IR 05000456/1987023
| ML20237J805 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1987 |
| From: | Little W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237J756 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-26, REF-GTECI-RV, TASK-A-26, TASK-OR 50-456-87-23, 50-457-87-22, IEIN-85-018, IEIN-85-18, NUDOCS 8709040080 | |
| Download: ML20237J805 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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RECION III l
l Report Nos. 50-456/87023(DRP);50-457/87022(DRP)
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Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 License Nos. NPF-72; CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690
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Facility Name:
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted: June 21 through August 1, 1987 Inspectors:
NRC l
T. M. Tongue W. J. Kropp
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T. E. Taylor
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N. Choules l f 4h Approved By:
W. S.' Li t e, Director AP M87 Braidwood Project Date
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l Inspection Summary
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Inspection on June 21 through August 1, 1987 (Report Nos. 50-456/87023(DRP);
50-457/87022(DRPR Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection of activities with regard to regional requests; licensee action on previously identified items; licensee event reports review; surveillance; main steam isolation valve opening while out of service during maintenance; Unit 1 startup test witnessing and observation; full power license issued; increased control room and plant observations; initial synchronization to the grid; operational
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l safety verification; onsite review; radiological protection; engineered safety feature systems; physical security; monthly maintenance observation; monthly surveillance observation; Unit 2 plant tour; training; report review; document review; and meetir.gs, training and other activities.
Results: Of the twenty areas inspected no violations were found in eighteen.
i Two violations were found in the areas of surveillance (Paragraph 5.a) and main steam isolation valves (Paragraph 6).
8709040080 870825 PDR ADOCK 05000456 G
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted l
- T. J. Maiman, Vice President M. J. Wallace, Manager'of Projects
- E. E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager
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- W. E. Vahle, Construction Superintendent j
- C. W. Schroeder, Station Services Superintendent j
- L. E. Davis, Assistant Superintendent - Technical Services-
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- K. Kofron, Production Superintendent j
B. Byers, Assistant Construction Superintendent
- M. Lohman, Project Startup Superintendent P. Cretens, Station Startup' Assistant Superintendent
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F. Willaford, Security Administrator
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- D. Paquette, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent l
D. O'Brien, Operations Assistant Superintendent j
- E. L. Martin, Quality Assurance Superintendent J
D. L. Shamblin, Assistant Preject Manager R. Benn, Assistant Security. Administrator G. E. Groth, Project field Engineering Manager l
- P. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- M. Takaki, Quality Control Supervisor
- J. Gosnell, Quality Control Supervisor
- R. E. Aker, Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor J. Jasnoz, Tech Staff AR/PR Coordinator
- R. Lemke, Technical Staff Supervisor
- E. R. Netzel, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- G. M. Orlov, Staff Assistant to Project Manager
- P. G. Holland, Regulatory Assurance
- T. W. Simpkin, Operating Experience Group
- R.C. Bedford, Regulatory Assurance
- R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- L. Kline, Regulatory Assurance Industry Group
- L. W. Raney, Nuclear Safety T. Bobic, Electrical Maintenance
- A. J. D' Antonio, Quality Control
- R. J. Ungeran, Operating Engineer Unit 1 R. Yungk, Operating Engineer R. J. Legner, Lead Operating Engineer
- R. Mertogul, Tech Staff
- T. O'Brien, Tech Staff S. Hedden, Master Instrument Maintenance J. Smith, Master Electrical Maintenance R. Hoffman, Master Mechanical Maintenance-W. McGee, Training Supervisor A. Iturrieta, P0AD Field Supervisor (.
- B. Tanouye, Project Construction Department
- Denotes those attending the exit interviews conducted on July 9, 23, and 30, 1987 or at other times throughout the inspection period.
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The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, startup engineers, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, contract security personnel, and construction personnel.
2.
Regional Request a.
Review of IE Information Notices I
(0 pen) TI 2500/14:
Inspection of the Location of the Manual Trip Circuit in Westinghouse Designed Plants with a Solid State Protection System (SSPS).
The resident inspectors were requested to review the licensee's response to IE Information Notice 85-18,
" Failure of Undervoltage Output Circuit Boards in the Westinghouse Design."
Commonwealth Edison, Station Nuclear Engineering Department and Project Engineering Department are aware of the issue and are still considering several solutions.
