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Insp Repts 50-456/87-14 & 50-457/87-14 on 870412-0620.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items,Ler Review,Maint,Procurement, Surveillances,License Issuance & Initial Criticality
	ML20235R507
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	07/06/1987
From:	Little W; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20235R481	List: IR 05000456/1987014; ML20235R479;
References
	50-456-87-14, 50-457-87-14, GL-85-22, IEIN-87-004, IEIN-87-4, NUDOCS 8707210346
	Download: ML20235R507 (16)
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     ' REGION III Reports ~No. 50-456/87014(DRP); 50-457/87014(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-70; CPPR-133-Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company-Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690-Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted: April 12 through June 20, 1987 Inspectors: ' M.'. Tongue

  - J. Krop T. E. Taylor
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L. R. Wharton s / ll Approved By: W. S..L ttI , /' ector f//[[[ Braidwood Projec Dste' Inspection Summary Inspection on Avil 12 through June 20, 1987 (Reports No. 50-456/87014(DRP); 50-457/87014(DRP)) Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection of activities with regard to regional request; licensee action on previously identified items, licensee event reports review; maintenance; procurement; surveillance; onsite followup of events occurring during the inspection period; Unit 1 startup test witnessing and observation; license issuance; initial criticality witnessing; Unit 2 preoperational testing; operational safety verification; radiological protection; engineered safety feature systems; physical security; monthly maintenance observation; Unit 2 plant tour; training; report review; document review; and meetings, training, and other activitie Results: No violations or deviations were identifie l l h G

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacte J. Wallace, Manager of Projects

* E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager W. Vahle, Construction Superintendent
*C. W. Schroeder, Station Services Superintendent L. E. Davis, Assistant Superintendent,-Technical Services K. Kofron, Production Superintendent B. Byers', Assistant Construction Superintendent
.M. Lohman,~ Project Startup Superintendent P. Cretens, Station Startup Assistant Superintendent F. Willaford, Security Administrator D. Paquette, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent D. O'Brien, Operations As'sistant Superintendent E. L. Martin, Quality Assurance Superintendent D. L. Shamblin, Assistant Project Manager R. Benn, Assistant Security Administrator G._E. Groth, Project field Engineering Manager
*P. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
*M. Takaki, Quality Control Supervisor
*R. E. Aker, Radiation / Chemistry. Supervisor J. Jasnoz, Tech Staff AR/PR Coordinator R._Lemke, Technical Staff Supervisor
* M. Orlov, Staff Assistant to Project Manager
*P. Holland, Regulatory Assurance T. W. Simpkin, Operating Experience Group R. C. Bedford, Regulatory Assurance
~ R. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor L. Kline, Regulatory Assurance Industry Group
*L. W. Raney, Nuclear Safety T. Bobic, Electrical Maintenance A. J. D' Antonio, Quality Control J. Gosnell, Supervisor Quality Control R. J. Ungeran, Operating Engineer Unit 1 R. Yungk, Operating Engineer R. J. Legner, Lead Operating Engineer S. Hedden, Master Instrument Maintenance R. Hoffman, Master Mechanical Maintenance
*W. McGee Training
*ilenotes those attending the exit interview conducted on June 19, 1987 or at other times throughout the inspection perio The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, startup engineers, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, contract security personnel, and construction personne _ _ _ _____ - -

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 . Regional Request Offshift Inspection of the Control Room In the light of recent concerns related to sleeping operators at a nuclear facility, the resident inspectors were requested by Region III to monitor control room activities during backshifts, e.g., between midnight and 0400. This was done or several occasions during'the inspection period. Control room personnel acknowledged the presence of the inspectors and provided briefings on the ongoing   i activitie.s when requested. No unacceptable conditions were note Review of I.E. Information Notices As requested by letter dated May 18, 1987, from C. E. Norelius to Senior Resident Inspectors relative to " Assignment of Review   l of Specific IE Information Notices," the inspector reviewed the   ]

licensee's response to the IE Information Notices (ins) addressed' ! in the May 18, 1987 letter. The results are as follows:

  (1) IN 87-04, " Diesel Generator Fails Test Because of Degraded Fuel." At Braidwood Station each Unit 1 diesel generator has two fuel oil storage tanks (25,000 gal.). Each of these tanks has a fuel oil transfer pump and strainer which feeds a common day tank. Each Unit 2 diesel generator has one fuel oil storage tank (50,000 gal.) and two fuel oil transfer pumps and strainers which feed a common day tank. The day tank is equipped with an overflow line running back to the fuel oil storage tank This allows for recirculation of the fuel oil while the diesel generator is in operatio The fuel line traveling from the day tank to the diesel generator has a set of parallel filters and strainers which allows one filter or strainer to remain in service while the other is on standb Each of the diesel fuel oil strainers and filters have differential pressure (dp) gauges which actuate high dp alarms at the local control pane Site Procedure BwVS 8.1.~1.2.e-1 requires that the filters and strainers be replaced every 18 months. Additionally, Procedure  l Bw05 8.1.1.2.e-1 requires that the diesel fuel oil be sampled monthly for oil particulate and Procedure 18w0S 8.1.1.2.c-1 requires that the diesel fuel oil storage tanks be sampled monthly for accumulated wate (2) ins 87-08, 87-10, and 87-12 are not applicable to the Braidwood Statio Generic Letter Review By memorandum, dated February 28, 1986, Region III requested that   l the resident inspectors review specific Generic Letters (GLs). The   I inspector reviewed the licensee's program to assure that the GLs are reviewed by appropriate personnel, that procedures are written or   i revised to address the issues, and that equipment is installed as appropriat _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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e The inspector reviewed the following generic letter:

  (Closed) Generic Letter 456/85022; 457/85022: Potential for Loss of Post-LOCA Recirculation Capability Due to Insulation Debris Blockag No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items Open Item (Closed) 50-456/86051-02; 50-457/86039-02: RCTs to demonstrate their qualifications in the collection of samples from RCS and secondary systems. The RCTs completed their training on the routine sampling of the RCS and the operation of the secondary sampling pane The inspectors had previously observed RCTs collecting routine samples from the HRSS (Inspection Reports No. 50-456/87008; and No 50-457/87007) and from the secondary system sampling panel (Inspection Reports No. 50-456/87012; and No. 50-457/87012).

Although the qualification cards for the operation of the primary system (RCS) were incomplete, the inspectors' review of the training records verified that 28 of the 29 RCTs had participated in classes on the operation of the HRSS for both accident and routine sampling of the RCS. They qualified for operation of the system by passing both written and practical examinations. Review of their qualification cards showed that the RCTs had been trained, tested, and signed off for operation of the secondary panel sampling system. This item is closed.

r Violations (Closed) 456/86063-01: Surveillance activities were not performed in accordance with established procedures. This violation consisted of three examples of the licensee's failure to adhere to surveillance program procedures. These examples and the licensee's corrective actions are as follows:

  (1) The surveillance program for the Engineered Safety Feature undervoltage, grid degraded voltage, and the reactor coolant pump undervoltage was inadequat The licensee's corrective action consisted of initiating work request packages to recalibrates relays PR43CO-427B141 and PR10CO-5278142 to the Technical Specification acceptance criteri The corrective action also required the Technical Staff to submit a list of relays to Electrical Maintenance which required inspection / testing in accordance with Procedure BwHP 300- The licensee's corrective action to avoid further violations included developing and issuing a new Surveillance Procedure, BwHS 4009-041. This procedure complies with

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Administrative Procedure BwAR 1400-7, which defines the required content of a surveillance procedure including acceptance criteri (2) The monthly operability surveillance for the diesel generator (DG) identified that both DG air start receivers were required to be greater than 240 psig. The surveillance was signed acceptable with one receiver less than 240 psi The licensee's corrective action consisted of issuing a temporary change to Surveillance Procedure 1Bw0S 8.1.1.2.a.1(2) to require that one of the air receiver's pressure be greater than 240 psi Additional corrective action consisted of reviewing 203 other operating department surveillance for other similar problem The licensee's corrective action to avoid further violations consisted of the Operating Department Surveillance Coordinator conducting training of the Operating Staff. The training pertained to documenting acceptance criteria and the use of the comments section of the surveillance data shee (3) A monthly surveillance required for Mode 4 was performed for documenting the current valve lineup for the Essential Service Water System (SX) in Mode 5. The valve lineup did not meet the acceptance criteria; however, the surveillance data sheet was marked as acceptable. This information was entered into the General Surveillance Program showing the surveillance l acceptable for Mode 4,

