IR 05000456/1987006
| ML20206F037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1987 |
| From: | Patterson J, Ploski T, Snell W, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206F013 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-87-06, 50-456-87-6, 50-457-87-05, 50-457-87-5, NUDOCS 8704140080 | |
| Download: ML20206F037 (22) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-456/87006(DRSS); 50-457/87005(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 License No. NPF-59; Construction Permit No. CPPR-133 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Braidwood Station, Braceville, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
March 17-20, 1987 ffN
'/fl87 Inspectors:
T. Ploski, Team Leader Date b0.
I J. Patterson 4/7/sv Date Y' Y N. Williamsef'
4h/s7 Date Approved By:
W.
n'e ief 4/7/a7 Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on March 17-20, 1987 (Reports No. 50-456/87006(DRSS); 50-457/87005(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection of the Braidwood Station's emergency preparedness exercise, involving observation by seven NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
Results:
No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identified as a result of the inspection.
e70414o000 870407 PDR ADoCK 0500o456 rh PDR l
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-DETAILS 1.'
Persons Contacted a.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed T. Ploski, Control Room (CR),ty (E0F) Technical Support Center (TSC),
Emergency Operations Facili J. Patterson, Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams F. McManus, CR, TSC H..Peterson, CR, TSC M. Smith, E0F G. Christoffer,- E0F, Joint-Public Information Center (JPIC)
N. Williamsen, Field Survey Teams b.
Commonwealth Edison Personnel E. Fitzpatrick, Station Mana N. Wandke, Nuclear Services,ger, Braidwood Corporate D. Scott, Operations Manger, Corporate J. Golden, Supervisor, Emergency Planning (NST), Emergency Pla T. Markwalter, Nuclear Services Technical T. Greene, Lead Controller, TSC, NST, Emergency Planning G. O'Neill, NST, Emergency Planning B. Schnell, NST, Emergency Planning T. Gilman, NST, Emergency Planning R. Moore, NST, Emergency Planning L. Litereski, GSEP Coordinator, Braidwood
- C. Brown, Controller, OSC, GSEP Coordinator, Quad Cities
.K. Skinner, Rad / Chem Foreman, Braidwood S. Stapp, Quality Assurance Inspector
- Denotes licensee personnel who did not attend the exit interview on Ma.ch 19, 1987.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items a.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-456/85037-02 and No. 50-457/85036-02:
Meteorological forecast changes were not incorporated into the l-protective action decisionmaking process in the prior 1985 exercise (Inspection Report No. 50-456/85037 and No. 50-457/85036).
In this I
exercise, on two separate occasions, including following a General
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l Emergency declaration, meteorological forecast changes were monitored
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and utilized.
This weather forecast information was considered in l~
utilizingthedoseprojectionvaluesandasapartoftheprotective l
action decisionmaking.
The licensee adequately demonstrated the
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capability to monitor forecast data and utilize it in making protective action recommendations.
This item is closed.
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(Closedl Open Item 50-456/86021-10 and No. 50-457/86019-10: This-
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was' required-to be completed prior.to exceeding five percent rated
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power.
The inspector confirmed that the logistics and analyses of
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-field monitoring samples.at the E0F had been proceduralized and were
. consistent with the emergency plan.
The corporate Emergency. Planning'
group has' developed a roster of trained individuals to implement ~the logistics and analyses of.the field monitorin samples at the EOF.
-These individuals were designated as Radioana tical Coordinators.
The inspector verified, through a review of t eir-training records, that they had completed training on all eight of'these procedures,
' designated NST-E0F-LAB,1 through 8. - Also, a copy of the approved -
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Braidwood Technical Specifications was available in the resource area'of the E0F.
This -item is closed.
3.
General:
- An exercise of the ~1icen'see's-Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP)
and the Braidwood Annex-to the GSEP was conducted at the Braidwood Station-on March 18, 1987, testing the integrated response of licensee, State, and local organizations to a' hypothetical accident scenario resulting.
inasimulatedmajorreleaseofradioactivematerial. This early morning exercise was~ integrated with a test of the' Illinois State, Will County,
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- Kankakee County, and Grundy County emergency plans. This was a partial-
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participation exercise for the State of Illinois and a full. participation-exercise for all three counties.
The State of Indiana also participated in the exercise, so that the licensee could satisfy the requirements of
~10'CFR 50,-Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F.1.
Attachment 1 describes the scope and ob,1ectives for the exercise.
Attachment:2 includes a narrative summary of the scenario.
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General 0bservations
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Procedures a
This exercise was conducted.in accordance with'10 CFR 5'0, Appendix E-requirements using the GSEP, Braidwood Annex, and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) used by the Station and Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) staffs.
b.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated,' orderly ( and timely.
If the events had been real', actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safety.
c.
Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with seven NRC observers.
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d.
