ML20154M766

LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With

ML20154M766
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	10/12/1998
From:	Copp S, Gordon Peterson DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-98-S01-01, LER-98-S1-1, NUDOCS 9810210030
Download: ML20154M766 (7)

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Duke Energy Corpor; tion i

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Catawba Nuctur St2 tion 4800 Concord Road York. SC 29745 (803) 831-4251 omct

. Gary L htuson

' Vice1%ident (gg33 g3j.34pg u, October 13, 1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555-0001

Subject:

Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 Special Report 413/98-001S Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71.(d), attached is Special Report 413/98-001S,. Revision 0, involving a terminated vendor employee entering the protected area.

This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the

-health and safety of the public.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this report.

Questions regarding this Special Report should be directed to Skip Copp, Catawba Regulatory Compliance, at (803) 831-3622.

Sincerely,

/

.JA<~~--

G.R.

Peterson I

Attachment-V.

9810210030 981012 '

PDR ADOCK 05000413 S

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October 13,;1998 L

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Mr. Luis Reyes l

Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61-Forsyth Street, S.W., Suite 23T85' Atlanta,.GA 30303 l

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

Mail-Stop O-14 H25 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 I

l Mr. Darrell Roberts NRC Senior Resident Inspector

-Catawba Nuclear Station j

INPO Records Center

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700 Galleria Place

' Atlanta, GA 30339-5957

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i Marsh & McLennan.Inc.

Mr. Kenneth W. Gannaway 100 N.

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Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413 1 of 5 TITLE (4)

Terminated Vendor Employee Entered the Protected Area due to a Computer Interface Malfunction EVENT IDATE W I.ER NiafHER m)

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NAME TFLEPHONE NUMBi R Skip Copp - Regulatory Compliance

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AEL% TRACT ILund en H00 mut es. is. approunuarts liltren smxte-spm e typewntren hunH IM On September 13, at 0610 hours0.00706 days <br />0.169 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.32105e-4 months <br /> with Unit 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 in a refueling outage, Security was notified by a vendor supervisor to delete the unescorted access of a vendor employee whose employment was to be terminated.

At 0614 hours0.00711 days <br />0.171 hours <br />0.00102 weeks <br />2.33627e-4 months <br />, Security terminated the vendor employee's badge in the Video Badging Network (VBN) comput er.

However, Security did not terminate the badge in the plant Security computer in order to prevent future access.

This latter action, a workaround, was necessary due to a previously identified malfunction in the interface between the VBN and plant Security computer.

At 1647 hours0.0191 days <br />0.458 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.266835e-4 months <br />, the terminated vendor employee obtained his badge and reported for work as scheduled.

He had not yet been notified that he had been terminated.

At 1721 hours0.0199 days <br />0.478 hours <br />0.00285 weeks <br />6.548405e-4 months <br />, the vendor employee's supervisor notified Security that the terminated vendor employee was inside the protected area.

Security escorted the vendor employee out of the protected area at 1732 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.59026e-4 months <br />.

. Security retained the vendor employee's badge to prevent further access.

The computer interface malfunction was repaired on September 15. The root cause of this~ event was a computer interface malfunction between the Video Badging Network computer and the plant Security computer.

NRC l-ORM 366

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NRC FORM 366A U S NUCLEAR HEGULATORY COMMISSION (6-8@

APPkou.D BY OMu No,31Alia EAPikE5 61/3MI6 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THl3 MAMDATORY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS TEXT CONTINUATION LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESilMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31540104),

OFFICF OF MANAGFMFNT AND BUDGFT WASHINGTON DC 70$03 FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER Nt]MBER (6)

PAGF (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBFR NUM8FR Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413 1998 001S O

2 OF 5

. BACKGROUND Catawba Nuclear Station utilizes a Video Badging Network (VBN) computer system that networks the access authorization and badging functions between Duke Power Company's three nuclear sites and the Access Services group in the General Office.