The licensee's corrective action consisted of revising the General Surveillance Program to reflect that the SX monthly surveillance, 1Bw0S 7.4.A-1, is required to be performed prior to entry into Mode 4. The corrective action to avoid further violations consisted of training each departmental surveillance coordinator in the proper use of the surveillance data sheets with emphasis on acceptance criteria and use of comments section The inspector reviewed the implementation of the above corrective actions and noted no problems. To measure the effectiveness of the corrective actions, the inspector reviewed 55 surveillance packages 3 with no problems being noted similar to those identified in this 1 violation. The result of this review is documented in Paragraph 8 of this repor This item is considered to be close (Closed) 456/85048-01; 457/85047-01: Improper torque switch setting The inspector reviewed the OAD procedure, " Procedures for Torque ! Switch and Limit Switch Rotor Settings for Limitorque Motor Operated i Valves," Revision 1, dated November 13, 1985, and the documentation showing the recommended factory settings and the values of the settings recorded in the fiel The torque switch settings for motor operated valves No.1CV8355B, No. ISI88078, and No. ISI8814 l were verified to be at the recommended settings. This violation is considered close ; l i

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,' ~ Deviation (Closed) 456/84006-07; 457/84006-07: Insufficient separation between safety-related DC cables from ESF Division 11 and Division 12 in the lower cable spreading room. The inspector reviewed Amendment 7 to the Braidwood FSAR and Drawings No. 20E-1-3361C11, No. 20E-1-3361, and No. 20E-1-3071. This-review. indicated that the existing separation would be acceptable if the conduits containing the cables were enclosed in fireproofing with a one hour rating since there was already automatic fire suppression in this zone. The inspector verified that Conduits No. 69, No. 70, and'No. 71 at elevation 439'-451' in the lower cable spreading room had been enclosed in
"Thermolag" fireproofing. This deviation is considered close Licensee Event Reports (LER) Review
~ Through' direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in accordance with technical l specifications:
~(Closed) 456/86001-01: Violated Fire Watches Due to Personnel Error. This supplemental LER was submitted as a summary of eight fire watch violations I for various reasons between October 21 through December 2, 1986. The causes were personnel errors such as; inattentiveness, miscommunication, and misunderstanding of instructions. The licensee provided a number of corrective actions such as retraining and dismissal, depending on the actions of the individuals involved. A notice of violation was previously issued (reference 456/87007-02(DRP)) for similar violations. The licensee is in the process of developing a respons (Closed) 456/87017-00: Failure to Dual Verify Liquid Radioactive Release Valve Lineup. The cause was found to be a rad waste foreman's (non-licensed supervisor) failure to recognize the Technical Specification requiremen The licensee is reviewing the applicable Procedure, BwCP 423-1T1, " Liquid Release Tank Form," for a revision. In addition, all rad waste foremen were trained through a discussion of the situatio (Closed) 456/87018-00: Train B Containment Isolation Signal Due to an Undervoltage Condition Sensed by Containment Incident Fuel Monitor 1RTAR01 The licensee determined the cause to be a momentary weather induced loss of offsite powe .(Closed) 456/87019-00: Shiftly Daily Surveillance Missed to Check Pressurizer Pressure Channels Due to Procedural Error. The licensee has implemented a temporary procedure change for immediate corrective actions and is. developing a permanent change to the common Byron /Braidwood Procedure, Bw05 0.1-1,2,3, "Shiftly and Daily Operating Surveillance,"

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} L (Closed)' 456/87020-00: Power Supply Cooling Fan Failure Results ._in Loss-of Control Room Fire Protection Zone Annunciators. The shift placed all available personnel on fire' watch in the auxiliary building within one hour, restored _ power to the affected panel within two hours, and placed sufficient fire watches within six hours of the event.

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 ' Closed) 456/87021-00: Turbine T_ rip / Reactor Trip Signal Generated Due to Momentary Unblock of P-7. This event was caused by maintenance personnel performing a solder repair of a loose wire connector _ on an energized circuit for the reactor protection system. This resulted in the unplanned tri The licensee is modifying Procedure BwMP 4006-011, " Electrical Maintenance Troubleshooting Work Sheet," to inhibit and/or remove from service any channels prior to performing a repair on energized electrical equipment, if appropriate and based on plant condition (Closed) 456/87022-00: Reactor Trip Due to Personnel Error as Result of Failure to follow Procedure. The cause was determined to be operator error and failing to follow the procedur This was contributed to by a procedure step with two actions. Corrective actions were to correct the condition of the equipment, advising operators, and-temporary and permanent
 ' procedure changes to Bw0S 3.1.1-20 and 21, " Train A (B) Bi-Monthly Surveillance."

