IR 05000458/1986009

Insp Rept 50-458/86-09 on 860224-28.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Response Capabilities During Exercise of Emergency Plan & Procedures. Seven Emergency Preparedness Deficiencies Identified

ML20195E405
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	04/09/1986
From:	Baird J, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195E402	List: ML20195E395 ML20195E405
References
50-458-86-09, 50-458-86-9, NUDOCS 8606090013
Download: ML20195E405 (14)

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APPENDIX

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/86-09 License: NPF-47 Docket: 50-458-

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Licensee: Gulf States Utilities -

River Bend Nuclear Group P. O. Box 2951 Beaumont, Texas 77704-Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: RBS, St. Francisville, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: February 24-28, 1986 Inspector: h$ dM Jr B. Baird, NRC Team Leader 3/A 7 /f6 Date '

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Other Inspectors: C. Hackney, RIV NRC R. Hogan, OIE NRC T. Essig, Pacific Northwest Laboratories l E. King, Pacific Northwest Laboratories G. Bethke, Comex Corporation A. Loposer, Comex Corporation

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Approved: u 'hA .4 )!7b L. A. Yandell,-Chief, Emergency Preparedness 04te'  !

and Safeguards Programs Section Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted February 24-28, 1986 (Report 50-458/86-09)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's emergency response capabilities during an exercise of the emergency f an l and procedure ~

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Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or i deviations were identified. Seven emergency preparedness deficiencies were

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identified, two by the NRC and five by the license i

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DETAILS Persons Contacted GSU

• D. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training

, P. Barker, Nuclear Control Operator

• R. Barrow, Board of Directors, GSU

• D. Bloemendaal, Senior Emergency Planner

• J. Cadwallader, Supervisor, Emergency Planning

• W. Cahill, Senior Vice President RBNG

• E. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiological Programs

• J. Conner, Supervisor, Environmental Services

• T. Crouse, Manager, Quality Assurance

• J. Deddens, Vice President RBNG

• W. Eisele, Health Physicist

• C. Fantacci, Radiation Protection Supervisor -

• D. Hartz, Shift Supervisor ,

E. Hensley, Radiation Protection Foreman

• R. King, Licensing <

R. Lantz, Nuclear Control Operator

• W. Odell, Manager, Administration

• G. Patrissi, Quality Assurance-Operations

• T. Plunkett, Plant Manager

• K. Suhrke, Manager, Project

• B. Thomas, Emergency Planner

• P. Tomlinson, Director, Quality Services

• C. Wells, Emergency Public Information Coordinator L. Woods, Control Operating Foreman Contractor Personnel T. Gildersleeve, NUTECH, Engineers J. Kauffman, NUTECH Engineers W. Keller, NUTECH Engineers T. Loudenslager,:NUTECH Engineers S. Reilly, NUTECH Engineers ,

• D. Simpson, NUTECH Engineers W. Smith, Impell-h State of Louisiana

• Spell, Administrator, LNED

• D. Zaloudek, Emergency Planning Supervisor, LNED

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-4-Federal Emergency Management Agency A. Lookabaugh, Chief, Technological Hazards Branch G. Jones, Community Planner

NRC Personnel

• D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector W. Jones, Resident Inspector Other GSU, state, and contractor personnel were also contacted during the inspectio * Denotes those present at the exit intervie . Exercise Scenario The GSU exercise scenario was reviewed prior to the exercise to determine that provisions had been made for the required level of participation by state and local agencies, and that all major elements of emergency response wculd be exercised by GSU in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and the guidance criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N. Comments from this review were discussed with GSU prior to the inspection date, and satisfactory resolution was obtained prior to the exercis Based on the scenario review, resolution of comments and exercise observations, the exercise scenario was considered to have been adequate to exercise fully GSU's emergency response capabilities and to enable adequate participation of state and local government agencie No violations or deviations were i'dentifie * Control Room a Initial conditions were provided to the control room staff assigned to respond to the simulated emergency at 9:45 a.m. by the exercise controller, and the exercise was initiated at 10:00 a.m. with an injured, contaminated radwaste operator requiring medical attention. The licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE) at 10:24 a.m. based on transportation of a contaminated and injured plant person to the hospita An Alert was declared at approximately 11:17 a.m. due to a severe level transient following a loss of condenser vacuum, with subsequent main turbine trip and reactor scra At approximately 12:17 p.m., a Site Area Emergency was declared as a result of a leak in the reactor g" ore isolation cooling system (RCIC) which could not be isolated immediately. At .

approximately 1:56 p.m. , a General Emergency classificatioq was declared due to a piping break in the residual heat removal (RHR) system, thermal shock and damage of the fuel, resulting in a release of radioactivity to the environment through ,the standby gas treatment system (SGTS).