Critique The licensee held a critique immediately after completion of each grou)'s performance in the exercise.
The NRC critique was held on Marc 1 19, 1987, as detailed in this report.
In addition, a public critique was held on March 20, 1987, to present both the onsite and offsite preliminary findings of the NRC and FEMA representatives, respectively.
5.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room (CR)
The CR staff, upon initial response to the main CR annunciator
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alarm, referred to their abnormal operating procedures (A0Ps) and the annunciator alarm procedures.
Once they determined that the trouble was a loss of power supply, action was taken to initiate a work request.
These emergency actions were well demonstrated.
The scope of the problem was not realized until the maintenance group advised them to conduct an annunciator check.
This annunciator check confirmed to the CR staff that the plant had lost the 1791 Balance of Plant (B0P) annunciator.
The Shift Engineer (SE), after assessing the plant conditions, implemented the GSEP procedures and correctly classified the emergency condition as EAL No. 13, loss of most or all of the annunciator system.
An Alert was declared at 0405.
Timely notifications were made to the State using the NARS telephone.
and separately to the NRC.
The dispatch of an o)erator to monitor the local indicators by roving the plant, when t1e annunciators were
. lost, was a proper and prudent action by the CR staff.
_(SCRE) plant parameters were changing, the Shift Control Room Enginee While-performed too many administrative duties.
For example, during the loss of feed pumas and reactor trip with failure to trip, the SCRE was using the NARS pione line to provide the Alert followup message to the State.
His message on the NARS stated that "no changes," " things are getting worse," and also that the classification had not been upgraded.
This occurred one minute after the Shift Engineer had clearly declared a Site Area Emergency (SAE).
After completing that conversation, the SCRE proceeded to complete the NARS form for
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the SAE.
From the time of the loss of the 1A Essential Service Water
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Cooling Pump until 30 minutes later, the SCRE did not evaluate reactor plant systems and parameters.
The licensee should reevaluate the SCRE's responsibilities to ensure that he is not overburdened with administrative tasks.
Knowledgeable communicators should be utilized whenever appropriate to relieve either the SCRE or the SE from being overburdened as indicated in the initial Braidwood Exercise (Inspection Report No. 50-465/85037 and No. 50-457/85063).
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The Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared by the SE prior to the complete activation of the TSC, using EAL-128 and EAL-13.
This
. EAL-13, varied from initial EAL-13 in.that besides a loss 'of most or.all alarm capability of annunciators in the CR, a plant transient was in-progress.
The CR staff properly identified these EALs, and made the correct emergency classifications and notifications.
Based on the above findings, the following item 'should be considered for improvement:
Communications,inely be done by the Shift Control Room Engineer including notifications to offsite authorities,
should not rout Other qualified Control Room personnel should assume these duties leaving the Shift Control Room Engineer to concentrate on evaluating reactor parameters to assist the Shift Engineer in mitigating the emergency conditions.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The-TSC personnel began arriving about 40 minutes after the Alert declaration.
By 0500, approximately 55 minutes after_the Alert, all designated TSC personnel had arrived. The Station Director was not ready to take command at that time, although his key supporting directors appeared cognizant of the plant status before 0510.
At the time when the Station Director (SD) decided to take command and control, between 0513 and 0535, a combination of abnormal transients occurred which made it a difficult time to transfer control.
These abnormal transients resulted in conditions requiring a declaration of an SAE as identified in Section Sa.
Although the TSC and CR maintained continuous communication and both agreed that the CR would make the SAE notifications, the TSC should have assumed the communications responsibilities from the CR.
This-would have allowed the CR staff to concentrate on the changing plant conditions.
The transfer of command and control to the TSC finally was accomplished at 0534, or one and one half hours after the Alert declaration.
At 0554, 19 minutes after the TSC relieved the CR of command and control, the TSC plant status board did not accurately indicate certain plant parameters.
For example, the mode was still listed Safety Injection Pump (p and the Safety Injection Actuation and as Mode 1.
Reactor tri SI) statuses were blank.
The timeliness of listing current plant parameters on the status board improved
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substantially during the course of the exercise.
Some confusion existed in the TSC about the status of SI Pump 18.
The fact that SI Pump 18actuallystartedandproperlyinjectedtotheReactorCoolant System (RCS) for about ten minutes prior to the pump failure was not understood in the TSC.
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At.0609 the:Ra'd/ Chem Director-reported a release.in: progress of
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4E + 9 uci/second.
Due to a scenario data error, this was computer.
'. indication of a release; however, no,other_ plant data supported a- -
release of this magnitude.
It was never made clear to all in the TSC
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that a release had not taken place at'that time.
It was possible
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- electrical power to the wide range monitors occurred.
This was-not conclusively demonstrated.
The licensee should confirm what indication.will be generated by the computer.during loss of power-to the process monitors and take-action to ensure system users do not.
recognize indications of-power loss as valid instrument res)onse.
