IR 05000456/1987004

Safety Insp Repts 50-456/87-04 & 50-457/87-03 on 870112-0410.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Resolution of Previous Insp Findings & Followup on 10CFR50.55(e) Deficiency Repts

ML20212R443
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	04/17/1987
From:	Danielson D, Jeffrey Jacobson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212R407	List: IR 05000456/1987004 ML20212R406
References
50-456-87-04, 50-456-87-4, 50-457-87-03, 50-457-87-3, NUDOCS 8704270178
Download: ML20212R443 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-456/87004(DRS); 50-457/87003(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-59; CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted: January 12-14, 28, 29, February 11, 12, 18, 20, 25, 26, March 3-5, 25, 26 and April 8, 10, 1987 t\ > n LL /g InspecIM . ce son M7 /<7 Date bb vt /-th~

Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief M//7/# 7 Materials and Processes Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on January 12-14, 28, 29, February 11, 12, 18, 20, 25, 26, March 3-5, 25, 26 and April 8, 10, 1987 (Reports No. 50-456/87004(DRS); 50-457/87003(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Unannounced safety inspection of the resolution of previous inspection findings (92701 and 92702), followup on 50.55(e) deficiency reports (99020).

Results: No violations or deviations were identified, l

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8704270178 DR 870417 i ADOCK 05000456 l PDR

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Conunonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

E. E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager M. J. Wallace, Project Manager

• E. Quaka, Site QA Superintendent

• C. W. Schroeder, Services Superintendent

• D. L. Shamblin, Assistant Project Manager

• P. L. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• M. Takaki, Quality Control Supervisor C. Bedford, Regulatory Assurance Operating Experience Group J. K. Jasnosz, Technical Staff AR/PR Coordinator E. R. Wendorf, PFE Mechanical Supervisor L. M. Kline, Regulatory Assurance F. Lotarski, Project Construction 4 The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employee * Denotes those attending the exit meeting at the Braidwood Station on April 10,198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (456/84009-01;457/84009-01): Failure to prescribe physical clearance criteria prior to installation of safety-related HVAC components or large bore pipin The issue concerning physical clearances for safety-related components has been addressed in the following NRC inspection reports:

50-456/86013 and 50-457/86011 Violation 456/83009-09B;457/83009-098),

j 50-456/86050 and 50-457/86037 Open Item 456/84042-05; 457/84038-05),

t 50-456/86028 and 50-457/86022 Violation 456/83009-01; 457/83009-01),

50-456/86016 and 50-457/86014 (0 pen Item 456/84042-03; 457/84038-03).

Explicit clearance guidelines have been established through the issuance of Engineering Change Notices (ECN) by S&L to all applicable contractor The piping, structural, electrical, and HVAC contractors have incorporated the guidelines into installation, as-construct, and final line walk procedure The NRC inspector reviewed the S&L report, " Limited Clearance Evaluation for Piping Systems and Their Supports," (PMEDF-LCR-001-BR)

which outlines the clearance evaluation program and provides a summary of the results. This evaluation, in conjunction with S&L Project Instruction BB-96 which describes responsibilities and instructions

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for conducting final clearance walkdowns of HVAC and piping systems,

' adequately addresses the clearance issue. This project instruction also contains provisions for reporting and evaluating those items which violate the three inch clearance envelope established by S& The above mentioned procedure revisions and final clearance walkdown, combined with the walkdown performed during the Hot Functional Test (BWTP-EM-10) provides adequate assurance of acceptable component physical clearance (Closed) Violation (456/84044-01; 457/84044-01): Vendor procured tanks and heat exchangers were installed with some welds not in accordance with the vendor drawings. The cause of this issue is believed to represent a deficient receipt inspection activity performed in 1978. Receipt inspection activities by CECO and it's contractors have been significantly upgraded since the time of this occurrence. As a result of the welding deficiencies noted at Braidwood Station and similar deficiencies noted at other stations, the NRC issued IE Information Notice No. 85-33 on April 22, 198 The technical evaluation of this issue is addressed in this report as 10 CFR 50.55(e) Item 456/85002-EE; 457/85002-EE). See paragraph (Closed)OpenItem(456/86013-01): Reinspection of Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) companion angle to duct welds. This reinspection was initiated as a result of identifying a number of broken shop installed silicon bronze welds. CECO NCR No. 701 was issued on December 11, 1984 to document and resolve this issue. The technical evaluation of this issue is discussed in NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-456/86013; No. 50-457/86011. See violations 456/84034-01 and 457/84032-0 To provide assurance that no broken silicon bronze welds remain in the installed hardware, the licensee performed a 100% reinspection of the companion angle to duct welds. All welds found broken were repaired per established procedures. For ongoing installation l inspections, Pullman Sheet Metal revised Procedure B10.3.F,

" Installation Inspection Procedure," to include a separate inspection attribute for broken shop installed silicon bronze weld The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation associated with the above actions and visually inspected approximately 200 silicon ,

bronze companion angle to duct welds. All corrective actions and j inspected hardware were found to be acceptabl I (Closed) Open Item (456/86020-01): Water seepage in the tendon !

tunnel. The NRC design review of the tendon tunnel is included i in NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-456/86020; 50-457/86018. The tendon tunnel is located approximately 50 feet below grade level and experiences some water seepage. Waterproofing efforts were performed

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- I to reduce'the seepage to a minimal amount.- S&L has determined that'

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-the-remaining seepage-is not of structural significance-(reference

telephone memo from B. Tanouye ofl CECO,' dated February 25,1987).