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The NRC inspector in the control room observed that personnel demonstrated appropriate use of emergency and abnormal operating procedures, together with classification and notification emergency plan implementing procedures (EIPs) for the exercise event In addition, it was noted that control room operators demonstrated an excellent knowledge of plant systems design and system component locations and characteristics, and took actions before expected or anticipated in the exercise scenari The NRC inspector noted that initial offsite notifications were begun promptly, and the NRC was notified immediately following the notifications to state and local agencie However, there was some difficulty in completing the notifications with the offsite agencies which resulted in approximately 22 minutes being required to complete the notification The NRC inspector also noted that the communicator assigned to operate the pager system had difficulty initiating an " actual" versus " drill"'pag In addition, the communicator had difficulty assimilating orders from shift operators to make various Gaitronics announcements. It was further noted that these announcements could not be heard consistently in the control roo The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for

! improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requiremen Provide additional training for shift communicators and consider having operators make their own Gaitronics announcement Adjust Gaittonics speakers ' volume and review placement of the speakers to improve the capability to hear announcements in the control roo No violations, or deviations were identifie . Technical Support Center The technical support center (TSC) was promptly activated following the declaration of an Alert and declared operational at 11:40 a.m. The NRC inspector in the TSC noted that personnel arrived in a timely fashion and immediately commenced their duties and task .The plant manager assumed the position of emergency director, announced the transfer of responsibility from the control room to the TSC and maintained positive control of the TSC throughout the exercise. The emergency director made periodic and informative announcements to keep TSC personnel apprised of plant conditions, made appropriate use of his resources and managed extended operations shift and recovery planning effectively. Of fsite notifications were within the required time limits for offsite agencie The NRC inspector also noted that habitability of the TSC was checked early on and frequently thereaf ter during the exercis .

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-6-The following additional observations were made by the NRC inspector in the TSC:

The public address (PA) system volume in the TSC was too loud resulting in distortion of announcements from the control roo There were no instructions readily available on setting the speaker volume.

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The alternate dose assessment advisor in the-TSC appeared to be ineffective in his performance and weak in his understanding of the TSC and emergency operations facility (EOF) cose assessment responsi-bility relationship. He appeared to be unsure of how to handle dose projections in the absence of a release in progres In addition, the radiological status board had incomplete and/or incorrect ~

information for much of the exercise, and this went essentially unnotice .

The emergency director classified the General' Emergency in a timely fashion; however, he appeared to take more time than necessary in attempting to pinpoint.the condition in the classification guide prior to making the declaration. The declaration was based on a high radioactivity release, when it could have been made based on an unisolable steam leak outside containment (loss of 2 fission product barriers) and increasing radiation levels (loss or potential loss of the third barrier).

The maintenance and quality of most logs in the TSC was inconsistent.'

It was noted that there were no specific requirements or instructions for log maintenance establishe The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for

' improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requiremen Provide readily available instructions and training for responsible personnel on volume adjustment of PA system speakers in TS Provide additional training for the alternate dose assessment advisor to strengthen this function during the period in which dose assessment is being transferred to the EO Provide formal, specific log keeping requirements and necessary logs for the TSC key function No violations or deviations were identifie *

5. Operational Support Center The operations support center (OSC) was activated within about an hour after the declaration of an Aler The NRC inspector noted that there was no announcement declaring that the OSC was operational although the

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_7 radiation protection foreman's logbook showed that the OSC was considered operational at 11:50 a.m. In addition, there were no other announcements given by the OSC coordinator during the exercis During the exercise, there were seven briefings from the TSC over the public address (PA) system. These contained emergency classification information and updates on the status of the injured person but contained very little information on plant condition Although the OSC coordinator and radiation protection foreman may have had some additional plant status information, it was not relayed to the OSC or posted on the status boat In addition, the OSC coordinator and radiation protection foreman spent much of the time on the telephone. With 15 teams being despatched, these individuals did not have enough time to provide sufficient briefings to the teams and discuss plans with the TS .

