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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20153B0531998-09-16016 September 1998 Special Rept:On 980817,errors in Implementation of Selected Licensee Commitment Testing Requirements on Fire Protection Sys Instruments,Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Interpretation of SLC Requirement.Will Revise Procedures ML20236M9151998-07-0707 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980611,determined That Required Firewatch Patrol Had Been Missed.Caused by Firewatch Being Performed on Wrong Unit Due to Human Error.Employee Was Verbally Counseled on Firewatches & Documentation Was Corrected ML20236G4451998-07-0101 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980618,declared Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Meet TS Definition of Channel Calibr.Will Revise Selected Licensee Commitment ML20248K1431998-06-0202 June 1998 Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Shrinkage of Foam & Improper Installation During Construction of Plant.Posted Fire Watches & Repaired Firestop F-AX-348-W-134 ML20247H5351998-04-12012 April 1998 Special Rept:On 980415,missed Insp of Fire Hose Caskets Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Transferring Info from One Procedure to Another.Planned Rev of Applicable Procedure to Include Gasket Insp at Appropriate Frequency ML20216B0211998-04-0606 April 1998 Special Rept:On 980325,determined That Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Being Inoperable for Greater than Thirty Days.Caused by Incorrect Testing.All Channels of Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Tested Utilizing Revised Test Method ML20217K9271998-03-26026 March 1998 Special Rept:On 971229,procedure Step for Closing Safety Injection Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Valve Was Inadvertently Skipped.Caused by Injection of Water Into RCS from Rwst.Simplified Procedures & Discussed Event ML20216D5641998-03-0505 March 1998 Special Rept:On 980204,discovered That Fire Detection Panel Was Apparently Not Communicating W/Several Local Fire Detectors.Caused by Faulty Computer Sys Cards.Replaced Four Computer Cards in Sys ML20202C4701998-02-0505 February 1998 Ro:On 971228:Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 6 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Excessive Static on Channel. Caused by Loose Connection.Work Order Has Been Written to Pursue Repairs ML20138E6851997-04-24024 April 1997 Special Rept:On 970318,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 13 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Sporadic Electical Static.Channel Was Removed from Svc & Entered Into TS Action Item Logbook as Inoperable ML20149M7251997-01-20020 January 1997 Special Rept:On 961209,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring (Lpm) Sys Channel 20 Declared Inoperable Due to No Signal Being Received from Field.Lpm Channel 20 & 22 Operable & Providing Monitoring Coverage for Primary Side of 1D S/G ML20134K4901996-11-0606 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961009,selective Licensee Commitment for Operability of Fire Protection Sprinkler Sys Not Maintained. Continuous Fire Watch Established within One H Following Identification of Incorrect Remedial Action ML20134H1331996-11-0404 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961004,Unit 1B DG Failed Due to Failure of Motor Operated Pot,Electronic & Mechanical Governor,Governor Droop Relay & Mechanical Binding of Fuel Rack Control Linkage.Dg Procedures Will Be Revised ML20113A1801996-06-17017 June 1996 Special Rept:On 960521,declared Detectors A01 for Zone 69 & A04 for Zone 60 Inoperable Because Detectors Effectively Isolated from Area in Intended Protection.Detectors Relocated,Tested & Declared Operable on 960524 ML20100H9801996-02-20020 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960111,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Channel 21 Declared Inoperable,Due to Spurious,Unexplainable Electronic Bursts.Work Request Initiated to Pursue Corrective Action ML20100H9751996-02-20020 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960111,Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 7 Declared Inoperable,Due to pre-amp Bias Voltage Indicating Zero Volts Twice During Previous Seven Days.Work Request Written to Pursue Corrective Action ML20097F5011996-02-11011 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960102,Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 17 Was Declared Inoperable.Two Other Channels Operable & Providing Coverage Against Loose Parts ML20096E7731996-01-12012 January 1996 Special Rept:On 951214,unit 2 DG Valid Failure Occurred. Caused by Fuel Line Fitting Backing Off from Cylinder Head Connection,Which Resulted in Fuel Oil Leakage.Dg Successfully Started,Run & Declared Operable on 951215 ML20096A8761995-12-18018 December 1995 Special Rept:On 951120,during Periodic Surveillance Testing, Lpms Channel 5 Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Preamp Bias Voltage Indications.Work Request 95048483 Initiated to Perform Corrective Maint During Unit 1 Cycle 9 ML20094Q5811995-11-13013 November 1995 Special Rept:On 951014,auxiliary Bldg Filtered Exhaust Sys Pump Room Heater Declared Inoperable