IR 05000416/1988020

Insp Rept 50-416/88-20 on 881003-06.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Radiological Emergency Response Exercise

ML20206A673
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	11/02/1988
From:	Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206A652	List: IR 05000416/1988020 ML20206A650
References
50-416-88-20, IEIN-83-28, NUDOCS 8811150208
Download: ML20206A673 (19)

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NUCLdAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f REGION ll

\e.,,,/ 101 MAR:eTTA ST, N ATLANTA. GeOAOLA 30323

. NOV 0 319N

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Report No.: 50-416/88-20 Licensee: Systen Energy Resources. In Jackson. MS 39205 x

Docket No.: 50-41 0 License No.: NPF 29

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Facility Name: Grand Gulf Inspection Conducted: October 3 4' 1.988 Inspe tor: Ab4 be b 1 b IN Date Signed

[je A(J. Cunningham

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Accompanying Personnel: J. L. Mathis M. E. Stein S. J. Vias d by O*'O' b , 2 MV./7dY Appro'g: / D vision T . Decker. Section Chief of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Date Signed f

SumARY scope: This reutine, announced inspet. tion involved observation and evaluation of the annual radiological emergency response exercise. The small scale or Ilmited participattun exercise was initiated at 8:00 a.m. on October 4.1988 I as an announced exercis Federal. State and County participation was limited to receipt and acknowledgement of emergency notifications and periodic follow-ups of same. The exercise was terminated at 4:00 p.m. on the above referenced date. Medical emerg(ncy and fire drills were integrated into the scenario as a routine part of the exercis Results: No violations or deviations were identified. The exercise was fully successful, and the licensee demonstrated the capability to effectively assess, control, and mitigate the pcstulated casualty presented in the exercise scenario. Additionally, onsite and offsite protective action recorrendations were prom:tly made and were consistent with the plan, procedures and prevailing

radiological condition E.011(<2 PDR ADOCK 05000416 O PDC

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FEPORT DETAILS .

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, Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• Cottle, Station Director W. Eiff Principal Quality Engineer 1

• R. Fron, tmergency Preparedness Manager

• C Hicks. Operations Assistance '

• T. Hildebe andt, Health Physics Supervisor J. Hurley, Emergency Planning Specialist

C. Hutchinson, General Manager  !

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• J. Mcdonald, Shift Superintendent  !

l *A. Morgan, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor l

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• L. Moulder, Operations Superintendent i i

! *J. Reaves, Quality Assurance Manager J. Roberts, Performance and System Eng neering Manager }

J. Fumers, Compliance Coordinator l

• J. Yelverton, Plant Operations Manager  ;

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i Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included i l craf tsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force member l

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l technicians, and administrative personne !

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l * Attended exit interview { Exercise Scenario (82301) }

i The scenario for the emergency exercistr was reviewed to assure that l provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion

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of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and

! organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance proru1 gated in Section !!.N of NUREG-0654 l The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed in l detail with licensee representatives on several occasions. While no major l scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent l during the exercise. The inconsistencies, bewever, failed to detract from the overall perfomunce of the licensee's emergency organization.

l The scenario developed for the exercise was detailed, and fully exercised I the onsite ecergency organization. The scenario provided sufficient infomation to the State, counties, local government, and Federal agencies consistent with their participation in the exercis The licensee demonstrated a significant cemitment to trainug and personnel through use of cen* ollers, evaluators, and specialists

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, participating in the exercise. The controllers provided adequate guidance j

throughout the exercis ;

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! No violations or deviations were identifie )

s L l AssignmentofResponsibility(82301)- l 1  ?

l This area was observed to assure that prs. nary responsibilities for l emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that f adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to i, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph !Y.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and ,

1 specific guidance prmulgated in Section !!.A cf NUREG 065 i

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1 The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignrents were made for  !