To date Braidwood has experienced no failures in the undervoltage output circuit boards.
This TI and IE IN will remain open until the final solution is resolved.
[ Closed)TI 2500/16:
Inspection to Determine if a Potential Seismic Interaction Exists Between the Moveable In-Core Flux Mapping System and Seal Table at Westinghouse Designed Facilities or Facilities with Similar Designs.
This is a followup on IE Information Notice 85-45 on the same subject.
The inspector reviewed the related 10 CFR 50.55(e) report and the Sargent & Lundy (S&L) letter of October 4,1985.
The S&L letter describes a finite element analysis of the flux mapping system.
This analysis report stated that the structural integrity is maintained for the flux mapping system and the flux thimble guide tubes at the seal table.
It also showed that the stresses in the thimble fittings at the seal table remain within the design stress allowances.
In summary, the Byron /Braidwood design is adequate and no changes are necessary.
These issues are considered closed.
(Closed) TI 2500/19:
Inspection of Licensee's Actions Taken to Implement Unresolved Safety Issue A-26:
Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection for Pressurized Water Reactors.
By memorandum, dated January 16, 1987, Region III Division of Reactor Projects requested the Resident Inspectors to review this issue.
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This issue was previously reviewed for the Byron /Braidwood design and published in the common Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Sections 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.3.
That review found the design to be acceptable.
The related equipment has been installed and has or will be tested as construction continues.
Procedures are in place addressing the issue and the training program also addresses the issue.
This matter is considered closed.
b.
High Ambient Temperatures In Areas Containing Electrical Equipment and Instrumentation By memorandum, dated June 26, 1987, Region III Division of Reactor
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Projects requested that an inspection be conducted at each site to
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verify that the licensee's have in place, requirements to monitor temperatures in areas based on equipment performance capabilities and have established linits on these temperatures.
The request was based on recent inspection findings at Monticello where the recent hot weather caused temperatures to approach or exceed 100 F in areas that contained electrical and/or electronic equipment.
At Sraidwood, the inspector found that the spaces of concern are listed in Technical Specification 3/4.7.12, " Area Temperature Monitoring," Table 3.7-6, with reference temperatures and associated action requirements.
In addition, there are shiftly surveillance to record the respective temperatures, IBwCS 0.1, " Area Temperature Monitoring," with surveillance related to specific plant modes and Bw0P 199, which includes operating logs for recording other area temperatures. To date, the temperatures in these spaces have not been a problem at Braidwood.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items a.
Open Items (Closed) 456/86038-01:
Procedure BwAP 400-4, " Control of Portable Measuring and Test Equipment," did not address actions to be taken for lost, stolen, or deleted instruments; reviews required for deficient equipment; and restricting the use of deficient equipment.
The licensee Revised Procedure BwAP-4 and issued Revision 6 to address the above.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) 456/86038-02: The mechanical maintenance and I&C groups did not have procedures for local control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE). The licensee prepared and issued BwMP 3400-003,
" Control of Mechanical Maintenance Certified Instruments," for use by the mechanical maintenance group in the control of M&TE.
Procedure BwAP 400-4 was revised and revisions issued to address the local control of M&TE by the I&C group.
This item is closed.
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.i (, Closed) 456/86038-05: The licensee's policy for review of items
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under shelf-life control did not provide for suffici'ent procurement
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lead times for some items.
The licensee had revised BwAP 800-5,
" Control of Items With Shelf-Life and/or Preventive Maintenance Requirements," and issued Revision 3 to incorporate provisions for restocking shelf-life items within acceptable re-order lead times.
This item is closed.
(Closed) 456/86038-08: The administrative procedures for the control of onsite reviews did not address or fully address several Technical Specification (TS) requirements.
Certain position titles had been changed and were different from those listed in the TS.
Also, Procedure BwAP 1205-1, " Selection and Authority of OnSite Review Committee," used the term " Radiation Protection" relating to disciplines required for personnel performing on-site review; whereas, the TS used " Radiological Controls." The licensee had revised Procedures BwAP 1205-2, "Onsite Review of Procedures," and BwAP 1205-3, "0nsite Review and Investigative Function," and issued Revision 5 for each procedure to address the TS requirements.
