IR 05000456/1987039

Safety Insp Repts 50-456/87-39 & 50-457/87-37 on 870929-1210.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Resolution of Previous Insp Findings,Walkdown of HVAC Sys & Insp of Electrical Switchgear Breakers

ML20237F047
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	12/18/1987
From:	Danielson D, Jeffrey Jacobson, David Jones, Liu W, Schapker J, James Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237F026	List: IR 05000456/1987039 ML20237F023
References
50-456-87-39, 50-457-87-37, IEB-83-05, IEB-83-5, IEIN-87-035, IEIN-87-35, NUDOCS 8712290322
Download: ML20237F047 (13)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-456/87039(DRS); 50-457/87037(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted: September 29, October 1, 29-30, November 5, 16, 18-19, 24-25, December 1, 7 and 10, 1987 eb? W Inspectors- J. M. Jacobson '

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D. E. Jones /2// 7 Date'

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obN0 W. C. Liu / /oP[/7 Dat'e /

k Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief /2/// //

Materials and Processes Section

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Inspection Summary Inspection on September 29, October 1, 29-30, November 5, 16 u 18-19, 24-25, December 1, 7 and 10, 1987 (Reports No. 50-456/87039(DRS); 50-457/87037(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Unannounced safety inspection of the resolution of previous inspection findings (92701 and 92702); followup on 50.55(e) deficiency reports (99020); followup on Part 21 reports (92716); walkdown of HVAC systems (50100);

walkdown of piping systems (37301); followup of licensee's actions in response to I.E. Bulletin 83-05 (92703); inspection of electrical switchgear breakers (92704).

Results: No violation or deviations were identifie ,

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

T. J. Maiman, Vice President E. E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager M. J. Wallace, Manager of Projects W. E. Vahle, Project Manager

• D. E. O'Brien, Services Superintendent C. W. Schroeder, Station Services Superintendent K. Kofron, Production Superintendent D. L. Shamblin, Assistant Project Manager

• P. L. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• M. Takaki, Regulatory Assurance

• R. C. Bedford, Regulatory Assurance J. K. Jasnosz, Technical Staff AR/PR Coordinator E. R. Wendorf, PFE Mechanical Supervisor l

• L. M. Kline, Regulatory Assurance l F. Lotarski, Project Construction B. Tanouye, Project Construction

• T. W. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance

• D. Anderson, "A" Electrician

• E. Johnson, Electrical Maintenance Engineer The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employee * Denotes those attending the exit meeting at the Braidwood Station on December 10, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (457/84040-08): NCR 39, which was issued in April 1979, identified weld deficiencies in electrical struts and hanger assemblies supplied by Systems Control (SC). The supporting documentation attached to the NCR indicated that 90% of the welds identified on the NCR were not in accordance with the AWS D1.1-75 Structural Welding Code. The welds were considered unacceptable due to improper dimensions and weld quality. The " Corrective Action" block on the NCR was marked "N/A" and contained a statement indicating that the welds were acceptable. However, there was nothing in the NCR package to support this determinatio Consequently, a Notice of Violation (456/84044-08; 457/84040-08)

was issue The NRC inspector reviewed the following documented chronology of events:

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(1) Material Receiving Report No. 4408 placed the shipment on hold due to questionable weld quality (April 23,1979).

(2) NCR 39 issued to document welding deficiencies (April 25,1979).

(3) Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory (PTL) inspection of SC material reports high weld reject rate (April 23,1979).

(4) Reinspection of welds by PTL, S&L, CECO, and SC (May 2, 1979).

PTL reports same high reject rate complicated by weld spatte (5) CECO Construction indicates in a May 8, 1979, memorandum to LKC that the May 2, 1979, reinspection reported that welds are within tolerances and directs LKC to remove spatter before inspecting and to report to Construction any deficient weld Though NCR 39 Corrective Action block at this point stated N/A, the Disposition block reflects the May 8, 1979, memo regarding removal of spatter and inspection of welds before installing hanger (6) LKC memo to Construction, dated May 25, 1979, reports that receipt inspection of Shipment 131 and 133 found simi".ar welding deficiencie (7) Ceco performs QA Surveillance 1195 on June 4 and 5, 1979, of SC shop and issues a stop work order until changes in production control and weld inspection are made. Followup inspection on June 19 and 20, 1979, authorizes the start of work with a PTL

