IR 05000412/1987039

Partially Withheld Preoperational Security Program Insp Rept 50-412/87-39 on 870504-08 (Ref 10CFR2.790).Major Area Inspected:Status of Security Program Implementation, Including Security Plan,Security Organization & Audit

ML20149M148
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	07/28/1987
From:	Bailey R, Keimig R, Galen Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149M144	List: IR 05000412/1987039 ML20149M143
References
50-412-87-39, IEB-79-16, IEIN-82-07, IEIN-82-7, IEIN-86-027, IEIN-86-083, IEIN-86-088, IEIN-86-091, IEIN-86-27, IEIN-86-83, IEIN-86-88, IEIN-86-91, NUDOCS 8802250357
Download: ML20149M148 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

REGION I

Report N /87-39 Docket N License N CPPR-105 Licensee: _Duquesne Light Company 435 Sixth Avenue

_ Pittsburgh, Pennsylvani Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 Review At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Review Conducted: ay 4-8, 1987 Date of Last P e era ,ional Security Program Review: April 6-10, 1987 Inspectors: ) ~7f;Ly G

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. Smith Sar guards Specialist C-'"~

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f1/ R. J. Bai ey, Physical S urity Inspector

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Approved by: ,

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1. R. Keimig, C 5 guards Section date Review Summary: Preoperational Sec rity Program Review on May 4-8, 1987 (Report No. 50-412/87-39)

Areas Ins >ected: Status of security program implementation, including:

lecurity >1an; Security Organization; Audit; Records and Reports; Testing I and Maintenance; Locks, Keys and Combinations; Physical Barriers - Vital l

Areas; Security System Power Supply; Lighting; Protection Aids - Vital Areas; Communications; and review of actions taken as a result of a NRC Bulletin and Information Notice Results: Development and implementation of the licensee's security program is I progressing on a schedule consistent with the licensee's anticipated fuel load date.

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DETAll  !

! Key Persons Contacted i

J. Carey, Sr. Vice President, Nuclear Group, Duquesne Light U eeny (DLC)  !

W. Roy, Manager, Administrative Services, OLC

H. Harper, Director of Security, DLC l; i F. Lipchick, Licensing Supery!S*, DLC  ;

D. Hunkele, Director Quality Assuance Operations, DLC  :

D. Roman, Supervisor, Quality Assurance, Maintenancet, DLC  !

A. Mizia, Supervisor, Quality Assurance, Operations, DLC H. Schobel, Startup Engineer, DLC l T. Slavic, Supervisor Engineering, DLC  ;

M. Johnston, Security Training / Procedures Coordinator, DLC l R. Druga, Acting Plan Manager, Unit 1, DLC l W. Reimer, Startup Engineer, DLC  !

P. Udon, Security Force Supervisor, Security Bureau, Inc. (581)  !

J. Gagliano, Security Startup Test Coordinator (SBI)  ! Security Plan Review

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The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's physical security plan  !

for Units 1 and 2 (combined) that was submitted to the NRC for approval on  !

February 19, 1987, as revised on April 10, 1987. The plan was approved by '

the NRC on May 8, 1987, i

Security Organization The inspectors observed that the security organization was as described in the NRC-approved physical security plan. The security force contractor ,

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has increased its onsite supervisory staff to support the expanded i security force for the cor.bined security progra !

! Security Program Audit

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The inspectors reviewed the security program audit corducted by the I Licensee's Quality Assurance group on March 30 - April 3,1987. The t audit was conducted to assess progress toward integrating the Unit 2 l security program into the Unit 1 program and to assess the Unit 2 pro- t gram against the NRC requirements specified in 10 CFR 73.55. Several i minor findings were identified during the audit and the licensee had '

initiated corrective actions to resolve them, i Records and Reports l j

The inspectors reviewed security program records and reports includin [

but not limited to, alarm records, key control records, training records, security shift assignments, and security event logs. All , m eds and  ;

reports were complete, properly maintained and readily accessibl l i

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! Testing and Maintenance i

During this review, the inspectors made the following observations of the maintenance program for security systems and equipment: Security Procedure 6.0, Issue 4, Revision 9, (Test, Inspections and Maintenance of Security Alarm Systemsl dated November 26, 1986, was revised to include the newly installed security equipment on Unit The new procedure identified in a., above does not contain a precaution to guard against compromising plant safety, creating a ;

loss of security program effectiveness, or jeopardizing personal ;