'At 0610- the ST: declared a General Emergency (GE) based on EAL 16
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This ann,ouncement was forwarded to the E0F and OSC.
About five
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minutes later, the GE declaration was rescinded by a contingency
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message.
This message was necessary to maintain the scenario time
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Throughout the remainder of the exercise, this scenario related problem created some confusion, as the key players correctly felt that their early GE delcaration was a
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conservative decision.
The TSC staff adequately demonstrated their capabilities to perform
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Procedures and plant drawings were well utilized.where applicable.
All TSC Directors maintained-their logs
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- efficiently throughout the exercise. The administrative ~ staff.
demonstrated good organization and coordination.in maintaining good message flow. 'Information was taken from the-key events board, typed on to message forms, and distributed-to each TSC Director in a
. timely fashion.
Each Director gave briefings, a) proximately every 30 minutes, to the TSC complement when directed )y the SD Communication links between the TSC.and the CR as well'as the OSC and E0F were adequately established and utilized.
At-the end of the exercise, the:TSC staff demonstrated good coordination and teamwork in' forming a prioritized recovery item checklist.
Based'on the above findings, the following item should be' considered
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.for improvement:
The transfer of command and control from the-CR to the TSC should be completed more expeditiously than demonstrated in this exercise..The offsite notification responsibilities, at the least, should-have been transferred-to the TSC prior to the SAE declaration;lities.thus relieving the SCRE of followup notification responsibi Tc.
Operational Support-Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams The OSC' activation process began about 0415, approximately ten minutes after the Alert was declared.
The OSC was fully activated guickly and efficiently in about 20 minutes, culminating with the
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initial briefing by the OSC Director.
Good command and control was l:
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OSC Supervisor.
Briefings by the OSC Director were. frequent and
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a ha'd sufficient substance in most instances.
The exceptions were
' the' description.of events occurring that' caused the Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency.
No accompanying' detail except.
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, the announcement of the emergency classification was given by the
. 0SC Director to the.0SC staff.
Logkeegingwasver good and kept current by all OSC key personnel tat the command tab e."~ This included the OSC Director, OSC Supervisors and the'two. dedicated Communicators.
Personal exposure-records were continually maintained for the Inplant Teams, other-OSC-personnel as well as for those emergency. response personnel in the TSC and the' Control Room.
Information on the latter two areas were transmitted by telephone to the OSC recorder. An OSC task assignment-sheet for the inplant teams was well maintained and utilized by the.
- 0SC Supervisor.
It served well as a quick reminder to the Radiation Chemistry Technician (RCT) as to_what equipment the task required and also contained a table-for individual dose records.
On a few-occasions, the inspector noted, however, that the RCT neglected tocompletesomepost-jobinformationonthe. sheet.
A flip chart was used as a status board for plant parameters and was maintained
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on a' current basis, however, the first three entries did not denote chronology. This was added later in the exercise.
A step-off pad and counting instrument was set up outside the OSC and used as a contamination control point until radiation levels in-the OSC increased to where the counting equipment would be saturated.
Communications with the Control Room and TSC overall went well.
' There were several. telephone calls with the'TSC on how to close the Containment Purge Isolation Valves.. These were followed by a good OSC planning discussion on how to close these valves.
A volunteer'was selected for this assignment to enter a'high radiation area. At-0933, the OSC Director was informed by the TSC that the valve had closed, thus stopping the release.
No explanation was.
given on how this closure occurred.
It was quite a psychological shock to the key OSC participants when.this abrupt message was.
relayed from the.TSC, and all the concern,-involvement, and planned actions were halted suddenly.
The inspector observed four inplant teams and evaluated their performance from pre-assignment briefings, actual task completion, and post-task briefings.
None of the'four RCTs asked the
. maintenance team members to read their pocket dosimeters when leaving a high radiation level area, which ranged _from 150 mR to approximately 100 R/hr in some instances.
Proper radiation monitoring equipment was used and the proper personal dosimeters wereiused by the team members. All instruments were checked for calibration during the OSC activation process earlier.
Briefings before and after the inplant team assignments were good and relevant to the task assigned.
The inspector concluded that depending on the plant conditions, some of the maintenance specialists could have initiated more " trouble shooting" and analytical approaches to equipment malfunctions that they demonstrated.
Because of scenario
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s limitations some maintenance' specialists did little more than=
identifyajocationandvalveclosureintheplantandthen. returned.
One team demonstrated exceptional competence in completing an
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-assignment to confirm that the VQ mini purge valve was locked in the-
. open position.
Dialogue _by radio between.the maintenance specialist'
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- and the OSC' Director was. meaningful. When asked to return to take a new assignment, the' maintenance specialistiinformed the OSC Director-that-he had to get the proper procedure and key' from the Shift-
- Engineer.'s office before attempting to start the hydrogen recombiner-This team-then returned to the OSC where.it was decided that another team would pursue starting the. hydrogen recombiner..The first
' maintenance specialist gave'a very good briefing on his knowledge.