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inspector to remain at the SC shop for ten days to observe weld inspection practice. Also, on June 19, 1979, hangers from several SC shipments are returned to SC for repair of weld (8) CECO NCR 451 is issued December 21, 1982, to document that a large percentage of SC supplied hangers did not conform to AWS D1.1-75 with regard to weld quality. The NCR was dispositioned by performing a random sample inspection of 80 hangers. S& performed a design evaluation based on the results of the weld inspections and reported that all were adequate. S&L stated that this sample provided a 95/95 confidence / reliability that all SC fabricated hangers were acceptable (February 17,1984), i I

(9) S&L letter to Ceco, dated May 9, 1984, states that the return l welds at the top and the connection of horizontal strut members {

were missing in many case S&L recommends that a weld l configuration reinspection be performed to verify actual weld j size and lengt j I

(10) CECO issued NCRs 708 and 709 to document the reinspection of SC hangers for weld configuratio )

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The N'RC inspector reviewed CECO NCR 708'(Unit 1),'NCR 709 (Unit 2),

, and related documentation. These NCRs included a 100% inspection of i all cable tray hanger connections, involving in excess of 30,000 connections, and a 100% inspection of'all 90 fittings totaling 932 welds. In addition, a sample of ladder rack rung to side channel welds, T-fittings, and instrument racks were inspecte No design significant discrepancies were found during the ladder rack, 90 fitting and instrument rack inspections. Any cable tray hanger connection missing a portion of a weld was evaluated and repaired as required to restore design margin. The weld quality of cable tray hangers had previously been resolved by CECO NCR L-45 In addition to the reviews outlined above, the NRC inspector visually inspected in excess of 150 cable tray hanger connections and found them acceptabl (Closed) Violation (456,'87015-01): ' Failure to perform adequate corrective action with regard to an identified nonconforming condition. The nonconforming condition is related to improper welding progression on some pipe support welds. This issue was brought to the attention of the NRC as an allegation and is discussed in detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-456/87015; 50-457/87015. Though two NCRs had been issued for improper ,

welding progression performed by the same welder, both instances s were treated as isolated occurrences. Additionally, a second welder was identified on an NCR for improper welding progression and again was. treated as an isolated occurrence. As a_ result of the allegation, additional occurrences of improper welding p'rogrcssion were found for both welders in question. _The technical resolution of this issue is contained in the above mentioned NRC Inspection Repor To prevent recurrence, the licensee directed the contractor to hold training sessions for both the production and inspection personne The NRC inspector verified that this training was complete (Closed) Open Item (457/86018-01): Water seepage in the tendon tunnel. The NRC design review of the tendon tunnel is included'in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-456/86020; 50-457/86018. The tendon tunnel.is located approximately 50 feet below grade level and experiences some water seepage. Waterproofing efforts were performed to reduce the seepage to a minimal amoun S&L has determined that the remaining seepage is not of structural significance (reference telephone memo from B. Tanouye of Ceco, dated February 25,1987).

The NRC inspector inspected the Unit 2 tendon tunnel and found the n .wwaterproofing effort to be successful in substantially reducing the water seepag .

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d. (Closed) Unresolved item (457/83002-02): A discrepancy between the

$'c S&L Construction Drawing S-1110 and the Teledyne Brown general information Drawing 22287 with regard to the position of a support column for the steam generator No. 2 lateral support (Units 1 and 2)

was note The S&L drawing is the controlling document for installation of the subject support. The NRC inspector verified that the as-built position of the support columns were in agreement with the S&L construction drawing. Upon further review, it was noted that the-S&L drawing S-1110 is in agreement with the dimensionality Teledyne Brown fabrication Drawing No. 22281. The Teledyne Brown Drawing No. 22287, which is utilized for general-information and piece mark reference only, shows the outside support column in a slightly different position. Since.this drawing is not dimensioned and could

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not be utilized for construction, this slight difference in position is inconsequentia e. (Closed) Unresolved Items (456/85004-01; 457/85004-01): Water seepage into containment tendon ducts. The licensee established a bi-annual inspection program to eliminate tt.a water or establish the