The' NRC inspector noted that teams dispatched from the OSC were provided adequate protective equipment and instrumentation, were given cursory briefings on expected hazards and had cumulative radiation exposure monitored. In addition, contanination control measures were established; contamination surveys conducted, and initial and followup habitability monitoring was performe In the beginning of OSC operations, an individual was assigned to maintain the status boards. The NRC inspector noted that when this individual was assigned other duties, no one was assigned to take over that function until an hour later. In addition, even when a person was assigned to .

maintain the boards, insufficient plant conditions data were poste The radiation' protection foreman obtained inplant radiation levels over the telephone or verbally from radiation protection personnel after returning from accompanying teams. These data were jotted down and later transferred to the logbook. Some of the data were also recorded on survey form The NRC inspector noted that the survey forms contained insufficient information to characterize area radiological status and that all radiological data were not readily available in one locatio The NRC inspector noted that.the collection of a post accident sampling system (PASS) sample was first discussed in the OSC at 1:50 p.m.; however, the sampling team was not dispatched until 2:53 p.m. The delay indicated that the relatively long lead time to collect and analyze a PASS sample may not have been considered when priorities for inplant activities were establishe The NRC inspector observed that there were no radiation protection technicians available to accompany a repair team formed at 3:10 p.m. At 3:22 p.m., the radiation protection foreman told the OSC coordinator that two additional radiation protection personi,el were available. No provisions for additional radiation protection to support critical activities were considered when it was apparent that additional support ;

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-8-In regard to control of the exercise in the OSC, the NRC inspector noted that imaginary personnel were created and some simulations used which were not documented in the exercise scenario. This indicated that there was a weakness in the written instructions and briefings of controllers and participants regarding the use of simulatio Based on observations by the NRC inspector in the OSC, the following item is considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:

T! command and control exhibited in the OSC were inadequate in that no plant status announcements were made by the OSC coordinator, status boards were not properly maintained to provide current and complete information and team briefings on inplant status were incomplete (458/8609-01).

The following tre observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's

! attention. ' ase observations are neither violations nor enresolved

! items. T: items were recommended for licensee consideration for l

improvea , but they have no specific regulatory requiremen *

Radiation data should be coordinated by a single individual on i appropriate forma for immediate reference by the radiation protection, forema Collection of PASS samples should be considered early on and receive sufficient priority so that results will be available in s'ufficient time to be useful for accident assessmen Additional radiation protection support personnel should be requested when it appears that there will be a shortage of personnel to support

, critical activitie A dedicated communicator should be provided for routine communications to relieve the OSC coordinator and radiation protection foreman of those dutie The use of simulation should be reviewed with all controllers and participants to assure that exercise objective can be adequately tested.

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No violations or deviations were identifie l 6. Emergency Operations Facility The emergency operations facility (EOF) was activated in a timely manner,

being completed within 45 minutes following the Site Area Emergency at 12:16 p.m. The recovery manager clearly announced the EOF activation and assumed direction and control which continued throughout-the exercis The NRC inspector noted that the recovery director also provided timely, effective briefings of the E0F staff-during the exercise with excellent

use of status. boards and key support staf Prior to the conclusion of the exercise,.he conducted a thorough, to-the point meeting to formulate

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-9-planned recovery actions with key GSU staff. The NRC inspector noted that status boards were well maintained during the exercise and the display of offsite monitoring data and the status of protective action recommendations versus those implemented by offsite authorities were improved over that observed during the previous exercis The following additional observations were made by the NRC inspector in the EOF: '

The dose assessment advisor was responsible for dose assessment, formulation of protective action recommendations and direction of field teams. These responsibilities, along with having to interface with state and NRC participants, appeared to be too much of a burden for one individual and resulted in a lack of attention to the direction of field monitoring team The review of dose assessment and protective action recommendations prepared by the dose assessment advisor was not as timely as it could be. The first dose assessment and protective action recommendation was completed at 1:40 p.m.; however, review and sign-off by the radiation protection advisor and recovery manager was not completed until 21 minutes late *

Adequate measurements of radiciodine concentrations from the stack and environs were not available for use in the dose assessment