I The,NRC inspector inspected.the-Unit 1 tendon tunnel and found the'

_ waterproofing effort to be ' successful in substantially reducing the . '

water seepage. The' Unit 2 waterproofing effort is still in progress

as..of this inspection and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio t

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i Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Items (Closed) 10 CFR 50.55(e) Item (456/82010-EE; 457/E2010-EE): Lack of-

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inspection and inadequate inspection documentation of bolted and ,

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welded connections in block wall columns and on miscellaneous' t structural stee ; Gust K. Newberg (GKN), the structural contractor, issued..NCR Nos. 213-497 and.213-498.to' resolve missing or inadequate inspection-  ;

records on accessible connections respectively. GKN NCR 213-497 was-

, dispositioned and resolved by_ inspecting all accessible bolted and-

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welded connections identified on the NCR. . To prevent recurrence of.

} inadequate or missing inspections, GKN revised Procedure QCP-31, 1 " Erection and Inspection of Structural Steel." The revision J instituted the use of a Structural Steel Installation Traveler

! for all future GKN installations to assure that bolted and welded i connections are properly inspected at the time of Linstallation.

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. CECO issued NCR 434 to' track and disposition those connections with inadequate inspections which were inaccessible. Initially, the  ;

j corrective action was to inspect a statistical sample of:the .

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t connections to determine if the work as installed was acceptabl While the sample did identify some discrepancies, S&L~ evaluation determined that none were design significant (i.e., design margins remained within specified code allowable stresses). '

! Prior to completion of the' sampling program, CECO revised the corrective action to include a 100%. inspection and repair if -

.l necessary, of all identified inaccessible connections wit ; inadequate inspection documentation. This decision was based on the fact that the Byron Station loads were being used for. the S&L evaluations, and it-was thought that the final-Braidwood loads could

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in some cases be greater. It was determined:to be more expedient to restore design margins to the inaccessible connections at this tim . -

i The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions L concerning the inadequate inspection of-structural-steel connections

[ and found them to be acceptabl ,

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b. -(Closed) 10 CFR 50.55(e) Item (456/83001-EE): .HVAC installations were not installed in accordance with specified dimensional tolerance A CECO QA Audit performed on Pullman Sheet Metal (PSM) in September 1982 resulted in identifying three hangers which failed to meet design tolerances. Prior to this time, PSM had been performing a 10% hanger configuration inspectio The corrective action was for PSM to perform a 100% configuration inspection of all safety-related hangers installed prior to September 1982. During the inspection effort it became apparent that a number of HVAC safety-related hangers, auxiliary steel, and bracing were not installed in accordance with dimensional tolerances. To implement- ,

the required reinspection program and to assure the design adequacy of safety-related hanger installations in the future, PSM revised it's existing QC Procedure 810.3F, " Installation Inspections," to require a 100% configuration inspection. Due to problems associated with identifying the installation date of some hangers, the scope of the reinspection was expanded to include those hangers installed prior to June 1984. _ CECO NCR No. 460 was issued in January 1983 to track and document resolution of this issu The NRC inspector reviewed the above actions, including CECO QA i

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Surveillance No. 6470 which documents completion of all inspections and required rework for Unit 1 and common HVAC safety-related supports, and found the corrective measures acceptable. As of this report date, 49 supports remain to complete the Unit 2 effor (Closed) 10 CFR 50.55(e) Item (456/83003-EE; 457/83003-EE): As a result of reviewing the "as-built" location of the Unit 1 and 2 Steam Generators and Reactor Coolant Pump Support Columns, it was determined that the locations exceeded -the tolerances shown on S&L drawing S-110 S&L performed a detailed analysis of the "as-built" locations of the above supports and found that two columns had the potential to reach their rotational limi The NRC review of this detailed analysis is addressed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-456/86009; No. 50-457/86008. Upon NRC review, questions were posed to the licensee regarding design significance. In addition, Westinghouse was asked to respond to the questions and provide an additional review of the "as-built" configuratio The analysis and evaluation performed by both S&L and Westinghouse indicate that the "as-built" installation of the subject support columns are acceptable.