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source and evaluate the effec All vertical tendons were inspected for water in December 1985. A total of 41 tendons, out of 324, were found with quantities of water varying from a trace to one gallon. As of the most recent inspection-(July 1987), three tendons in Unit 2 contained from one half pint to three pints of water. During the July 1987 ISI of the Unit I tendons, small areas of corrosion were observed on the anchorheads. One head had pits approximately 0.005" deep; however, the wires were free of corrosion. The observed levels of corrosion on the anchorheads was determined to be insignificant with respect to the structural integrity of the tendon A surveillance program for all hoop tendons below grade was initiated in July 1986. A total of 11 tendons were found with quantities of water varying from a trace to four gallons. These tendons were reinspected in December 1986 and again in July 1987 with a similar quantity of water being found. Three anchorheads had small areas of corrosion with pits less than 0.005" deep. Wires for two tendons had corrosion with pits less than 0.003" deep. The corroded wire was removed and tested for ductility and tensile strength and found to be acceptabl In January 1988, all vertical and hoop tendons which were found wet in the July 1987 surveillance will be inspected. For the Unit 2 ISI scheduled for September 1988, the following inspections will be made:

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Five random dome tendon *'

Five random vertical tendons and one wet vertical tendon will be selected for wire remova *-

Seven random hoop tendons and one below grade tendon will be selected for wire remova *

One additional wet hoop tendon will be selected for wire remova *

Unit I tendon 2CB will be selected for wire removal to monitor corrosio *

A surveillance of the remaining tendons found to contain water during the previous inspectio The licensee will perform an engineering evaluation of the surveillance results and plan additional followup as appropriat To date, the water found in some tendons has not caused a reduction in the structural integrity of the Braidwood containments. The NRC Region III staff will continue to monitor this issue as part of the licensee's ISI. progra . Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Items (Closed) 50.55 (e) Item (457/83001-EE): HVAC installations were not installed in accordance with specified dimensional tolerance A CECO QA Audit performed on Pullman Sheet Metal (PSM) in September 1982 resulted in identifying three hangers which failed to meet design tolerances. ' Prior to this time, PSM had been performing a 10% hanger configuration inspectio The corrective action was for PSM to perform a.100% configuration inspection of all safety-related hangers installed prior to September 1982. During the inspection effort it became apparent that a number of HVAC safety-related hangers, auxiliary steel, and bracing were not installed in accordance with dimensional tolerance To implement the required reinspection program and to assure the design adequacy of safety-related hanger installations in the future, PSM revised it's existing QC Procedure B10.3F, " Installation Inspections," to require a 100% configuration inspection. Due to problems associated with identifying the installation date of some hangers, the scope of the reinspection was expanded to include those hangers installed prior to June 1984. CECO NCR No. 460 was issued in January 1983 to track and document resolution of this issu _ _ _ . - - . - . - . . - - _ _ - _ _ - - -J

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The NRC inspector reviewed the above actions, including CECO QA Surveillance No. 7386 which documents completion of all inspections and required rework for Unit 2 and common HVAC safety-related supports, and found the corrective measures acceptabl b. (Closed) 50.55(e) Item (456/84008-EE; 457/84008-EE): Installation deficiencies of HVAC housings and air risers. The liner plates for the Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VA) system exhaust filter housings and the Reactor Containment (VP) system fan cooler housings, including the associated return air risers, were not installed by Pullman Sheet Metal (PSM) in accordance with the design drawings and specifications. The deficiencies included welding configurations which did not match the drawings and incomplete weld quality inspection CECO issued NCR 632 to track and resolve this HVAC issu Sargent &

Lundy (S&L) was directed by Ceco to perform a field verification and evaluation of the as-built condition of the housings and riser In cases where the evaluation indicated inadequacies, S&L incorporated rework or other hardware fixes into the drawings. Upon completion of the required rework, PSM was directed to perform a 100%

reinspection of the housings and risers for configuration and weld quality. The inspections were performed in accordance with PSM Procedures QCP-B10.2.F, " Installation Inspection," and 810.3.F,

" Visual Weld Inspections." CECO QA Surveillance Nos. 6525, 7099, and 7226 document a review of the corrective actions and closure of NCR 63 The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation associated with this issue and concluded that adequate corrective action has been take In addition, the NRC inspector has visually examined several hundred HVAC welds, including fan cooler and filter housing welds, and found the welding to be of acceptable quality, c. (Closed) 50.55(e) Item (457/84019-EE): Insufficient crush strength of energy absorbing material (EAM) used in pipe whip restraint During testing of the Byron Station EAM, it was found that some material exhibited an average dynamic crush strength less that that specified. The tests were mostly conducted on specimens from new material obtained from the supplier Hexcel, not specimens from the EAM core blocks originally supplied to Byron Statio Further investigation indicated that the variation in strength may have been due to problems associated with an earlier brazing process utilized by Hexcel. It was further determined that the EAM supplied to the Byron, Braidwood, and LaSalle projects could be affected by the

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questionable fabrication process.

