ML20195E405

Insp Rept 50-458/86-09 on 860224-28.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Response Capabilities During Exercise of Emergency Plan & Procedures. Seven Emergency Preparedness Deficiencies Identified

ML20195E405
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	04/09/1986
From:	Baird J, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195E402	List: ML20195E395 ML20195E405
References
50-458-86-09, 50-458-86-9, NUDOCS 8606090013
Download: ML20195E405 (14)

See also: IR 05000458/1986009

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APPENDIX

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/86-09 License: NPF-47

Docket: 50-458-

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Licensee: Gulf States Utilities -

River Bend Nuclear Group

P. O. Box 2951

Beaumont, Texas 77704-

Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: RBS, St. Francisville, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: February 24-28, 1986

Inspector: h$ dM

Jr B. Baird, NRC Team Leader

3/A 7 /f6

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Other Inspectors: C. Hackney, RIV NRC

R. Hogan, OIE NRC

T. Essig, Pacific Northwest Laboratories l

E. King, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

G. Bethke, Comex Corporation

A. Loposer, Comex Corporation

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Approved: u 'hA .4 )!7b

L. A. Yandell,-Chief, Emergency Preparedness 04te'  !

and Safeguards Programs Section

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted February 24-28, 1986 (Report 50-458/86-09)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's emergency

response capabilities during an exercise of the emergency f an l and procedures.

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8606090013 860604

PDR ADOCK 05000458

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Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or

i deviations were identified. Seven emergency preparedness deficiencies were

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identified, two by the NRC and five by the licensee.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

GSU

• D. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training

, P. Barker, Nuclear Control Operator

• R. Barrow, Board of Directors, GSU

• D. Bloemendaal, Senior Emergency Planner

• J. Cadwallader, Supervisor, Emergency Planning

• W. Cahill, Senior Vice President RBNG

• E. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiological Programs

• J. Conner, Supervisor, Environmental Services

• T. Crouse, Manager, Quality Assurance

• J. Deddens, Vice President RBNG

• W. Eisele, Health Physicist

• C. Fantacci, Radiation Protection Supervisor -

• D. Hartz, Shift Supervisor ,

E. Hensley, Radiation Protection Foreman

• R. King, Licensing <

R. Lantz, Nuclear Control Operator

• W. Odell, Manager, Administration

• G. Patrissi, Quality Assurance-Operations

• T. Plunkett, Plant Manager

• K. Suhrke, Manager, Project

• B. Thomas, Emergency Planner

• P. Tomlinson, Director, Quality Services

• C. Wells, Emergency Public Information Coordinator

L. Woods, Control Operating Foreman

Contractor Personnel

T. Gildersleeve, NUTECH, Engineers

J. Kauffman, NUTECH Engineers

W. Keller, NUTECH Engineers

T. Loudenslager,:NUTECH Engineers

S. Reilly, NUTECH Engineers ,

• D. Simpson, NUTECH Engineers

W. Smith, Impell-

h State of Louisiana

• W. Spell, Administrator, LNED

• D. Zaloudek, Emergency Planning Supervisor, LNED

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Federal Emergency Management Agency

A. Lookabaugh, Chief, Technological Hazards Branch

G. Jones, Community Planner

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NRC Personnel

• D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector

W. Jones, Resident Inspector

Other GSU, state, and contractor personnel were also contacted during the

inspection.

• Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Exercise Scenario

The GSU exercise scenario was reviewed prior to the exercise to determine

that provisions had been made for the required level of participation by

state and local agencies, and that all major elements of emergency

response wculd be exercised by GSU in accordance with the requirements of

10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and the

guidance criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N. Comments from this review

were discussed with GSU prior to the inspection date, and satisfactory

resolution was obtained prior to the exercise.

Based on the scenario review, resolution of comments and exercise

observations, the exercise scenario was considered to have been adequate

to exercise fully GSU's emergency response capabilities and to enable

adequate participation of state and local government agencies.

No violations or deviations were i'dentified.

3. Control Room a

Initial conditions were provided to the control room staff assigned to

respond to the simulated emergency at 9:45 a.m. by the exercise

controller, and the exercise was initiated at 10:00 a.m. with an injured,

contaminated radwaste operator requiring medical attention. The licensee

declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE) at 10:24 a.m. based on

transportation of a contaminated and injured plant person to the hospital.