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proces Field teams were directed to collect only two air samples and an attempt to collect and analyze a stack sample later in the-exercise had to be aborted due to sample activity being prohibitively high at that time: The uncertainty in radiciodine concentrations was aggravated by an error in field data recorded in the E0F resulting in estimates of radiciodine concentrations that were a factor of 5 higher that the predicted iodine to noble gas ratio of 1:100 This delayed the assessment process until the error was discovere Procedure EIP-2-020, step 4.1.2.d, covering EOF activation, required the EOF manager to place the E0F ventilation system in recirculation mode only if the EOF is in, or is expected to be in, the radiological plume. A review of procedures and observations indicates there was no procedural mechanism for revisiting this question if the plume should shift toward the EOF after initial activatio *

Feedback to the E0F on protective action implemented by offsite authorities identified that Pointe Coupee Parish had decided to evacuate a zone not included in the unified protective action recommendatio It was subsequently learned that Pointe Coupee officials had misinterpreted the protective action message. This appeared"to be a problem in training relat'ed to use of the message form The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved

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items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requiremen The dose assessment advisor responsibilities should be reviewed and some tasks assigned to other personne *

The process for reviewing and approving assessment and protective action recommendations should be reviewed, and the efficiency of that process improve More attention should be given to prompt collection of effluent samples and collection of a representative number of offsite air sampias to characterize radioiodine concentration *

Procedure EIP-2-020 should be reviewed to determine if it would be feasible to place the E0F ventilation system in the recirculation mode when the E0F is activated regardless of the plume directio Supplemental protective action aids and displays should be reviewed for human factors, formalized and incorporated in procedure No violations or deviations were identifie .

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The first aid portion of the exercise began at approximately 10:05 with a simulated injury and contamination of 1 of 2_radwaste operators ,

loading drums with low-level dry waste. The uninjured radwaste operator applied initial first-aid until the first-aid team and radiation protection support arrived to perform their funtLions as defined in the emergency plan and EIP The NRC inspector observed that the initial responders did not take vital signs, and the individual was left to take care of himself while help was called for on the Gaitronics. It was noted that insufficient health physics personnel were available to support the first-aid team. The only health. physics technician at the injury site was not able to serve the needs of the recovery team and control the area at the same tim No general area barriers were put up and personnel without protective clothing continued to walk through the area. Contaminated articles passed freely over the step off pad; no gloves were used by the first-aid team to control contamination spread; first aid supplies were handled with the same bare hands that handled the victim; and the first-aid team leader

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crossed the local contamination barrier several times without employing

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contamination control techniques. In addition, the NRC inspector noted that no air-sample was taken and that the question of potential internal contamination of the victim was neither considered nor discusse At approximately 10:31 a.m., the simulated victim was transported to the ambulance which had arrived from offsite, and the first-aid team briefed

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-11-the ambulance nurses on the condition of the victi Good procedures in the handling of the victim were observe At about 11:50 a.m., a maintenance team was dispatched from the OSC to check the RCIC area in the auxiliary building, attempt to reset the feedwater breaker and attempt to close the RCIC isolation valve in the steam tunnel. The NRC inspector noted that adequate direct radiation, contamination and air radioactivity surveys were made and that the results were documente The NRC inspector also noted that a security-escorted survey team took radiction readings outside of the controlled area. The surveys were made in an appropriate fashion and the traverse stopped when the western edge of the plume was detected based on expectation of potentially high dose rates in the plum The following is an observation the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention. This observation is neither a violation nor an unresolved item. This item was recommended for licensee consideration for improvement, but has no specific regulatory requiremen Provide additional first-aid training for plant personnel who may be first responders to an acciden No violations or deviations were identifie . Offsite Monitoring The NRC inspector reviewed EIP-2 ' 14, "Offsite Radiological Monitoring,"

EIP-2-103, " Emergency Equipment In?entory," RPP-0019, " Decontamination of Areas, Tools and Equipment," and EIP-2-0012, " Radiation Exposure Controls." Upon arriving at the EOF minor confusion was noted due to the locked emergency equipment room access door to the emergency kits and cabinets. The offsite monitoring procedure appeared to have been written for personnel arriving during the offshift and not from the sit Access to the EOF emergency equipment door was not addressed, e.g., how to obtain emergency equipment with lockr.d doors and cabinets. The NRC inspector noted that EIP-2-103, sectica 3.1, required a kit to be inventoried if the kit had been tampered with or found unsealed. The NRC inspector determined that the emergrncy kits and cabinets had not been sealed since the licensee received an operating license. Additionally, there were several pieces of equipment listed as being in a kit when the equipment was located in the equipment room and not in the ki The NRC inspector noted that EIP-2-014, Section 3.4, stated that 2 four-wheel drive vehicles were designated for offsite monitoring use and equipped with two way radios. The vehicles were not to leave the site if the radios were inoperable. The vehicle radios were to be monitored during non-emergency use. The NRC inspector determined that the two way radios had been removed from the vehicles, and vehicles were being used without radio .