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- of the. situation to the new team members upon returning to the OSC.
An. air sampler was started and.ran for an hour at a' rate of 0.5 cu ft.
per minute.
Also,-the resident RCT assigned to the OSC took periodic-
. radiation readings within the OSC as protective measure for-the.
occupants.
- Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:
.The OSC-Director should include some specific descriptive
information in his announcement of emergency classification changes to.the OSC staff.
Radiation / Chemistry Technicians should routinely request the
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Linplant teams to read their pocket dosimeters when entering or leaving a high radiation area.
d.
- Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
L The E0F became fully operational at 0617, within one hour of the decision to activate the facility.
Access control was adecuate
. throughout the exercise.
Staff briefings were adequately cetailed and conducted within adequate' time frames throughout the exercise.
Record keeping by management, communicators, including liaison logs
and checklists were detailed enough to provide adequate reconstruction i
ofE0Factivitiesincludingtimelinesofany.majordecisions.
Status-boards were adequately maintained throughout the exercise, and critical plant parameters were also adequately trended throughout the exercise.
Emergency classification notifications and subsequent updates were completed in an accurate and timely manner.
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Notifications to the NRC including emergency updates were simulated l
by TSC staff with E0F management personnel monitoring the timelines and accuracy of the information.
This method using ENS communication
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was implemented because the Braidwood ENS line was not installed at
the Mazon EOF at the time of this exercise.
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The E0Fistaff' developed the appropriate initial offsite: Protective Action. Recommendation (PAR) based on. release rate and source,ters'
information obtained from plant personnel.and field survey: team
. data. :The PAR was subsequently revised, based on changes-in meteorological, data,-dose projections and plant conditions.
E0F personnel thoroughly monitored the recommended-PAR;against those-being implemented offsite. The State then activated PARS involving.
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-care of livestock and use of KI for offsite emergency workers.
Meteorological: forecast data was requested twice~during the~ exercise,.
once upon the. activation'of the E0F-and again following the General'
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Emergency declaration.
This demonstrated the knowledge and capability-to monitor weather data and incoroporate this data in the-protective action-decisionmaking process.
The E0F staff succe'ssfully demonstrated the capability of the new~
Revision 6 GSEP organization to manage and direct the licensee's response to an-incident. Under this-organization, the Manager.~of Emergency Operations (ME0) monitored the entire res
!and was able to interface with offsite authorities ponse. organization
and perform all decisionmaking processes in an organized and timely manner. ~The Technical and Advisory Support Managers performed the management of vital areasiand kept the ME0. informed through frequent briefings.
~All aspects of-the changes in the new 20F. organizations were adequately tested and demonstrated including the successful attempt
.to obtain approval to exceed dose limits for plant emergency workers from the corporate medical staff.-
The E0F' staff conducted. adequate, well-organized recovery task
. evaluations. -Technical Support, Advisory Support and Public
.Information groups met separately to discuss their short and Llong term task evaluations. When this process was completed, the-Managers met with the ME0 to discuss both short and long term tasks and their priorities.
A conference call was then instituted with the TSC to coordinate with their discussions.
Recovery procedures-and checklists were followed by both groups.
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Based on the findings, this portion of the licensee's program is
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acceptable.
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Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) was located in a
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storage / workshop area at the eastern end of the E0F building.
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licensee has not yet begun modification work on the JPIC as discussed in the December 20, 1985 letter from Mr. Dennis L. Farrar,
Commonwealth Edison, to.Mr. J. G. Keppler, NRC Region III.
The JPIC was activated in a timely manner.
Seven news releases were issued during this exercise.
The news release announcing
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the SAE'was-issued one hour and five minutes after it was declared.
.The news release announcing the General Emergency was issued 41-minutes after the declaration.
The information contained in the
. news releases was clear and concise.
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News releases were approved by the Advisory Support Manager.before publication.
The Public Information Manager maintained close contact with the Public Information Director and the Technical Advisors throughout the exercise.
Additionally, the Public Information Manager and the
.Public Information Director discussed the event status before the news releases were published.
The Public Information Manager, Public Information Director,.and their Technical Advisors would caucus with the State before press briefings, to make sure that both the licensee and the State understood the other's position on the issues.
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-In the~ press briefings, the licensee representatives presented their information in a professional manner.
If they were unsure of or did not know the answer to a question, they stated they would get.back to the reporter.
The reporter was then informed of the answer in a reasonable length of time.
Slide diagrams were used to explain what was occurring at the plant.
Additionally, licensee representatives-deferred to the State spokesman when the topics dealt with offsite protective actions.
The Public Information Manager kept the Manager of Emergency Operations informed of what had occurred during the press briefings.