An Alert was declared at approximately 11:17 a.m. due to a severe level

transient following a loss of condenser vacuum, with subsequent main

turbine trip and reactor scram. At approximately 12:17 p.m., a Site Area

Emergency was declared as a result of a leak in the reactor g" ore isolation

cooling system (RCIC) which could not be isolated immediately. At .

approximately 1:56 p.m. , a General Emergency classificatioq was declared

due to a piping break in the residual heat removal (RHR) system, thermal

shock and damage of the fuel, resulting in a release of radioactivity to

the environment through ,the standby gas treatment system (SGTS).

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The NRC inspector in the control room observed that personnel demonstrated

appropriate use of emergency and abnormal operating procedures, together

with classification and notification emergency plan implementing

procedures (EIPs) for the exercise events. In addition, it was noted that

control room operators demonstrated an excellent knowledge of plant

systems design and system component locations and characteristics, and

took actions before expected or anticipated in the exercise scenario.

The NRC inspector noted that initial offsite notifications were begun

promptly, and the NRC was notified immediately following the notifications

to state and local agencies. However, there was some difficulty in

completing the notifications with the offsite agencies which resulted in

approximately 22 minutes being required to complete the notifications.

The NRC inspector also noted that the communicator assigned to operate the

pager system had difficulty initiating an " actual" versus " drill"'page.

In addition, the communicator had difficulty assimilating orders from

shift operators to make various Gaitronics announcements. It was further

noted that these announcements could not be heard consistently in the

control room.

The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's

attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved

items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for

! improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.

Provide additional training for shift communicators and consider

having operators make their own Gaitronics announcements.

Adjust Gaittonics speakers ' volume and review placement of the

speakers to improve the capability to hear announcements in the

control room.

No violations, or deviations were identified.

4. Technical Support Center

The technical support center (TSC) was promptly activated following the

declaration of an Alert and declared operational at 11:40 a.m. The NRC

inspector in the TSC noted that personnel arrived in a timely fashion and

immediately commenced their duties and tasks. .The plant manager assumed

the position of emergency director, announced the transfer of

responsibility from the control room to the TSC and maintained positive

control of the TSC throughout the exercise. The emergency director made

periodic and informative announcements to keep TSC personnel apprised of

plant conditions, made appropriate use of his resources and managed

extended operations shift and recovery planning effectively. Of fsite

notifications were within the required time limits for offsite agencies.

The NRC inspector also noted that habitability of the TSC was checked

early on and frequently thereaf ter during the exercise.

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The following additional observations were made by the NRC inspector in

the TSC:

The public address (PA) system volume in the TSC was too loud

resulting in distortion of announcements from the control room.

There were no instructions readily available on setting the speaker

volume.

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The alternate dose assessment advisor in the-TSC appeared to be

ineffective in his performance and weak in his understanding of the

TSC and emergency operations facility (EOF) cose assessment responsi-

bility relationship. He appeared to be unsure of how to handle dose

projections in the absence of a release in progress. In addition,

the radiological status board had incomplete and/or incorrect ~

information for much of the exercise, and this went essentially

unnoticed. .

The emergency director classified the General' Emergency in a timely

fashion; however, he appeared to take more time than necessary in

attempting to pinpoint.the condition in the classification guide

prior to making the declaration. The declaration was based on a high

radioactivity release, when it could have been made based on an

unisolable steam leak outside containment (loss of 2 fission product

barriers) and increasing radiation levels (loss or potential loss of

the third barrier).

The maintenance and quality of most logs in the TSC was inconsistent.'

It was noted that there were no specific requirements or instructions

for log maintenance established.

The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's

attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved

items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for

' improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.

Provide readily available instructions and training for responsible

personnel on volume adjustment of PA system speakers in TSC.

Provide additional training for the alternate dose assessment advisor

to strengthen this function during the period in which dose

assessment is being transferred to the EOF.

Provide formal, specific log keeping requirements and necessary logs

for the TSC key functions.

No violations or deviations were identified. *

5. Operational Support Center

The operations support center (OSC) was activated within about an hour

after the declaration of an Alert. The NRC inspector noted that there was

no announcement declaring that the OSC was operational although the

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radiation protection foreman's logbook showed that the OSC was considered

operational at 11:50 a.m. In addition, there were no other announcements

given by the OSC coordinator during the exercise.

During the exercise, there were seven briefings from the TSC over the

public address (PA) system. These contained emergency classification

information and updates on the status of the injured person but contained

very little information on plant conditions. Although the OSC coordinator

and radiation protection foreman may have had some additional plant status

information, it was not relayed to the OSC or posted on the status boata.

In addition, the OSC coordinator and radiation protection foreman spent

much of the time on the telephone. With 15 teams being despatched, these

individuals did not have enough time to provide sufficient briefings to

the teams and discuss plans with the TSC. .