I the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff I l was availtble to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response l t organization was augmented by designated licensee representativest  !

however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or I continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not {

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required. Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review i

of the site Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) indicated that a sufficient  !

number of trained technical personnel were available for continuous '

staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed, f

) The inspectors also observed activation, staffing, and operatten of the I i emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC). Operations i Support Center (OSC) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and near-site l Emergency News Media Cente The required staffing and assignrent of

responsibility at these facilities were cenststent with the licenseo's j Emergency Plan and approved implementing procedure ,

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j OnsiteEmergencyOrganization(82301)

l The licensee's ensite emergency organization was observed to assure that i the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(bV,e),

j Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guivar a

! promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654: (1)unambigueusdefinitionof j responsibilities for emergency respense; (2) provisions of adequate

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staffing to assure iratial facility accident responte it key functional ,

i areas at all tires; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support  ;

organizational interaction }

l The inspector c N erved that the initial onsite emergency crganization was

] adequately defined, and that staff vas available to fill key functional positio.is witnin the organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shif t i

and available on-shift personnel. The en duty Shift Supervisor assumed 1 the duties of Erergency Coordinator proeptly upon initiation of the sinulated emergency, and directed the response until femally relieved by

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! the Station Manage Required interactions between the licensee's i I emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were i adequate and consistent with the scop 6 of the exercise.

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Ne violations or deviations were identifie l

, Emergency Classification System (82301) }

ency classificatien !

This area was and action leveiobserved sr. heme to assure was in usethat a standard by the nuclear emerfacility licensee !

i pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,

, specific guidance prottnigated in Section !!.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance 7 j ree.omended in NRC Information Notice 83-2 j An Emergency Action Level (EAL) matrix was used to promptly identify and i properly classify an emergency and escalate it to more severe emergency j i classifications as the simulated accident sequence progrersed. Licensee

actions in this area were timely and effective.

j j Observations confirmed that the emergency classificatien system was

effectively used, and was consistent with the REP and implementing 1 procedures. The system was cbserved to be adequate for classification of ,

the simulated accident sequence The emergency procedures provided for j initial and centinuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergenc l f

No violations or deviations were identifie }

- NotificationMethedsandProcedures(82301)

j This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for

, notification of State and local respense crganizatiens and emergency l personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and follow up ressages to response organizatiens was established. This area was further '

< ebserved to assure that reans to provide early notification to the !'

) populace w; thin the plume exposure pathway were established pursuknt to 1 10 CFR 5-0.47(b)(5). Paragraph !Y.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section !!.E of NUREG 0654 l

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An inspector observed that notification methods 4 procedures were j estabitshed and available for use in providing > emation regarding the

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sirolated emergency conditions to Federal, S' < w, el local response ;

) organtraticns, and to alert the licensee's Nw - m gency response j j organizations, if require State and local ini, notification * were t

irplemented within the 15-minute tir.e regie following declaration of f I each energency classificatio Periodic updates of plant status were f j eensistently ecmunicated to the State via telephone and later followed up }

by providing hard copies of sar '

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No violatiens or deviations were identifie l 1 I i

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4 Euergency Co w nications (82301)

This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pJrsuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-065 The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, E0F), the licensee and offsite response organizations, and the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the TSC/E0 The inspector also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organization. Emergency cormiunications and communication systems were significantly ir'p roved , and consistent with emergency response requirement No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequste emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-065 The inspector observed activation 4 staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities, and observed the use ti equipment therei Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control Room, TSC, OSC, and E0 Control Room - The Unit 2 Control Room was provided for tne exercise .

Shift Super *isor and his staf Required communications equipment, ,

Control Room procedures and documents care readily availabl The !

inspector observed that, following review and analysis of the sequence of accident ever,ts, Control Room operations perscnnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergenc Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercise Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded i overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency condition The Shift Supervisor and Control Room Operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authoritie These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classificatio ..

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The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to consistently and effectively assess the initial conditions of the casualty and implement required mitigating actions in a timely manne It was noted that a detailed log of facility activities was maintained by the Shift Supervisor throughout the exercise, Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Emergency Coordinator of the simulated emergency conditions and declaration of the Alert classification. The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities. Required operation of the facility proceeded in an orderly manner. The TSC was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staf During operaticn of the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as required. Status boards and related visual aids were strategically located to facilitate viewing by the TSC staf Dedicated communicators were assigned to the facilit Notification is '

discussed in Paragraph 6, abov Inspection disclosed the following additional findings, namely:

(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored into problem-solving exercises; (2) assumption of duties by the Emergency Coordinator was definite l and firm; (3) trarsfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC was f'rmly declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4) brittfings for the TSC staff were frequent, and consistent '

with changes in plant statut and related emergency conditions; (5)accountabitity, including 1Jentifying missing personnel, was ,

readily implemented within the accepted time regime and was cor.sistent with the scope of the scenario; and (6) TSC Controllers were effective in identifying minor scenario problems and interacted with players without prorpting. The transfer of authority and specific respoisibilities by the Emergency Coordinator to the E0F