The following information was readily available and easily accessible to individuals in the JPIC:
" Reporters Guide to CECO Nuclear Generating Stations;" "Braidwood Nuclear Station Fact
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Sheet;" pamphlet on " Emergency Information;" licensee news releases and State of Illinois news releases.
Two items of concern were identified relating to the JPIC activities.
First, on several occasions, there were no licensee representative in the JPIC between press briefings.
This may have been due to the fact that there were no media representatives used in this exercise.
Secondly, news release number 4 was collected and taken out of the JPIC several minutes after distribution.
However, several minutes later they were collected and taken out of the JPIC.
The licensee stated that they wanted to clarify something in the news release.
The news release was brought back to the JPIC several minutes later with no changes.
In summary, during this exercise, the licensee demonstrated their ability to adequately activate and manage the JPIC, in addition to releasing pertinent information to the public in a timely manner.
Additionally, the licensee demonstrated their ability to coordinate
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information with the State Government Spokesperson in order that the public would not receive contradictory information.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.
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Scenario and Controller Problems During the exercise, there were problems evident in the scenario and mc1tiple controller errors.
The most pronounced scenario error was
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the emergency classification oversight per EAL No. 16.
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approximately 0610, the Station Director declared a GE based on EAL 16.
It was not recognized by the scenario development group that
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l EAL 16 could apply until after the commitment for the scenario time line was made.
A contingency message was prepared to block the
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upgrade to GE.
During the Controllers meeting on March 17, 1987, r
considerable discussion about the applicability of EAL 16 took place.
F Some controllers believed EAL 16 to be the proper classification l
while others did not believe it applicable.
The NRC's basic concern F
was that the licensee's controllers seemed uncertain as to how they F
would evaluate a player decision regarding the ap licability of EAL
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16.
During the exercise, decision makers in the SC and E0F made the i:
correct decision to declare a GE per EAL 16.
However, when attempting
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to block this decision in order to keep the exercise play on the t
prearranged timeline, the controller was too slow in issuing the I,
contingency message which resulted in TSC and EOF confusion.
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contingency message was meant to have the exercise continue on with SAE until a GE was later to be classified based on EAL No.18 and 24.
g Further controller errors were associated with radiological concerns.
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Most significant was the early, erroneous, radiological release data
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from the computer trend output for the Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM).
E This erroneous data was not understood by the Environs Controller E-which resulted in invalid information being relayed to the Rad / Chem E
Director.
The erroneous release information created some confusion
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in the TSC.
TSC personnel came to a conservative conclusion that at r
least a puff release had occurred.
This confusion and belief of a E
puff release remained for five to ten minutes until the TSC Lead b
Controller realized the problem and resolved the confusion.
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stated that there was no release and that it was a human error in
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inputting the data into the computer.
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A problem also occurred in the TSC relating to TSC habitability.
is First, a Rad / Chem Technician arrived at the TSC without being E
accompanied by a Controller. There were ap)arently not enough I
Controllers at the OSC to accompany the tecinician to the TSC.
F-Therefore, the OSC requested that TSC Controllers relay dose rate
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survey information to the technician. The unfamiliarity of the TSC Environs Controller with the dose rate survey data resulted in h
issuing a wrong dose rate data of 100 mR/hr at 0644 hours0.00745 days <br />0.179 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.45042e-4 months <br />.
This error went unnoticed for approximately seven minutes until the E
k Station Director proceeded to review procedures to consider donning E
respirators and to decide who to evacuate from the TSC.
The
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Controller corrected the dose rate value to less than 1 mR/hr at 0651 hours0.00753 days <br />0.181 hours <br />0.00108 weeks <br />2.477055e-4 months <br />.
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A combination of scenario and controller problems surfaced concerning~-
the release path through the containment mini purge valves.
Prior to the release, the operators noticed the problem of the mini purge valve 1A0V-VQ005C not being closed after the reactor trip and subseguent containment isolation signal.
The valve positions for the mini purge valves-indicated valves 1A0V-VQ005A and B closed and 1A0V-VQ005C not closed.
Anticipating a possible release path, and recalling a similar release path from a previous drill, the operators proceeded to immobilize the mini purge system.
The-respective fuses to the valves were removed to leave them inoperable.
This was accomplished prior to the restoration of the Essential Service (ESF)
Bus 141 at 0725 hours0.00839 days <br />0.201 hours <br />0.0012 weeks <br />2.758625e-4 months <br />.
The lack of controller awareness and scenario insight created a condition of confusion throughout the remainder of the exercise. When the ESF Bus 141 was re energized, the mini purge valves 1A0V-VQ005A and B were subsequently bumped open, due to a power surge.- This was in accordance with the scenario to create a release path.
This was blatantly unfeasible, since power.could not be supplied to the valves without their associated fuses.