Due to Blown Fuse & Not Restored to Operable Status within 7 Days Per Ts. Technical Investigation Will Be Performed ML20094B8291995-10-25025 October 1995 Special Rept:On 950919,loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 1 Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Preamp Bias Indication. Work Request Written to Investigate & Repair Channel ML20098A4641995-09-19019 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950817,Unit 2 Lpms Channel 12 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Channel Sensor Failing Acceptance Criteria During Performance of PT/O/A4600/03 ML20092G6041995-09-14014 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950815,CNS Unit 1 DG 1A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Main Bearing High Temp Trip Signal.Caused by Failed Splice Installed in Circuit for RTD 1LDRD5630.New RTD Installed in Main Bearing 5 ML20086H1401995-07-12012 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950615,Channel 4 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Noise Uncharacteristic of Healthy Channel Detected Via Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring Sys.Corrective Maint Will Be Performed During 1EOC9 Outage ML20086H1431995-07-11011 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950608,Channel 13 Was Declared Inoperable. Trending of Bias Voltage & Background Rms Evaluated to Conclude Channel Was Experiencing Periodic Failures. Corrective Maint Will Be Performed During 1EOC9 Outage ML20086C6441995-06-29029 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950523,Unit 1 Train a Fuel Handling Ventilation Filter Heaters Declared Inoperable.Evaluation Done to Determine Fault ML20085M4061995-06-20020 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950501,lower Rv Tube 4 Was Declared Inoperable ML20084N7271995-05-25025 May 1995 Special Rept:On 950425,valid Failure of DG 1A Occurred. Caused by Jacket Water Thermostatic Control Valve Sticking in Position Which Reduced Engine Cw Flow Through Heat Exchanger.Thermostatic Cv Internals Removed & Replaced ML20082L2711995-04-17017 April 1995 Special Rept:On 950308,Unit 2 Cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable & Remained Inoperable Greater than 10 Days ML20081D4851995-03-13013 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950211,actuation of PORV 1NC32B Occurred. Procedure OP/1(2)/A/6100/02 Revised to Require More Emphasis on Monitoring Pressure Indication During Sensitive Evolutions ML20080Q8701995-03-0202 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950202,Unit 1 DG 1B Invalid Failure Due to Overcurrent Breaker Trip During Governor Troubleshooting ML20149H7821994-12-20020 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941129,discovered That Selective Licensee Commitment (SLC) for Visual Insp of Fire Rated Assemblies Exceeded Due to Misinterpretation of Requirements of SLC 16.9-5.Fire Barriers Visually Inspected ML20078R0021994-12-12012 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941103,Channel 3 (Upper Rv a) Declared Inoperable.Caused by Channel Sensor Failure of Acceptance Criteria During Performance of PT/0/A/4600/03.Repair Planned for End of 2EOC7 Outage Due to Containment Entry Required ML20078K7361994-11-17017 November 1994 Special Rept on 941021,DG 1A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Main Bearing High Temp Trip.Operability Performance Test Successfully Completed & Engine Declared Operable on 941022 ML20149G8041994-11-0101 November 1994 Special Rept:On 940922,CNS,Unit 2 Cathodic Protection Sys Declared Inoperable & Remained Inoperable for Greater than 10 Days.Wo 94080948-01 Initiated to Replace Prepackaged Anode Well 1.WO Scheduled for 941114 ML20076F3191994-10-0404 October 1994 Special Rept:On 940908,valid Failure of D/G 1A Occurred Due to Air Start Valve Sticking Open.Maint Procedure MP/0/A/7650/99 Revised,New Air Roll Criteria Developed & Sixteen Starting Air Valves Replaced ML20072P4251994-08-23023 August 1994 Ro:On 940719,channel 9 (S/G a Channel 2) Declared Inoperable.Work Request Was Generated to Repair Channel During Future Outage of Sufficient Length Since Containment Entry Required for Work ML20072E5961994-08-15015 August 1994 Special Rept:On 940715,inoperability of Unit 2 Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring System Channel 4 & 6 Occurred.Caused by Leds Not Lighting During Performance of PT/0/B/4600/03. Work Orders 94051250-01 & 94051251-01 Initiated ML20071N7441994-07-28028 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940711,delta-t Channel on Chart Recorder Found to Be out-of-tolerance Due to Drifting of Analog to Digital (A/D) Converter Card.A/D Card Replaced & delta-t Channel Chart Recorder Declared Operable ML20071N8511994-07-28028 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940711,main Steam Relief Valve Exhaust Monitors Declared Inoperable Due to Engineering Calculation Concerns.Engineering Calculation CNC-1229.00-00-0047 re-performed Using EPA-400 Methodology ML20070K0191994-07-18018 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940630,re Inoperability of Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 2EMF12.Work Request 94026262 Generated to Reattach 2EMF12 to Main Steamline.Work Request Completed on 940701 ML20069H0861994-05-31031 