ML20247H535

Special Rept:On 980415,missed Insp of Fire Hose Caskets Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Transferring Info from One Procedure to Another.Planned Rev of Applicable Procedure to Include Gasket Insp at Appropriate Frequency

ML20247H535
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	04/12/1998
From:	Gordon Peterson DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9805210188
Download: ML20247H535 (6)

Text

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Duke Power Catawba Nudrar Station

, , , , . 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 Gary R. Peterson (803) 831-4251 ornCE Vice Pmident * (803) 831-3426 fax l

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May 12, 1998 l

l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 Special Report Missed Inspection of Fire Hose Gaskets l

l' l Pursuant to Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.4 and License Conditions 2.c. (8) for Unit 1 and 2.c.(6) for Unit 2, attached is a Special Report concerning a missed inspection of Fire Hose Gaskets. This event was discovered on April 15, 1998. The only commitment contained in this document is listed in the " Corrective Actions" section of the attached i report.

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Questions regarding this Special Report should be addressed g to J.W. Glenn at (803) 831-3051 1

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l Very tru urs, l 'G.'R. Peterson

.O Attachment ,

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9805210188 980412 PDR ADOCK 05000413 S PDR _.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission May 14, 1998 Page 2 Attachment Special Report Missed Inspection of Fire Hose Gaskets Abstract:

On April 15, 1998 both Units were in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100% power. While performing a self assessment Engineering personnel discovered that Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) Testing Requirement 16.9.4 (a) (ii) (2) had not been performed every 18 months as required. SLC 16.9.4 requires all SLC committed fire hose station coupling gaskets to be inspected and replaced as needed every 18 months. The root cause of the problem was an error in transferring information from one procedure to another.

Corrective actions were an immediate visual inspection of all the coupling gaskets for the SLC committed fire hose stations as listed in the SLC and a planned revision of the applicable procedure to include a gasket inspection at an appropriate frequency.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission May 14, 1998 Page 3 Introduction Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 are four loop Westinghouse Units. The plant utilizes fire hose stations as one method of fire suppression. Fire hose stations are provided throughout the plant. The fire hose stations are arranged to reach any plant location with a maxin.um of 100 feet of one and one half inch fire hose. The installation of fire hose stations meets the intent of NFPA 14-1978,

" Standard for' Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems".

The fire hoses use gaskets where the hose connects to the l standpipe and where the nozzle [EIIS:NZL] connects to the l

hose. Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.4 states that all fire hose stations listed in Table 16.9-2 shall be operable.

Testing requirement 16. 9. 4 (a) (ii) (2) requires all fire hose i

gaskets to be inspected at least once per 18 months. Any degraded gaskets found in the couplings are to be replaced.

Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.4 is a part of the Catawba Fire Protection [EIIS:KP] Program and is subject to the provisions of the Catawba Facility Operating License Condition 2.c. (B) for NPF-35 (Unit 1) and License Condition 2.c. (6) for NPF-52 (Unit 2). Prior to April 11, 1994 inspection of fire hose coupling gaskets was done per Procedure PT/0/A/4400/010, " Eighteen Month Fire Protection Equipment Inspection". This inspection was successfully completed seven times between February 1983 and February 1992. During the time of this event, fire hose station inspection and proceuure preparation for fire protection activities was the responsibility of the Station (Industrial) Safety Organization.

Description of Event 2-10-92 The inspection of fire hose gaskets was last

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performed per procedure PT/0/A/4400/010

. 4-11-94 Procedure PT/0/A/4400/01Q was deleted and l I procedure PT/0/A/4400/01N " Hydrostatic Test i for Fire Hose and Annaal Inspection of Outside Fire Protection Hoses and Cabinets" l

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission May 14, 1998 Page 4-(Change 2) was revised and issued. The requirements for fire hose gasket inspection were to have been placed into Procedure PT/0/A/4400/01N. During the transfer of content from PT/0/A/4400/010 to PT/0/A/4400/01N, the requirement to inspect fire hose station coupling gaskets was inadvertently omitted.

i 5-1-94 Responsibility for the fire protection j through program was transferred from the Station 9-30-94 Safety Organization to the Station Engineering Organization.

4-15-98 Engineering was performing self assessment Morning CER-04-98 " Catawba Nuclear Station Fire Protection Testing and Surveillance Program".

During the process of the assessment it was discovered that a procedure did not exist to implement the required gasket inspection.

4-15-98 Engineering initiated an inspection of all 1200 fire hose coupling gaskets.

4-15-98 Engineering completed the inspection. No 1400 degraded gaskets were found.

Cause Of Event The root cause of the problem was determined to be failure to transfer inspection requirements from one procedure to another. Procedure PT/0/A/4400/010 was used for inspection of fire protection equipment and was performed by station personnel. This inspection took place at the fire hose station. Procedure PT/0/A/4400/01N is for hydrostatic testing of fire hoses and is performed by a vendor. This activity takes place outside the plant. Degraded hose gaskets could have been discovered during the hydrostatic test but the procedure does not directly specify an inspection of the gaskets. A contributing factor is that at the time of this revision there was no process for obtaining a Cross Disciplinary Review of the procedure by the Fire Protection Engineer. This incident is considered historical in that it occurred four years ago and the person who revised the procedures is no longer assigned to the safety L_ _ _______ _ _ _ __________.._._____________________._____ _ __ _ _ _ . _ _ _

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4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory-Commission May 14, 1998 Page 5 organization. This event is not indicative of current performance.

A review of corrective action program documentation for the past thirty six months indicates that there have been no

, other reportable events as a result failure to properly l

revise change related documents.

There are no EPIX reportable failures associated with this event.

Corrective Actions Subsequent

1. Engineering personnel performed a visual inspection of all of the coupling gaskets for the SLC committed fire hose stations as listed in Table 16.9-2 of SLC 16.9.4.

All were found to be satisfactory.

l Planned

1. Procedures will be reviewed and revised to implement l the requirement to inspect fire hose gaskets at an appropriate frequency.

Additional Information Each fire hose station has two coupling gaskets. One is located where the hose connects to the standpipe and the other is located where the nozzle connects to the hose. A degraded gasket at the nozzle to hose connection would not present a problem in an actual fire response scenario i because it is standard practice for the fire brigade to ,

bring an enhanced replacement nozzle (with gasket) with them j whenever they respond to a fire. The hose to standpipe I gasket could leak if the gasket were defective; however the l connection could be adequately tightened with a spanner wrench to reduce or eliminate leakage. A defective or  !

degraded coupling gasket would not impair the fire brigades  ;

l ability to use a hose station to fight a fire. The health  !

and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

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i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-May 14, 1998 Page.6 xc: L. A. Reyes U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II l

Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 P. S. Tam NRC Senior Project Manager (CNS)

U..S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-14H25 Washington, DC 20555-0001 D.J. Roberts Senior Resident Inspector (CNS)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Catawba Nuclear Site l

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