ML19209D106

Forwards Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis,Suppl I. Addresses Availability of Suppression Pool Cooling Mode of RHR Sys in Event of Fire

ML19209D106
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/01/1979
From:	Janecek R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7910190412
Download: ML19209D106 (28)

Text

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Commonwealth Edison One First National Plaza. Chicago, ilhnois Ac' dress Reply to. Post Cffice Box 767 Chicago, Illmois 60690 October 1, 1979 Mr. T. A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors - Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Subj ect: Quad-Cities Units 1 and 2 Fire Protection - Safe Shutdown Analysis Supplement 1, September, 1979 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254/265

Dear Mr. Ippolito:

Table 3.2 of the Quad-Cities Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, July 27, 1979 indicates that an analysis of the capability of the RCIC System to maintain hot shutdown conditions including an evaluation of the 250 volt de system to support this mode of operation should be provided by October 1, 1979.

The Quad-Cities Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis dated July, 1978 outlined a method of safely shutting down the station in the event of fire which used the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) for decay heat removal and reactor water makeup.

Subsequent to the July, 1978 report a further analysis was made of the RCIC shutdown method which indicates that the suppression pool temperature will exceed acceptable limits after about four hours of operation if no suppression pool cooling is available. The 250 volt battery loading was also analyzed during RCIC operation, and it was found that the battery is capable of handling the necessary RCIC 250 VDC loads for approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> without a charger to maintain the battery.

In order to control the suppression pool temperaturc within accepted limits for RCIC mode of operation, the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) is necessary to cool the suppression pool. The attached Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis -

Supplement 1 - September, 1979 addresses the availability of the suppression pool cooling mode of the RHR System in the event of fire. This analysis indicates that the RHR System with certain modifications to the auxiliary electric power system in the station can be relied upon to cool the suppression pool water and that this, in conjunction with the RCIC System, can safely shut down the plant for any postulated fire in the station.

1173 304 7910190 u)1

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Commonwealth Edison NRC Docket Nos. 50-254/265 Mr. T. A. Ippolito: October 1, 1979 One of the modifications necessary is to provide control of the emergency diesel generators from the diesel generator rooms separated from the controls existing in the control room. This modification will provide AC power to supply the 250 volt battery chargers thus climinating the problem cited earlier concerning the extended capability of the 250 volt battery without a charger in service for RCIC system operation.

The necessary modifications to allow use of the RHR system to support the RCIC method of safe shutdown in the event of fire are listed in Part A4.0 of the attached Supplement to the Quad-Cities Safe Shutdown Analysis dated September, 1979.

It is Commonwealth Edison Company's conclusion that the Quad-Cities Safe Shutdown Analysis dated July, 1978 and the Supplement to that Safe Shutdown Analysis dated Eeptember, 1979 together provide evidence that the Quad-Cities Ctation can be safely shut down in the event of fire.

Please address any additional questions you may have concerning this matter to this office.

One (1) signed original and thirty-nine (39) copies of this transmittal are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

- m Robert F. anecek Nuclear Licensing Administrator Boiling Water Reactors RFJ:mae attachment i173 305

FIRE PROTECTION SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS SUPPLEMENT 1 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM SUPPRESSION POOL COOLIN QUAD-CITIES STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 SEPTEMBER 1979 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY 1173 306

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 A

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Al.1 PURPOSE In support of the Quad-Cities Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis, which proposed use of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System for reactor shutdown, an analysis of the availability of the suppression pool cooling mode of the Residual Heat Removal ( RHR) System in case of a postulated fire has been made.

Al.2 ANALYSIS CRITERION See Subsection 1.2 of the Quad-Cities Fire Protection Safe Shut-down Analysis.

Al.3 EVALUATION METHOD The steps followed in conducting this evaluation are as follows:

a. The previously described RCIC method for hot shutdown utilizes the reactor protection system for reactivity con-trol and the RCIC system for decay heat removal and reactor water makeup. This analysis postulates the utilization of the RHR system in its suppression pool cooling mode for ultimate removal of decay heat. The actions necessary to operate the RHRS in this mode are described in Section A2.G.

By taking credit for local manual control, manual valve operation, and visual monitoring of local instrumentation, dependence on ecntrol panels and control and instrument cables located in the Control Room, Cable Spreading Room, Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room, and Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Tunnels is eliminated.