A number of the aforementioned problems clearly point out the need for greater involvement by plant staff engineers and maintenance specialists in the scenario development process.
In addition, the need is apparent for controllers to remain more aware of player actions.
6.
Exit Interview The. inspectors held an exit interview on March 19, 1987, with those licensee personnel identified in Paragraph 1.
The Team Leader discussed-the scope and preliminary findings of the inspection.
The licensee agreed to consider the items discussed.
The inspectors determined from the licensee that none of the information discussed was proprietary in nature.
Attachments:
1.
ExerciseScopeandObjectives 2.
Exercise Narrative Summary
vetemper av-nou
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Revisicn 1
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BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR POWER STATION ~
GSEP EXERCISE March 18,1987 SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION The March 18, 1987 Braidwood GSEP Exercise is a nighttime event to test the capability of the basic elements within the Commonwealth Edison Company 6SEP.
The Exercise will include mobilization of Ceco personnel and resources
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adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergency.
Commonwealth Edison will participate in the Braidwood Station Exercise by activating the on-site emergency response organization and the offsite emergency response organization, as appropriate, subject to limitations that may become necessary to provide for safe, efficient operation of the Braidwood Station and other Ceco nuclear generating stations. The Corporate Comnand Center at the General Of fice in Chicago will not be activated for this Exercise.
Activation of the TSC and other on-site participants will ba _ conducted on a real time basis. The Exercise shift will receive the initial scenario
information and respond accordingly, i
The Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the Recovery Group will tHe prepositioned close to Braidwood to permit use of Recovery Group personnel-from distant locations.
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Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident L
situation, but will not actually incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercise.
Commonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the Exercise. Commonwealth Edison will provide unforeseen actual assistance only to the extent that the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Company.
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BRAIDWOOD 1987 GSEP EXERCISE
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March 18, 1987 OBJECTIVES PRIMARY OBJECTIVE:
Demonstrate the capability.to implement the Commonwealth Edison Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) in cooperation with the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA) to protect the public in the event of a major accident at the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station.
Please note, for this Exercise, that the demonstration of the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents will include coordination with appropriate agencies in the State of Indiana.
This coordination will be done in order to demonstrate the integrated capabilities of the State of Illinois and Indiana to respond to a majo! accident at the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station.
Demonstrate this capability during the hours to qualify as a nighttime
Exercise in accordance with NRC guidance.
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:
1)
Incident Assessment and Classification a.
Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident conditions, to determine which Emergency Action Level (EAL)
has been reached, and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with GSEP.
2)
Notification and Consnunication a.
Demonstrate the capability to notify the principal offsite organizations within fif teen (15) minutes of declaring an accident classification.
b.
Demonstrate the capability to notify the NRC within one (1)
hour of the initial incident.
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c.
Demonstrate the capability to contact organizations that l
would normally assist in an emergency, but are not
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participating in this exercise (e.g., INPO, Murray &
Trettel, Westinghouse, etc.)
d.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely l
I information so that reports may be made to the Emergency l
News Center for Press releases.
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e.
Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up information to l
the State in a timely manner.
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BRAIDWOOO 1987 GSEP EXERCISE
March 18,1987 08]ECTIVES
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3)
Radiological Assessment a.
Demonstrate the capability to calculate of fsite dose
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projections.
b.
Demonstrate the capability of Environmental Field Teams to
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c.
Demonstrate the capaiblity to conduct in-plant radiation
protection activities.
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d.
Demonstrate the ability to perform calculations with radiological survey information, trend this information, and make appropriate recommendations concerning protective actions.
e.-
Demonstrate the ability to collect and conduct analysis of air or liquid samples on-site, via HRSS.
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f.
Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate recommendations concerning protective actions.
4)
Emeroency Facilities a.
Demonstrate the capability to activate the emergency organization and staff the nuclear station ~ emergency response facilities in accordance with procedures during the nighttime period.
-(EOF, TSC, CR, OSC, and JPIC)
5)
Emeroency Direction and Control i
a.
Demonstrate the ability of the new GSEP Revision 6 organization to manage and direct a simulated emergency
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Exercise.
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b.
Demonstrate the ability of the Directors to manage the emergency organizations in the implementation of the GSEP.
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BRAIDWOOD GSEP EXERCISE MARCH 18,1987 NARRATIVE SUMMARY INITI AL SITUATION (0315-0345)
Unit 1 Plant Status:
1.
Mode 1 - Steady state operation at 92% power for the last month with equilibrium xenon. Core Average Burnup is 16,500 MWD /MTU. Unit is limited to base load operation.
2.
Reactor Coolant Iodine 131 concentration at l.0 E-02 microcuries per gram.
3.
