ML20195E405
| ML20195E405 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1986 |
| From: | Baird J, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195E402 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-86-09, 50-458-86-9, NUDOCS 8606090013 | |
| Download: ML20195E405 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1986009
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-458/86-09
License: NPF-47
Docket:
50-458-
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Licensee: Gulf States Utilities
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River Bend Nuclear Group
P. O. Box 2951
Beaumont, Texas 77704-
Facility Name:
River Bend Station (RBS)
Inspection At:
RBS, St. Francisville, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted:
February 24-28, 1986
Inspector:
h$ dM
3/A 7 /f6
Jr B. Baird, NRC Team Leader
Date
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Other Inspectors:
C. Hackney, RIV NRC
R. Hogan, OIE NRC
T. Essig, Pacific Northwest Laboratories
E. King, Pacific Northwest Laboratories
G. Bethke, Comex Corporation
A. Loposer, Comex Corporation
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Approved:
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L. A. Yandell,-Chief, Emergency Preparedness
04te'
and Safeguards Programs Section
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted February 24-28, 1986 (Report 50-458/86-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's emergency
response capabilities during an exercise of the emergency f an and procedures.
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8606090013 860604
ADOCK 05000458
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Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or
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deviations were identified.
Seven emergency preparedness deficiencies were
identified, two by the NRC and five by the licensee.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
GSU
- D. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training
P. Barker, Nuclear Control Operator
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- R. Barrow, Board of Directors, GSU
- D. Bloemendaal, Senior Emergency Planner
- J. Cadwallader, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
- W. Cahill, Senior Vice President RBNG
- E. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiological Programs
- J. Conner, Supervisor, Environmental Services
- T. Crouse, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. Deddens, Vice President RBNG
- W. Eisele, Health Physicist
- C. Fantacci, Radiation Protection Supervisor
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- D. Hartz, Shift Supervisor
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E. Hensley, Radiation Protection Foreman
- R. King, Licensing
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R. Lantz, Nuclear Control Operator
- W. Odell, Manager, Administration
- G. Patrissi, Quality Assurance-Operations
- T. Plunkett, Plant Manager
- K. Suhrke, Manager, Project
- B. Thomas, Emergency Planner
- P. Tomlinson, Director, Quality Services
- C. Wells, Emergency Public Information Coordinator
L. Woods, Control Operating Foreman
Contractor Personnel
T. Gildersleeve, NUTECH, Engineers
J. Kauffman, NUTECH Engineers
W. Keller, NUTECH Engineers
T. Loudenslager,:NUTECH Engineers
S. Reilly, NUTECH Engineers
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- D.
Simpson, NUTECH Engineers
W. Smith, Impell-
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State of Louisiana
- W. Spell, Administrator, LNED
- D. Zaloudek, Emergency Planning Supervisor, LNED
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Federal Emergency Management Agency
A. Lookabaugh, Chief, Technological Hazards Branch
G. Jones, Community Planner
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NRC Personnel
- D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector
W. Jones, Resident Inspector
Other GSU, state, and contractor personnel were also contacted during the
inspection.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Exercise Scenario
The GSU exercise scenario was reviewed prior to the exercise to determine
that provisions had been made for the required level of participation by
state and local agencies, and that all major elements of emergency
response wculd be exercised by GSU in accordance with the requirements of
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and the
guidance criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
Comments from this review
were discussed with GSU prior to the inspection date, and satisfactory
resolution was obtained prior to the exercise.
Based on the scenario review, resolution of comments and exercise
observations, the exercise scenario was considered to have been adequate
to exercise fully GSU's emergency response capabilities and to enable
adequate participation of state and local government agencies.
No violations or deviations were i'dentified.
3.
Control Room
a
Initial conditions were provided to the control room staff assigned to
respond to the simulated emergency at 9:45 a.m. by the exercise
controller, and the exercise was initiated at 10:00 a.m. with an injured,
contaminated radwaste operator requiring medical attention.
The licensee
declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE) at 10:24 a.m. based on
transportation of a contaminated and injured plant person to the hospital.
An Alert was declared at approximately 11:17 a.m. due to a severe level
transient following a loss of condenser vacuum, with subsequent main
turbine trip and reactor scram.
At approximately 12:17 p.m., a Site Area
Emergency was declared as a result of a leak in the reactor g" ore isolation
cooling system (RCIC) which could not be isolated immediately.
At
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approximately 1:56 p.m. , a General Emergency classificatioq was declared
due to a piping break in the residual heat removal (RHR) system, thermal
shock and damage of the fuel, resulting in a release of radioactivity to
the environment through ,the standby gas treatment system (SGTS).
