IR 05000456/1987010
| ML20207T253 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1987 |
| From: | Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207T247 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-87-10, 50-457-87-10, NUDOCS 8703230353 | |
| Download: ML20207T253 (6) | |
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- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP 911SSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-456/87010(DRSS);50-457/87010(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 License No. NPF-59 Permit No. CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braceville, Illinois Inspection Conducted: March 5-6, 1987 0.
Inspector:
T. Ploski
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2/I8/87 Date LO Approved By:
W. Snell, Chief 7/8/J7 Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on March 5-6, 1987 (Reports No. 50-456/87010(DRSS);
No. 50-457/87010(DR55))
Areas Inspected: Announced followup inspection on items identified during the June 1986 Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal, and the January 1987
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emergency plan activation. This inspection was conducted by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No violations of NRC requirements were identified. All emergency preparedness open items requiring completion of corrective actions prior to initial criticality have been closed.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted,
Licensee Personnel
- E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager
- C. Schroeder, Services Superintendent
- L. Davis, Assistant. Superintendent - Technical Services
- R. Aker, Rad Chem Supervisor
- L. Literski, GSEP Coordinator
- A. Scott, GSEP Training Instructor
- P. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- R. Bedford, Regulatory Assurance Staff
- W. Lloyd, Chemist
- M. Beaumont, Radiation Chemistry Technician
- R. Polk, Radiation Chemistry Technician
- M. Andrews, Chemist
- T. Simpkiz, Regulatory Assurance Staff
- M. Takari, Regulatory Assurance Staff
- T. Chubb, HRSS Drill Controller
- J. Bowman, HRSS Drill Controller R. Richard, Tech Staff Engineer W. Brenner, Corporate Emergency Planning Staff Other Personnel E. Robinson, FEMA, Region V
- Indicates those who attended the March 6, 1987 exit interview.
2.
Licensee A>. tion on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Item No. 456/80015-8B: Bulletin issued in 1980 on possible loss of power to the emergency notification system (ENS) to the NRC Operations Center.
ENS telephones have been installed and were operable in the Control Room and Technical Support Center. The power failure requirements have been met, as both telephones receive power from the Security Bus, backed by the Security Diesel Generator, which would start and take load if the bus would fail. This item is closed.
(Closed) Item Nos. 456/86021-36 and 457/86019-36: Prior to exceeding five percent power, the prompt notification (siren) system for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) must by fully operational, including completion of training by all persons responsible for system activation.
The inspector reviewed records of training sessions held at the county sheriff's dispatching centers for Grundy, Will, and Kankakee Counties during December 1986 and January 1987. The training sessions included an overview of the encoder system, a demonstration of its functions, and hands-un training.
Besides Sheriff's Department staffs, the sessions were also attended by some county Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) officials.
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A. siren system certification test was conducted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in early December 1986,' as part of that agency',s overall~offsite emergency. planning ~ approval process. A FEMA representative stated that this. test was successful, and showed that the system for the
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Braidwood Station was adequate to'give reasonable assurance that the public can be alerted within the specified notification period. The inspector also reviewed records of stren remote interrogation tests which took place on February 3 and March 3, 1987. These records indicated that all 68 sirens had passed these interrogation tests on both dates.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Item No. 456/86046-02: 'By initial criticality, the licensee must successfully-demonstrate the use of the Unit 1 High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS) for primary coolant sampling"under simulated accident conditions. The licensee successfully demonstrated the use of the HRSS under simulated post-accident conditions during a semi-annual Health Physics drill.that was observed by the inspectors.- An actual sample of reactor coolant was collected and analyzed during this drill.
The sampling team consisted of three individuals. One functioned as
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the primary operator. Another was the secondary operator / procedure reading. Per-the procedure, the third. individual was an HRSS Chemist who could either be with the team or remain at the Operational Support Center (OSC).
It was apparent that the chemist's preferred location was with the team.
Prior to sample collection activities, the team members thoroughly checked their equipment and had a good discussion of relevant-procedures.