One requirement regarding the approval of participants involved in onsite review activities by the Station Manager, which was not addressed in BwAP-1, was addressed in BwAP 1205-4 and no procedure revision was required. The TS had been revised to update position titles.
It is the licensee's position that there is no substantive difference between " Radiation Protection" and " Radiological Controls" for the purpose they are used in the 1S and in their administrative Procedure BwAP 1205.1.
The inspector concurs with this position.
This item is closed.
b.
Violation (Closed) 457/83017-07: Tightening requirements for electrical connections were not included in the project specifications. This item was reviewed and closed for Unit 1 in Inspection Report 456/84019(DRS); 457/84018(DRS).
c.
Unresolved Item (Closed) 457/83017-04: Cable pull tension calculations were not contained in quality assurance records.
This item was reviewed and closed for Unit 1 in Inspection Report 456/84019(DRS);
457/84018(DRS) and the corrective action is applicable to Unit 2.
d.
IE Bulletin (Closed) 457/85002-BB: Undervoltage Trip Attachments of Westinghouse D8-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers.
This Bulletin is not applicable to Braidwood.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Licensee Event Reports (LER) Review Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in accordance with technical l
specifications:
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(Closed 456/87016-LL):
SX Valve Stroke Surveillance not Completed Within Required Frequency Due to Inadequate Administrative Procedure.
This LER is addressed in Paragraph 5.a of this report.
[ Closed 456/87025-LL and Revision 01):
Inadvertent Opening of Main Steam Isolation Valve During Maintenance Activities Due to
Procedural Error. This LER is addressed in Paragraph 6 of this report.
(Closed 456/87026-LL):
Failure to Obtain Final Approval signature Within 14 Days Due to Cognitive Personnel Error. On May 7, 1987, the licensee discovered that two Temporary Procedure Changes (TPC),
No. 469 and No. 852, were misfiled before obtaining the final approval signature of the Station Manager.
This personnel error caused the licensee to exceed the 14-day technical specification
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requirement for final approval.
The procedure changes were administrative in nature and did not affect equipment function or safety.
Upon discovery, the TPCs were immediately signed by the Station Manager. The Station Procedure Coordinator's temporary j
procedure log was revised to reflect final approval signatures.
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(Closed 456/87027-LL):
Reactor Trip Signal Generated During Solid
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State Protection System Logic Testing Due to a Procedural i
Deficiency. The trip signal was generated from source range channel N31 high flux. A reactor trip was not generated due to the test configuration.
The root cause of the event was a procedural error which resulted in the unblocking of P-6 and re-energization of the source range (SR) while above the SR high flux trip set point.
Corrective action was to reset the reactor trip signal and initiate a temporary procedure change to specify that the surveillance should be done at greater than 10% power, which will not allow the SR channel to re-energize.
[ Closed 456/87029-LM:
Missed Technical Specification Surveillance Due to Procedural Deficiency.
This LER is addressed in Paragraph 5.a of this report.
(Closed 456/87030-Lt.}:
Containment Purge Isolation Signal Due to Radiation Monitor Loss of Power as a Result of a Shorted Fuse Holder.
On June 8, 1987, the containment fuel handling incident area radiation monitor 1RT-AR012 initiated a primary containment ventilation isolation Signal on Train B.
The root cause was a loss of power to the monitor due to a shorted fuse holder.
The isolation valves were already closed prior to the initiation.
Power was restored in about ten seconds and the ventilation system was reset.
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(Clos.ed 456/87031-LL):
Control Room Ventilation Shift to the
' Emergency Makeup Mode as a Result of Spurious Actuation of a Radiation Monitor Due to Inadvertent Radio Operation. The cause was found to be a radio keyed within the designated exclusion area ~near radiation monitor OPR 32J which spiked and caused the ESF actuation.
The only person in the area at the time M v e event was a security.
guard who stated that there was a possibili _ that-his radio might-
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have been inadvertently keyed.
The preceding LERs have been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 2,
Appendix C, and when the incidents described meet all of the following-l requirements, no Notice of Violation is normally issued for that item:
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The event was identified by the licensee,
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b.
The event was an incident that, according to the current enforcement policy, met the criteria for Severity Levels IV or V violations, c.
The event was appropriately reported,
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d.
The event was or will be corrected (including measures to prevent-
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I recurrence within a reasonable amount of time), and
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e.