May 1994 Special Rept:On 940501,Unit 2 DG 2A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Right Bank Turbocharger Vibration Trip.Based on Cooper-Enterprise Recommendations,Procedure Changes Made to Calibr Procedures for All Four DGs ML20065K5011994-04-13013 April 1994 Special Rept:On 940314,invalid Failure of Diesel Generator 1B Occurred Due to Output Tripping During Calibration of Electronic Governor.Dg 1B Started Successfully on 940315 & Declared Operable ML20064G2911994-03-15015 March 1994 Special Rept:On 940203,SG Channels 9 & 11 Declared Inoperable.Channels Failed to Meet Band Limited Rms Acceptance Criteria During Performance of 18 Month Channel Calibr Test.Work Request Written to Repair Channels ML20064G2771994-03-0707 March 1994 Special Rept:On 940125,Channels 6,7 & 10 Were Declared Inoperable.Channels Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria During Performance of 18 Month Channel Calibr Test.Work Request Written to Repair Channels 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9561999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C9111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20203A2581999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of TR DPC-NE-3002-A,Rev 2, UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology. Rept Acceptable. Staff Requests Duke Energy Corp to Publish Accepted Version of TR within 3 Months of Receipt of SE ML20204C9161999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K8711999-01-13013 January 1999 Inservice Insp Rept for Unit 2 Catawba 1998 Refueling Outage 9 ML20199E3071998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20205E9441998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 10CFR50.59 Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2, Containing Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of Ses.With ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20203A4101998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-25, Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr ML20203A4041998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 14 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 11 Colr ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20199E3221998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised MOR for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20198E3151998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20195E5521998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198E3261998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154M7661998-10-12012 October 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
- . . . ...-.~ ~.~ - . . ~ . ~ . . .
ll l
, DukeIburr Company WitwatR. McCcxun JR
. Catauba Nuck'ar Generation Department \1ce President 4800 ConcordRoad (8(BJS31&te Office 3
- York,SC 9745 (803)S3131% Fax i
DUKEPOWER l November 6,1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 l
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear Station i Docket No's. 50-413 and 50-414 l 2
Special Report j i !
Gentlemen:
i Attached is a 30 Day Special Report, Selective Licensee Commitment for Operability of Fire Protection Sprinkler System Not Maintained.
a This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of j the public.
Very truly yours, -
g '
c i
- W. R. McCollum, Jr.
I j i
j Attachment cc: Mr. S.D. Ebneter INPO Records Center i Administrator, Region ll 700 Galleria Place )
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 !
101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. P. S. Tam Marsh & McLennan Nuclear U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John Hoffman Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 301 Tresser Blvd.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Stamford, CT 06904 190008 Nir. R. J. Freudenberger N '<)l NRC Resident inspector Catawba Nuclear Station
'9611190141.961106 PDR ADOCK 05000413 L J2 .PDR
DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NUMBERS 50-413 and 50-414 30 DAY SPECIAL REPORT SELECTIVE LICENSEE COMMITMENT FOR OPERABILITY OF FIRE PROTECTION SPRINKLER SYSTEM NOT MAINTAINED ABSTRACT This special report documents non-compliance with the remedial action requirements for fire protection (sprinkler) system inoperability per Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9-2. Catawba Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100% power on 10/08/96 when the sprinkler system for the auxiliary feedwater system pump rooms was removed from service for cleaning of the sprinkler system piping. An hourly firewatch was established in those rooms at that time. A continuous firewatch should have been established per the remedial action of SLC 16.9-2 because the sprinkler system inoperability affected the ability to protect all three safe shutdown paths.
The terminology used in SLC 16.9-2 has specific meaning when applied to fire protection systems. That terminology, as most often used for other nuclear safety related systems, typically has a different meaning. Plant personnel were not aware of the different intent implied for fire protection systems. This is attributable to a program-to-program interface failure because some information from the fire protection program was not communicated to the operating procedure and training program.