The preceding LERs have been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, and when the incidents described meet all of the following requirement, no Notice of Violation is normally issued for that item:

, The event was identified by the licensee, 'The event was an incident that, according.to the current enforcement policy, met the criteria for Severity Levels IV or V violations,
 - The event was appropriately reported, .The event was or will be corrected (including measures to prevent recurrence within a reasonable amount of time), and e '. The event was not a' violation that could have been prevented by the licensee's corrective actions for a previous violatio In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection perio This was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance, potential trends, etc. DVRs were also reviewed for assurance that they were generated appropriately and dispositioned in a manner consistent with the applicable procedures and the QA manua !

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. tiaintenance The' inspectors reviewed several completed Nuclear Work Request (NWR)

packages. The areas of interest were adequacy of work instructions, post maintenance testing, and work request backlog. The inspectors identified concerns relative to the method used to document post maintenance testin In some cases,.the licensee' identified testing requirements contained in an existing surveillance procedure, but the procedure was not used for-the NWRs reviewe Discussions with licensee personnel identified that this practice no longer existed and that the surveillance procedures were now being use The instructions contained in the.NWRs appeared to be adequate _ for the work activity and the NWR backlog was not excessiv The,following NWRs were reviewed: A11961 A10189 A10262 A08319 A11518 20SIO62 A08430 A10714 20SIO48 No violations or deviations were identifie . Procurement During this inspection period, an individual from the Quality Evaluation Section of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation visited the Braidwood site to participate in a procurement inspection. The inspectors selected several procurement documents to verify licensee compliance to the specified technical and quality assurance requirements for the procurement of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the procurement of commercial grade items and their subsequent upgrading to a safety related applicatio When reviewing the commercial grade procurement activities, a concern was identified by the inspector This concern pertained to the engineering evaluation utilized to upgrade (dedicate) the commercial grade item to a safety-related item. Discussions with licensee personnel revealed that this engineering evaluation is performed during the initial procurement of the commercial grade and is not performed for subsequent purchases unless the manufacturer's part number has changed since the initial purchase. The inspectors are concerned that a manufacturer could change the design of an item without changing the part number. Licensee personnel stated that previous attempts to require a vendor in a procurement document to notify them of any design changes met with considerable vendor resistance. Pending further review, the concern that safety-related commercial grade items are being reordered based solely on a part number is considered an Open Item (456/87014-01(DRP); 457/87014-01(DRP)). No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance The inspectors reviewed documentation pertaining to 55 surveillanc These reviews included the most current surveillance results as well as the results of past surveillance. The inspectors reviewed the surveillance packages for the following: l

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* evaluation of the.results by the shift personnel      j o . reviews by the operating staff
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* proper tracking of partial surveillance      1 The reviews of the surveillance packages revealed no problems with the data recorded or with any of the attributes identified abov However, the inspectors did have a concern with the ;ontrol of the surveillance packages'after their review by the shift personne Several of the surveillance documentation packages requested by the inspectors were not readily retrievable. These surveillance packages were retrieved within several hours and some were retrieved in three days. These surveillance packages had been reviewed by the shift personnel and were in the process of being reviewed by the operating staff. Even though all the surveillance packages requested by the inspectors were eventually retrieved, the inspectors are concerned that the review process of the surveillance packages by the operating staff (operating engineer and/or technical staff supervisor) is not adequately controlled. This lack of control could result in a loss of surveillance packages which would deem the affected systems / component inoperabl During this inspection activity the inspectors reviewed documentation associated with the following surveillance packages:

BwVS 6.3.3-18 SwVS 6.3.3-5 BwVS 6.3.3-19 Bw0S DC-WY Bw0S 6.2.1.A-1 BwVS 6.3.3-10 Bw05 7.3.1-1 Bw0S 6.1.1.A-1 BwVS 6.3.3-6 Bw05 6.1.7.1-1 SwVS 6.3.3-2 Bw05 7.1.2.1.A-2 BwVS 6.3.3-22 BwVS 0.5.2.R Bw0S 7.1.2.1.A-1 Bw05 3.3.5-1 Bw05 3.2.1-812 18w05 3.2.1-816 IBw0S 3.2.1-806 BwHS 4009-21 IBw05 8.1.1.2.E-1 18w05 8.1.1.2.a-2 1BwIS 3.2.1-007 18wIS 3.1.1-040 BwIS 3.1.1-003 BwIS 3.201-204 1BwIS 3.2.1-012 1BwIS 3.2.1-010 BwVS 0.5-2.C w0S 3.2.1-900 18w05 5.1.1.C-1 1Bw0S 3.2.1-820 IBwVS 6.3.3-11 IBw0S 3.2.1-803 IBw05 3.2.1-821 IBwVS 6.3.3-12 IBwVS 0.5-2.R wVS 7.1.5-1 1Bw0S 3.1.1-10 1BwVS 3.2.1-3 18wVS 3.3.1-2 18wVS 3.3.9-2 BwVS 3.3.9-3 BwVS 3.3.1-3 18wVS 6.3.3-15 BwVS 0.5.2-RH.2-1 Bw S 0.5.2.5 BwVS 0.5.2.C BwVS 0.5.2.C BwVS 0.5.3.AF 1-1 BwVS 0.5.3.AF.1-2 ! BwVS 0.5.3.CC.1-1 BwVS 0.5.2.Si.2-5 BwVS 0.5.2.CV.2-2 BwVS 0.5.2.CV.2-3 No violations or deviations were identifie I

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. Onsite Followup of Events Occurring Durir.g the Inspection Period Cracking Identified in the Unit 1 Condensate Piping On April 16, 1987, a one to two gallon per minute leak was detected in
'the condensate pump common header at the junction of the "D" condensate pump discharge line. The failure was determined to be caused by metallurgical fatigue. The licensee cooled the plant down, made repairs, conducted additional analyses, and placed additional support under the heade This matter was reported to the NRC and additional followup inspect-ion has been conducted by a Region III Division of Reactor Safety metallurgy specialis Severe Electrical Storm Activates the Seismic Monitors During a severe electrical storm on May 19, 1987, the seismic monitors alarmed when lightning struck the containment buildings and associated auxiliary and turbine buildings. The monitors indicated that the operational base earthquake and safe shutdown earthquake had occurre In addition, a relay house in the main switchyard was struck, but war, returned to normal status after replacing some electrical fuses. Some other temporary instrumentation problems also resulted. Inspections of the affected areas showed no evidence of damage. The station personnel verified through the load dispatcher that there was no other evidence of an actual earthquake. As a courtesy, the licensee reported the occurrence to the NRC via ENS telephon Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Opening While Out of Service During Maintenance On June 6, 1987, the licensee discovered the 1B MSIV open when it had been out of service and declared inoperable for maintenance. Investigation revealed that while performing maintenance on the 1B MSIV, which was gagged closed, maintenance personnel inadvertently bled off the hydraulic oil pressur Due to the loss of hydraulic oil pressure, the steam generator pressure exerted enough force to break the gag device and force open the valve. Upon discovery, the licensee promptly entered the Limiting Operating Condition Action Requirement, re-shut the valve and placed a stronger gag on the valv They informed the senior resident inspector (0ps) who was onsite and made a courtesy ENS notification. The SRI examined the area, reviewed the licensee's actions and verified the loading calculations and all were found to be acceptable. The licensee reduced temperature and pressure prior to completing the maintenance work. The work was completed on June 17, 198 Seismic Event An earthquake occurred at 6:49 p.m. (CDT) on June 10, 1987, centered at Lawrenceville, Illinois, measuring 5.0 on the Richter scal The location is about 200 miles south of Braidwood and was felt at the sit The Senior Resident Inspector (0ps) was onsite at the time, went to the control room and found that the control room personnel were made aware l

