IR 05000456/1987043
| ML20237E614 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1987 |
| From: | Ploski T, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237E608 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-87-43, 50-457-87-42, NUDOCS 8712290085 | |
| Download: ML20237E614 (9) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. - - _ _ _ . .. , , .. U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-456/87043(DRSS); 50-457/87042(DRSS) Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 License No. NPF-72; Permit No. CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Station, Braceville, Illinois Emergency Operations Facility, Mazon, Illinois Inspection Conducted: November 17, 1987 and December 1-4, 1987 //#/[[ Inspectors: Date ~Mlb m d M.J. Smith 4?b2/l97 Date 'bb Approved By: Wi iam Snell, Chief /4/2//87 Emergency Preparedness Date l Section Inspection Summary Inspection on November 17 and December 1-4, 1987 (Report No. 50-456/87043(DRSS); and No. 50-457/87042(DRSS)) Areas Inspected: Special, announced appraisal of the following areas of the Station's emergency preparedness program: licensee actions on previously-identified items; emergency plan activations; training program; facilities, equipment, and supplies; offsite dose calculation and assessment; shift staffing and augmentation; and corrective action tracking mechanisms.
Results: No violations were identified during this inspection. There are no outstanding concerns which would adversely impact a Commission decision regarding low power licensing of Unit 2.
8712290085 871222 PDR ADOCK 05000456
DCD L
_ - _ _ _ _ _. _ _ - . . , .. DETAILS j l 1.
Persons Contacted
- E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager
- D. O'Brien, Services Superintendent
- K. Kofron, Production Superintendent
- R. Legner, Senior Operating Engineer
- R. Aker, Rad Chem Supervisor
- T. Gilman, Emergency Planning Supervisor - Nuclear Services Technical
!
- L. Literski, GSEP Coordinator
- A. Scott, GSEP Training Instructor
- P. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- L. Raney, Onsite Nuclear Safety Supervisor
- F.
Willaford, Security Administrator
- R. Bedford, Regulatory Assurance Staff
- E. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance Staff
- L. Kline, Regulatory Assurance Staff
- S. Stapp, Quality Assurance Staff
- N. Coan, Office Supervisor B. McCue, Operating Engineer R. Ungeran, Operating Engineer W. McGee, Training Supervisor D. Huston, Training Instructor G. Vanderheyden, Training Instructor R. Lemke, Tech Staff Supervisor D. Kapinus, Assistant Tech Staff Supervisor R. Mertogul, Assistant Tech Staff Supervisor C. Chovan, Shift Engineer (SE)
P. Habel, SE D. Cooper, SE P. Smith, SE J. Nalewajka, Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE) D. Miller, SCRE J. Kuchenbaker, SCRE M. Prospero, SCRE D. Hoots, Shift Foreman (SF) A. Chojnicki, SF R. Yurkovich, SF L. Weber, SF J. Nyhart, SF W. Best, SF G. Masters, Assistant Superintendent for Operations P. Cretens, Assistant Superintendent for Planning J. Anspaugh, Health Physicist R. Thacker, Health Physicist D. Poi, Health Physicist S. DeGarmo, Health Physicist K. Root, General Engineer J. Cronin, Lead Chemist A. Scaccia, Offsite Emergency Planner ,
_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ __ - _.
-
. .. I M. Benedict, Administrative Assistant R. Godwin, Training Instructor
W. Shear, Group Leader i . S. Hess, Support Services Group Supervisor' ! M. Sayers, Training Instructor " K. Randell, Operating Staff J.~ Allen, I&C Foreman
J. Smith, Master Electrician I B. Goering, Assistant to Office Supervisor J. Newman, Central Files Supervisor M. Peterson, Surveillance Coordinator P. Ha11avel, Deviation Report-Coordinator M. Boyle, Mechanical Maintenance Foreman R. Jacobs, Electrical Maintenance Foreman C. Melone, Tech Staff Engineer G. Schniebel, Training Instructor
- Indicates those who attended the December 4, 1987 exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/87021-01 and 457/87019-01: The 1987 edition of the Braidwood Public Information Brochure, containing revised language, must be distributed within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) during 1987. The State of Illinois approved revised language for the brochure in mid-1987.
In accordance with a commitment to the ASLB, the revised brochure more clearly indicates that the most probable.
radioactive release from the Station would be in the form of an invisible, odorless plume whose movement would depend on local wind conditions.
It also indicates that local wind conditions could affect which evacuation routes are recommended by offsite-officials.
Records review indicated that the 1987 edition of the revised brochure was distributed during the period August through mid-October 1987.