Recovery Manager following activation of the EOF was prompt, effective, and consistent with the REP and implementing procedure Frequent and effective comunications were maintained between the

respective facility manager Operations Support Center (05C) - The OSC was promptly staffed following activation of the Emergency Plan by the Emergency Coordinato An inspector observed that teams were prcmptly assembled, briefed, and dispatched. A Health Physics techniciaa accompanied each team. The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilitie During operation of this facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documente _ . - - _ - . _ _ _ - _ , . . - . - , - - - - - . - - - . - . _ . - - _ _ . _ _ _ . - - - - . - - . , _ - -

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The OSC Supervisor demonstrated effective management and control practice The supervisor assured that OSC status beards were maintained current, and that OSC principals thoroughly briefed each investigation / repair team prior to their deployment to accident area It was noted by the NRC evaluators, however, that the OSC Supervisor failed to periodically update the facility staff on plant status throughout the exercise. This finding was discu' sed with cognizant licensee representatives prior to and dur e exercise critiqu The OSC Supervisor's checklist recornae...ed periodic updating of the facility staff on current plant statu It appeared that additionel training regarding this item should be considere This item will be tracked as an Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI), and reviewnd during future exercise IFI 50-416/88-20-01' Ensure that USC Supervisor periodically updates the facility staff on plant status throughout exercise Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) - The E0F is located approxi-mately 0.6 mile from the plant sit The facility was adequately equipped and staffed to support the required response to the simulated emergenc <

EOF security was promptly established and was included as a routine requirement for preparation and activation of the facility. Status boards and other related visual aids were strategically located and were readily accessible for viewing by the E0F staf Dedicated communicators were assigned to the facility, and all required notifications consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise . vere promptly mad The E0F principal staff freely interacted with the TSC, Control Room, and the OS The facility staff was frequently informed of plant status, and was consistently factored into the decision-making process addressing required and proposed protective measures and decisions. Transfer of authority and responsibilities from the TSC Emergency Coordinator to the EOF Operations Emergency Coordinator (0EC), attending activation of the facility, was firm and effectiv The OEC was frequently updated on the status of the emergency and was thoroughly briefed on previous and proposed mitigating action E0F communications with the Control Room, TSC, and OSC were maintained throughout the exercise, ,

It was observed by NRC evaluators and licensee observers and controllers that activation of the E0F requirad a total time of one hour and 32 minutes, which was 32 minutes in excess of the procedurally allotted time of one hour. Difficulty in activation of the facility within one hour was discussed in detail prior to the exercise. The delay was reasonably traceable to consistent logistic problems in transport of the OEC and a portion of his staff from the Corporate Emergency Center (CEC) in Jackson, Mississippi, to the near-site E0F in Port Gibson, Mississipp A corrective action

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devised by the licensee to preclude delay in activating the E0F simply involved use of onsite candidate principals (e.g., Vice President Nuclear Operations and Site Director) who are qualified to assume and implement the duties of the OEC. Implementation of this action requires a revision to the REP and respective Emergency Plan implementing Procedures (EPIPs). Based upon the planned corrective action, EOF activation time could be considerably reduced to less than one hour. This finding will be tracked as an IFI until the above cited corrective action has been implemented. This item will be reviewed during future inspection ;

IFI 50-416/88-20-02: Ensure that the EOF is activated within the time regime assigned by the EPIP No violations or deviations were identifie ,

i AccidentAssessment(82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific gui lance promulgated in Section 11.1 of NUREG-065 '

The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and i offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing plant status and providing recomendations to the Emergency Director

! concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, provention and/or control of radioactive releases, and 4 prompt termination of the emergency conditio Radiclogical assessment teams were dispatched to determinc the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume. Radio-logical effluent data were received in the TSC, where dose calculations ,

were performed and factored into the exercise. All resultant data were consistent with projected scenario parameter '

I Radiological field monitoring teams were neither observed nor evaluated by the NRC; however, inspectors assigned to the TSC and E0F observed dose -

assessment activities and related coordination and management of field t monitoring teams deployed to identify, monitor, and track offsite radiological releases. Accordingly, the E0F Field Team Coordinator demonstrated effective communication and interaction with the offsite radiological monitoring teams regarding provision of radiological monitoring data for dose assessment and projection calculations performed by the E0F throughout the release period, and factored into required protective action recommendations and decision ;

No violations or deviations were identified.