A continuous fire watch was established at 1220 hours0.0141 days <br />0.339 hours <br />0.00202 weeks <br />4.6421e-4 months <br /> on 10/09/96. SLC 16.9-2 will be revised to provide specific guidance regarding determinations for continuous versus hourly fire watches. Operators have been instructed to establish continuous fire watches for all inoperable SLC committed sprinkler systems pending revision of the SLC.
BACKGROUND The required remedial actions for inoperable fire protection (RF) [KP] sprinkler [SRNK] systems are stated in SLC 16.9-2, "With one or more of the above required Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems inoperable, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components
DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION 30 DAY SPECIAL REPORT PAGE,2 4
could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch".
The intent of this statement is to assure that when
- sprinkler systems in areas where the analyzed redundant methods of achieving safe shutdown following a fire are inoperable, a continuous fire watch is established to minimize the possibility of fire damage to both trains of equipment.
The typical and most frequent use of the term " redundant" applies to nuclear safety related equipment delineated by trains (A and B) or channels (I, II, III, and IV). The term
" redundant" in SLC 16.9-2 applies to divisions of plant safe shutdown systems and instrumentation used to ensure safe shutdown of both units following a fire. This safe shutdown equipment may or may not be train related.
There are three redundant methods for achieving a shutdown condition following a fire event: a) use of A train equipment, b) use of B train equipment, and c) use of the Standby Shutdown System (SSS) in conjunction with damage control measures. Thus, continuous fire watches are required in areas where all three trains are located, or in areas containing both train A & B equipment when the SSS is inoperable.
The SSS is part of a plan to assure the ability to achieve
, cold shutdown following a fire that affects operability of both Train A & B. The plan includes use of the SSS to maintain a hot standby condition and damage control measures to restore components of either Train A or B to attain the ability to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The auxiliary feedwater (CA) [BA) pump [P) room and the reactor building annulus are the only areas where all three trains are located.
SLC 16.9-2 is part of the Catawba fire protection program and subject to the provisions of the Catawba facility operating license conditions C. (8) for NPF-35 (unit 1) and C. (6) for NPF-52 (unit 2).
EVENT DESCRIPTION Part of the fire protection system auxiliary building header piping was scheduled for cleaning on 10/09/96. The required system alignment for this cleaning resulted in degraded or inadequate flow to several SLC committed sprinkler systems, including the unit 1 and unit 2 CA pump room sprinkler
1 DUKE POWER COMPANY /CATAW3A NUCLEAR STATION 30 DAY SPECIAL REPORT
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PAGE,3 i
systems. The CA pump rooms contain components related to both Trains A and B, and related to the Standby Shutdown ;
4 System (SSS) . This-area should have been placed under a continuous fire watch. Instead, hourly fire watches were established on 10/8/96 at 2036 hours0.0236 days <br />0.566 hours <br />0.00337 weeks <br />7.74698e-4 months <br /> for the unit 2 CA pump room and at 2042 hours0.0236 days <br />0.567 hours <br />0.00338 weeks <br />7.76981e-4 months <br /> for the unit 1 CA pump room.
A review of the affected SLC on 10/09/96 generated questions j regarding the meaning of the term " redundant" in that SLC. A review of the design bases of the fire protection systems l revealed train A components, train B components, and the l standby shutdown systems (SSS) constitute the redundant
- systems referenced in SLC 16.9-2. Since the inoperable
- sprinkler system affected all three redundant shutdown paths, a continuous fire watch should have been established. i Both hourly fire watches were terminated at 1220 hours0.0141 days <br />0.339 hours <br />0.00202 weeks <br />4.6421e-4 months <br /> on 10/9/96 and replaced with continuous fire watches. l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IMMEDIATE A continuous fire watch was established within one hour following the identification of the incorrect remedial action.
SUBSEQUENT Operators were instructed to establish continuous fire watches for all inoperable SLC committed sprinkler systems pending revision of the SLC to provide more detailed guidance.
PLANNED SLC 16.9-2 will be revised to include the dependencies between plant systems relative to the requirements for remedial actions.
SAFETY ANALYSIS Once this problem was identified (10/9/96 at 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />) a continuous fire watch was established within one hour.
Follow-up investigation of the event determined the remedial action requirements had been inappropriately evaluated in previous scenarios involving sprinkler system inoperability.
Rather than attempting to recreate each past event, the
1 DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION 30 DAY SPECIAL REPORT l PAGE 4 I
following safety analysis is intended to address those inoperabilities from a generic perspective.
CA PUMP ROOMS There is no high energy electrical equipment which may start a fire in the CA pump room. Energized electrical cables have a protective armor shield and are grounded such that a internal short would not start a fire. The quantity of l combustible materials in the room is very low. Considering these features, there is low probability of a fire in the CA pump room.