Essential mechanical and electrical components (i.e., the power cables, instrumentation, operating equipment, and position chancing valves) needed for this mode of RHR operation are listed in Table A2-1 according 'o the fire area / zone in which they are physically located. These fire areas / zones are Tables definedA2-2 in the Quad-Cities 1&2 Fire Pro-and A2-3 are a comprehensive tection Report.

listing of active and passive mechanical and electrical equipment, excluding cable trays, needed for this mode of RHR operation. All the components listed in Tables A2-1, A2-2, and A2-3, with the exception of cable trays and valves, appear on the General Arrangement drawings or the Fire protection Figures referenced in Table 2-4 of the Quad-Cities Safe Shutdown Analysis. The physical location of all active or passive equipment, excluding cable trays, can be determined from the coordinates given in Tables A2-2 and A2-3.

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QUAD-CITIES 1&2

b. No further analysis was required for those fire areas /

zones which do not contain mechanical or electrical components needed for RHR Suppression Pool Cooling as listed in Table A2-1. For each of those fire areas /

zones which do not contain mechanical or electrical components for RHR Suppression Pool Cooling it is shown to be available independent of that fire area /

zone. The following fire areas / zones were eliminated from additional analysis for the reasons discussed below:

1. Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 (Unit 1 Reactor Building Basement Floor) and 1.1.2.1 (Unit 2 Reactor Building Basement Floor)

These fire zones contain position-changing valves for the suppression pool cooling mode of the RHR system. However, the valves for the A and B RHR loops are separated by more than 70 feet. Con-sidering the low fire loading in these zones,and their physical separation, credit is taken for operation of i he valves for one RHR loop (A or B).

2. Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 (Unit 1 Reactor Building Ground Floor) and 1.1.2.2 (Unit 2 Reactor Building Ground Floor)

These fire zones contain both divisions of electrical power cables which feed the RHR Pumps. However, the two divisions are routed along opposite walls of the Reactor Building, with approximately 120 feet of separation between divisions. One division only of RHR power cable for Unit 1 exists in the area where the divisional cable trays in Fire Zone 1.1.1.2A (see page 3-2 of the Quad-Cities Fire Protection Safe Shut-down Analysis dated July 1978 for the definition of Fire Zone 1.1.1.2A) are in close proximity. The Unit 2 RHR power cables are all divisionally separated by approximately 120 feet since no Unit 2 RHR power cable exists in Fire Zone 1.1.2.2.A.

As shown in the Quad-Cities Safe Shutdown Analysis, 250V d-c and 480V a-c power cables to various RHR valves are also located in these zones. However, manual operation of these valves is assumed. Con-sidering the low fire loading, the physical separation, and the existence of cable tray fire stops in these zones, at least one RHR loop is assumed available.

3. Pire Zone 1.1.1.3 (Unit 1 Reactor Building Mezzanine Floor) and 1.1.2.3 (Unit 2 Reactor Building Mezzanine Floor)

For Unit 1, this fire zone contains only Division I RHP Pump electrical power cables. Therefore, Division II i173 308 Al-2

- QUAD-CITIES 1&2 of the RHR System remains available. For Unit 2, this fire zone contains both divisions of electrical power cables which feed the RHR Pumps. However, the two divisions are routed along opposite walls of the Unit 2 Reactor Building, with approximately 100 feet of separation between divisions.

One division (Division II) only of RHR power cable for Unit 2 is routed through Fire Zone 1.1.2.3B (see page 3-2 of the Quad-Cities Fire Protection Safe Shut-down Analysis dated July 1978 for the definition of Fire Zone 1.1.2.3B), where divisional cable trays are in close proximity.

One cable supplying RHR Pump Motor Heaters is routed through Fire Zone 1.1.2.3A. A redundant supply to the RHR Pump Motor Heaters is routed with the power cable for each pump and the approximate 100-foot separation is maintained for thi.s supply.

The 480V power cables routed through these zones for valve operators are unnecessary assuming manual valve operation. Considering the low fire loading, the physical separation, and the er'stence of cable tray fire stops in these zones, ec 1 'st one RHR loop is assumed available.

4. Fire Area 7.0 (Unit 1 and Unit 2 Batterv ? noms)

The Unit 1 and Unit 2 125V batteries provide a redundant backup to each other. They are physically separated, such that a single pratulated fire could disable only one of the set of ".nt :25V batteries.

5. Fire Zone 8.2.1 (Turbine Building Basement Floor)

Both divisions of alectrical power cables for the RHR Service Water Pumps are routed through this zone.