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10. Protective Response (82301) l This area was observ2d to determine whether guidelines established for protective actions, cor6 tent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and whether protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were promptly implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-065 The protective measures decision-making process was observed by the inspecto For each emergency classification defined, appropriate inplant and offsite protective measures were reviewe Protective measures recommendations were consistent with the current REP and procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and whether these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11) and specific guida.re promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-065 The inspector observed that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers. Periodic radiological surveys were conducted in the emergency response facilities. Exposure guidelines were also in place for various categories of emergency action Adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection were available for use as require Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared to be adequat Health Physics Supervisors were observed to thoroughly brief survey, investigative, and repair teams prior to their deployment from the OSC into radiation controlled area Dosimetry was available and effectively used. High-range dosimeters were also available for use if require No violations or deviations were identifie . Public Educatien and Information (82301)

This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated emerqency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to 10 CfR 50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section !!.G of NUREG-065 Inform 6 tion was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercis The information included details on how the public would be

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notified and the initial actions which should be taken during an emergency. A rumor control program was also in place, An NRC inspector was assigned to observe and evaluate routine operation of the near-site Emergency News Media Center (ENMC). The following evalua-tions were made: (1) the number of telephones aviilable to resident press representatives was adequate; (2) accurate information was contained in news releases; (3) periodic press briefings and related updates were frequent; (4) by virtue of the new ENMC design and lay-out, visiting media personnel were precluded from interfering with operation and management of that facility; (5) information provided to the public was simply stated and readily understandable; and (6) adequate telephone service was provided in the araa assigned to the NRC representativ No violations or deviations were identifie . Status of Previous Findings (92701) (0 pen) IF1 50-416/87-16-05: In response to NRC Bulletin No. 79-18, complete the installation and testing of the warning system for j high-noise areas of the plant.

l l Inspection disclosed that the above committed action remained l incomplet The licensee stated that the subject corrective action was in progress, (0 pen) IFI 50-416/87-24-01: Verify shif t staff augmentation times using announced and unannounced drill Inspection disclosed that the subject item remained incomplete, (Closed) IFI 50-416/87-31-01: Scenario data for radiological monitoring teams (RMTs) had outdated maps and overlapping time frames, inspection disclosed that maps provided to RMTs were updated as required, and remaining subject corrections were implemented and promulgated in the subject exercise scenario, (Closed) IFl 50-416/87-31-02: Jackson rumor control was not providing current status of simulated emergenc Inspection disclosed that rumor control personnel provided current plant status information in response to three inqu,res initiated by an inspector, (Closed) IFI 50-416/87-31-03: No telephones available in the NRC area of the media cente I

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Inspection disclosed that a telephone was provided in the subject area of the ENMC. The phone, providing three separate lines, including dedicated long-distance capability, was considered adequat . Exercise Critique and Exit Interview (82301)

The licensee's critique of the amergency exercise was observed to determine whether shortcomings identified as part of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-065 The inspector observed the licensee's Controller / Evaluator critique conducted on October 5, 198 The subject critique involved a detailed discussion and analysis of required improvements and deficiencies identified during the exercise. All findings were documented for review and correction. Positive findings were also discussed and recorded for presentation during the formal NRC/ Licensee critique. The formal critique was convened on October 6, 1988, and directed to identification and documentation of substantive findings and indicated improvements. The conduct and content of the cited critiques were consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited abov The inspector summarized the scope and results of the exercise with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo Although reviewed during this inspection, prcprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting ccmments were not received from the license Item Tyne Description 50-416/88-20-01 IFl Ensure that OSC facility staff is periodically updated on plant statu /88-20-02 IF1 Ensure that E0F is activated within time regime assigned by EP!P Attachment:

Exercise Scope and Objectives and Narrative Sunmary

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Inspection disclosed that a telephone was provided in the subject area of the ENMC. The phone, providing three separate lines, including dedicated long-distance capability, was considered adequat '

1 Exercise Critique and Exit Interview (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency 'aercise was observed to determine whether shortcomings identified as part of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to l 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-065 The inspector observed the licensee's Controller / Evaluator critique conducted on October 5, 1988. .The subject critique involved a detailed '

discussion and analysis of required improvements and deficiencies identified during the exercise. All findings were documented for review and correction. Positive findings were also discussed and recorded for

presentation during the formal NRC/ Licensee critique. The formal critique

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was convened on October 6,1988, and directed to identification and l documentation of substantive findings and indicated improvements. The conduct and content of the cited critiques were consistent with regulatory ,

requirements and guidance cited abov !