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The NRC inspector in the control room observed that personnel demonstrated
appropriate use of emergency and abnormal operating procedures, together
with classification and notification emergency plan implementing
procedures (EIPs) for the exercise events.
In addition, it was noted that
control room operators demonstrated an excellent knowledge of plant
systems design and system component locations and characteristics, and
took actions before expected or anticipated in the exercise scenario.
The NRC inspector noted that initial offsite notifications were begun
promptly, and the NRC was notified immediately following the notifications
to state and local agencies.
However, there was some difficulty in
completing the notifications with the offsite agencies which resulted in
approximately 22 minutes being required to complete the notifications.
The NRC inspector also noted that the communicator assigned to operate the
pager system had difficulty initiating an " actual" versus " drill"'page.
In addition, the communicator had difficulty assimilating orders from
shift operators to make various Gaitronics announcements.
It was further
noted that these announcements could not be heard consistently in the
control room.
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's
attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved
items.
These items were recommended for licensee consideration for
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improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
Provide additional training for shift communicators and consider
having operators make their own Gaitronics announcements.
Adjust Gaittonics speakers ' volume and review placement of the
speakers to improve the capability to hear announcements in the
control room.
No violations, or deviations were identified.
4.
The technical support center (TSC) was promptly activated following the
declaration of an Alert and declared operational at 11:40 a.m.
The NRC
inspector in the TSC noted that personnel arrived in a timely fashion and
immediately commenced their duties and tasks.
.The plant manager assumed
the position of emergency director, announced the transfer of
responsibility from the control room to the TSC and maintained positive
control of the TSC throughout the exercise.
The emergency director made
periodic and informative announcements to keep TSC personnel apprised of
plant conditions, made appropriate use of his resources and managed
extended operations shift and recovery planning effectively.
Of fsite
notifications were within the required time limits for offsite agencies.
The NRC inspector also noted that habitability of the TSC was checked
early on and frequently thereaf ter during the exercise.
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The following additional observations were made by the NRC inspector in
the TSC:
The public address (PA) system volume in the TSC was too loud
resulting in distortion of announcements from the control room.
There were no instructions readily available on setting the speaker
volume.
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The alternate dose assessment advisor in the-TSC appeared to be
ineffective in his performance and weak in his understanding of the
TSC and emergency operations facility (EOF) cose assessment responsi-
bility relationship. He appeared to be unsure of how to handle dose
projections in the absence of a release in progress.
In addition,
the radiological status board had incomplete and/or incorrect
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information for much of the exercise, and this went essentially
unnoticed.
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The emergency director classified the General' Emergency in a timely
fashion; however, he appeared to take more time than necessary in
attempting to pinpoint.the condition in the classification guide
prior to making the declaration.
The declaration was based on a high
radioactivity release, when it could have been made based on an
unisolable steam leak outside containment (loss of 2 fission product
barriers) and increasing radiation levels (loss or potential loss of
the third barrier).
The maintenance and quality of most logs in the TSC was inconsistent.'
It was noted that there were no specific requirements or instructions
for log maintenance established.
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's
attention.
These observations are neither violations nor unresolved
items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for
' improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
Provide readily available instructions and training for responsible
personnel on volume adjustment of PA system speakers in TSC.
Provide additional training for the alternate dose assessment advisor
to strengthen this function during the period in which dose
assessment is being transferred to the EOF.
Provide formal, specific log keeping requirements and necessary logs
for the TSC key functions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Operational Support Center
The operations support center (OSC) was activated within about an hour
after the declaration of an Alert.
The NRC inspector noted that there was
no announcement declaring that the OSC was operational although the
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radiation protection foreman's logbook showed that the OSC was considered
operational at 11:50 a.m.
In addition, there were no other announcements
given by the OSC coordinator during the exercise.
During the exercise, there were seven briefings from the TSC over the
public address (PA) system.
These contained emergency classification
information and updates on the status of the injured person but contained
very little information on plant conditions.
Although the OSC coordinator
and radiation protection foreman may have had some additional plant status
information, it was not relayed to the OSC or posted on the status boata.
In addition, the OSC coordinator and radiation protection foreman spent
much of the time on the telephone. With 15 teams being despatched, these
individuals did not have enough time to provide sufficient briefings to
the teams and discuss plans with the TSC.
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The' NRC inspector noted that teams dispatched from the OSC were provided
adequate protective equipment and instrumentation, were given cursory
briefings on expected hazards and had cumulative radiation exposure
monitored.