M0-lSX-0018 (Essential Service Water (SX) Pump 18 Suction Valve) is Out of Service for internal binding inspection. This results in both the 18 and 2B Essential Service Water Pumps being inoperable. The 1A Essential Service Water Pump is operating. Unit l'is in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Limiting Condition for Operation with 63 hours7.291667e-4 days <br />0.0175 hours <br />1.041667e-4 weeks <br />2.39715e-5 months <br /> remaining and repairs are estimated to be completed within 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. Maintenance Department has been working on the valve for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
4.
Containment Mini-Purge valve line-up completed and a containment purge is initiated with no mini-purge fans.
Positive Displa' ement Pump (1CV 02P) is Out of Service due to high 5.
c vibration problems during operation. Maintenance Department has been working on the pump for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
6.
Normal full power electrical lineup.
7.
The Commonwealth Edison Power Supply Load Dispatcher has notified all operating plants to maintain. steady state power operation due to the status of system conditions being RED.
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Unit 2
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L Plant Status:
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Mechanical valve line-ups are in progress to support Intergrated Hot
l Functional Testing scheduled for next week.
2.
No major plant equipment is in operation.
ALERT (0345-0515)
(EAL #13) -- Loss of most or all alarm capability of annunciators in the Main Control Room.
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y Unit 1 Nuclear Station Operator (NS0) acknowledges the Main Control Room
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Annunciator "AN SYS ISOL CAB PWR SUP TROUBLE" alarm. The AC/DC Crossover l
Power Supply Unit in IPA 30J-N3 failed resulting in the loss of 1791 Balance of Plant (B0P) annunciator points.
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BRAIDWOOD GSEP EXERCISE MARCH 18, 1987 NARRATIVE SUMMARY At 0445 (t+90)
Line 1SX 02AA-36" partially breaks at the weld joint downstream of 1 A Essential Service Water Pump Manual Discharge Valve (1SX 143A) which causes the room to begin flooding.
Break flow does not exceed the capability of the operating 1A SX Pump.
Radwaste control room operator notifies the control room of leak detection sump alarms for 1A and 2A SX pumps and a HI-HI level in SX Sump #1.
At 0510 (t+115)
Complete loss of any function needed to maintain cold shutdown (Both RH trains, or both CC trains, or both SX trains).
The water level in the "A" SX Pump Room continues to rise and the 1A
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SX Pump trips due to the motor becoming submerged.
The 1 A Essential Service Water Pump 4160 V Electrical Supply Breaker
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fails to open resulting in the loss of the 4160 Volt ESF Swgr. Bus 141.
- 18 Condensate Pump Discharge Line (ICD 31 AB-18") partially breaks at the weld joint connected to the Condensate Pump Discharge Header Line (1C0318-30") causing the Condensate Pump Room to begin flooding and a decrease in suction pressure to the Main Feedwater Pumps.
SITE EMERGENCY (05154715)
Plant shutdown functions: transient requirina operation of
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(EAL #128)
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sfutdown systems with failure to trio.
(Power generation
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ccntinues but no core damage evident)
Lo_ss of most or all alarm capability of annunciators.
(EAL #13)
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In the_jiain Control Room and a plant transient in oroaress.
'At 0515 (t+120)
i Both Main Feedwater Pumps trip on overspeed due to Condensate Pump l
Discharge Line break.
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l Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure to trip.
(Power Generation continues, but no core damage evident.)
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The following information concerning the ATWS condition is available to l
the control room:
- The Reactor Protection System (RPS) malfunctions resulting in no Reactor Trip.
Turbine Trip is verified.
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BRAIDWOOD GSEP EXERCISE MARCH 18, 1987 NARRATIVE SUMMARY The Group 1 Steam Dump Valves fail to operate.
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One Pressurizer PORY (1RY455A) fails to open and the upstream block
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valve will not close due to the loss of ESF Bus 141.
- Both Rupture Discs on the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) fail.
- All Reactor Coolant Pumps trip.
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At 0525 '(t+130)
Upon Containment Ventilation Isolation, 1A0V-VQ005C fails open - SA & SB indicate closed.
At 0530 (t+135)
Loss of Sx to Centrifugal Charging Pump Bearing Oil Coolers and Gear Oil Coolers results in the 'inoperability of the 18 Centrifugal Charging Pump.
The 1A Centrifugal Charging Pump is unavailable due to the loss of ESF Bus 141.
Due to the pressurizer PORY (1RY455A) f ailing-in the open position, primary system leakage is beyond the capabilities of the charging pumps.
At 0535 (t+140)
Reactor trip of Unit 1 is successful. The 18 Safety Injection Pump trips on overcurrent due to pump bearings overheating as a result of the loss of SX - inoperable status.
' At 0545 (t+150)
Trip status and bypass permissive lights GR6 status indicates 1A0V-VQ005C not closed.
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At 0630 (t+195)
18 Diesel Auxiliary Feedwater Pump trips as a result of engine driven cooling water pump failing along with the high temperature trip. The
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station is now in a loss of Heat Sink condition.