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The technical evaluation of the pipe whip restraint design and EAM is addressed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-454/84051; 50-455/84035. To resolve the EAM crush strength variability l

issue it was decided to replace all EAM with new material properly qualified by improved production tests. The NRC inspector reviewed the installation documentation and visually field verified the installation of the new material for the following pipe whip restraints:

2WR-RY-3 2WR-FWR-9 2WR-RY-4 2WR-FWR-1 2WR-RY-5 2WR-FWR-10 2WR-RC3-4 2WR-SI9R-475B All whip restraints examined were found to have the proper EAM installe . Licensee Action on IE Bulletins (Closed) IE Bulletin 83-05 (457/83005-88): This Bulletin concerns pumps manufactured by Hayward Tyler Pump Company during the period 1977 through 1981. The NRC investigation of allegations resulted in NRC findings that-Hayward Tyler failed to effectively implement its QA program. To assure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50 have been satisfied, it was recommended that licensees conduct certain performance test There are two ASME Code Hayward Tyler Pumps at Braidwood Statio These units are utilized as essential service water booster pumps for each diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pum They are identified as ISX04P and 2SXO4 The subject pumps are ASME Class 3 equipment. The ISI requirements for Class 3 components are outlined as follows for Table IWD-2500-1 of Section XI - Division 1:

A visual examination (VT-2) shall be performed under the operating condition as a System Inservice Test (IWD-5221)

during each inspection perio A visual examination (VT-2) shall be performed under the conditions of a System Hydrostatic Test (IWD-5223) at or near the end of each inspection interval, or during the same period of each inspection interval of Inspection Program The subject pumps were tested and included the following items for each pum A pre-start test was conducted which included a pump-to-diesel engine alignment and a hand rotation of the shaf A head (flow) check was made to measure differential pressure across the pump and to calculate the pump hea f

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I A temperature check was conducted to verify temperature stabilizatio ,

A visual inspection checked the pump for leaks at the joints and mechanical seal A pump rundown check was made to note the rundown duration and smoothnes ,

A rpm speed check was made to verify proper operatio ,

The pump ran for 48 consecutive hours during the above test. The above test for ISX04P and 2SX04P was inteqrated into the Unit 1 preoperational tests of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Essential Service Water (SX) System was hydrostatically tested at 125% of rated design pressure prior to system acceptance for testin There are no spare parts for the subject pumps onsite or ordered from Hayward Tyler Pump Company (HTPC). The HTPC recommendations on replacement parts given in Attachment 3 of the subject Bulletin is incorporated into the applicable maintenance procedure. The NRC inspector reviewed the test procedure checklist and other related documentation. The actions taken by the licensee were acceptable nnd the subject pumps performed satisfactoril . Licensee Action on 10 CFR Part 21 Item (Closed) 457/84007-PP: Insufficient crush strength of energy absorbing a material (EAM) used in pipe whip restraints. This item is addressed in Paragraph 3.c of this inspection report as 10 CFR 50.55(e) (457/84019-EE).

6. Safety Evaluation Report (SER)

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(Closed) SER Item (457/86000-05): Upgrade Essential Service Water (SX)

system to and from containment fan coolers to Quality Group B; add debris screen to miniflow purge system supply duct and upgrade the !

Reactor Containment Fan Coolers (RCFC) to Quality Group B. The inspector reviewed the following drawings to verify that these SER items have been -

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Drawing Revision Sheet Items M-126 AA 3 SX Upgrade M-126 AT I Debris Screen Drawing M-126 required magnetic particle examination on the RCFC coil nozzle joint at the water box header and radiographic examination of the weld at the flange connection to the nozzle. This drawing also identified that the SX piping was to be installed as Quality Group B

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for that portion inside the containment. The NRC inspector reviewed radiographs for some of the flange welds to verify that the drawing p

requirements were met. The following radiographs were reviewed with

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no problems noted:

2VP01 AA-5-FW-1 2VP01 AA-5-FW-2 2VP01 AB-1-FW-2 '