In addition, contanination control measures were established;
contamination surveys conducted, and initial and followup habitability
monitoring was performed.
In the beginning of OSC operations, an individual was assigned to maintain
the status boards.
The NRC inspector noted that when this individual was
assigned other duties, no one was assigned to take over that function
until an hour later.
In addition, even when a person was assigned to
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maintain the boards, insufficient plant conditions data were posted.
The radiation' protection foreman obtained inplant radiation levels over
the telephone or verbally from radiation protection personnel after
returning from accompanying teams.
These data were jotted down and later
transferred to the logbook.
Some of the data were also recorded on survey
forms.
The NRC inspector noted that the survey forms contained
insufficient information to characterize area radiological status and that
all radiological data were not readily available in one location.
The NRC inspector noted that.the collection of a post accident sampling
system (PASS) sample was first discussed in the OSC at 1:50 p.m.; however,
the sampling team was not dispatched until 2:53 p.m.
The delay indicated
that the relatively long lead time to collect and analyze a PASS sample
may not have been considered when priorities for inplant activities were
established.
The NRC inspector observed that there were no radiation protection
technicians available to accompany a repair team formed at 3:10 p.m.
At
3:22 p.m., the radiation protection foreman told the OSC coordinator that
two additional radiation protection personi,el were available.
No
provisions for additional radiation protection to support critical
activities were considered when it was apparent that additional support
would be needed.
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In regard to control of the exercise in the OSC, the NRC inspector noted
that imaginary personnel were created and some simulations used which were
not documented in the exercise scenario.
This indicated that there was a
weakness in the written instructions and briefings of controllers and
participants regarding the use of simulation.
Based on observations by the NRC inspector in the OSC, the following item
is considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:
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command and control exhibited in the OSC were inadequate in that
no plant status announcements were made by the OSC coordinator,
status boards were not properly maintained to provide current and
complete information and team briefings on inplant status were
incomplete (458/8609-01).
The following tre observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's
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attention.
' ase observations are neither violations nor enresolved
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items. T:
items were recommended for licensee consideration for
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improvea
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Radiation data should be coordinated by a single individual on
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appropriate forma for immediate reference by the radiation protection,
foreman.
Collection of PASS samples should be considered early on and receive
sufficient priority so that results will be available in s'ufficient
time to be useful for accident assessment.
Additional radiation protection support personnel should be requested
when it appears that there will be a shortage of personnel to support
critical activities.
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A dedicated communicator should be provided for routine
communications to relieve the OSC coordinator and radiation
protection foreman of those duties.
The use of simulation should be reviewed with all controllers and
participants to assure that exercise objective can be adequately
tested.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
The emergency operations facility (EOF) was activated in a timely manner,
being completed within 45 minutes following the Site Area Emergency at
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12:16 p.m.
The recovery manager clearly announced the EOF activation and
assumed direction and control which continued throughout-the exercise.
The NRC inspector noted that the recovery director also provided timely,
effective briefings of the E0F staff-during the exercise with excellent
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use of status. boards and key support staff.
Prior to the conclusion of
the exercise,.he conducted a thorough, to-the point meeting to formulate
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planned recovery actions with key GSU staff. The NRC inspector noted that
status boards were well maintained during the exercise and the display of
offsite monitoring data and the status of protective action
recommendations versus those implemented by offsite authorities were
improved over that observed during the previous exercise.
The following additional observations were made by the NRC inspector in
the EOF:
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The dose assessment advisor was responsible for dose assessment,
formulation of protective action recommendations and direction of
field teams.
These responsibilities, along with having to interface
with state and NRC participants, appeared to be too much of a burden
for one individual and resulted in a lack of attention to the
direction of field monitoring teams.
The review of dose assessment and protective action recommendations
prepared by the dose assessment advisor was not as timely as it could
be.
The first dose assessment and protective action recommendation
was completed at 1:40 p.m.; however, review and sign-off by the
radiation protection advisor and recovery manager was not completed
until 21 minutes later.
Adequate measurements of radiciodine concentrations from the stack
and environs were not available for use in the dose assessment
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process.
Field teams were directed to collect only two air samples
and an attempt to collect and analyze a stack sample later in the-
exercise had to be aborted due to sample activity being prohibitively
high at that time:
The uncertainty in radiciodine concentrations was
aggravated by an error in field data recorded in the E0F resulting in
estimates of radiciodine concentrations that were a factor of
5 higher that the predicted iodine to noble gas ratio of 1:1000.
This delayed the assessment process until the error was discovered.