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of the event by the load dispatche No seismic ' alarms were activate The licensee made a precautionary plant tour. for damage and none was identifie Reactor Trip Breakers On May 26, 1987,.while troubleshooting a Shutdown. Bank C rod withdrawal failure,.an attempt was madeJto close the Reactor. Trip Breakers. Reactor Trip Breaker "A" failed to close. Investigation by the licensee revealed that the trip latch, which is designed to be. fastened on the pivot pin was no longer fastened. The trip latch therefore, could not rotate. The licensee. informed Westinghouse, the manufacturer of the Reactor Tri Breaker, of the failure of the trip latch. Preliminary evaluation by Westinghouse determined that if the failure of the trip latch had occurred during plant operation, the breaker would have tripped ope :The licensee has shipped the Reactor Trip Breaker to Westinghouse for

   - analysis. Westinghouse will issue a failure analysis report at a later
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dat . Unit 1 Startup Test Witnessing and Observation The. inspectors witnessed performance of portions of the following Unit 1 startup test procedures in order to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with the operating license and procedural requirements, test data was properly recorded, and performance of licensee personnel conducting the tests demonstrated an understanding of assigned duties an? responsibilities: BwSU RD-34A, Bank Worth Measurement At Zero Power BwSU RD-348, Bank Worth With Overlap Measurement At Zero Power BwSU IC-31, Incore Flux Mapping At Low Power In order to accomplish the above, the inspectors verified that the proper procedure revision was available and in use, minimum crew requirements were met, test prerequisites were met or, if waived, were done in accordance with Technical Specifications, and required test equipment was calibrated to appropriate standards and inservice crew actions were coordinated, timely and correct. Routinely, the inspectors reviewed planning documents, various applicable logs, and attended planning meetings to monitor test planning and progres No violations or deviations were identifie . License Issuance On May 19, 1987, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) issued a decision recommending issuance of an operating license for Braidwood Unit 1. On May 21, 1987, NRR issued license (NPF-70) for Unit 1 authorizing operating power levels up to 5% power.

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1 Initial Criticality Witnessing The'initia1' criticality was achieved on May 29, 1987 at 10:39 The inspectors' continuously monitored the preparation, approach, and achievement of criticalit ] The inspectors noted that the_ initial criticality was achieved in a competent'and professional manne Plant operations went smoothly and without-incident. Operating personnel were prompt.to identify minor problems, such as an intermittent failure in the digital rod position indication (DRPI), anomaly in the intermediate range instrument failure, et Corrective actions, such as securing dilution and evaluation, were

 : conducted in a conservative manner' The procedure followed was BwSU NR-31,
 " Initial Criticality."

No violations or deviations were identifie . Unit 2 Preoperational Testing Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Test Witnessing l During the inspection, the inspectors witnessed portions of ESF tests to l verify that testing was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, l- independently verify portions of the test results, and evaluate the performance of licensee personnel conducting the tests. The inspector witnessed operation of logic; protection and alarm functions, including response times; demonstrated redundancy and electrical independence and l coincidence; bus stripping signals, separation of non-vital loads and proper sequencing of vital loads; and sensor operation During the inspection, portions of the following tests were witnessed: BwPT-EF-51 ECCS Full Flow BwPT DG-50 Diesel Generator 2A BwPT DG-51 Diesel Generator 2B BwPT DG-52 Emergency Diesel Generator Test BwPT AP-56 Bus Loading and Independence During the tests, the inspector found that they were run in a timely, well planned and well executed manner, that the personnel performing the l tests were properly informed on the subjects and the tests were carried l out in a professional manne No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during the inspection period to make an independent assessment of equipment conditions, plant conditions, construction activities, security, fire protection, general personnel safety, housekeeping, and adherence to applicable regulatory requirements. During the tours, the inspectors reviewed various logs, daily orders, interviewed personnel, attended shift briefings and plan