At each nuclear site, the VBN computer is designed to interface with the plant Security Computer to transfer data regarding unescorted access authorization status changes (additions, updates, and removal).

The plant Security computer controls access into the protected area based on the data received from the VBN computer.

On August 19, 1998, a malfunction in the interface between the VBN computer and the plant Security computer was discovered.

The malfunction prevented a certain type status change made in the VBN computer from being transferred to the plant Security computer unescorted access data base.

This malfunction necessitated establishing a workaround process.

On August 19, 1998, Security Officers responsible for entering data into the VBN computer were informed of this malfunction via Duke Power Company's internal E-mail system (Lotus Notes).

Within the communication, instructions were provided to perform a workaround, which required the Security VBN computer operator to separately contact the plant Security computer operator (Security alarm station operator) to manually enter the status change in the plant Security computer.

Hard-copies of this communication were also placed in the VBN computer work area.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT September 13, 1998 0525 hours0.00608 days <br />0.146 hours <br />8.680556e-4 weeks <br />1.997625e-4 months <br /> Vendor supervisor counseled vendor employee regarding inadequate performance (not being in assigned work area, arriving at work late, leaving the plant for over 30 minutes and signing his time-sheet which did not reflect the non-paid status).

Vendor employee was not informed that he was to be terminated.

0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br /> Vendor employee ended his work shift and exited the protected area.

0610 hours0.00706 days <br />0.169 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.32105e-4 months <br /> Vendor supervisor notified Security via telephone to terminate vendor employee's badge.

0614 hours0.00711 days <br />0.171 hours <br />0.00102 weeks <br />2.33627e-4 months <br />

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCL EAR REGLv ATORY COMMISS10Nt6 69)

ASTKO) tb Bi O\\lB NO. 3154MHtM EXi'1218 Nf31FWI ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS M/MDATORY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

INFORMATION COLL ECTION REQUEST. 50 0 HRS. REPORTED LESSON 3 LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCE SS AND FEO TEXT CONTINUATION BACK TO INDUSTRY FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. OC 20555 0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 0104).,

OFFIFF OF MANAGFMFNT AND BUDGFT WA9HINGTON DC ?(Wn FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER f 6)

PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMRF R NUMRF R Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413 1998 001S 0

3 OF 5 The Access Control Specialist who received the telephone notification terminated the vendor employee's badge in the VBN computer.

However, the Access control Specialist did not contact the alarm station operator to terminate the badge in the plant Security computer.

Since the plant Security computer controls access into the protected area, the badge remained valid for access.

1647 hours0.0191 days <br />0.458 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.266835e-4 months <br /> The vendor employee reported for work as scheduled, entered the protected area, and proceeded to his assigned work area.

The vendor employee had not yet been notified that he had been terminated.

1 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br /> Vendor supervisor observed the terminated vendor employee inside the protected area.

1721 hours0.0199 days <br />0.478 hours <br />0.00285 weeks <br />6.548405e-4 months <br /> Vendor supervisor notified Security via telephone that the terminated vendor employee was inside the protected area.

1732 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.59026e-4 months <br /> Security Officer escorted vendor employee out of the protected area.

Vendor employee's badge was retained by Security to prevent further access.

1815 hours0.021 days <br />0.504 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.906075e-4 months <br /> Vendor employee's badge was placed on Hold in the plant Security computer pending inquiry into the event.

1821 hours0.0211 days <br />0.506 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.928905e-4 months <br /> Event reported to NRC pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73.71(b).

1919 hours0.0222 days <br />0.533 hours <br />0.00317 weeks <br />7.301795e-4 months <br /> Vendor employee's badge was terminated in the plant Security computer.

CONCLUSION

'The root cause of this event was the computer interface malfunction between the Video Badging Network computer and the plant Security computer.

A significant contributing factor to this event was inadequate communication of'the required workaround to the Security Officers who were responsible for ope'.ating the VBN computer.