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-12-The NRC inspector also observed the offsite monitoring teams responding to the E0F. The monitoring teams reported to the E0F according to procedure EIP-2-014 and proceeded to inventory their equipment. The health physics technicians were diverted to assist in monitoring evacuated site personnel reporting to the E0F. Monitoring evacuated personnel was not listed for the offsite monitoring teams in the procedure. The offsite monitoring teams performed an inventory of the emergency kits prior to departing the EO The NRC inspector noted that the emergency teams were not briefed prior to departure as stated in EIP-2-014, Section 4.1. The NRC inspector accompanied and observed one offsite monitoring team during the exercise. It was noted that the team consulted and used the offsite monitoring procedures adequately during the exercise. The team took both open and closed window radiological instrument readings outside

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the vehicle window. The team maintained contact with the EOF communicator during the exercise and monitored reports from the other monitoring tea During the exercise one team requested confirmation from another team as to the recently reported dat Both teams conferred on the report, confirmed the data and resumed their radiological monitoring. Soil and vegetation samples were collected offsite and returned to the E0F. The offsite monitoring team 3 surveyed their equipment upon returning to the E0 Based on observations by the NRC inspector, the following item is considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency. Compliance with ..

the provisions of emergency plan implementing procedures was not always adequate as determined by the following observations (458/8609-02): Emergency equipment was not located in kits and cabinets as stated in EIP-2-10 Offsite monitoring teams were not briefed prior to departure as required in EIP-2-014, Section 4.1. , Emergency kits and cabinets were not sealed as required in EIP-2-103, Section Radios were not in the designated emergency vehicles as required in EIP-2-014, Sect, ion *

The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requiremen .

Emergency equipment inventory list should be readily available for conducting rapid inventorie *

Emergency equipment should be more accessible by the monitoring teams.

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Assemble loose procedures and furms in a notebook with tab *

Offsite teams should have respiratory protection readily available in vehicles when conducting offsite monitorin *

Emergency kits snould have a compass for night time directional orientation monitorin EIP-2-014 should remind team members to frisk themselves both during the sampling period and upon returning to the sit Revise EIP-2-014 to reflect any other duties that are expected of the offsite team. Revise the procedure to reflect when the team may report to the E0F from the sit No violations or deviations were identifie . Joint Information Center The Joint Information Center (JIC) was activated in a timely manner. The NRC inspector noted that information flow from the TSC was initiated promptly and that information was released to the news media in a timely fashion. It was also noted that there was good communication and cooperation between the state, local authority representatives and the utility information staff Slides and training materials were available as visual aids for news conferences, and the conduct of the news conferences was excellen .

The media and public telephone response teams were established in a timely manner, and messages for rumor control and public information were handled wel No violations or deviations were identifie . Exercise Critique The NRC inspectors attended the post exercise critiques by the licensee staff on February 26 and 27, 1986, to evaluate the licensee's identifi-cation of deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14)

and Appendix E of Part 50, paragraph IV.F.5. It was noted that most of-the observations by the NRC inspections during the exercise were also independently made and reported by the GSU staff. Both the NRC and the licensee's staff identified the deficiencies listed below. Corrective action for identified deficiencies, and weaknesses will be examined during a future NRC inspectio *

Control and handling of nonessential personnel at the evacuation assembly area east was inadequat .

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Personnel in the OSC were not adequately trained in use of the accountability card reader syste Radiation protection coverage for the injury event and rescue and first-aid personnel training in contamination control procedures were not adequat *

Training in the use of message forms by offsite agencies was weak as evidenced by misinterpretation of protective action recommendations by Pointe Coupee Parish official Radiological assessment was weak due to the staffing plan for this function in the emergency response organizatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Meeting The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 28, 198 The NRC inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the findings. The NRC inspection team leader stated that although deficiencies were identified during the exercise, the licensee's actions during.the exercise were found to be adequate to protect the health and safety of the publi <

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