Procedure EIP-2-020, step 4.1.2.d, covering EOF activation, required
the EOF manager to place the E0F ventilation system in recirculation
mode only if the EOF is in, or is expected to be in, the radiological
plume. A review of procedures and observations indicates there was
no procedural mechanism for revisiting this question if the plume
should shift toward the EOF after initial activation.
Feedback to the E0F on protective action implemented by offsite
authorities identified that Pointe Coupee Parish had decided to
evacuate a zone not included in the unified protective action
recommendation.
It was subsequently learned that Pointe Coupee
officials had misinterpreted the protective action message.
This
appeared"to be a problem in training relat'ed to use of the message
forms.
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's
attention.
These observations are neither violations nor unresolved
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items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for
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improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
The dose assessment advisor responsibilities should be reviewed and
some tasks assigned to other personnel.
The process for reviewing and approving assessment and protective
action recommendations should be reviewed, and the efficiency of that
process improved.
More attention should be given to prompt collection of effluent
samples and collection of a representative number of offsite air
sampias to characterize radioiodine concentrations.
Procedure EIP-2-020 should be reviewed to determine if it would be
feasible to place the E0F ventilation system in the recirculation
mode when the E0F is activated regardless of the plume direction.
Supplemental protective action aids and displays should be reviewed
for human factors, formalized and incorporated in procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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First Aid and Inplant Radiation Protection
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The first aid portion of the exercise began at approximately 10:05 a.m
with a simulated injury and contamination of 1 of 2_radwaste operators
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loading drums with low-level dry waste.
The uninjured radwaste operator
applied initial first-aid until the first-aid team and radiation
protection support arrived to perform their funtLions as defined in the
emergency plan and EIPs.
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The NRC inspector observed that the initial responders did not take vital
signs, and the individual was left to take care of himself while help was
called for on the Gaitronics.
It was noted that insufficient health
physics personnel were available to support the first-aid team.
The only
health. physics technician at the injury site was not able to serve the
needs of the recovery team and control the area at the same time.
No
general area barriers were put up and personnel without protective
clothing continued to walk through the area.
Contaminated articles passed
freely over the step off pad; no gloves were used by the first-aid team to
control contamination spread; first aid supplies were handled with the
same bare hands that handled the victim; and the first-aid team leader
crossed the local contamination barrier several times without employing
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contamination control techniques.
In addition, the NRC inspector noted
that no air-sample was taken and that the question of potential internal
contamination of the victim was neither considered nor discussed.
At approximately 10:31 a.m., the simulated victim was transported to the
ambulance which had arrived from offsite, and the first-aid team briefed
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the ambulance nurses on the condition of the victim.
Good procedures in
the handling of the victim were observed.
At about 11:50 a.m., a maintenance team was dispatched from the OSC to
check the RCIC area in the auxiliary building, attempt to reset the
feedwater breaker and attempt to close the RCIC isolation valve in the
steam tunnel.
The NRC inspector noted that adequate direct radiation,
contamination and air radioactivity surveys were made and that the results
were documented.
The NRC inspector also noted that a security-escorted survey team took
radiction readings outside of the controlled area.
The surveys were made
in an appropriate fashion and the traverse stopped when the western edge
of the plume was detected based on expectation of potentially high dose
rates in the plume.
The following is an observation the NRC inspectors called to the
licensee's attention.
This observation is neither a violation nor an
unresolved item. This item was recommended for licensee consideration for
improvement, but has no specific regulatory requirement.
Provide additional first-aid training for plant personnel who may be
first responders to an accident.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Offsite Monitoring
The NRC inspector reviewed EIP-2 ' 14, "Offsite Radiological Monitoring,"
EIP-2-103, " Emergency Equipment In?entory," RPP-0019, " Decontamination of
Areas, Tools and Equipment," and EIP-2-0012, " Radiation Exposure
Controls." Upon arriving at the EOF minor confusion was noted due to the
locked emergency equipment room access door to the emergency kits and
cabinets.
The offsite monitoring procedure appeared to have been written
for personnel arriving during the offshift and not from the site.
Access
to the EOF emergency equipment door was not addressed, e.g., how to obtain
emergency equipment with lockr.d doors and cabinets.
The NRC inspector
noted that EIP-2-103, sectica 3.1, required a kit to be inventoried if the
kit had been tampered with or found unsealed. The NRC inspector
determined that the emergrncy kits and cabinets had not been sealed since
the licensee received an operating license.
Additionally, there were
several pieces of equipment listed as being in a kit when the equipment
was located in the equipment room and not in the kit.