The "A" RHR Service Water loops for the two units can be cross-connected by manually opening valve 1/2-1099-1 in the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 power cables are separated by approximately 200 feet, most of which is earth fill material. (3ee General Arrangement drawing M-6). Due to the separation between units in this zone, RHR Service Water Pump capability for one unit is assumed to remain available to feed the other unit.

6. Fire Zones 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 (Turbine Building Upper Basement Floor)

One division of electrical power cables for the RHR Service Water Pumps for each unit is routed t. ough 1173 309 Al-3

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 these zones (Division I for Unit 1, Division II for Unit 2). The other division using another routing remains available in either case.

7. Fire Zone 8.2.4 (Unit 1 Cable Tunnel)

The electrical power feed to 4160V SWGR 14-1 (Division II) is routed through this zone. Howaver, the switch-gear can also be fed from the Unit 1 Diesel Generator (see Figure 2.1-5 in the Quad-Cities Fire Protection Report, April 1977). In addition, 4160V SWGR l' J -l (Division I) remains available.

8. Fire Zone 8.2.5 (Unit 2 Cable Tunnel)

A fire in this zone could disable both divisions of 4160V power feeds to SWGR 23-1 and 24-1. However, these switchgear can also be fed from the Unit 2 and Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator respectively (see Figure 2/1-5 in the Quad-Cities Fire Protection Report, April 1977).

9. Fire Zone 8.2.6 (Turbine Building Ground Floor)

Division II electrical power cables for each unit to the RHR Pumps Tre routed through this fire zone. How-ever, Division I using a different routing remains available for both units. Both divisions of electrical power cables to the RHR Service Water Pumps are routed through this zone. However, the "A" (Division I) RHR Service Water loops for the two units can be cross-connected by manually opening valve 1/2-1099-1 in the Unit 1 Reactor Building. Due to the 250-foot separation in this zone between RHR SW Pump power cables for the two units, RHR Service Water Pump capability for one unit is assumed to remain available to feed the other unit through valve 1/2-1099-1.

Both divisions of 4160V switchgear power feeds are routed through this zone. However, SWGR 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1 can also be fed from the Unit 1, 1/2, and Unit 2 Diesel Generators (see Figure 2.1-5 in the Quad-Cities Fire Protection Report, April 1977). There-fore, at least one division is assumed to remain available for each unit.

10. Fire Zone 8.2.7 (Turbine Building Mezzanine Floor) 4160V Busses 13, 14 (Unit 1) and 23, 24 (Unit 2) are located in this fire zone. A postulated fire could result in the loss of both divisions. However, the Unit 1, 1/2, and Unit 2 Diesel Generators are available to feed the 4kV switchaear 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1.

Al-4 1173 310

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 One division of electrical power cable for the RHR Service Water Pumps for each unit is routed through this zone (Division I for Unit 1, Division II tor Unit 2). However, the other division remains avail-able for each unit. In case of a postulated fire which disables both 4160V Bus 13 and 14 (or 23 and 24), the RHR Service Water "A" loop of the other unit can be cross-connected to feed the affected unit. Since the 4160V Busser, for the two units are located at opposite ends of the Turbine Building, a postulated fire is assumed to affect the 4160V supply to only one unit.

11. Fire Area 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 (Unit 1 and 2 RHR Service Water Areas)

A postulated fire in this area could disable the RHR Service Water Pumps for one unit. The RHR Service Water Pumps for one unit are located in three separate adjoining rooms, one pump in each end room and two pumps in the middle room. Each room is surrounded on three sides (including the shared walls) by a three-hour rated fire barrier. An automatic water sprinkler system is being installed in each room. In addition, considering the 200-foot separation between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 pump areas, the RHR Service Water Pumps for the other unit are assumed available to feed the affected unit through the cross-connected "A" loops. The cross-connect can be established by manually opening valve 1/2-1099-1 in the Unit 1 Reactor Building.

12. Fire Area 11.2.2, 11.2.4, 11.3.2, and 11.3.4 (Unit 1 and 2 RHR Corner Rooms)

Each of these rooms contains one division of RHR Pumps and Heat Exchanger for each unit. Since the rooms are enclosed by 3-hour fire barriers and are physically separated, one division is assumed to be available in case of a postulated fire in either RHR pump room of either unit.

c. In Section A3.0, Area Analysis, the fire areas / zones con-taicing active elements of the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling mode, including both Division I and Division II cables, are analyzed in more detail. Thb supporting information identifies any local control, monitoring and/or manual operation of mechanical or electrical equipment whose cables are affected by a fire in the fire area / zone, the fire protection measures taken, and a list of cable which pass through the fire area /

zone being analyzed. A discussion of the fire protection measures shows the provisions already planned insure that only one electrical division is disabled in a postulated fire.