Approximately 19,100 copies were mailed to residences and businesses within the EPZ in August 1987. By mid-October, licensee personnel had delivered roughly 6,000 copies of the brochure to about 160 special facilities within and around the 10-mile EPZ', including governmental offices, recreation areas, industries, schools, motels, post offices and i libraries. This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/87026-01 and 457/87026-01: A Severity Level IV Violation was issued due to a backlog of filing of controlled documents at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) located near Mazon, Illinois. A mid-November 1987 tour of the Mazon EOF revealed that all controlled documents were filed, and that adequate administrative support was available to ensure the operational readiness of the EOF. A controlled document room had been completed at the facility.
In addition, an item had been added to the Quality Assurance _ Department's audit schedule-to address the operational readiness of the EOF.
This' item is closed.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ - - _ - -.
- - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - -_-_- .- l .. 3.
Emergency Plan Activations NRC and licensee record's associated with all emergency plan activations from mid-July through September 1987 were reviewed. These records included: Licensee Event Reports (LERs); records generated by NRC Duty Officers; Control Room logs; Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) forms completed by onshift personnel following each emergency declaration; the licensee's Deviation Reports; and evaluations of each activation that were performed by the GSEP Coordinator.
During this time period, onshift personnel declared five Unusual. Events.
Four were declared shortly after-initial determinations of leak rates in excess of Technical Specification limits. These declarations were conservative since the wording of the relevant Emergency Action Level (EAL) and the interpretation of a Technical Specification Action Statement were under reevaluation, based on an item identified during a recent inspection at the licensee's Byron Station. The EAL was appropriately reworded in early October 1987. The fifth Unusual Event was conservatively declared when an oncoming shift recognized that'an emergency diesel generator surveillance had not yet been completed. The.
diesel generator in question was briefly declared inoperable pending completion of the surveillance, while a second diesel generator remained
operable.
Initial notifications to State and NRC officials were completed within the regulatory time limits following each Unusual Event declaration.
Based on the LER review, there were no other classifiable events through September 30, 1987.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
l 4.
Emergency Preparedness Training Program Records review indicated that all 1987 training requirements had been successfully completed by all members of the onsite emergency organization. An approved training matrix defined the annual training requirements for specific emergency organization positions.
In almost every case, annual training requirements were a combination of approved modules and relevant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). The position of Chemistry Specialist had been created during 1987 as a staff assistant to the Rad Chem Director position, which was filled by persons having greater Health Physics than Chemistry expertise. 'The. licensee indicated that an EPIP for the Chemistry Specialist position.would be approved during the first quarter of 1988.
In the interim, persons assigned to the new position had received training relevant to the needs of all responders to the Technical Support Center (TSC).
All required emergency preparedness drills and the annual exercise were conducted and critiqued during 1987. The final critique report for a mid-November Inplant Health Physics Drill was not yet available for review. Documentation of all other drills was complete and readily available.
_______ _-___ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
- .- _- -_- - __ ____ ' . . The annual Medical Drill was conducted in early 1987. Onsite licensee participants included a Shift Foreman, Rad Chem Foreman, and three Rad Chem Technicians (RCTs).
Several training sessions were conducted in conjunction with the drill by the licensee's medical contractor for local hospital, ambulance service, and fire department personnel.
Additional training for local fire department personnel was offered in mid-November 1987.
Topics included a review of firefighting equipment locations, site access procedures, and radiological exposure control fundamentals. The training session was followeo by a fire drill.
Annual training to representatives of all offsite support organizations was offered on Octvber 29, 1987. The agenda included a review of the emergency classes and example EALs for each class. Attendees were also told how to request audit information regarding the evaluation of the Station's interface with offsite support groups. Training materials had been upgraded since the 1986 meeting. A " Nuclear Power Handbook," containing plant systems drawings, terminology, and basic information on radiation was made available to attendees along with information on EALs and emergency response facilities.
Based on the above fincings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
5.
Walkthroughs Interviews were conducted with four teams of Control Room personnel.
Each team consisted of a Shift Engineer (SE), Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE - the licensee's Shift Technical Advisor), and one or two Shift Foremen (SF).
Interview topics included: general knowledge of the licensee's emergency preparedness program; undelegatable responsibilities of the Acting Station Director; emergency detection and classification; onsite and offsite protective action decisionmaking; offsite notification requirements; emergency communications systems; and emergency response facility activation requirements. All personnel exhibited good teamwork and an adequate familiarity with the emergency preparedness program and relevant procedural guidance.
Interviews were conducted with 35 other persons who had been assigned positions in the Station's emergency response organization.