safety during the conduct of performance verification testing, The inspectors observed that there were approximately 30 outstanding Unit I security work requests from January 1986 and inquired of security supervisors about the support they receive from on-site maintenance groups. As an example, the inspectors observed that, on October 27, 1986, security representatives requested that a perimeter intrusion detection system zone be modified and upgraded i to a more dependable level. The security representatives assigned a security force member to this zone, as a compensatory measure, because of the unreliability of the detection system. The inspectors learned that an Engineering Memorandum (EM),No. 62021, dated October 27, 1986, was initiated by the security force concerning the detec-tien system in this zone. EM No. 62021 was given a priority 6 (the lowest maintenance repair priority) by the maintenance department and was held by the maintenance sectioh until March 27, 1987. The main-tenance supervisor had no explanation for the assignment of such a o low repair / modification priority number to the EM. The first survey on EM No. 62021 was conducted on March 27, 1987, by a maintenance representative and an 91ectrical engineer who determined that the repair priority sho;k reuin as a The inspectors determined through discussion ,th these representatives that they did not con-suit with the security organization when they made their decision to delay working on the syste The inspectors also determined that security representatives did not pursue their own request for wor Discussions with licensee representatives revealed that there was no formal procedure for establishing priorities for maintenance on security related equipment. The licensee acknowledged this obstua-tion and stated that the work priority for the zone will be upgraded and written procedures will be developed to integrate the security work requests into the established maintenance control system. The inspectors advised the licensee to consider !&E information Notice No. 86-88 - Compensatory Measures for prolonged periods of Security Systems Failure in regard to this matte >

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, Locks, Keys, And Combinations

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i The inspectors determined that the 'i:ra**m' . 6)y and lock controls were .

adequate for protection and in conformance with the NRC-approved physical l security plan and implementir.g procedures. Tests requested by the inspectors of the access control system indicated that the system was

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1 functioning properly and was effective and appropriate for its intended purpose.

Physical Barriers - Vital Areas

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i 1-i J Security System Power Supply '

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i 10. Lighting

! The inspectors determined that the lighting in the isolation zones and )

i exterior areas within the protected area was in compliance with the '

) NRC-approved physical security plan, The lightin; v'; determined, by

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observation, to be sufficient to monitor and eLierve persons and activi-

] ties in the areas and to assess the existence of a potential threa !

11. Detection Aids (Vital Areas)

I At the inspectors' request, the licensee performed intrusion, tamper and line supervision alarm tests in selected vital area intrusion detection

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zones. Al' equipment performed as required and in accordance with the

, NRC-approved physical security plan.

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12. Communications The inspectors detet .ined that the licensee had established and is

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maintaining the re,t f red procedures to utilize internal and enternal

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communication me.ha , in conformance with the NRC-approved physical security plan H ~ ever, the licensee had not identified the locations ,

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within Unit 2 wht require restricted or limited use of portable radio I j transceivers. T* s licensee was advised by the inspectors that a survey l

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l should be conducted to determine those locations prior to the licensing of Unit 2. In a,1dition, these restrictions should be documented in security procedures and included in security force trainin . NRC Bulletin and Information Notices >

" During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed previously issued Bulletin and Information Notices to determitie whether the licensee had considered

these in developing the Unit 2 security program. Those reviewed are

identified in Attachment 1 to this report, along with the licensee's ,

2 disposition.

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14. Exit Interview T',se inspectors met with the licensee representatives listed in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the preoperational review on May 8,1987. At that l time, the purpose, scope and findings of the review were presente At no time during this preoperational review was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector '

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.. ( C ATTACHMENT 1 I & E Information Notice No. 86-27 - Access Controi at Nuclear Facilities The licensee's security representatives stated that they had considered the information in the above-mentioned information notice, but ths.t they had not previously experienced any of the access control problems identified in the notic I & E Information Notice No. 82-07 - Inadequate Security Screening Program and 83-15 - Falsified Pre-Employment Screening

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C. I & E Information Notice No. 86-83 - Underground Pathways Into Protected '

and Vital Areas The invectors conducted a survey of the underground pathways into protected and vital areas that were identified by the license The !

inspectors determined that those pathways were adequately protected from intrusio )

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0. I & E Bulletin 79-16 - Vital Area Access Control and I & E Information Notice 86-91 - Limiting Access Authorization I

I The inspectors determined through a review of access control procedures, I records, and observation of security force members, that the licensee has appropriately considered the information in the above-mentioned bulletin ,

i and information notice. The licensee limits access authorization to protected and vital areas on an as-needed-basis and reviews all access authorizations each month. Although the licensee has an established access control program, some problems are still being experienced. The l inspectors noted that additional training and monitoring of badge issuance '

procedures is required by security management to ensure that the current ,

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Attachment 1 2 I & E Information Notice 86-88 - Compensatory Measures for Prolonged Periods of Security Systems Failure The inspectors determined through a review of procedures, records, and observations that the licensee had considered the information in the above-mentioned notice, however, the inspectors did identify a problem *

with the prolonged use of compensatory measures as described in para-graph 6 of this report. The inspectors also determined that the licensee was not following the NRC recommended guidelines for guard force overti,ne restrictions. The inspectors' review disclosed that from the time the protected area controls were established until this preoperational review, members of the security organizatior. were working in excess of the number of hours of overtime mentioned in the NRC Information Notice. Although the overtime being worked was voluntary, the licensee took immediate action to assure that no further overtime would be worked in excess of the NRC-recommended guidelines. The security contractor will adopt the NRC guidelines as its formal overtime polic i