The inspector summarized the scope and results of the exercise with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas ,

inhpected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license Item Type Description

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50-416/88-20-01 IFI Ensure that OSC facility staff is periodically updated on plant statu /88-20-02 IFI Ensure that E0F is activated withen time regime assigned by PIP l Attachment: '

Exercise Scope and Objectives and Narrative Summary

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GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OBJECTIVES OCTOBER 1988 I. Onsite Response Objectives Actions to be Demonstrated Recognition and classification of emergency conditions

, Activation of emergency plan Knowledge, implementation, and use of appropriate e'eergency procedures l ~ Notification and rasponse of plant emergency response personnel Notification of offsite agencies Recognition of more severe conditions _,a.,dJ escalation of emergency classification

, Activation of Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation of Operations Support Center (OSC)

i Activation of Site Access Point (SAP)

1 Activation of search and rescue teams 11. Transfer of control and Emergency Director duties from Shift

' Superintendent to appropriate plant management personnel  ;

1 Control and management of emergency response personnel 13. Ability of Control Room operations and technical staff to take

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appropriate actions to control, mitigate, and terminate the emergency and limit releases of radioactive materials to the

,. environment 1 Ability to perform onsite and offsite radiological monitoring and dose assessment

1 Ability to adequately communicate between onsite and offsite l

eoergency facilities Actions Not to be Demonstrated

- Shif t staffing for long-ters oper'ations Evacuation of Control Roos, TSC or OSC l

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3. Total site evacuation or evacuation of any personnel not normally associated with GGNS 4. Decontamination of personnel or vehicles on or departing site 5. Response to simulated offsite radiological release involving offsite agencies

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86. Medical team response and transportation for a simulated contaminated and injured individual

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• 7. Actual use of Post Accident Sampling Systes 8. Utilization of the Class A Dose Model in performing dose assessments

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• These items are tested in separate drill e

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II. Offsite Response Objectives

. Actions to be Demonstrated Notification and response of offsite emergency response personnel Response and assembly of offsite emergency response personnel at appropriate emergency facilities Activatior, of the Corporate Emergency Center (CEC) Knowledge, implementation and use of appropriate emergency

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procedures Ability to adequately communicate between onsite and offsite emergency facilities Timely release of coordinated news information from CEC and performance of emergency information functions Control and management of emergency response personnel at CEC Ability to transfer emergency response personnel to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Emergency News Media Center (ENMC) Activation of the EOF 1 Activation of the ENMC 1 Communication and coordination between the TSC and EOF 1 Ability of E0F to perform technical support services 1 Ability of EOF to direct offsite radiological monitoring and perform dose assessment 1 Ability of EOF to provide timely and accurate notifications and

.. information to offsite agencies 1 Ability of ENHC to provide timely and accurate information to news media personnel 1 Security and access controls at EOF and ENMC Actions Not to be Demonstrated Notification or requests to ca.i-SERI organizations to provide technical or logistical support and assistance Notification of elected public officials Shif t staffing for long-term operations J13MISCB8070601 - 3

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4. Provision for lodging and seals a local area for emergency '

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5. Transfer from EOF and EMC back to CEC due to de-escalation of emergency classification 6. Use of backup EOF 7. Performance of offt d i radiological monitoring from aircraft or watercraft C. Decontamination of personnel or vehicles on or departing site 9. Uu';iza' ,'on of the Class A Dose Model in performin) dose assesseAtt

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-/ GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE NARRATIVE Sup04ARY OF EVENTS This scenario takes place in October. The local schools are in session. The plant is approaching the end of Cycle 3 and is presently operating at 100%

power. ANO Units 1 and 2 and Waterford Unit 3 are on line and the grid is stable. Thunderstorms are reported in the areas of Jefferson, Claiborne, and Warren counties. Drywell leakage has been increasing for the past two week However, the present trend indicates that the plant can continue to operate until the scheduled outage without eneeding leakage limits described in the Technical Specification '

The Division I Diesel Generator deluge system har. been tagged out in order to repair problems discovered during a routine surveillance test. The Division III Diesel Generator is inoperable due to repairs of various maintenance items on the lube oil system which has been completely draine The HPCS pump is tagged out for an oil change. A continuous fire watch with a C02 fire extinguisher is stationed in the Division I Diesel Generator roo ~

At 0855, the Control Rooa receives a report from Sec @ity Island that a tornado has been sited south of the site. Minutes later, the tornado passes approximately ona mila south of the site resulting in the loss of the Franklin 500 Kv and Port Gibson 115 Ky offsite power lines ar.d soon followed by the loss of th6 Baxter Wilson 500 Kv line. An UNUSUAL EVENT is declared due to a loss of all offsite power (re: 10-S-01-1, 8.1.1).