. (Closed) 10 CFR 50.55(e) Item (456/85002-EE; 457/85002-EE): Deficient

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welds on certain ASME Section III tanks and heat exchangers. This

, issue was divided into two categories, each assigned a CECO NCR to document and resolve the ,

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(1) Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) field erected tanks with weld deficiencies, such as undersized fillet welds, improper fit-up gap, unacceptable weld profile, improper weld configurations and missing welds. This condition is limited to tanks supplied / erected by CB&I under the jurisdiction of ASME Section II (NCR694)

(2) Various vendor supplied safety-related ASME Section III tanks and heat exchangers with weld deficiencies limited to undersized fillet welds on integral vessel supports and reinforcing fillet welds on vessel nozzles. (NCR 711)

To resolve NCR 694, CB&I inspected the following tanks and mapped all welds not in accordance with drawing requirement CECO N Service 1AB03T Boric Acid 2AB03T Boric Acid 0AB1TA Recycle Hold Up OABITB Recycle Hold Up 2000TB Diesel Fuel 2000TB Diesel Fuel ID00TA Fuel Oil ID00TB Fuel Oil ID00TC Fuel Oil 1000TD Fuel Oil Those welds not in accordance with drawing requirements were evaluated by CB&I to determine if design criteria requirements were met. Welds not meeting design requirements were field repaired. The NRC inspector reviewed the CB&I evaluations and found them acceptabl The following tanks were visually inspected to verify repairs:

1D001TD Diesel Oil Fuel 0AB01TA Recycle Hold Up  !

0AB01TB Recycle Hold Up 1AB03T Boric Acid 2AB03T Boric Acid To resolve NRC 711, Westinghouse analyzed the results of the Pittsburgh Testing Lab (PTL) inspections of the following vessels:

0AB01DA Resin Demineralizer Tank OCC01A Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger 1CC01T Component Cooling Surge Tank 2CC01T Component Cooling Surge Tank 1CV01AB Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger 1CV010A Resin Demineralizer Tank 1CV01T Volume Control Tank 1CV02A Seal Water Heat Exchanger ICV 04AB Horizontal Letdown Heat Exchanger ICV 05A Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger

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1FC01A Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger 2FC01A Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger 0GWO1TD Gas Decay Tank 1RH02AA Vertical Residual Heat Exchanger 1SIO4TC- Accumulator Tank S&L analyzed the PTL inspection results of the following tanks:

10010T Aux Feedwater Pump Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tan CS01T Spray Additive Tank The results of the Westinghouse and S&L evaluations concluded that no weld repairs were required, and that design requirements were satisfie (0 pen) 10 CFR 50.55(e) Item (457/87001-EE): Diesel generator rocker arm failure On February 4,1987, the 2A Diesel Generator experienced high lube oil level after approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> of operation during a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test run. As discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-456/87005; 50-457/87004, Paragraph 5, the engine was shut down and inspected to determine the cause. An examination of the valve train revealed broken rocker arms on the IR and 3R cylinders and a crack-like

. indication on the SR exhaust rocker. The failure was determined to have been caused by the seizure of the cross-head to the guides for the respective cylinders. To correct the suspected cause of the seizure, all 20 power head assemblies were removed and all cross-head guides were honed to a nominal 4 mil cross-head-diametrical clearanc Upon reassembly, the 2A Diesel was started and loaded for an anticipated 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> test run. On February 13, 1987, after approximately 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> of operation, the exhaust and intake rocker arms on the SR cylinder failed. The licensee issued a report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) (457/87001). The SR powerhead assembly was replaced and cross-head guides were honed to a nominal 6 mil cross-head diametrical clearance. The licensee and Cooper-Bessemer, the diesel manufacturer, are currently performing metallurgical evaluations to determine the cause of failure. The 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> test run for 2A Diesel was successfully completed on February 24, 198 In preparation for operating the 2B Diesel, all powerheads were removed and cross-head to guide clearance was set at a nominal 6 mils. After approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of operation, the intake and exhaust rockers on the SR cylinder failed. The licensee and Cooper-Bessemer are performing tests to evaluate the cause of 4 failur '

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The resolution of the rocker arm failures and any associated impact on the Unit 1 Diesels will be evaluated durin and is considered an Open Item (456/87003-01)g a future inspection

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4. Licensee Action on SER Items (Closed) SER Item-(456/86000-17; 457/86000-17): During the audit meeting held October 20-23, 1981, at S&L, the NRC staff asked that CECO demonstrat that the Category I manholes are adequately designed against missile impact. During this meeting, CECO committed to replace the existing Category I manhole covers with ductile steel covers to provide the necessary missile- protectio Category I manhole covers, while utilized at the Byron Station for the Essential Service Water Cooling Towers, are not utilized at the Braidwood Station (Reference S&L letter, dated 9/19/86 from K. J. Green to A. D. Miosi).

, 5. Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involves some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph . Exit Interview The Region III inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 10, 198 The inspector summarized the purpose and findings of the inspectio The licensee representatives acknowledged this information. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regards to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection. The licensee representatives did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary, i

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