Although the e-mail communication containAng the necessary information and instruction was

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APPkURD BY OMis NO,3154e104 EXP1RL51M/3tWil ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

INFORMATON COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HAS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED TEXT CONTINUATION BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T 4 F33), U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'SSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20$56-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICF OF MANAAFMFNT AND BUDGFT WASHINGTON OC 20843 FACIUTY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGEf3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMRFR NUMRFR Catawba Nuclear St.

ion, Unit 1 05000413 1998 001S 0

4 OF 5 sent to all Access Control Specialists, and hard-copies were placed in the VBN work area, there was no process in place to ensure that the e-mail communication had been received and understood by the Access Control Specialists.

The Access Control Specialist who received the employee termination notification from the vendor supervisor, performed the required badge termination steps in the VBN computer.

However, he did not notify the alarm station operator to manually enter the status change in the plant Security computer.

i The Access Control Specialist had apparently opened the e-mail message, but stated he did not recall reading the message contents and was unaware of the required workaround.

The Access Control Specialist departed the site on August 21 for a two week military duty leave (the e-mail communication was sent on August 19).

The Access Control Specialist returned to work on September 5.

He indicated that he had approximately 20 additional new e-mail messages upon his return.

Although the August 19 workaround message was still in his e-mail In-Box, he did not open the message since it's color indicated he had already opened it.

He instead focused on the new e-mail messages.

Operating experience databases were searched for information/ events of a similar nature occurring with the past 24 months.

Although there were several events involving improper termination of a Security badge, there was only 1 event whereby protected area entry was gained.

That event occurred prior to the implementation of the current Video Badging Network and plant Security computer systems.

Due to the significantly different circumstances surrounding these evencs and the nature of the deficient processes, the su.) ject event is not considered to be a repeat occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION Immedi e

Upon receiving notification that the terminated vendor employee was onsite, a Security Officer was dispatched to escort the individual off-site.

The vendor employee exited the protected area at 1732 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.59026e-4 months <br />.

Vendor employee's badge was placed on Hold (restricted) at 1815 hours0.021 days <br />0.504 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.906075e-4 months <br />, j

and subsequently terminated in the plant Security computer at 1821 l

hours.

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NRC FORM 366A U S NUCLEAH REGULATOHY COMMISSION (6 89)

APPROM.D BY OMmNO. 31Sp.eitM rm:u mm l

ESTIMATED BUROEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST; 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS l

LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AND FED l

l TEXT CONTINUATION SACK TO INDUSTRY. rORWARD COuuENTs REGARDiNG eUnDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH l

(T 6 "3), U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC I

20555 0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 0104).

OFFICF OF MANAGFMENT AND BUDGFT WASHINGTON OC 20%3 FACluTY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

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YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Ni tMRFR NUMRFR Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413 1998 001S 0

5 OF 5

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l Subsequent A comparison review of Access Control Daily Process Checklists (manual records), and VBN computer termination records indicate that no other events occurred during the time-fran:e the workaround was in force.

1.

On September 16, Security implemented a documented process whereby all badge restriction transactions are verified as being properly completed within the plant Security computer.

The computer interface malfunction between the VBN computer and plant Security computer (which necessitated the workaround) was repaired on September 15.

However, the badge restriction verification process described above will remain in effect until System Administrators and Information Technology personnel have determined that system reliability has been fully restored.

Security obtained server space on the Local Area Network (LAN) as a central information source for Security personnel.

A "VBN Information" folder has been established for all communication regarding VBN activity.

All assigned Access Control Specialists are required to review the information in the folder and initial a checklist when completed.

Security has also implemented a formal Communications Guideline that outlines how communications are to be performed within the Security section.

SAFETY ANALYSIS Although the vendor employee accessed the protected area after his company had decided he was to be terminated, the vendor employee was unaware of the termination.

There was no malevolence associated with the entry.

Subsequent review of Plant Security Computer System records determined that no vital areas had been accessed by the terminated vendor employee.

This event did not result in any uncontrolled releases of radioactive l

material, personnel injuries, or radiation overexposure.

The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

L.