IR 05000457/1987020
| ML20235E070 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1987 |
| From: | Danielson D, Liu W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235E032 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-457-87-20, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8709250471 | |
| Download: ML20235E070 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-457/87020(DRS)
Docket No. 50-457 License No. CPPR-133 j
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company l-Post Office Box 767
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Chicago, IL 60690 l
Facility Name:
Braidwood Station, Unit 2 Inspection At:
Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Il?inois Inspection Conducted:
June 15-19, 23-24, July 6-9, 14-17, 21-24, and August 17-21, 24-.27, 1987 w
Inspector:
W. C. Liu 9//fF7 Date l
YW Approved By:
D. H. Danielson, Chief 9[ #7 l
Materials and Processes Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection from June 15 through August 27, 1987 (Report No. (50-457/87020(DRS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine safety inspection of reactor coolant pressure boundary piping (49053, 49054, and 49055), of welding activities (55073, 55075, 55083, and 55085); of safety-related components (50074); of testing of pipe support /
restraint systems (70370); of safety-related pipe support / restraint systems (50090); of seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems (25529);
and of training and qualification (41400).
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Results:
One violation was identified, failure to identify and correct deficiencies on safety-related pipe supports, Paragraph 2.b.
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l 8709250471 870918 PDR ADOCK 05000457 O
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DETAI'LS'-
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.. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison! Company (CECO)~
- D.'Shamblin,.-ProjectManager.
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- W. Vahle, Project. Construction Superintendent
- E. Martin,. Quality Assurance Superintendent-
- K.i ofron, Production Superintendent...
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- L. Davis, Assistant Superintendent, Technical. Services
- D. Paquette, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
- P. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor-
- M. Inserra, Test Review Board Supervicor'
'*E. Netzel, QA Supervisor
- D. Geddings, Field Engineer,-Project Construction-
- M. Pape, QA Welding Engineer, Construction
- R. Wa_ninski, Project F1 eld Engineer.
- R. Bedford, Regulatory Assurance
- L. Raney, Nuclear Safety.
D. Throne; QA Welding Engineer Sargent and Lundy Engineers (S&L)
D. Gallagher, Site Manager D. Roth, Senior Structural Engineer Phillips Getschow Company (PGCo)
W. Berg, QC Supervisor C. Lutz, QC Foreman
.NRC Resident Inspectors
.T. Tongue, Senior Resident Inspector, Operation W. Kropp, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction l
- Denotes those attending the exit interview at the Braidwood Station on August 27, 1987.
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2.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping - Observation'of-Work (49053'
and 49054), Safety-Related Components - Observation of Work (50074),
Safety-Related Pipe Support / Restraint Systems.(50090), and Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping systems (25529)
a.
Review of Procedures and Instructions PGC0 Procedure QCP-821, " Installation of ASME.Section III and
Safety-Related Process Piping Systems Two Inch and Smaller,"
Revision 14, June 12, 1986.
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PGC0 Procedure QCP-823, " Installation and Inspection of
Component Supports," Revision 16, July 22,-1986.
PGC0 Procedure QCP-828, " Fabrication and Installation of ASME
Section III and Safety-Related Large' Bore Process Piping Systems," Revision 9, June 12, 1986.
PGC0 Procedure PGCO-48, " Final Linewalk of Component
Supports / Restraints," Revision 4, July 16, 1986.
Sargent and Lundy PI-BB-64, " Evaluation of Formal Analysis
As-Built Subsystems," Revision 2, August 8, 1986.
Sargent and Lundy PI-BB-96, " Limited Clearance Walkdowns,
Revision 2, September-15, 1986.
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The NRC iaspector reviewed the relevant portions of the above
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procedures / instructions pertaining to safety-related piping l
subsystem installation and inspection to determine whether j
l appropriate procedures have been established and _whether they j
l comply with NRC requirements and the licensee commitments.
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NRC inspector noted that in general these procedures appeared to be acceptable in terms of controlling work activities associated
with installation and inspection.
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b.
Field Inspection of Pipe Supports Per Design Drawings The NRC inspector selected the following safety-related pipe (
supports / restraints for a verification inspection to determine
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l whether the supports were inctalled and inspected in accordance
with the applicable procedures and the design drawings.
i Support Number Piping System l
- 2SI14011X (Sway Strut)
Safety Injection
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i 2SI14012X (Sway Strut)
Safety Injection
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2SIO1020G (Box Frame)
Safety Injection 2RC10050R (Sway Strut)
Reactor Coolant 2RC130765 (Snubber)
Reactor Coolant 2RC10057G (Box Frame)
- 2CC190175 (Snubber)
Component Cooling
- 1CC03158X (Sway Strut)
Component Cooling 2CV878031G (Box Frame)
Chemical and Volume Control
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- 2CV25052S (SnuLoer)
Chemical and Volume Control
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- 2RH07026S (Snubber)
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- Indicates discrepancies identified during the inspection.