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QJAD-CITIES 1&2

d. Modifications are proposed to mitigate the complete dis-abling of RHR Suppression Pool Cooling operation by a credible fire in a fire area / zone. These modifications are identified in Section A4.0.

Al.4 ASSLMPTIONS See Subsection 1.4 of the Quad-C.'. ties Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis.

A1.5 CONCL'JS IONS The basis of this analysis is that the RHR System Suppression Pool Cooling mode can be operated in support of the RCIC System hot shutdown method described in the Quad-Cities Safe Shutdown Analysis.

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling is available independent of equipment which could be damaged by fire in a single plant area.

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QUAD-CITIES 1&2 A2.0 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING MODE OPERATION Section A2.1 describes the actions necessary to operate the RHR System in the Suppression Pool Cooling Mode. Section A2.2 con-tains Tables A2-1, A2-2, and A2-3, which identify equipment integral to this system operating mode and describes its physical location as discussed in Section A1.3.

A2.1 OPERATION

a. The actions necessary to achieve hot shutdown by the RCIC Method are described in Section 2.0 of the Quad-Cities Safe Shutdown Report dated July 1978.

b. With the RHRS in the containment cooling mode of operation, the RHRS main system pumps are aligned to pump water from the suppression pool through the RHRS heat exchangers where cooling takes place by transferring he.t to the service water. The flow returns to the suppression pool via the full flow test line. The RHR System and the associated RHR Service Water System can be operated using the standby Diesel Generator upon loss of normal auxiliary power. To return water to the suppression pool from the RHR pumps, valves MO 1001-34 and MO 1001-36 must be opened (on loop A or B). The RHR Service Water Pumps take suction from the crib house. To provide service water flow through the RHR heat exchanger, Valve MO 1001-5 must be opened (on loop A or B). These valves can be operated manually. One RHR pump ,

one heat exchanger, and one RHR Service Water Pwnp will pro-vide adequate suppression pool cooling. The proceduro to initiate suppression pool cooling is as follows:

1. Start an RHRS service water pump.

2. Verify that MO 1001-7A and B or MO 1001-7C and D are open for the RHRS loop to be used.

3. Verify that the suppression chamber dump valve, MO 1001-36 A/B, is closed and that RHRS discharge pressure is greater than 40 psig.

4. Open the suppression chamber test valve, MO 1001-34 A/B, for suppression chamber cooling. Open minimum flow valve MO 1001-18 A/B before starting RHR pump.

5. Start the desired RHRS pump on the loop on which the RHRS service water pump is running and simultaneoasly open the suppression chamber dump valve, MO 1001-36 A/B. Close minimum flow valve MO 1001-18 A/B. ,

Throttle MO 1001-36 A/B to maintain RHRS discharge pressure greater than 20 psig less than RHRS ser-vice water pressure.

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QUAD-CITIES 1&2

6. Verify that the RHRS flow is approximately 3500 gpm.

7. If additional cooling is required, throttle the RHRS heat exchanger bypass valve, MO 1001-16 A/B.

8. Verify valves MO 1001-19 A and MO 1001-19 B are open.

Local visual monitoring of reactor instrumentation is described in Scotion 2.1 of the Quad-Cities Safe Shutdown Analysis. Local flow and pressure indication for the RHR System will be provided.

In summary, it is possible to cool the suppression pool by this method to facilitate continued RCIC operation. Only 4160V a-c power to the RHR Pumps and RHR Service Water Pumps, and 125V d-c power to the 4kV breakers are necessary. In addition, manual operation of the 4kV breakers is possible.

A2.2 EQUIPMENT AND CABLE REQUIREMENT TABLES The power feed cables and active equipment neede for RHR opera-tion in this mode are identified by plant fire zone in Table 32-1. The electrical and motor-operated mechanical equipment tor the RHRS are listed in Table A2-2 (Unit 1) and A2-3 (Unit 2) .

Table 2-4 of the Quad-Cities Safe Shutdown Analysis provides a listing of the fire areas / zones and the applicable General Arrangement drawings and Fire Protection Figures.

