ML20236M915

Special Rept:On 980611,determined That Required Firewatch Patrol Had Been Missed.Caused by Firewatch Being Performed on Wrong Unit Due to Human Error.Employee Was Verbally Counseled on Firewatches & Documentation Was Corrected

ML20236M915
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	07/07/1998
From:	Gordon Peterson DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9807140324
Download: ML20236M915 (6)

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] Duke Power

. ,- Catauha Nudear Station

,, % % 4800 Concord Road i York SC29745 Gary R. Pctenon (803) 831-4251 omct yu.e j%,sident (803) 831-34?6ux i

July 7, 1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 l

Subject:

Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 Special Report: Fire Protection Program Missed Firewatch in the Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room l Pursuant to Facility Operating License Section 2F, License Conditions 2.C. (8) for Unit 1 and 2.C. (6) for Unit 2, and.

Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5; attached is a Special Report concerning a Missed Firewatch in the Unit 2

! Electrical Penetration Room. This condition.was discovered on June 11, 1998. There are no commitments associated with this Special Report.

l Questions regarding this Special Report should be addressed l to J.W. Glenn at (803) 831-3051.

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G. R. Peterson ,-

Attachment I

9907140324 990707 PDR ADOCK 05000413' >

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. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 7, 1998 i

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l Attachment Special Report Missed Firewatch in the Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room Abstract:

On June 11, 1998 with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100% power, it was determined l that a required firewatch patrol had been missed. The L firewatch patrol was actually performed on the wrong unit.

The root cause of the event was determined to be a human l performance error. Corrective action was verbal counseling

( of the person involved.

Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 Facility Operating License NPF-35 and NPF-52 require that Duke Energy Corporation implement and maintain in effect all provisions l of the approved Fire Protection Program, as amended. It was i determined that the degradation described in this report constitutes a noncompliance with this license condition.

Consequently, this occurrence was reported within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery pursuant to the provisions of Facility Operating License Section 2F (Reference Event #34390, June

. 11, 1998). This written follow-up is being provided within l 30 days of the occurrence.

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. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 7, 1998 Page 3 Introduction Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 are four loop l

1 Westinghouse Units. Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9.5, Fire Barrier Penetrations, is a part of the Catawba Fire Protection [EIIS:KP) Program and is subject to the provisions of the Catawba Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.(8)for NPF-35 (Unit 1) and License Condition 2.C. (6) for NPF-52 (Unit 2). SLC 16.9.5 requires that all fire barriers (walls, floor / ceilings, cable tray enclosures and other fire barriers) and all sealing devices in fire

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barrier penetrations (fire doors, fire dampers, cable, pipe and ventilation duct penetration seals) separating

• Safety from non-safety related areas or, l

• Redundant analyzed Post Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment or,

• Control Complex (Control Room, Cable Rooms and Battery Rooms) from the remainder of the plant or,

• Containment from non-containment areas, shall be operable at all times.

With one or more of the required fire barrier penetrations and/or sealing devices inoperable, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration or verify the operability of the fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable penetration and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

An audit of the fire protection program is performed every three years. The audit is called the " Triennial Fire Protection Audit". This audit was performed at Catawba from 5-4-98 to 5-8-98.

Description of Event 5-4-98 The triennial fire protection audit team through noted an excessive gap on the underside of 5-8-98 a control room floor penetration. An investigation determined that the required depth of foam had not been achieved and that the foam was not located correctly with respect to the Control Room floor slab. It

. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 7, 1998 Page 4 was determined that sixty Control Room floor penetrations were affected. (This event was reported in a Special Report dated June 2, 1998).

5-18-98 Followup investigation discovered six more 15:00 areas where fire barrier penetrations had similar problems. One of these areas was the Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room at the 560' elevation. Eight fire barrier l penetrations between this area and the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room were affected. Fire Impairment Serial Number 98-84 was issued and an hourly firewatch patrol was j initiated.

6-11-98 The hourly firewatch patrol was due for the 17:53 Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room on the 560' elevation. It was actually performed in the corresponding area of Unit 1.

6-11-98 The person who was performing the hourly 18:01 firewatch patrol passed through the Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room area while checking vital area doors, thus performing a firewatch patrol eight minutes after it was due.

6-11-98 The hourly firewatch patrol was performed 18:53 again on the Unit 1 side of the plant.

6-11-98 The person who was performing the hourly 1 19:53 firewatch patrol again went to the. Unit 1 area and realized that the firewatch patrol ,

was for the Unit 2 area. He went immediately  !

to the Unit 2 area and was able to perform '

the firewatch patrol on time.

l Cause Of Event

.The cause of this event was a human performance error. The error was a skill based (unintentional slip or lapse) error.

There have recently been-an increased number of firewatches

. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

! July 7, 1998

! Page 5 1

to compensate for fire barrier problems discovered during the triennial fire protection audit. This increased work load was determined not to be a causal factor for this event. There are no EPIX failures associated with this event. A search of the corrective action databases reveals i

that this is not a recurring problem.

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f Corrective Actions Subsequent

1. The employee was verbally counseled on the importance of firewatches.

2. Documentation on the fire impairment form was corrected to accurately document that the firewatch patrol was late at 17:53 and was missed at 18:53 on 6-11-98.

l Additional Information The firestops as installed would still have provided some degree of fire protection in the event of a fire in the area. The Unit'2 Electrical Penetration Room has a low combustible loading and the area is supplied with fire detection and suppression. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

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. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory _ Commission July 7, 1998 Page 6 xc: L. A. Reyes U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 P. S. Tam

NRC Senior Project Manager (CNS)

O. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-14H25 Washington, DC 20555-0001 D.J. Roberts Senior Resident Inspector (CNS)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Catawba Nuclear Site I

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