The' NRC inspector noted that teams dispatched from the OSC were provided

adequate protective equipment and instrumentation, were given cursory

briefings on expected hazards and had cumulative radiation exposure

monitored. In addition, contanination control measures were established;

contamination surveys conducted, and initial and followup habitability

monitoring was performed.

In the beginning of OSC operations, an individual was assigned to maintain

the status boards. The NRC inspector noted that when this individual was

assigned other duties, no one was assigned to take over that function

until an hour later. In addition, even when a person was assigned to .

maintain the boards, insufficient plant conditions data were posted.

The radiation' protection foreman obtained inplant radiation levels over

the telephone or verbally from radiation protection personnel after

returning from accompanying teams. These data were jotted down and later

transferred to the logbook. Some of the data were also recorded on survey

forms. The NRC inspector noted that the survey forms contained

insufficient information to characterize area radiological status and that

all radiological data were not readily available in one location.

The NRC inspector noted that.the collection of a post accident sampling

system (PASS) sample was first discussed in the OSC at 1:50 p.m.; however,

the sampling team was not dispatched until 2:53 p.m. The delay indicated

that the relatively long lead time to collect and analyze a PASS sample

may not have been considered when priorities for inplant activities were

established.

The NRC inspector observed that there were no radiation protection

technicians available to accompany a repair team formed at 3:10 p.m. At

3:22 p.m., the radiation protection foreman told the OSC coordinator that

two additional radiation protection personi,el were available. No

provisions for additional radiation protection to support critical

activities were considered when it was apparent that additional support  ;

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In regard to control of the exercise in the OSC, the NRC inspector noted

that imaginary personnel were created and some simulations used which were

not documented in the exercise scenario. This indicated that there was a

weakness in the written instructions and briefings of controllers and

participants regarding the use of simulation.

Based on observations by the NRC inspector in the OSC, the following item

is considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:

T! command and control exhibited in the OSC were inadequate in that

no plant status announcements were made by the OSC coordinator,

status boards were not properly maintained to provide current and

complete information and team briefings on inplant status were

incomplete (458/8609-01).

The following tre observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's

! attention. ' ase observations are neither violations nor enresolved

! items. T: items were recommended for licensee consideration for

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improvea , but they have no specific regulatory requirement.

Radiation data should be coordinated by a single individual on

i appropriate forma for immediate reference by the radiation protection,

foreman.

Collection of PASS samples should be considered early on and receive

sufficient priority so that results will be available in s'ufficient

time to be useful for accident assessment.

Additional radiation protection support personnel should be requested

when it appears that there will be a shortage of personnel to support

, critical activities.

A dedicated communicator should be provided for routine

communications to relieve the OSC coordinator and radiation

protection foreman of those duties.

The use of simulation should be reviewed with all controllers and

participants to assure that exercise objective can be adequately

tested.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Emergency Operations Facility

The emergency operations facility (EOF) was activated in a timely manner,

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being completed within 45 minutes following the Site Area Emergency at

12:16 p.m. The recovery manager clearly announced the EOF activation and

assumed direction and control which continued throughout-the exercise.

The NRC inspector noted that the recovery director also provided timely,

effective briefings of the E0F staff-during the exercise with excellent

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use of status. boards and key support staff. Prior to the conclusion of

the exercise,.he conducted a thorough, to-the point meeting to formulate

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planned recovery actions with key GSU staff. The NRC inspector noted that

status boards were well maintained during the exercise and the display of

offsite monitoring data and the status of protective action

recommendations versus those implemented by offsite authorities were

improved over that observed during the previous exercise.

The following additional observations were made by the NRC inspector in

the EOF: '

The dose assessment advisor was responsible for dose assessment,

formulation of protective action recommendations and direction of

field teams. These responsibilities, along with having to interface

with state and NRC participants, appeared to be too much of a burden

for one individual and resulted in a lack of attention to the

direction of field monitoring teams.

The review of dose assessment and protective action recommendations

prepared by the dose assessment advisor was not as timely as it could

be. The first dose assessment and protective action recommendation

was completed at 1:40 p.m.; however, review and sign-off by the

radiation protection advisor and recovery manager was not completed

until 21 minutes later.

Adequate measurements of radiciodine concentrations from the stack

and environs were not available for use in the dose assessment

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process. Field teams were directed to collect only two air samples

and an attempt to collect and analyze a stack sample later in the-

exercise had to be aborted due to sample activity being prohibitively

high at that time: The uncertainty in radiciodine concentrations was

aggravated by an error in field data recorded in the E0F resulting in

estimates of radiciodine concentrations that were a factor of

5 higher that the predicted iodine to noble gas ratio of 1:1000.