At 0640 (t+205)
The Primary Containment radiation level is currently at 225 R/Hr indicating a loss of 2 fission product barriers.
At 0645 (t+210)
l-Alert condition for 15 minutes for loss of heat sink.
At 0650 (t+215)
l The Primary Containment radiation level is currently at 850 R/Hr.
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BRAIDWOOD GSEP EXERCISE MARCH 18, 1987 NARRATIVE SUMMARY At 0700 (t+225)
The Primary Containment Radiation Level is currently at 1550 R/Hr.
GENERAL EMERGENCY (0715-1000)
(EAL #18)
-- Alert condition for 45 minutes for a loss of Heat Sink.
(EAL #24)
-- Loss of fission product barriers:
>2000 R/Hr in Primary Containment loss of 2 of the 3 fission product barriers with an imminent loss of the third barrier.
At 0715 (t+240)
The Primary Containment radiation level is 3,500 R/Hr and increasing rapidly.
At 0725 (t+250)
The Primary Containment radiation level is 10,000 R/Hr.
18 SX outage is cleared allowing the IB SX pump to be placed in operation.
4160 Volt ESF Swgr. Bus 141 is operable as a result of removing the 1A SX Pump Breaker from the Bus cubicle.
At 0730 (t+255)
The Unit 1 Containment Purge Effluent Radiation Monitors and Auxiliary Building Ventilation Stack Monitors are indicating an increase in radiation levels. A monitored release is in progress.
The Containment Mini-Purge Exhaust Isolation Valve (lA0V-VQ005A) control switch open position indicating light is flickering on and off.
Containment Mini-Purge Exhaust Isolation Valve (IA0V-VQ005B) open and closed position indicating lights are lit.
The Containment Mini-Purge Exhaust Flow Control Valve (1 A0V-VQ005C) still indicates open.
At 0930 (t+375)
Containment Mini-Flow Purge Txhaust Flow Control Valve (lA0V-VQ005C)
indicates closed in the control room, thus terminating the release.
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BRAIDWOOD GSEP EXERCISE MARCH 18, 1987 NARRATIVE SUMMARY RECOVERY (1000-1100)
At 10:00 hours, a one week time jump occurs. With the return to service of the Essential Service Water System and ESF Bus 141, the plant condition is considered stable with adequate RCS subcooling obtained and Primary Containment under control (pressure, temperature, hydrogen levels, radiation levels, and sump recirculation in progress).
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BRAIDWOOD GSEP EXERCISE TIMELINE OF EVENTS
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T +0 T+30 T +120 T+180 T+240 T+300 T+360 T+420 (0315)
(0345)
(0515)
(0615)
(0715)
(0815)
(0915)
(1015)
Alert Site General Recovery
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Emergency Emergency (EAL #128 or 13)
(EAL 18/24)
Summary of Events 03:15 (t=0)
Initial Conditions
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03:45 (t=+30)
Loss of 80P annunciators in the Main Control Room.
Alert-EAL 13 04:45 (t=+90)
1A SX Pump Discharge Line partial break downstream of 1 SX 143A manual discharge valve.
05:10 (t=+115) Loss of Essential Service Water (SX)
ALERT-EAL 12A Loss of 4160 V ESF Bus 141 1B Condensate Pump Discharge Line partial break at discharge header line ICB 318-30"
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05:15 (t=+120) Main Feedwater Pumps trip on overspeed.
RPS Malfunction results in ATWS.
Site Emergency - EAL 128 or 13 05:25 ( t=+130) 1A0V-VQ005C fails open on Containment Ventilation Isolation 05:30 (t=+135) 18 Centrifugal Charging Pump trips - inoperable status 05:35 ( t=+140) Reactor Trip successful.
1B Safety Injection Pump trips - inoperable status 06:30 ( t= +195) 1B Diesel Aux,- Feedwater Pump trips - inoperable status 06:40 (t=205)
Primary Containment Radiation level 225 R/Hr 06:45 (t=+210) ALERT condition for 15 minutes for a loss of Heat Sink 06:50 (t=+215) Primary Containment Radiation level is 850 R/Hr 07:00 (t=+225) Primary Containment Radiation level is 1550 R/Hr
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- IO7:15 (t=i240) ALERT Ccnditien fer 45 cinutes for a loss of Heat Sink
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GENERAL EMERGENCY-EAL 18/24 Primary Containment Radiation level is 3500 R/Hr and increasing rapidly 07:25 (t=+250)
Primary Containment Radiation level is 10,000 R/Hr ESF Bus 141 Operable Outage cleared on 18 SX pump - SX Available 07:30 (t=+255) Release initiated thru containment mini-purge exhaust line Loss of Fission Product Barriers
09:30 (t=+375) Release terminated
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110:00 ( t= +405 ) RECOVERY /RE-ENTRY
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