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The above pipe supports were' inspected by the licensee QC personnel and the NRC inspector using the corresponding design drawings for general configuration, identification, member size, weld size, fastener installation, and damage / protection.
In general, the supports were installed in accordance with design documents with the exception of the supports identified below:
(1) Support No. 1CC03158X, Revision 0.
It was noted that the nuts on the load stud were all loose and that one of the locking nuts was missing.
The snap ring on the rear bracket was missing, y
An incorrect support number _ tag was attached to the sway strut along with the correct one.
(2) Support No. 2CC19017S, Revision 8.
It was found that two of j
the four washers between the snubber extension tube flange and
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the housing were loose.
(3) Support No. 2SI14011X, Revision A.
It was noted that the locking clip on the top of the rear bracket was broken.
(4) Support No. 2RH07026S, Revision A.
It was noted that the snubber had been completely painted including the piston shaft.
(5) Support No. 2CV25052S, Revision A.
It was found that washers were not installed as required by the instruction.
The above pipe support deficiencies were identified during inspections of the preselected supports and supports in the adjacent area during field walkdowns inspections.
These deficiencies were discussed in detail with licensee representatives.
No dissenting comments were l
received from the licensee.
The deficiencies identified above are
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examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI'
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(457/87020-01).
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In response to the above NRC inspection findings, the licensee
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initiated NRC No. 7156 on July 24, NRC No. 7134 on June 26, NRC No. 7171 on August 26, Discrepancy Report DR No. 8192F, Revision C, on June 23 and DR No. 8247F, Revision 0, on July 7, 1987, to correct the deficiencies on the above pipe supports.
The licensee is in the process of conducting sample reinspection programs to determine whether further evaluations are necessary to meet licensee commitments and NRC requirements.
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Field Inspection of Pipe Supports Per Functional Requirements
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The NRC inspector selected the following safet -related snubbers j
y and spring hangers to verify whether the installed hangers can
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perform. its intended function as required by the design.
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Support Number ~
Piping System 2CV31007S(Snubber, Size 1)
. Chemical and Volume Control 2CV31020S (Snubber, Size 1)
Chemical and Volume Control
2SIO5002S'(Snubber, Size 1)
Safety Injection I
251050135 (Snubber, Size 1)
Safety Injection-2SIO1023S (Snubber, Size 3)
Safety Injection 2SIO3018S (Snubber, Size 3)
Safety Injection i
2RH07003S (Snubber, Size 1)
Residual Heat Removal 2RH07006S(Snubber, Size 1)
Residual Heat Removal The relevant portions of-the above snubbers were inspected to verify that there was no damage to the snubber assembly, to stroke the snubber i
through the full travel range for proper operation, to verify material condition, and to verify that all nuts' and bolts are properly engaged j
and secure. No discrepancies were identified during the inspection
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of the above snubbers.
d.
Field Verification of As-Built Dimensions for Piping Subsystems
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The NRC inspector reviewed the field verification of as-built
dimensions for the following piping subsystems.
Piping Drawing Number Subsystem 2A-CC-20, Revision G 1CC03 (Unit 2)
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t 2C-CV-49, Revision A 2CV05 2C-SI-26, Revision A 2SIO1, 2SIO3, 2S104, 2S109 The NRC inspector, with the aid of QC personnel, measured the'above piping subsystems to determine whether the dimensions shown on the drawings are consistent with the actual installations.
Results of the verification revealed that the as-built dimensions were valid.
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During the verification of as-built dimensions, it was'noted that-ten rattle points were identified.on Drawing 2A-CV-49, four rattle points on Drawing 2C-SI-26, and two rattle points _on Drawing 2A-CC-20.
A review of existing records revealed that 13 rattle points had previously been identified.
Three new rattle points were found as a result of the NRC inspector's verification.
At the time of
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this inspection, the NRC inspector could not determine whether j
the 13 existing rattle points had been evaluated by S&L.and if a
the three new rattle points will impact the piping subsystems.
Pending further review, this' matter is. identified as Open Item l
(457/87020-02).
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Review of Pipe Support Calc'ulations Pertaining to IE Bulletin No. 79-14 Requirements The NRC inspector randomly selected the following safety-related i
pipe support calculations for a verification review to determine whether the calculations were performed in accordance with established procedures / instructions.