Interviewees were selected based on one of the following criteria: appointment to the emergency organization since mid-1986; change in emergency organization position since that time; or non-involvement in the March 1987 exercise. The following numbers and types of personnel were interviewed: (2) Station Director; (2) Station Director's Communicator; (2) Operations Director; (3) Technical Director; (1) Maintenance Director; (2) Rad Chem Director; (2) Chemistry Specialist; (2) Environs Director; (1) Security Director; (2) Administrative Director; (7) Callout List Supervisor; (3) Control Room Communicator; (3) Communicator / Recorder; and (3) Maintenance Foreman.
.__ - __ _ _ - _ . .
,. .. . l Personnel were questioned about their'overall knowledge of the licensee's program and their specific roles in the emergency organization.
The i r -- knowledge of their own duties and relevant EPIPs was adequate. However, a number of the newer members of the organization exhibited or expressed L some uneasiness regarding how they would actually interface with other members of the Station Group during an actual emergency, an exercise,-or a drill situation.. Such personnel often indicated that they had not_ yet participated in a drill or exercise.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was-acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:
The licensee should conduct several tabletops or drills involving newer members of the onsite emergency organization to provide them with experience in performing their duties in a stressful situation, l and more familiarity with how they should interface with other emergency responders.
6.
Emergency Facilities / Equipment / Supplies A mid-November 1987 tour of the Mazon E0F revealed that it was being maintained in an operational state of readiness by licensee staff based at the facility. As indicated in Paragraph 2 of this report, adequate corrective actions had been taken to avoid recurrence of controlled I document filing problems which had resulted in the issuance of a Notice of Violation in August 1987. A dual purpose transportation facility had been built next to the EOF.
It would serve as a shelter for a dedicated "GSEP Van" which would be used by an offsite' survey team augmenting teams dispatched from Braidwood Station.
The structure was also intended to accommodate overflow personnel from the EOF and Joint Public : Information Center (JPIC).
The re-modeled JPIC, located next to the EOF, was also toured.
Re-modeling appeared to be about 90 percent complete.
An early December tour of onsite emergency response facilities (ERFs) revealed that the TSC and Operational Support Center (OSC) were being maintained in an adequate state of readiness.
Both facilities were located as described in the Braidwood Annex to the Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP). Their layout, equipment, supplies, and everyday use remained as described in previous inspection reports.
The TSC's emergency ventilation system was on an 10 month surveillance schedule to better ensure its operability. Records review indicated that one successful surveillance had already been performed.
Onsite assembly areas that would be utilized by nonessential personnel were toured. These areas were as described in,the Braidwood Annex to the GSEP and in previous inspection reports. A tour of the plant indicated that adequate numbers of signs were in place to provide directions to the various assembly areas. The assembly areas were still equipped with special keycard readers to facilitate the accounting of nonessential personnel. All assembly areas were also equipped with emergency lights.
Surveillance records review indicated that the Station's assembly siren
. - __ - _ _ _ - __-___-__ _ ________ - ______ -
_ _ - - _ _ _. _ - _ _ _ _ _. . .__ - - _ _ -.._ -_ - ____ _- ! . -
. l . . i had been tested on a monthly basis. A tour of the onsite medical and i l decontamination facility indicated that it was being maintained in an operational state of readiness.
Emergency com p, # Cons systems were in place within the Control Room, onsite ERFs, and dn EOF, as described in the Braidwood Annex, GSEP, and previous inspection reports.
Records' review indicated that'all required tests had been performed on emergency communications equipment for 1937.
The few problems that had been identified during these tests had been corrected in a timely manner. Adequate copies of NARS forms used to document initial notification messages to State agencies were readily available in the Control Room, TSC, and EOF. The licensee has proceduralized the NRC's Event Notification Worksheet to facil-itate and document communications with NRC Duty Officers'following an emergency declaration.
Copies of the form were readily available in the Control Room.
Records review indicated that periodic inventories of supplies maintained in the onsite ERFs and the First Aid.and Decontamination Room had been completed and adequately documented through the third quarter of 1987, as were inventories of field survey team kits and first aid kits and stretchers deployed at specified inplant locations.
Fourth quarter inventories of emergency supplies were in progress during this inspection.
Procedures included provisions for inventorying emergency supplies after use and for the timely replacement of missing or defective items.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
7.
Offsite Dose Assessment and Calcualtion (82207) The licensee's dose calculation and assessment methodologies were reviewed as contained in Environmental Director (ED-series) procedures, copies of which were maintained in the TSC and EOF. Topics addressed in these procedures included: quantifying gaseous and liquid release rates; estimating source terms from field measurements; acquiring current and forecast meteorological information; and the use of field survey teams.
Dose calculation methodologies ranged from rapid, conservative estimates employing gross activity source terms and worst-case meteorology, to options accommodating nuclide-specific source terms and real-time meteorology.
ED-series procedures included methodologies for manual calculation of offsite dose in the event that computerized models would become unavailable.