The NRC inspector noted that EIP-2-014, Section 3.4, stated that 2 four-wheel
drive vehicles were designated for offsite monitoring use and equipped
with two way radios.
The vehicles were not to leave the site if the
radios were inoperable.
The vehicle radios were to be monitored during
non-emergency use.
The NRC inspector determined that the two way radios
had been removed from the vehicles, and vehicles were being used without
radios.
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The NRC inspector also observed the offsite monitoring teams responding to
the E0F.
The monitoring teams reported to the E0F according to procedure
EIP-2-014 and proceeded to inventory their equipment.
The health physics
technicians were diverted to assist in monitoring evacuated site personnel
reporting to the E0F.
Monitoring evacuated personnel was not listed for
the offsite monitoring teams in the procedure.
The offsite monitoring
teams performed an inventory of the emergency kits prior to departing the
EOF.
The NRC inspector noted that the emergency teams were not briefed
prior to departure as stated in EIP-2-014, Section 4.1.2.6.
The NRC inspector accompanied and observed one offsite monitoring team
during the exercise.
It was noted that the team consulted and used the
offsite monitoring procedures adequately during the exercise.
The team
took both open and closed window radiological instrument readings outside
the vehicle window.
The team maintained contact with the EOF communicator
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during the exercise and monitored reports from the other monitoring team.
During the exercise one team requested confirmation from another team as
to the recently reported data.
Both teams conferred on the report,
confirmed the data and resumed their radiological monitoring.
Soil and
vegetation samples were collected offsite and returned to the E0F.
The
offsite monitoring team 3 surveyed their equipment upon returning to the
E0F.
Based on observations by the NRC inspector, the following item is
considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency.
Compliance with
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the provisions of emergency plan implementing procedures was not always
adequate as determined by the following observations (458/8609-02):
a.
Emergency equipment was not located in kits and cabinets as stated in
EIP-2-103.
b.
Offsite monitoring teams were not briefed prior to departure as
required in EIP-2-014, Section 4.1.2.6.
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c.
Emergency kits and cabinets were not sealed as required in EIP-2-103,
Section 3.1.
d.
Radios were not in the designated emergency vehicles as required in
EIP-2-014, Sect, ion 3.4.
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's
attention.
These observations are neither violations nor unresolved
items.
These items were recommended for licensee consideration for
improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
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Emergency equipment inventory list should be readily available for
conducting rapid inventories.
Emergency equipment should be more accessible by the monitoring
teams.
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Assemble loose procedures and furms in a notebook with tabs.
Offsite teams should have respiratory protection readily available in
vehicles when conducting offsite monitoring.
Emergency kits snould have a compass for night time directional
orientation monitoring.
EIP-2-014 should remind team members to frisk themselves both during
the sampling period and upon returning to the site.
Revise EIP-2-014 to reflect any other duties that are expected of the
offsite team.
Revise the procedure to reflect when the team may
report to the E0F from the site.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
The Joint Information Center (JIC) was activated in a timely manner.
The
NRC inspector noted that information flow from the TSC was initiated
promptly and that information was released to the news media in a timely
fashion.
It was also noted that there was good communication and
cooperation between the state, local authority representatives and the
utility information staffs.
Slides and training materials were available as visual aids for news
conferences, and the conduct of the news conferences was excellent.
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The media and public telephone response teams were established in a timely
manner, and messages for rumor control and public information were handled
well.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Exercise Critique
The NRC inspectors attended the post exercise critiques by the licensee
staff on February 26 and 27, 1986, to evaluate the licensee's identifi-
cation of deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14)
and Appendix E of Part 50, paragraph IV.F.5.
It was noted that most of-
the observations by the NRC inspections during the exercise were also
independently made and reported by the GSU staff.
Both the NRC and the
licensee's staff identified the deficiencies listed below.
Corrective
action for identified deficiencies, and weaknesses will be examined during
a future NRC inspection.
Control and handling of nonessential personnel at the evacuation
assembly area east was inadequate.
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Personnel in the OSC were not adequately trained in use of the
accountability card reader system.
Radiation protection coverage for the injury event and rescue and
first-aid personnel training in contamination control procedures were
not adequate.
Training in the use of message forms by offsite agencies was weak as
evidenced by misinterpretation of protective action recommendations
by Pointe Coupee Parish officials.
Radiological assessment was weak due to the staffing plan for this
function in the emergency response organization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Exit Meeting
The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 28, 1986.
The NRC inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection
and the findings.
The NRC inspection team leader stated that although
deficiencies were identified during the exercise, the licensee's actions
during.the exercise were found to be adequate to protect the health and
safety of the public.
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