Pipe Support Number Piping System 2CV02006V Chemical and Volume Control
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2CV02010S Chemical and Volume Control 2RC11008R Reactor Coolant
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2RC12065R Reactor Coolant 2RH02008S Residual Heat Removal 2RH02037R Residual Heat Removal
- 2RY05001V Reactor Coolant Pressurizer 2RY05008R Reactor Co.olant Pressurizer l
2SIO4019R Safety Injection 2SI23012A Safety Injection The above pipe support design calculations involving five piping systems were reviewed.for conformance to analysis criteria, applicable codes, NRC requirements and licensee commitments.
The calculations in general contained some errors, however, they were determined to be minor in nature.
This was evidenced by the review of calculations for Support No. 2RY05001V where the moment about the x-axis and about the y-axis was written in terms of 8.41 ksi and 3.12 ksi respectively.
A further review of the calculations on Page 7 revealed that the above moments were erroneously written.
These values were the bending stresses about the x-axis and about the y-axis respectively.
The calculation was corrected, this matter was considered resolved.
Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified.
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Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping - Review of Quality Records (49055), Observation of Welding Activities (55073 and 55083), Review of Welding Records (55075 and 55085)
a.
Review of' Quality Records The NRC inspector selected the following safety-related piping l
packages for a verification review to determine whether the i
packages were properly reviewed and documented in accordance with the established procedures / instructions.
Piping Drawing Number Piping System 2A-CV-18, Revision B Chemical and Volume Control i
2C-RC-14, Revision C Reactor Coolant
2A-SI-41, Revision A Safety Injection The relevant portions of the above piping packages were reviewed by the NRC inspector to verify the applicable code class, NDE and ISI requirements, base material identification, welding material traceability, welder and QC inspector qualification, applicable process procedures, and heat treatment. The inspector concluded that in general, the above quality records appeared to be acceptable in terms of meeting the licensee's commitments and the NRC requirements.
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Observation of Welding Activities and Review of Welding Records j
During the inspection, two safety-related welding activities were
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observed by the NRC inspector. Welding on pipe support 2CVK60002T, Revision A, was observed through tack-up, fit-up inspection, and-l weld out. The verification included the base metal preparation, electrical characteristics, interpass cleaning, filler material control, and welder qualification.
The NRC inspector visually inspected this installation subsequent to the licensee's QA/QC
inspection. lhe second welding activity observed was the installation of line 2RH02AA-8" for the Residual Heat Removal System. This operation involved the welding of an eight inch schedule 40 pipe spool RH-10-3A to an eight inch schedule 40 flange in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building.
Items verified by the NRC inspector included fit-up and alignment of the components, welding progression, electrical characteristics, gas flow rates, penetration, material traceability, and welder qualification. No discrepancies were identified during the observation of the welding activities and review of the corresponding welding records.
Further, the welders i
qualifications associated with the above welding activities were verified and were found to be acceptable in accordance with the applicable procedures.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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Testing Pipe Support'and Restraint Systems (70370)
a.
Field Observation of Thermal Walkdowns During hot functional testing,.thb licensee representatives and'the'NRC inspector. observed the Reactor Coolant Pressurizer.-
subsystem 2RY09 and Residual: Heat; Removal subsystem.2RH02 toiverify l
by visualtobservation and measurements whether the. safety related piping subsystemsican expand without restrictionfof-movement during:
system heatup and to determined whether the supports / restraints-n
. including snubbers'on.the piping' subsystems can perform their intended; functions as required by:the design. ~ Seventeen potential thermal.growthLinterference locations data sheets were initiated.
by the licensee for further. evaluation.
Attributes included in the observations are:
-(1) Support type listed is not the.:same as support installed.
l (2).. Support" located in field not on. support list.
(3)- Support listed but not installed.
(4) Travel stops installed on' spring cans or protective wrapping-installed on snubbers.
(5) Evidence of restriction to thermal expansion movements.
'(6) Spring support. topped or bottomed out.
(7) Snubber swing clearance inadequate or clamp-snubber interference.
(8) Snubber piston fully extended.or retracted.
(9) Pipingorsupportincontactwith'adjacentcomponents.
(10) Evidence of damage or impaired operability.
(11) Other, b.
Field Observation of Vibration Test The NRC inspector observed the vibration testing for:the reactor coolant pressurizer piping' system ~2RT06.to determine whether excessive vibrations existed and to. determined whether:the
. vibrations measured were in the acceptable range and-in accordance-
-with the established procedures..The measured vibrations are'to be evaluated by.the licensee in accordance with the specified criteria for qualification of piping steady. state vibrations.
Within the areas inspected, not violatio'ns or deviations were identified.
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Training and Qualification (41400)
j The NRC inspect reviewed the training and qualification records for
three welders wur King in the area of safety-related piping and :upport installation. These individuals were trained and qualified in ccordance with the applicable procedures and instructions.
Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 2.d.
7.
Exit Interview The inspector met with site representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted Paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
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