A2-2 1173 4i4 1

TABLE A2-1 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING ACTIVE EQUIPMENT LOCATION FIRE QUIPMENT LOCATED VALVES LOCATED IN POWER CABLE LOCATED IN FIRE ARBA/ ZONE IN FIRE AREA / ZONE FIRE AREA / ZONE AREA / ZONE 1.1.1.1 None None MOl-1001-18 A/B Mol-1001-34 A/B MOl-1001-36 A/B 1.1.1.2 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V SWGR None None 13-1 to RHR Pumps lA-1002 and 1 2002 g Electrical Power Cables from 4160V SWGR >

% 14-1 to RHR Pumps IC-1002 and 1D-1002  ?

O None None 8 E 1.1.1.3 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V SWGR 13-1 to RHR Pumps lA-1002 and 1B-1002 $

m 1.1.1.4 None None None g w

1.1.1.5 None None None 1.1.1.6 None None None 1.1.2.1 None None MO2-1001-18 A/B MO2-1001-34 A/B MO2-1001-36 A/B 1.1.2.2 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V SWGR None None 23-1 to RHR Pumps 2A-1002 and 2B-1002 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V SWGR

]{, 24-1 to RHR Pumps 2C-1002 and 2D-1002 1.1.2.3 #

Electrical Power Cables from 4160V SWGR None None 23-1 to RHR Pumps 2A-1002 and 28-1002 q ,a Electrical Power Cables from 4160V SWGR

__. 24-1 to RHR Pumps 2C-1002 and 2D-1002 LD

TABLE A2-1 (Cont'd)

^ ^ '

POWER CABLE _ CATED IN FIRE AREA / ZONE IN FIRE AREA / ZONE FIRE AREA / ZONE AREA / ZONE 1.1.2.4 None None None 1.1.2.5 None None None 1.2.1 None None None 1.2.2 None None None O

2.0 None* None* None y y 3.0 None* None* None O d

u 6.1 Electrical Power Cables from 125V DC 125V DC BUS lA .2one N BUS lA and 1B to 4160V BUS 13 and 14 125V DC BUS 1B and 4160V SWGR 13-1 and 14-1 6.2 Electrical Power Cables from 125V DC 125V DC BUS 2A None BUS 2A and 2B to 4160V BUS 23 and 24 125V DC BUS 2B and 4160 SWGR 23-1 and 24-1 6.3 None* None* None 7.0 None None None 8.1 None None None 8.2.1 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS None None

- 13 and 14 to RHR Service Water Pumps

- 1-1001-65 A,B,C,D N Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS u 23 and 24 to RHR Service Water Pumps 2-1001-65 A,B,C,D u

TABLE A2-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE Q N OCATED VALVES LOCATED IN POWER CABLE LOCATED IN FIRE AREA / ZONE IN FIRE AREA / ZONE FIRE AREA / ZONE AREA / ZONE 8.2.2 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS None None 13 to RHR 3ervice Water Pumps 1-1001-65 A and B 8.2.3 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS None None 24 to RHR Service Water Pumps 2-1001-65 C and D C

8.2.4 Electrical Power Cable from 4160V BUS None None y 14 to 4160V SWGR 14-1  :

w Y b u 8.2.5 Electrical-Power Cables from 4160V BUS j 23 and 24 to 4160V SWGR 23-1 and 24-1 m m

8.2.6 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS None None [

13 and 14 to 4160V SWGR 13-1 and 14-1 w Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS 23 and 24 to 4160V SWGR 23-1 and 24-1 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS 13 AND 14 to RHR Service Water Pumps 1-1001-65 A,B,C,D Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS 23 and 24 to RHR Service Water Pumps 2-1001-65 A,B,C,D 8.2.7 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS 4160V BUS 13, 14 None 13 to RHR Service Water Pumps 4160V BUS 23, 24 1-1001-65 A and B

__. Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS

_- 24 to RHR Service Water Pumps s; 2-1001-65 C and D Les W

TABLE A2-1 (cont'd)

FIRE OCAND VAMS LOCAED IN POWER CABLE LOCATED IN FIRE AREA / ZONE IN FIRE AREA / ZONE FIRE AREA / ZONE AREA / ZONE 8.2.8 None 4160V SWGR 13-1, 14-1 None 4160V SWGR 23-1, 24-1 8.2.9 None None None 8.2.10 None None None 9.0 None None** None 11.1.1 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS RIIR Service Water Pumps None O 13 and 14 to RHR Service Water Pumps 1-1001-65 A,B,C,D @

g 1-1001-65 A,B,C,D f 11.1.2 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V BUS RHR Service Water Pumps None 23 and 24 to RHR Service Water Pumps 2-1001-65 A,B,C,D y 2-1001-65 A,B,C,D w None None