The event was not a violation that could have been prevented by the licensee's corrective actions for a previous violation.
In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection period. This
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personnel performance, potential trends, etc. DVRs were also reviewed; for assurance that they were generated appropriately and dispositioned in a manner consistent with the applicable procedures and the QA manual.
5.
Surveill.cnces a.
Missed Surveillance During a review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and Deviation
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Reports (DVRs) the inspectors identified a trend showing surveillance intervals that had exceeded i.he critical due date.
In the examples to iollow, due to surveillance scheduling errors, the licensee violated the requirements of Technical Specification Section 4.0.2 relative to the 25% maximum allowable extension for a specified surveillance time interval.
On May 4,1987, while preparing to perform quarterly surveillance 18wVS 0.5-2,1, ASME Surveillance Requirements for SX Valves, it was discovered that the critical date for this surveillance had been
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exceeded. The critical date was. missed due to an error in the'
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scheduling process. The partial surveillance performed on Januery 30, 1987 was mistaken for a complete surveil. lance..The last valia complete surveillance was performed on December 13, 1986. 'The cover sheet for the partial surveillance did not identify it as a
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, partial nor was the complete procedure contained in the surveillance R
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the computer schedule as such.
This event is detailed in LER 87-016.
On May 27, 1987, the licensee discovered that the critical date for
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l 18w05 3.3.6-1, Accident Monitoring, had been exceeded. The critical date for IBw05 3.3.6-1 was March 29, 1987.
On March 28, 1987, an unsuccessful surveillance was performed at which time a LC0AR was
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entered. On' April 1, 1987, a valid partial surveillance was performed which cleared the LC0AR.
Due to a breakdown in communications _between the Shift Engineer and the Operations Surveillance Coordinator, the LCOAR status and surveillance status concerning the accident monitoring surveillance were incorrect.
The surveillance was not correctly scheduled due to the erroneous information noted, showing a LC0AR still in effect on the computer
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schedule for 1Bw0S 3.3.6-1.
More details relative to this item are contained in DVR 87-188.
l h June 17, 1987, it was discovered that surveillance 18w0S
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3.2.1-808 nad exceeded its critical date of April 12, 1987. The
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surveillance was last performed December 1986. The required
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Technical Specification frequency is 92 days. The computer schedule I
due date erroneously showed the next due date as June 1988. The scheduling error was caused by entering the original frequency in I
the computer as 550 days. On February 9, 1987, the frequency error was identified, at which time the frequency was changed to 92 days.
When the frequency error was found, neither a correct next due date was entered nor was the surveillance performed.
These actions would have prevented exceeding the critical date.
A previous Notice of Violation was issued for failure to comply with administrative controls for the surveillance program which ensure
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that components addressed in the Technical Specifications are
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The three examples described above are also examples of a failure to properly implement the
administrative controls.
P this case the failure to properly
administer the surveillance program led to the licensee's failure to i
properly implement the requirements of Technical Specification (TS)
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Paragraph 4.0.2.
This failure to comply with TS Paragraph 4.0.2 is
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considered a violation (456/87023-01(DRP)).
b.
18 Diesel Generator Load Swings On July 17, 1987, while reviewing the shift engineer's log the
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inspector noted an entry which indicated that load swings of 500KW to 1000KW had been encountered on the IB Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) while performing 18w0S 8.1.1.2.a-2, "1B Diesel Generator Operability Monthly (Staggered) and Semi-Annual (Staggered)
Surveillance." This surveillance is used.to fulfill the Technical Specification requirements which require the dienel to run with a load of greater than or equai to 5500KW for at least one hour. - The surveillance was performed at about 5:00 a.m. that morning. The
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ins'metors prompt ;/ cnnsulted with regional management on this issue
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and cencurred that W ED/G should have been declared inoperable.
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Durin'g subsequent dis 6usrions at abopt 0930, 1130, and 1530 with shift and station management personnel, the licensee contended that the IB ED/G surveillance was acceptable. However, at 1938, the licensee declared tha IB ED/G ino,nrable and entered the appropriate
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limiting cor.dition fo* operating action requirement (LC0AR) and commenced troubleshooting the diesel control systems to eliminate the severe, load swings.
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Subsequent to the apave discussions the inspectors also reviewed past 18w0s 3.1.1.2 rP surveillance.
