ML20248K143

Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Shrinkage of Foam & Improper Installation During Construction of Plant.Posted Fire Watches & Repaired Firestop F-AX-348-W-134

ML20248K143
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	06/02/1998
From:	Gordon Peterson DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9806100011
Download: ML20248K143 (8)

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, Duko Power Company A ikbr Ency G mpany Catauba Nudeer Station A m a-v %

4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 i

Ga'ry R. Peterson (803) 831-4251 omCE Vice hident (803) 8313426nx l

June 2, 1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 l

Subject:

Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 l Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 l Special Report: Fire Protection Program Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetrations Pursuant to Facility Operating License Section 2F, License Conditions 2.c.(8) for Unit 1 and 2. c. (6) for Unit 2, and , / .

Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5; attached is a Special Report concerning inoperable fire barrier penetrations. [

This condition was discovered on May 5, 1998. The only commitments contained in this document are listed in the

" Corrective Actions" section of the attached report. p Questions regarding this Special Report should be addressed  ;

to J.W. Glenn at (803) 831-3051.

Ve - uly yours, I G eterson W .-

g Attachment 9006100011 9006G.:

PDR ADOCK 05000413 l 8 pm m____--- - - - )

. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I June 2,,1998  !

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Attachment Special Report Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetrations i

l Abstract:

I On May 5, 1998 both Units were in Mode 1 (Power Operation) I at approximately 100% power. During a Triennial Fire Protection Audit, it was discovered that certain fire barriers appeared to be degraded. Investigation by 4 Engineering determined that one fire barrier in a masonry block wall in the Auxiliary Building was degraded and sixty  !

penetration seals in the fire barrier in the Control Room floor were inoperable. Since these fire barriers had been in this condition for an indeterminate time, it was determined that the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9.5 had not been met in the past history of the plant and the appropriate remedial actions had not been taken. The root cause of the problem in the Auxiliary Building was shrinkage of the firestop foam and damage that occurred when a forming board was removed. The root cause for the problem with the Control Room floor firestops was improper installation during the construction of the plant.

Corrective actions were posting the required firewatches and repair of the Auxiliary Building firestop. Planned corrective actions include further inspections to determine l the extent of these problems and either removing the Control I Room floor as a committed fire barrier or repairing the firestops.

. Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License NPF-35 and NPF-52 require that Duke Energy Corporation implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program, as amended. It was determined that the degradation described in this report constitutes a noncompliance with this-license condition. ,

I Consequently, this occurrence was reported within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery pursuant to the provisions of Facility )

Operating License Section 2F (Reference Event #34208, May  !

12, 1998 and an update May 19, 1998). This written follow-up 1 is being provided within 30 days of the occurrence.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 2,,1998 Page 3 Introduction Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 are four loop Westinghouse Units. Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9.5, Fire Barrier penetrations; is a part of the Catawba Fire Protection (EIIS:KP] Program and is subject to the provisions of the Catawba Facility Operating License i Condition 2.c.(8)for NPF-35 (Unit 1) and License Condition

2. c . ( 6) f or 14PF-52 (Unit 2). SLC 16.9.5 requires that all fire barriers and all sealing devices in fire barrier j penetrations shall be operable such that fires would be confined or adequately retarded so that the following criteria is achieved:

1. Fire will not spread from non-safety related areas to safety related areas,

2. Fire will not damage redundant analyzed post fire safe shutdown equipment,

3. Fire will not spread from the balance of plant to the control complex (control room, cable rooms and battery rooms),

4. Fire will not spread from non-containment areas to containment areas.  ;

I Firestop number F-AX-348-W-134 is located in a masonry block wall that separates the Unit 1 A Train Component Cooling Pumps from the Unit 1 B Train Component Cooling Pumps, Firestops of the K-AX-657-F-XXX series (where XXX represents a sequential number) are located in the floor of the Control Room and separate the Control Room from the Cable Spreading Rooms. There are 79 of these penetrations of which 60 were fcund to be inoperable.

An audit of the fire protection program is required every three years. The audit is called the " Triennial Fire  ;

Protection Audit". This audit was performed at Catawba from i 5-4-98 to 5-8-98. The Audit Number was SA-98-100(All). The problems' described in this Special Report were discovered as a result of this audit, r

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1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j i

June 2, 1998 I l Page 4 f 1

Description of Event '

5-5-98 During a triennial fire protection audit 18:15 walkdown inspection it was noted that there was an excessive gap at the top of wall firestop F-AX-348-W-134. The gap extended completely through the barrier. Engineering verified that the firestop was inoperable, Operations was notified and a firewatch was posted.