• 11.1.3 None w

11.1.4 None None None 11.2.1 None None None 11.2.2 Electrical Power Cables frcm 4160V SWGR R11R Pumps 1C-1002 Mol-1001-5B 14-1 to RilR Pumps 1C-1002 and 1D-1002 1D-1002 M01-1001-16B 11.2.3 None None None

-11.2.4 Electrical Power Cabler from 4160V SWGR RIIR Pumps lA-1002 Mol-1001-5A

~^

13-1 to RHR Pumps lA-1002 and 1B-1002 1B-1002 Mol-1001-16A 1/2- 1099-1 11.3.1 None None None w

s

TABLE A2-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ^ ^ ^

POWER CABLE LOCATED IN FIRE AREA / ZONE IN FIRE AREA / ZONE FIRE AREA / ZONE AREA / ZONE 11.3.2 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V SWGR RHR Pumps 2C-1002 MO2-1001-5B 24-1 to RHR Pumps 2C-1002 and 2D-1002 2D-1002 MO2-1001-16B 11.3.3 None None None 11.3.4 Electrical Power Cables from 4160V SWGR RHR Fwtos 2A-1002 MO2-1001-5A 23-1 to RHR Pumps 2A-1002 and 2B-1002 2B-1002 MO2-1001-16A o

11.4 None None None S O

14.1 None None None E U

I N

14.2 None None None y u2 14.3 None None None g, e.

14.4 None None None 14.5 None None None 19.0 None None None

• RHR control panels and cables located in this area are not necessary, since manual operation of equipment and valves is assumed.

• • Diesel Generator 1/2 provides a redundant backup to both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Diesel Generators. The Diesel Generators themselves are a redundant backup to normal auxiliary power.

w M

w U

s

TABLE A2-2 UNIT 1 -

RHR SUPPRESSION POOL Co l' MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ELEVATION NOMENCLATURE NUMBER (Feet) COLUMN / ROW FIRE AREA / ZONE COMMENTS Heat Exchanger Discharge MOl-1001-5A 554 13-14/M-N 11.2.4 NC/O Heat Exchanger Discharge M71-1001-5B 554 18-19/M-N 11.2.2 NC/O O

Heat Exchanger g Bypass MOl-1001-16A 554 13-14/M-N 11.2.4 NO/O  ?

, O m Heat Exchanger 8 Bypass MOl-1001-16B 554 18-19/M-N 11.2.2 NO/O $

m Pump Min. Flow H Bypass MOl-1001-18A 554 14-M 1.1.1.1 NC/O 0 Pump Min. Flow Bypass MOl-1001-18B 554 18-M 1.1.1.1 NC/O Torus Cooling and Test Outboard MOl-1001-34A 554 14-M 1.1.1.1 NC/O Torus Cooling and Test Outboard M01-1001-34B 554 18-M 1.1.1.1 NC/O Test Line Suppression

] Pool Cooling MGl-1001-36A 554 14-M 1.1.1.1 NC/O Test Line Suppression

• Pool' Cooling MOl-1001-36B 554 18-M 1.1.1.1 NC/O tw N

CD

Table A2-2 (Cont'd)

ELEVATION NOMENCLATURE NUMBER (Feet) COLUMN / ROW FIRE ARrA/ ZONE COMMENTS RIIR Service Water Locked closed Cross-Connect 1/2-1099-1 554 13-14/M-N 11.2.4 Manual Valve RHR Service Water Pump 1-1001-65A 547 18/D-C 11.1.1 RIIR Service Water Pump 1-1001-65B 547 18-19/D-C 11.1.1 RIIR Service Water Purap 1-1001-65C 547 19-20/D-C 11.1.1 @

p R11R Service Water y F2mp 1-1001-65D 547 20-21/D-C 11.1.1 h o -

[

RHRS Pump 1A-1002 554 13-14/M-N 11.2.4 m tn RIIRS Pump 1B-1s02 554 13-14/M-N 11.2.4 R11RS Pump 1C-1002 554 18-19/M-N 11.2.2 RiiRS Pump 1D-1002 554 18-19/M-N 11.2.2 4160V BUS 13 615 22-23/H-G 8.2.7 Feeds SWGF '3-1, Service Water Pume.s A and B 4160V BUS 14 615 22-23/H-G 8.2.7 Feeds SWGR 14-1, Service Water Pumps C and D 4160V SWGR 13-1 639 14-15/II-G 8.2.8 Feeds RHR Pumps A and B