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of the day meetings, witnessed various construction work activities, and independently determined equipment status. During the shift changes, the inspector observed operator, shift control room engineer, and shift engineer turnovers and panel walkdown Throughout the inspection period, up to the issuance of the operating license NPF-70, the inspectors verified that all applicable requirements for Unit 1 were met during this period which included periodic checks of the locked valves for boron dilution prevention as required by the interim license NPF-5 These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative proccdure No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Protection The inspectors selected portions of the licensee's radiological program to verify conformance with facility policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements. Various functions observed were the Health Physics Manager's awareness of any unusual conditions or challenges, implementation of the ALARA program, use of Radiological Work Permits (RWPs), control and monitoring of radiation exposures, including work in high radiation areas if applicable, and control of radioactive materia No violations or deviations were identifie . Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems During the inspection, the inspector selected accessible portions of several ESF systems to verify their statu Consideration was given to the plant mode, applicable Technical Specification, Limiting Conditions for Operating Requirements (LC0ARs), and other applicable requirement Various observations, where applicable, were made of hangers and supports; housekeeping; freeze protection; valve positions and conditions; potential ignition sources; major component labeling, lubrication, cooling, etc.; and interior conditions of electrical breakers and control panel Instrumentation was verified to be properly installed, functioning and significant process parameter valves were consistent with expected values. Instrumentation was calibrated; necessary support systems were operational; and breaker and valve positions concurred locally and at the control panel During the inspection, the following ESF systems / components were walked down: UNIT 1 1A Emergency Diesel Generator IB Emergency Diesel Generator Safety Injection Accumulators

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s No violations or deviations were identifie . Physical Security At various times throughout the inspection period, the inspectors monitored compliance with the Physical Security Plan (PSP). . Observations were made of, selections of manning levels and collateral duties of assigned personnel; access control equipment and processes, such as x-ray machines, metal detectors, explosive detectors, and other search mechanisms; PA and VA barrier maintenance procedure adherence; compensatory. measures implementation when required; badging and escorting practices within the PA and VA; and various detection / assessment' aids operability, such

 .as fences and clarity and resolution of the PA and TV monitor illuminatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or. standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: .the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to. initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were-properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente Work' requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activity was observed / reviewed:

Repair of IB Main Steam Isolation Valve Following completion of maintenance of the valve, the inspector verified that the system had been returned to service properl No violations or deviations were identifie < 1 Unit 2 Plant Tour The inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work and plant conditions during general inspections in Unit 2 wort area ' Observation of work included cable trays, junction boxes, pipe support welding and mechanical equipmen Particular attention was given to material identification, nonconforming material identification and

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9* ,- housekeeping. The_ inspector reviewed work activities by reviewing travelers while touring the plant. These travelers pertained to electrical, piping, and hanger installatio No violations or deviations were identified.

, 19. Training The effectiveness of_ training programs for licensed and non-licensed

. personnel were reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of the licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and
' operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response to events which occurred during the inspection period. Personnel-appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of trainin No violations or deviations were identifie . Report Review During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the itcensee's Monthly Operating Reports for April and May 1987. The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9. and Regulatory Guide 1.1 The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Reports for March, April, and May 198 No violations or deviations were identifie . Document Review During the inspection period, a number of documents were reviewed by the inspectors in order to gain familiarity with the content and clarify their understanding. In addition, the licensee documents were reviewed for conformance with other regulatory standard The following documents were reviewed: Facility Operating License NPF-70 issued May 21, 198 ! Technical Specifications issued as Appendix A to License No. NPF-70 (NUREG-1261) as amended from License No. NPF-5 ASLB Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Planning Issues of May 13, 198 ASLB Concluding Partial Initial Decision (Operating License) of May 19,1987, ASLBP 79-410-03-OL including the Dissenting Opinio Commonwealth Edison's Braidwood Plan for Managing Unit 1/ Unit 2 Concurrent Activitie This is an expansion of the licensee's
" Error Free Plan" that was previously implemente _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - - _ _ _

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l Commonwealth Edison's Braidwood Operating Department Watchstanding Practices OJT Checklist. This is a comprehensive training guide ( and check off plan for training non-licensed operating personne ' No violations or deviations were identifie . Meetings, Training, and Other Activities Emergency Planning Meeting The Senior Resident Inspector (Operations) attended a public meeting held on May 20, 1987, at the Reed Custer High School in Braidwood, on Emergency Preparedness for the Braidwood Station. The meeting was hosted by the Emergency Services and Disaster Administration (ESDA) and participants were ESDA personnel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III, Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS), and the County emergency coordinators from Will and Grundy Counties. Following formal presentations, the participants responded to questions from members of the public and the pres Site Visits by NRC Staff Members of NRR Headquarters staff and Region III staff were onsite on June 11 and June 18, 1987 for site familiarization and plant tour On both occasions, the licensee made presentations on the status of the station and exchanged information with the NRC personne . Open Item l Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed by the inspector and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee and contractor representatives denoted in Paragraph I during and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 19, 1987. The inspector summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natur I

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IR 05000456/1987014

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