This revi u identified that on May 6,1937, during' a post tnodification surveMlance numerous 700KW load swings had occurred and the operator had to take action
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to maintain the 5500KW load. The r.st test of.the IB diesel was I
S, conducted on Muy 18, 1987 andAnd load swing wis experienced.
The purpose of this surveillance is to demonstrate the reliability of the IB ED/G and to show it meets its design requirements.
Large load swings and operator action to maintain loa'd greater than 5500KW is not a demonstratic u f reliability. The failure to declare the D/G inoperable and puesti the cause of the load swings on May 6,1987 and take appropriate ccrrective action, as was eventually done on July 17, 1987, is considered a poor operating /marggement practice.
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This issue was discussed with station management personnel on deveral occasions and at the exit meetings on July 23 and 30,1987.
1his will require further review and is considered an unresolved item (456/87023-02(DRP)).
6.
Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Opening While Out of ServPe During
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Maintenance Inadsed.ent Opening of IB Main Steam Isolation Valve in Excess of the TimefTEedbyTechnicalSpecifications This ime was disc;ssed in the previous Inspection Report 456/87014(DRP);
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457/87014(DRP), Paragraph 8, and is further described in LER 456/87025.
In the interim, the licensee has completed their investigation and evaluation and the following is a summary:
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At 1900 on June 5,1987, licenseu maintenance personnel continued working on the IB Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). The IB MSIV hydraulic accumulator had been blown down for the hydraulic oil leak repair and was held shut with a cable and come-along gag.
Upon commencing work at approximately 1920, t' a mechanics, thinking the hydraulic system was depressurized, loose ?d a fitting that resulted in the mechanics oeing sprayed with hydraulic oil from the pressurized hydraulic system, which also depres N rized the MSIVs hydraulic oil system. The individuals were proratly given first aid and sent to an offsite facility for medical attention. The operations Shift Foreman made a superficial inspection of the scene.
His inspection was limited by the smoky atmosphere and his concern for te injured.
He did note, however, that the come along for the 5ag was in position.
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.At 1940 on the same date, the Sequence of Events Recorder in the control room printed a message "19/1C MSIV NOT OPEN RESET" and the
"Steamline Isolation" annunciator cleared, indicating that the IB MSIV was open. This was noted by the NSO on shift, who informed the Shift Engineer (SE) and an equipment attendant.
The SE then contacted the shift foreman at about 2000 who indicated that he had just been at the valve and the valve was closed. No further followup was conducted at that time, which is significant to the event.
At about 0845 on June 6, 1987, the day shift maintenance pe sonnel noted the 1/2" diameter wire rope gag had parted and the IB MSIV was I
open.
The control room personnel were informed at about 0920 and the appropriate Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation Action Requirement (LC0AR) was entered. The valve was then shut and regagged with redundant 3/4" wire ropes and chain-falls or come-alongs.
The calculations for loads on the gags were performed by a member of the Tech Staff and confirmed by the SRI (0ps). The results showed
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that the original 1/2" cable gag had a load capacity of 4 tons of j
force and the calculated load from the steam in the main steam line
was 8.5 tons. The initial gag was placed by maintenance personnel and concurred in by a valve manufacturer representative.
The IB MSIV failed open at about 1940 on Jane 6, 1987, and sufficient information was available on shift such that the LC0AR should have been entered; however, it was not until about 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> later when the parted cable was found and the LC0AR entered. The failure to enter the LC0AR is a violation of Technical Specification 3/4.7.1.5 which states that during Modes 2 or 3, the inoperable MSIV is to be
maintained closed or be in hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and hot shutdown
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within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (456/87023-03(DRP)).
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At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 2 (Startup),
critical less than 1% power, and conducting initial physics testing.
In addition, the power level had never exceeded 1% at the time of the event.
LER 456/87025-LL submitted on July 1, 1987 did not give an assessment of the potential consequences relative to the inability to isolate the main steam line in the event of a break or a steam generator tube rupture.