This delayed the assessment process until the error was discovered.

Procedure EIP-2-020, step 4.1.2.d, covering EOF activation, required

the EOF manager to place the E0F ventilation system in recirculation

mode only if the EOF is in, or is expected to be in, the radiological

plume. A review of procedures and observations indicates there was

no procedural mechanism for revisiting this question if the plume

should shift toward the EOF after initial activation.

Feedback to the E0F on protective action implemented by offsite

authorities identified that Pointe Coupee Parish had decided to

evacuate a zone not included in the unified protective action

recommendation. It was subsequently learned that Pointe Coupee

officials had misinterpreted the protective action message. This

appeared"to be a problem in training relat'ed to use of the message

forms.

The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's

attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved

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items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for

improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.

The dose assessment advisor responsibilities should be reviewed and

some tasks assigned to other personnel.

The process for reviewing and approving assessment and protective

action recommendations should be reviewed, and the efficiency of that

process improved.

More attention should be given to prompt collection of effluent

samples and collection of a representative number of offsite air

sampias to characterize radioiodine concentrations.

Procedure EIP-2-020 should be reviewed to determine if it would be

feasible to place the E0F ventilation system in the recirculation

mode when the E0F is activated regardless of the plume direction.

Supplemental protective action aids and displays should be reviewed

for human factors, formalized and incorporated in procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified. .

,7. First Aid and Inplant Radiation Protection

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The first aid portion of the exercise began at approximately 10:05 a.m

with a simulated injury and contamination of 1 of 2_radwaste operators ,

loading drums with low-level dry waste. The uninjured radwaste operator

applied initial first-aid until the first-aid team and radiation

protection support arrived to perform their funtLions as defined in the

emergency plan and EIPs.

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The NRC inspector observed that the initial responders did not take vital

signs, and the individual was left to take care of himself while help was

called for on the Gaitronics. It was noted that insufficient health

physics personnel were available to support the first-aid team. The only

health. physics technician at the injury site was not able to serve the

needs of the recovery team and control the area at the same time. No

general area barriers were put up and personnel without protective

clothing continued to walk through the area. Contaminated articles passed

freely over the step off pad; no gloves were used by the first-aid team to

control contamination spread; first aid supplies were handled with the

same bare hands that handled the victim; and the first-aid team leader

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crossed the local contamination barrier several times without employing

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contamination control techniques. In addition, the NRC inspector noted

that no air-sample was taken and that the question of potential internal

contamination of the victim was neither considered nor discussed.

At approximately 10:31 a.m., the simulated victim was transported to the

ambulance which had arrived from offsite, and the first-aid team briefed

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the ambulance nurses on the condition of the victim. Good procedures in

the handling of the victim were observed.

At about 11:50 a.m., a maintenance team was dispatched from the OSC to

check the RCIC area in the auxiliary building, attempt to reset the

feedwater breaker and attempt to close the RCIC isolation valve in the

steam tunnel. The NRC inspector noted that adequate direct radiation,

contamination and air radioactivity surveys were made and that the results

were documented.

The NRC inspector also noted that a security-escorted survey team took

radiction readings outside of the controlled area. The surveys were made

in an appropriate fashion and the traverse stopped when the western edge

of the plume was detected based on expectation of potentially high dose

rates in the plume.

The following is an observation the NRC inspectors called to the

licensee's attention. This observation is neither a violation nor an

unresolved item. This item was recommended for licensee consideration for

improvement, but has no specific regulatory requirement.

Provide additional first-aid training for plant personnel who may be

first responders to an accident.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Offsite Monitoring

The NRC inspector reviewed EIP-2 ' 14, "Offsite Radiological Monitoring,"

EIP-2-103, " Emergency Equipment In?entory," RPP-0019, " Decontamination of

Areas, Tools and Equipment," and EIP-2-0012, " Radiation Exposure

Controls." Upon arriving at the EOF minor confusion was noted due to the

locked emergency equipment room access door to the emergency kits and

cabinets. The offsite monitoring procedure appeared to have been written

for personnel arriving during the offshift and not from the site. Access

to the EOF emergency equipment door was not addressed, e.g., how to obtain

emergency equipment with lockr.d doors and cabinets. The NRC inspector

noted that EIP-2-103, sectica 3.1, required a kit to be inventoried if the

kit had been tampered with or found unsealed. The NRC inspector

determined that the emergrncy kits and cabinets had not been sealed since

the licensee received an operating license. Additionally, there were

several pieces of equipment listed as being in a kit when the equipment

was located in the equipment room and not in the kit.