In addition to throat microphones, the team members obtained personal dosimetry, protective clothing, and respiratory protection equipment in accordance with pre-approved Radiation Work Permits for emergency use that were maintained in the TSC.
Althouch Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBAs) would be utilized at leaat during the initial entry into the HRSS room under' emergency conditions, the facility was equipped so that each team member could transfer his air supply to large, compressed breathing air tanks maintained outside the room.
This, however, necessitated that a team member first: climb up on the bottle rack in order to manipulate the regulator valves for this air supply system. This maneuver was perceived as an unnecessary safety hazard by the inspectors, especially if the climber was waaring a SCBA.
During the sample collection activities the personnel repeatedly demonstrated good teamwork. Communications using the throat microphones were adequate, even when team members utilized a telephone to talk to Control Room personnel. Adherence to procedural steps was very good.
The procedures were formulated so that the reader had to initial each step upon completion and also log the task completion times, when appropriate. At each step, the operator was required to repeat back the instructions given by the procedure reader. All personnel demonstrated good familiarity with the HRSS panels, and were very conscientious about
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minimizing their simulated exposures by using reach rods or remaining behind other control panels to obtain some additional shielding from the sample collection area. The HRSS Chemist remained in positive control of the team's activities at all times. During the source line purging process, the chemist noted that gauge RC-G1 was indicating an erroneously high reactor coolant system pressure, despite the fact that the gauge had a current calibration sticker. While this did not impact sampling activities, this gauge must be repaired. The chemist later indicated that a work request had been submitted to repair this gauge.
The team observed good Health Physics practices when preparing the sample for transport to the Hot Lab. While the HRSS room was equipped with a
dumb waiter" to facilitate sample transfer to the lab, this device was not yet operable, nor was a small lead pig available for use with the dumb waiter.
At the Hot Lab, the sampling team and laboratory personnel adequately demonstrated their abilities to analyze the liquid sample.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Item No. 456/86046-03: By initial criticality, the licensee must successfully demonstrate the use of the Unit 1 Containment Air Sampling Panel (CASP) under simulated accident conditions.
Following the demonstration of the HRSS, the same three person team successfully demonstrated the use of the CASP and the CASP Control Panel (CCP). As the team had previously demonstrated an adequate knowledge of protective equipment requirements for post-accident sampling activities, the inspectors did not require them to wear SCBAs or protective clothing, other than rubber gloves, during this drill.
The team exhibited good familiarity with the sampling procedures and
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equipment. Good teamwork, and positive control of team activities by the l
HRSS' chemist were apparent during the demonstration.
However, several minor problems were noted. Due to the cramped location of the CASP and CCP, it would be awkward for the operator, equipped with a SCBA, to manipulate the CCP and also check-off the procedural steps. One of the operators experienced several problems with the gas partitioning device.
At first, he had problems obtaining a vacuum, probably due to a bad seal on the sample cartridge. During the second attempt at utilizing the l
equipment, the needle on the particulate / iodine cartridge syringe was damaged. The third attempt at collecting the sample was successful.
Whether these problems were material or personnel in nature, the operator should have taken more care when setting up the gas partitioning device and in adjusting and aligning the syringe needle of the particulate / iodine cartridge with the sample vial holder. The inspectors concluded that the problems in obtaining the air sample were partially due to occasional distractions resulting from workers or guards passing through the CASP sampling area, and the team's awareness that the day s demonstrations were behind schedule.
The inspectors were satisfied that the team was
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adequately familiar with the CASP and CCP equipment and the relevant
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procedures. The team demonstrated adequate Health Physics practices when
. transporting the sample for laboratory analysis. This item is closed.
(Closed) Item Nos. 456/86055-01 and 457/86042-01: By initial criticality,-
the Technical Support Center (TSC) must be equipped with: a fully operational-emergency ventilation system; an aperture card reader /
printer; and approved Technical Specifications.
The inspectors reviewed copies of the TSC ventilation system's acceptance test results and visually inspected system components.