The LER addresses the actual consequences by discussion of the personnel hazards and the potential results of a water hammer if the MSIV were to open with the down stream piping depressurized. Through discussion with licensee personnel, it was found that they considered this when preparing the LER and did not include it because of the low power history (never exceeded 1%
l power) and the releace would not have approached the 10 CFR 100 l
criteria. After further discussion on the intent of the Technical Specification that was exceeded, the licensee submitted a
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suppl.emental LER to address the ESF consideration. A related cause was the maintenance personnel's lack of familiarity with the MSIV hydraulic system.
d On July 15, 1987, an enforcement board was convened in Region III to
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assess this event for potential escalated enforcement actions. The board I
I concluded and as stated above, the potential significance of the event was minimized by the low power history and upon discovery, the licensee took prompt and proper corrective action.
The board concluded that escalated enforcement action would not be pursued; however, several factors that contributed to the event were raised that the licensee has or should address. These are:
personnel not believing instrumentation (indications), e.g., when the annunciator alarms cleared without explanation and the related failure to pursue conflicting information,
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e.g., when the annunciator cleared indicating the MSIV had opened and I
the conflicting report of observation by personnel involved.
7.
Unit 1 Startup Test Witnessing and Observation The inspectors witnessed performance of portions of the following Unit 1 l
startup test procedures in order to verify that testing was conducted in i
i accordance with the operating license and procedural requirements, test l
l data was properly recorded and performance of licensee personnel l
responsibilities:
BwSU FW-30A, " Steam Generator Level Controller Response at 3-6% Power."
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Full Power License Issued On June 30, 1987, a Commission briefing was held at the Commission Offices in Washington, D.C. for determining if the licensee should receive a full power license to operate Braidwood Unit 1.
After presentations by Commonwealth Edison and members of the NRC Staff, the Commissioners voted 4 to I authorizing the granting of the license.
I On July 2,1987, NRC Operating License NPF-72 was issued by NRR.
No violations or deviations were identified.
I 9.
Increased Control Room and Plant Observations l
In response to a Region III commitment to the Commission, the Resident Inspectors conducted continuous (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day) inspection: in the control room and in the plant during the first three days when reactor power was increased above 3% following the issuance of the full power license.
In addition, monitoring was increased during other major l
l activities at the plant, such as main turbine rolls and initial synchronization to the grid. This was done to verify that any conflicts were resolved between Unit 1 power ascension and Unit 2 testing activities.
Inspectors also monitored those activities that were being initially performed at Braidwood. The inspectors found that the
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activ.ities.were well planned and performed in a professional manner. Any
- onflicts between the two units were resolved sufficiently to prevent confusion to operations personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Initial Synchronization to the Grid On July 12, 1987 at 0105, the Unit 1 main turbine generator was synchronized to the grid on nuclear steam for the first time. The inspector monitored the preparation, increase in power, and the execution of the activities.
They were carried out in a well planned, cautious manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Operational Safety Verification The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during the. inspection period to make an independent assessment of equipment conditions, plant conditions, construction activities, security, fire protection, general personnel safety, housekeeping, and adherence to applicable regulatory requirements.
During the tours, the inspectors reviewed various logs,
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I daily orders, interviewed personnel, attended shift briefings and plan of the day meetings, witnessed various construction work activities, and l
independently determined equipment status.
During the shift changes, the l
inspector observed operator, shift control room engineer, and shift engineer turnovers and panel walkdowns.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under l
technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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Onsite-Review Prior to issuance of the full power license, the inspectors reviewed the l
licensee's administrative guidelines and documents generated relative to
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Onsite-Review (OSR) Committee activities.
The Braidwood Administrative Procedures (BwAP) reviewed were:
BwAP 1205-1, " Selection and Authority of Onsite-Review Committee," Revision 2; BwAP 1205-2, "Onsite-Review of Procedures," Revision 2; and BwAP 1205-3, "Onsite-Review and Investigation Function." The inspectors review of the BwAPs indicated that the administrative controls for Onsite-Review Committee activities are adequate in scope and content to perform their required functions.
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inspectors also reviewed results of the OSRs documented activities relative to their review of modifications, temporary alterations, technical specification changes, licensee event reports, and procedures.
The review of OSR activities in the aforementioned areas were determined to be adequate in that all significant elements of the Bv.APs are being implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Radiological Protection The inspectors selected portions of the licensee's radiological program to verify conformance with facility policies, procedures, and regulatory l --
requirements. Various functions observed were health physics managers awareness of any unusual conditions or challenges, implementation of the ALARA program, use of Radiological Work Permits (RWPs), control and monitoring of radiation exposures, including work in high radiation areas if applicable, and control of radioactive material.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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14.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems l
During the inspection, the inspector selected accessible portions of several ESF systems to verify their status.