The NRC inspector noted that EIP-2-014, Section 3.4, stated that 2 four-wheel

drive vehicles were designated for offsite monitoring use and equipped

with two way radios. The vehicles were not to leave the site if the

radios were inoperable. The vehicle radios were to be monitored during

non-emergency use. The NRC inspector determined that the two way radios

had been removed from the vehicles, and vehicles were being used without

radios.

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The NRC inspector also observed the offsite monitoring teams responding to

the E0F. The monitoring teams reported to the E0F according to procedure

EIP-2-014 and proceeded to inventory their equipment. The health physics

technicians were diverted to assist in monitoring evacuated site personnel

reporting to the E0F. Monitoring evacuated personnel was not listed for

the offsite monitoring teams in the procedure. The offsite monitoring

teams performed an inventory of the emergency kits prior to departing the

EOF. The NRC inspector noted that the emergency teams were not briefed

prior to departure as stated in EIP-2-014, Section 4.1.2.6.

The NRC inspector accompanied and observed one offsite monitoring team

during the exercise. It was noted that the team consulted and used the

offsite monitoring procedures adequately during the exercise. The team

took both open and closed window radiological instrument readings outside

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the vehicle window. The team maintained contact with the EOF communicator

during the exercise and monitored reports from the other monitoring team.

During the exercise one team requested confirmation from another team as

to the recently reported data. Both teams conferred on the report,

confirmed the data and resumed their radiological monitoring. Soil and

vegetation samples were collected offsite and returned to the E0F. The

offsite monitoring team 3 surveyed their equipment upon returning to the

E0F.

Based on observations by the NRC inspector, the following item is

considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency. Compliance with ..

the provisions of emergency plan implementing procedures was not always

adequate as determined by the following observations (458/8609-02):

a. Emergency equipment was not located in kits and cabinets as stated in

EIP-2-103.

b. Offsite monitoring teams were not briefed prior to departure as

required in EIP-2-014, Section 4.1.2.6. ,

c. Emergency kits and cabinets were not sealed as required in EIP-2-103,

Section 3.1.

d. Radios were not in the designated emergency vehicles as required in

EIP-2-014, Sect, ion 3.4.

The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's

attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved

items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for

improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.

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Emergency equipment inventory list should be readily available for

conducting rapid inventories.

Emergency equipment should be more accessible by the monitoring

teams.

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Assemble loose procedures and furms in a notebook with tabs.

Offsite teams should have respiratory protection readily available in

vehicles when conducting offsite monitoring.

Emergency kits snould have a compass for night time directional

orientation monitoring.

EIP-2-014 should remind team members to frisk themselves both during

the sampling period and upon returning to the site.

Revise EIP-2-014 to reflect any other duties that are expected of the

offsite team. Revise the procedure to reflect when the team may

report to the E0F from the site.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Joint Information Center

The Joint Information Center (JIC) was activated in a timely manner. The

NRC inspector noted that information flow from the TSC was initiated

promptly and that information was released to the news media in a timely

fashion. It was also noted that there was good communication and

cooperation between the state, local authority representatives and the

utility information staffs.

Slides and training materials were available as visual aids for news

conferences, and the conduct of the news conferences was excellent. .

The media and public telephone response teams were established in a timely

manner, and messages for rumor control and public information were handled

well.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Exercise Critique

The NRC inspectors attended the post exercise critiques by the licensee

staff on February 26 and 27, 1986, to evaluate the licensee's identifi-

cation of deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14)

and Appendix E of Part 50, paragraph IV.F.5. It was noted that most of-

the observations by the NRC inspections during the exercise were also

independently made and reported by the GSU staff. Both the NRC and the

licensee's staff identified the deficiencies listed below. Corrective

action for identified deficiencies, and weaknesses will be examined during

a future NRC inspection.

Control and handling of nonessential personnel at the evacuation

assembly area east was inadequate. .

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Personnel in the OSC were not adequately trained in use of the

accountability card reader system.

Radiation protection coverage for the injury event and rescue and

first-aid personnel training in contamination control procedures were

not adequate.

Training in the use of message forms by offsite agencies was weak as

evidenced by misinterpretation of protective action recommendations

by Pointe Coupee Parish officials.

Radiological assessment was weak due to the staffing plan for this

function in the emergency response organization.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Exit Meeting

The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 28, 1986.

The NRC inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection

and the findings. The NRC inspection team leader stated that although

deficiencies were identified during the exercise, the licensee's actions

during.the exercise were found to be adequate to protect the health and

safety of the public.

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