Successful tests of the system have been completed to ensure _ proper installation and operation of its components, including: dampers, filters, heaters, instrumentation, controls, alarms, and interlocks. Testing, including
' leakage tests with' filters installed, were completed in the first quarter of 1987. The acceptance test program was considered as the first surveillance on the system.
Future system surveillances will be performed on an 18-month schedule. A visual inspection of system components indicated that charcoal and HEPA filters were installed and that various gauges had current calibration stickers.
An aperture card reader / printer was installed and operable in the TSC.
Central Files staff were responsible for maintaining the aperture card files. Two controlled copies of approved Braidwood Station Technical Specifications were also in the TSC. This item is closed.
(Closed) Item Nos. 456/86055-02 and 457/86042-02: By initial criticality, all stretchers must be positioned in their procedurally specified locations. The inspectors toured the site and determined that 24 of 27 stretchers were in their procedurally specified locations. The inspectors did not deem it to be necessary to verify the remaining three stretchers.
The total number of stretchers visually verified was determined to be more than adequate. This item is closed.
3.
Emergency Plan Activation (Closed) Item No. 456/870XX-01: Emergency Plan Activation. Between fuel load and March 4, 1987, the station's emergency plan was activated on one occasion. On the evening of January 21, 1987, the Shift Engineer (SE)
declared an Alert due to the brief loss of a system needed to maintain Unit 1 in a cold shutdown condition.
Adequately detailed records of the January 1987 event which were reviewed by the inspector included:
the Licensee Event Report submitted to the NRC; the SE's log excerpts for the time period in question; Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) forms used to document the conversations with appropriate Illinois agencies; a copy of the NRC's Event Notification Worksheet completed by licensee personnel in order to document the conversation with the NRC Duty Officer; and the GSEP Coordinator's worksheet used to document the internal evaluation of the station's response to this emergency plan activation.
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At about 1802 hours0.0209 days <br />0.501 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.85661e-4 months <br /> on January 21, 1987,-the.1A component cooling water pump tripped due to'an indication of low level'In its surge tank. The i
1B pump started automatically, but soon tripped due to low level in the surge tank. As a result, the component cooling wtter supply to the only lost. Thus, the RHR system was declared froperable. Operating personne,l operable train of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)csystem was temporarily
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F began refilling the surge tank and begac investigating thi cause of the',
low surge tank level. The tank was adequate'y refill;3d in abaut ten
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minutes. At about 1816 hours0.021 days <br />0.504 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.90988e-4 months <br /> the 1A component coolir.f water pump was
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successfully restarted, thus restoring the operability cf tw RHR system and effectively ending the event.
L Meanwhile, the SE and Operating Engineer began efforts to classify the situation per the station's Emergency Action Levels (EALs). Although one train of the RHR system had been returned to service by about 1816
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hours, the SE conservatively declared an Alert >at.1825 hours0.0211 days <br />0.507 hours <br />0.00302 weeks <br />6.944125e-4 months <br />, as an EAL condition warranting an Alert declaration had been satisfied between i
L about 1802 and 1816 hours0.021 days <br />0.504 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.90988e-4 months <br />.
Initialnotificationcallstoapproprfate i
State Agencies and the NRC Operations Center were made about 13 rnd
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33 minutes following the emergency declaration, respectively. Both times are within the regulatory time limits for initial notifications.,
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Between the initial notification calls to the State agencies and the
.NRC, licensee personnel utilized the NARS to inform the State that the
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emergency condition had already been termin'ated. Thus, the initial call'
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to the NRC Operations Center served the deel purpose of informing the Outy Officer that a classifiable emergoney condition had existed, but s
that it had already been eliminated.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.
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4.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Improvement Ityms, t
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions on improvement items summarized in Appendix B to the Emergency preparedress Impivmentation Appraisal (Inspection Report No. 456/8.6021 and 417/86019). The following items were inspected and considered at:ceptable:' 17,18,19, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 39, 41, 42, 49, 51, 55, and 61.
5.
Exit Interview On March 6,1987, the inspectors met with those license representatives denoted in Paragraph I to present the preliminary ins;lection findings.
The licensee did not in11cate that any of the items discussed were i
proprietary in nature. '
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