1 The only routine maintenance activity involving combustible 2 I
materials is pump maintenance which occurs in the pits. The pits are protected by a fixed carbon dioxide fire suppression system. Also, the turbine driven CA pump is j located in a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated enclosure such that fire l which originates in one pump pit would not propagate to the l 4 redundant pump pit. j I
In the event of a fire in the CA pump room, the fire l i !
detection system would provide prompt notification. The station fire brigade would respond with portable fire .
extinguishers and fire hoses. l Cables associated with the turbine driven CA pump are protected with a radiant energy shield consisting of a fire resistive blanket material. Should a fire occur in the CA pump room while the sprinkler system is inoperable and the station fire brigade be unable to control it, the fire resistive radiant energy shield would protect the turbine driven pump cables. Operators could achieve safe shutdown from the control room using the turbine driven CA pump.
REACTOR BUILDING ANNULUS There is no high energy electrical equipment which may start a fire in the annulus. Energized electrical cables have a protective armor shield and are grounded such that an internal short would not start a fire. The quantity of combustible materials in the annulus is very low.
Considering these features, there is low probability of a fire in the Annulus.
The only routine activity involving combustible materials is maintenance of the standby make-up pump. The standby make-up pump is not located near train A or B safe shutdown cables.
4 DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION 30 DAY SPECIAL REPORT i
PAGE 5 4
In the event of a fire in the Annulus, the fire detection system would provide prompt notification. The station fire brigade would respond with portable fire extinguishers and fire hoses.
The analyzed safe shutdown components in the annulus are
, cables and instruments associated with primary system and steam generator instruments and pressurizer heaters. They 4 typically are located about 10 feet (or more) above floor level. In addition, there is typically about 15 feet (or i more) of vertical separation between Train A & B cables. I (Train A cables enter the annulus on elevation 577, Train B '
cables enter the 1mnulus on elevation 560.) Floor elevation i of the Annulus is 552 feet. Cable failure temperature is above 700*F. Should a fire occur in the Annulus while the sprinkler system is inoperable and the station fire brigade be unable to control it, the fire would have to generate 700*F at an elevation about 20 feet above the floor to damage redundant cables of safe shutdown components. There is no credible fire scenario in the Annulus which could generate sufficient heat to damage redundant safe shutdown cables or instruments.
ND, NV, and KC' PUMP AREAS Sprinkler systems installed in the decay heat removal' (ND)
[BP] and centrifugal charging (NV) [CB) pump [P] rooms, and over the general area of component cooling (:KC) [CC] pumps
[P) are provided to assure redundant pumps and motors are not damaged by fire. Thus, damage control measures for this ,
i equipment only involves installing power cables rather than replacing pumps and motors.
The quantity of combustible materials in each of these pump rooms / areas is very low. Each of the pump motors is rated at 4160 volts. A motor high energy fau]P could be a potential fire source.
The only routine activity, in these areas, involving !
combustible materials is maintenance of the respective pumps. Each of these pumps is separated from it's redundant train by a three hour fire rated barrier. In the event of a fire in these areas, the fire detection system would provide ;
prompt notification. The station fire brigade would respond j with portable fire extinguishers and fire hoses. Because of 1 the fire rated barrier between redundant components, fire would have.to propagate around the barrier to damage redundant pumps and/or motors. Due to the low quantity of combustible material in these areas and prompt alarm and l
1 DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION 30 DAY SPECIAL REPORT PAG.E. 6 response, the possibility of redundant pumps and/or motors being damaged by a single fire while the SSS is inoperable is considered low.
CABLE ROOM AND BATTERY ROOM CORRIDORS Sprinkler systems in the cable and battery room corridors are provided to protect unprotected cable trays and their supports to prevent collapse and subsequent damage to the l fire rated barriers (reference letter dated 2/10/84 from H.B. Tucker to H.R. Denton). There is no energized electrical equipment, which may start a fire, adjacent to locations where these cable tray supports penetrate fire rated barriers. Energized electrical cables have a protective armor shield and are grounded such that an )
internal short would not start a fire. There are no in situ )
combustible materials and storage of combustible materials l is programmatically controlled in these areas. Considering these features, there does not appear to be potential fire hazards in these areas which could damage these supports to the point of collapse.
SUMMARY
Considering the above, failure to establish continuous fire watch in these areas is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. There has been no damage to safety related systems or components due to such failures.