removed and ,
replaced during the 1EOC9 inspections. The linkage assembly i from the fuel control rod to the respective fuel pump was ,
I installed such that the required 90* angle was not maintained, l l This is a process failure in that the applicable procedures )
did not give clear guidance on the importance of the fuel linkage assembly position with the fuel shaft control rod.
Corrective Actions to be Taken l Applicable DG procedures which cover the removal and replacement of fuel rod linkage assemblies will be revised to j include a note which states that the assemblies should be installed such that a 90 angle is maintained with the fuel shaft control rod as referenced in CNM-1301.00-0237, vol 2, sheet 02-371-04, note 5. This commitment has been assigned I to MNT and will be tracked through completion in corrective action #3 of Problem Investigation Process (PIP) 1-C96-2697.
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