Computerized models could be run by accessing an onsite computer or a computer at the licensee's corporate offices.
j The licensee's A-Model is a computerized dose calculation and assessment methodology available to Control Room personnel.
For monitored releases and for containment radiation levels in excess of specific values, the A-Model will automatically activate. Output available to Control Room personnel included: numerical release rate or containment radiation level data; time-averaged onsite meteorological data; affected downwind
)
r .- , sectors; centerline dose rates at six predetermined distances (1/4,1/2,1, 2, 5, and 10 miles); the dose rate and 2-hour dose at the " practical site boundary", which is a sector-dependent distance from l containment along the plume's centerline; release type (ground level or elevated); and emergency classification.
While A-Model output included the appropriate emergency classification, the relevant Emergency Action Level (EAL) was not identified in the output. While 1-hour dose rates and the location of the "1 Rem Line" were model outputs, the A-Model output did not include an offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) corresponding to either 1-hour dose rates or integrated doses for a 2-hour default release duration.
It was noted that the "C-Model" available in the TSC and EOF to dose assessment staff had an option for providing an offsite PAR based on the dose projection results. Also, the usefulness of the model's projected dose at the sector-dependent " practical site boundary" was questionable, as the licensee's proceduralized PAR guidance focused on such uniform distances as 2, 5, and 10 miles from the Station.
The A-Model associated with Unit 1 was fully operational.
Due to detector calibration problems or sensor electronics drift problems, there have been two occasions during 1987 where the Unit 1 A-Model had automatically activated when no abnormal releases or containment radiation levels actually existed. Both situations were promptly recognized and investigated by the licensee. The GSEP Coordinator emphasized that Control Room personnel had been correctly trained to view the A-Model as only one of several tools available to them to detect abncrmal radiation conditions, and not to declare an emergency based solely on A-Model output.
The Unit 2 A-Model was in the final stages of pre-operational testing.
The Unit 2 A-Model must be fully operational, including completion of model verification and validation, prior to Unit 2 exceeding five percent , of rated power. This is an Open Item.
(457/87042-01) Walkthroughs were conducted with two Environs Directors.
Both individuals were adequately familiar with procedural guidance for performing dose calculations and formulating offsite protective action recommendations. Both were able to utilize computer terminals located in the TSC to acquire current onsite meteorological data. They understood how to interpret the meteorological parameters and to utilize them in dose calculations.
Both persons were proficient in generating several offsite dose projections when given postulated onsite and offsite radiation measurements. The interviewees had had some drill or exercise experience involving offsite survey teams. They had an appreciation for the information needs and ALARA concerns of field teem personnel, and were adequately faniliar with procedural guidance on communicating with field
sursey teams.
In addition to the Open Item, the following item should be considered for improvement:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
___ _ _ _ .- l The A-Model's output should be revised to include the relevant EAL and any appropriate PAR. All reference to the " practical site l boundary," including projected dose at that loc 4 tion, should be l deleted from A-Model output.
8.
Shift Staffing and Augmentation (82205) The licensee's provisions for shift staffing and for augmenting onshift personnel following an emergency declaration were adequate and unchanged from those identified during the previous inspection (Reports No. 50-456/87026(DRSS) and No. 50-457/87026(DRSS)). Since the last inspection, the licensee has conducted a second, successful off-hours augmentation drill to satisfy a semi-annual commitment. The GSEP Coordinator has updated the prioritized call-out list of emergency response personnel on a quarterly basis, per procedural requirements.
The call-out list for the fourth quarter of 1987 included adequate numbers of persons qualified for specified positions.
Personnel for each response position were prioritized on the listing based on their estimated travel times from their residences to the Station.
. Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program ! l was acceptable.
9.
Corrective Action Tracking Mechanisms Based on records review, several-effective methods were in use for tracking corrective actions on concerns involving the Station's emergency preparedness program.
Regulatory assurance staff were responsible for tracking actions taken on items identified and tracked by the NRC, the licensee's Quality Assurance (QA) Department, and the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations. QA Department procedures included provisions requiring that formal responses on audit findings be submitted by specified deadlines, and that completed corrective actions be evaluated for adequacy.
The GSEP Coordinator maintained an informal system for tracking corrective actions being taken on items identified during drills and exercises. The Coordinator was also responsible for compiling and evaluating, from an emergency preparedness viewpoint, records associated with actual emergency plan activations. The Coordir.ator's evaluations of 1987 plan activations were adequate and included documentation of any corrective actions taken.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was j acceptable.
I 10.
Exit Interview ' On December 4, 1987, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives identified in Paragraph I to present their preliminary I inspection findings.
The licensee agreed to consider the items discussed ) and indicated that none were proprietary in nature.
I
l a }}