The Divisions I and II Diesel Generators start automatically, reenergizing the 15AA and 16AB busse A reactor scram occurs due i

to closure of MSIV's and loss of RP Note: (A loss of valve solenoid power causes an Auxiliary

< Building and Containment isolation to cccur.)

The fire watch reports that a fire has developed in the Division I Diesel Generator room and is unable to be extinguishe The room is

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completely filled with dense black smoke and all visibility is los At 1015, the Division I Diesel Generator trips and bus 15AA deenergizes. An ALERT is declared due to a fire defeating one safety system electrical division (re

10-S-01-1,11.2.1). A loss of valve solenoid power causes the Division I Auxiliary Building and Containment isolation to occu The Control Room receives trip of RCIC turbine concurrent with RCIC i Steam Line High D/P, RCIC Room Temperature HI, and RCIC Area i Radiation Monitor annunciators. Although the RCIC turbine trips, it does not isolate as the F063 and F064 valves fail to close by automatic or manual operatio J13 MISC 88081203 - 1

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A security guard making rounds in the RCIC room reports that the i room and the Auxiliary Building corridor is hot and steamy and that

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visibility is poo It appears that large amounts of steam is exiting the RCIC room and that the RCIC room door is stuck ope Evacuation of the Auxiliary Building is ordere At 1220, a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared due to a RCIC steam line break outside containment which cannot be isolated (re: 10-S-01-1,5.4.1).

At 1225, Security reports to the Control Room that a laborer is unaccounted for. A Search and Rescue Team is organized and dispatched to locate the missing individual. The individual was working in the RCIC room in full protective clothin0 and apparently hyperventilated. The laborer was located and taken to Health Physics for first aid

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treatmen Reactor water level begins to decrease due to loss of vessel inventory via RCIC steam line break. The "B" CRD pump is the only pump available for vessel makeup. As the reactor water level approaches the top of active fuel, the shift operators begin to initiate preparations for emergency depressurization. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) "C" pump trips when a start is attempted and cannot be restored to service as a result of a breaker malfunctio The RHR "B" pump will align for LPCI mode, however, its injection valve (F0428) only opens slightly as its operating motor trips. OSC team reports that manual operation of the valve is unsuccessfu The reactor water level decreases below the ten of active fue A radiation release to the environment occurs due to SBGT exhaust and ,

Auxiliary Puilding outleakage, however, the radiation and coolant activity levels do not exceed the limits that would require the declaration of a General Emergenc At 1535, the HPCS pump and Division III Diesel Generator are returned to service. The reactor water level is restored to above top of active ;

fuel via the HPCS pum RCIC is successfully isolated resulting in a '

decrease of radiation levels in the plant and the release to the environment is considered to be under control. The Reentry and Recovery phase may be entered and the exercise is terminated at 160 J13 MISC 88081203 - 2

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GRAND GUIS NUCLEAR STATION EERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCEDULE OF EVESTS Date Time Event September 30, 1988 1300 Pre-exercise controller meeting (EOF)

October 3, 1988 1300 Pre-exercise briefing for controllers, MRC, and other observers (EOF) s October 4. 1988 0800 Exercise begins 1600 Exercise ends 1630 Individual PJtF critiques October S, 1988 1000 SER_I controller critique (EOF)

October 6, 1988 0900 SERI management and NRC critique (ESC Auditorius)

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A GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS EXERCISE TIMETABLE FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS Time 0800 Initial conditions given to Control Room Persennel 0900 UNUSUAL EVENT - Loss of all Offsite Power 1017 ALERT - Fire defeating one safety system electrical division 1220 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Main steam line break outside primiry containment which cannot be isolate ,

1545 Reentry & Recovery - Reactor suberitical and dose rates decreasing 1600 Exercise Terminated

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