Consideration was given to the plant mode, applicable Technical Specification, Limiting Conditions for Operating Requirements (LC0ARs), and other applicable' requirements.
Various observations, where applicable, were made of hangers and supports; housekeeping; freeze protection (if required); valve positions and conditions; potential ignition sources; major component labeling, lubrication, cooling, etc.; interior conditions of-electrical breakers and control panels; instrumentation was properly installed, functioning and significant process parameter values were consistent with expectei values; instrumentation was calibrated;.necessary support systems were operational; and breaker and valve positions concurred locally and at the control panels.
During the inspection, the following ESF systems / components were walked down:
UNIT 1 Safety Injection Systems Charging Systems Portions of the DC Electrical Distribution System Portions of the Class IE 4160 Volt Electrical Distribution System Wo violations or deviatic.ns were identified.
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Physical Security At various times throughout the inspection period, the inspectors monitored compliance with the Physical Security Plan (PSP). Observations were made of selections of manning levels and collateral duties of assigned personnel; access control equipment and processes, such as x-ray machines, metal detectors, explosive detectors, and other search mechanisms; PA and VA barriers are properly maintained; procedures are properly followed; compensatory measures are appropriately used when required; persons in the PA and VA are properly badged and escorted if required; and various detection / assessment aids are operable, such as fences, illumination of the PA and TV monitors have sufficient clarity and resolution.
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No vi,olations or deviations were identified.
16. Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to I
determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is
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l assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activity was observed / reviewed:
l 1B Emergency Diesel Generator Control Rod Drive - Solid State Control System Following completion of maintenance of the valve, the inspector verified that the system had been returned to service properly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
17. Monthly Surveillance Observation l
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by technical specifications for Unit 1 during the inspection period and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration af the affected components were accomplished, that results conformed with technical specifications and I
procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the I
individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified l
during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate
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management personnel.
The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Unit 1 1B Diesel Generator Operability Monthly (Staggered) Surveillance.
I N44 Power Range Surveillance.
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18.
Unit.2 Plant Tour l
The inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work and
plant conditions during general inspections in Unit 2 work areas.
Observation of work included cable trays, junction boxes, pipe support welding and mechanical equipment.
Particular attention was given to i
mater'cl identification, nonconforming material identification and housekeeping.
The inspector reviewed work activities by reviewing travelers while touring tne plant.
These travelers pertained to electrical, piping, and hanger installation.
I No violations or deviations were identified.
19. Training The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed personnel were reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of the licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response to events which occurred during the inspection period.
Personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of training. However, one exception was noted and is discussed in Paragraph 6.
No violations or deviations were identif!ed.
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20.
Report Review During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Operating Report for June 1987.
The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification J
6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Report for June 1987.
No violations or deviations were identified.
21. Document Review During the inspection period, a number of documents were reviewed by the inspectors in order to gain f amiliarity with the content and clarify their understanding.
In addition, the licensee documents were reviewed for conformance with other regulatory standards.
The following documents were reviewed:
a.
Facility Operating License NPF-72 issued July 2,1987.
b.
Technical Specifications issued as Appendix A to License No. NPF-72 (NUREG-1261) as amended from License No. NPF-70.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Meetings,-Training, and Other Activities
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Site Visits by NRC Staff I
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On June 27, 1987, Doctor Thomas E. Murley, Director, Office of Nuclear i
l Reactor Res,ulation, was on site for a familiarization tour and a meeting with the licensee.
He was accompanied by Mr. A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator; Mr. W. S. Little, Braidwood Project Director; and the Senior Resident Inspectors.
l Plant Status Meeting A meeting was held on July 14, 1987 between the licensee's Project Manager, the Region III Project Director, and members of each of their staffs. The purpose of the meeting was for the licensee to provide an update on the status of Units 1 and 2.
23. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
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order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or i
I deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.b.
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24. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee and contractor representatives denoted in Paragraph I during and at the conclusion of the inspection on July 30, 1987.
The inspector summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report.
The licenseo acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered
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proprietary in nature.
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