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2VP01 AB-5-FW-2 2VP01 AA-1-FW-1 2VP01 AC-1-FW-2 1 2VP01 AC-5-FW-2 2VP01 AD-1-FW-2 7. Inspection of Electrical Switchgear Breakers i General An NRC Region III inspectw assisted an hRC Headquarters, NRR, representative in the inspection of Westinghouse breaker Models l DS-416 and 0S-206 for weld soundness, size, and length. This l inspection was performed to gather information onl It was not I a NRC regulatory compliance inspectio A minimum acceptance criteria for these welds has not been approved by the NRC at this date. The breakers observed by the NRC inspectors appeared to have adequate welds to perform their design functio Background On July 2,1987, it was reported that a DS-416 reactor trip breaker did not open on demand at McGuire Unit 2 during rod drop testing following a refueling outage. This malfunction was determined when plant personnel observed smoke in the vicinity of the reactor trip switchgea Since the breaker had not opened on demand the shunt'

coil current was not interrupted, resulting in a damaged coil. The l breaker could not be tripped manually, but did trip when the manual i charging handle was manipulated. During subsequent cycling on the test bench, the breaker jammed again. An inspection was conducted at the site jointly by Westinghouse, Duke Power, and the NRC, at which time the breaker was cycled 37-38 times. During this inspection, the breaker operated successfully each time. Visual inspection noted wear (nearly 3000 cycles of operation) and separation of the weld which attached the center pole lever to the pole shaft. The NRC issued Information Notice 87-35 on July 30, 1987, reporting this even '

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-The breaker was subsequently shipped to Westinghouse where a detailed investigation was performed following the guidelines jointly developed by Duke Power, the NRC, and Westinghouse.

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The breaker malfunctioned after some 130 operation The scenario at McGuire can be explained as follows: The roller attached to the main drive link normally rests on the outer close cam laminations. The broken weld permitted lateral movement of the main drive link which moved the roller close to its tolerance limit In the jammed position, the roller had slipped off the outer laminate of the cam. The' force exerted by the breaker closing action induced a twisting motion which caused the roller to wedge between the close cam lamination and the side frame. Although it was e;tablished that the stacking part tolerances played a part in the jamming of the breaker, it was also concluded that the breaker would not jam unless a broken weld was present to permit the I twisting action that allowed the roller to wedg Subsequent evaluation of the broken weld revealed that the weld had about 25% fusion. The mechanism producing the weld separation was low cycle fatigue with the fatigue striations indicating separation after about 2,500 cycle Inspection The NRC inspectors observed 23 breakers for evidence of cracked welds, insufficient length or inadequate sized weld, incomplete fusion, or other significant defects which could cause failure of the weld. No cracks or lack of fusion (excluding starts and stops)

was observed. Two separate inspection criteria were utilized; the original Westinghouse Specification No. 82124TA/SW, dated June 28, 1987, " Gas Metal Arc Welding of Low Carbon Steel," and an Information Letter to utilities of the Westinghouse Owners Group, dated September 11, 198 The welds observed by the NRC inspectors met the requirements of the Information Letter, dated September 11, 1987, but in some cases did not meet the original Specification requirements of No. 82124TA/SW. The general appearance of the welds was adequate to good. (No gross weld defects as experienced on the 05-416 trip breaker at McGuire were observed.) This inspection was intended to gather data to better evaluate the generic implications of the breaker failure at McGuire. The NRC inspectors did not evaluate the adequacy of the' welds inspected other than as reported abov . Walkdown of Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC), Systems The NRC inspectors performed a walkdown of selected areas of HVAC equipment to inspect for proper location, configuration, identification, general condition, and FSAR compliance. The inspection included the following areas:

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• Portions of the Control Room HVAC system components.for Units-1 and 2, including duct work, filters, chilled water cooling coils and one supply fan.

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Portions of the auxiliary building HVAC system common to both units, including supply fans, duct work, HEPA and charcoal filter plenum, and damper '

Seismic supports for duct wnrk, including approximately 120 welds and 50 silicon bronzo weld No deficiencies were identified in the area of HVAC systems. The installations were found to be in accordance with applicable drawings as described in the FSAR and-the general condition of the equipment was found to be acceptabl . Walkdown of Piping Systems The NRC inspectors performed a walkdown of selected areas of piping systems to inspect for proper location, configuration, identification, general condition and FSAR compliance. The inspection included portions of the following systems:

Chemical and Volume Control S&L Drawing M-138 Component Cooling S&L Drawing M-66 Safety Injection S&L Drawing M-136 Residual Heat Removal S&L Drawing M-1376 No deficiencies were identified during the walkdown. The installations were found to be in accordance with applicable drawings as described in the FSAR and the general condition of the equipment was found to be acceptabl . Exit Interview The Region III inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on December 10, 198 The inspector summarized the purpose and findings of the inspectio The licensee representatives acknowledged this information. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regards to documents or processes reviewed during the inspectio The licensee representatives did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.

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