5-5-98 Work request 98021525 (Work order 98044764-18:30 01) was generated for repair of the firestop.

5-6-98 The triennial fire protection audit team 11:30 noted an excessive gap on the underside of floor firestop numbers K-AX-657-F-104 and  ;

K-AX-657-F-109. When viewed from the upper l side it appeared that the required eight inch l minimum depth of foam had not been achieved.

5-6-98 Work request 98021617 (Work Order 98044845-15:00 01) was initiated to have the depth of foam measured in all circular sleeves in the Control Room Floor.

5-6-98 Hourly firewatches were established for the 16:00 Control Room - Cable Spreading Rooms Area.

5-7-98 Maintenance completed the inspection of ,

firestop foam 1,n the Control Room floor j penetrations and forwarded the data to Engineering.

5-7-98 Engineering notified Operations of Control 10:30 Room floor firestops with inadequate depth of foam. (A firewatch was already in place).

5-7-98 Maintenance completed repair of wall firestop 13:45 F-AX-348-W-134.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 2,.1998 Page 5 5-18-98 Additionnl inspections along with an 15:40 Engineering followup evaluation identified 24 additional inadequate floor firestops in six other committed barriers. These penetrations were declared inoperable. Hourly firewatches were established.

'Cause Of Event The root cause of the problem for the auxiliary building wall penetration was determined to be shrinkage of the foam such that it pulled away from the top of the penetration blockout. After the installation of a silicone foam penetration seal, some shrinkage is expected to occur. The installation procedure requires a new foam seal to be inspected 3 to 7 days after installation to ensure the seal is acceptable. TheLamount of shrinkage noted with this firestop was greater than the normal post installation shrinkage. There was also some apparent damage from the removal of firestop forming boards. Other firestops were

' inspected for similar damage and no additional cases were found.

The root cause of the problem with the Control Room floor penetrations was determined to be improper installation of firestop foaming material during the construction of the plant. The Control Room Penetration seals were in embedded sleeves which project four inches above the floor. Firestop foam was placed in the sleeve up to the top of the four inch projection. The firestop foam should have been installed within the sleeve in the area of the' floor slab instead of the area' within the sleeve above top of the floor slab.

There are no EPIX failures associated with this event. A search of the corrective action databases reveals that this is.not a recurring problem.

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1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 2,.1998 Page 6

. Corrective Actions Subsequent

1. Engineering personnel evaluated the items discovered by l the audit team and notified Operations of conclusions.

2. Operations posted the required fire watches.

3. Firestop F-AX-348-W-134 was repaired by Maintenance.

4. Additional inspections were initiated to identify other problems.

Planned

1. Engineering will evaluate a modification to delete the Control Room Floor as a committed fire barrier. This is based on a study that was performed as a part of the

" Cost Beneficial Licensing Action" initiative. This study identified a new technical criteria for maintaining committed fire barriers. One criteria addressed barriers that separate areas of the control complex from other areas of the station. Since the control room and cable spreading rooms are both within-the control complex, it may be possible to remove the barriers between the two areas as committed fire barriers. If-this approach is not feasible, the affected firestops will be repaired.  ;

2. Additional inspections of similar configurations will continue and repairs will be made as necessary.

Additional Information The wall firestop in the Component Cooling Pump Area is a i part of a boundary that is used to separate redundant  !

Component Cooling Pumps and is intended to prevent a single fire from damaging redundant pumps and motors so as to allow repairs necessary to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />

! after.a fire event.

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1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 2,.1998 Page 7-The firestops as installed in the Control Room floor (and similar) penetrations still afford some level of fire protection. The Control Room and Cable Spreading Rooms have low combustible loadings,-both areas are supplied with fire detect'on, and the Control Room is continuously occupied.

The health'and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

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1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

June 2,.1998 l l Pase 8 )

xc: L. A. Reyes  ;

U. S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85

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Atlanta, GA 30303 P. S. Tar NRC Senior Pr'oject Manager (CNS) i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-14H25 Washington, DC 20555-0001 D . J ., Roberts Senior Resident Inspector (CNS) '

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Catawba Nuclear Site

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