[4160VSWGR 14-1 639 16-17/H-G 8.2.8 Feeds RHR Pumps C and D N 25 DC BUS lA 615 24-25/G-H 6.1 4kV Breaker Control

+

1B 615 24-25/G-H 6.1 4kV Breaker Control J 25 DC BUS N

TABLE A2-3 UNIT 2 -

RilR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING MECIIANICIL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ELEVATION NOMENCLATUP2 FUMBER (Feet) COLUMN / ROW FIRE AREA / ZONE COMMENTS Ileat Exchanger Discharge MO2-1001-5A 554 7-8/M-N 11.3.4 NC/O Heat Exchanger Discharge MO2-1001-5B 554 12-13/M-N 11.3.2 NC/O Ileat Exchanger @

Bypass MO2-1001-16A 554 7-8/M-N 11.3.4 NO/O y

> e

'f Heat Exchanger 3 g Bypass MO2-1001-16B 554 12-13/M-N 11.3.2 NO/O [

m Pump Min. Flow Bypass MO2-1001-18A 554 8-M 1.1.2.1 NC/O Pump Min. Flow Bypass MO2-1001-18B 554 12-M 1.1.2.1 NC/O Torus Cooling and Test Outboard MO2-1001-34A 554 8-M 1.1.2.1 NC/O Torus Cooling and Test Outboard MO2-1001-34B 554 12-M 1.1.2.1 NC/O Test Line Suppression MO2-1001-36A 554 8-M 1.1.2.1 NC/O

] Pool Cooling Test Line Suppression Pool Cooling MO2-1001-36B 554 12-M 1.1.2.1 NC/O U

N N

Table A2-3 (Cont'd)

ELEVATION NOMENCLATURE NUMBER (Feet) COLUMN / ROW FIRE AREA / ZONE COMMENTS RHR Service Water Pump 2-1001-65A 547 5-6/D-C 11.1.2 RHR Service Water Pump 2-1001-65B 547 6-7/D-C 31.1.2 RHR Service Water Pump 2-1001-65C 547 7-8/D-C 11.1.2 RHR Service Water Pump 2-1001-65D 547 8-9/D-C 11.1.2 @

$i y RHRS Pump 2A-1002 554 7-8/M-N 11.3.4 w 0 8

RHRS Pump 2B-1002 554 7-8/M-N 11.3.4 h 5 M

RHRS Pump 2C-1002 554 12-13/M-N 11.3.2 RHRS Pump 2D-1002 554 12-13/M-N 11.3.2 4160V BUS 23 615 3-4/G-H 8.2.7 Feeds SWGR 23-1, Service Water Pumps A and B 4160V BUS 24 615 3-4/G-H 8.2.7 Feeds SWGR 24-1, Service Water Pumps C and D 4160V SWGR 23-1 639 9-10/G-H 8.2.8 Feeds RHR Pumps A and B

__ 4160V SWGR 24-1 63a ll-12/G-H 8.2.8 Feeds RHR Pumps C and D 22J 125V DC BUS 2A 615 1-2/G-H 6.2 4kV Breaker Control u

125V DC BUS 27- 615 1-2/G-H 6.2 4kV Breaker Control L~

N V.

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 A3.0 AREA ANALYSIS The fire areas / zones which contain essential components of the RilR Suppression Pool Cooling mode _nd which are not eliminated from further analysis in Section A1.3 are analyzed in Sections A3.1 through A3.3 (See Table A3-1). The analysis of each area was performed as discussed in Section A1.3.

A3-1 1173 324

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 Table 3-1 AREAS CONTAINING ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING MODE SECTION FIRE AREA / ZONE LOCATION ANALYZED A3.1 6.1 Unit 1 DC Distribution Room, Turbine Building Elevation 615 feet, Area Bounded by G-H and 24-25.

A3.2 6.2 Unit 2 DJ Distribution Room, Turbine Building Elevation 615 feet, Area Bounded by G-H and 1-2.

A3.3 8.2.8 Turbine Building Main Floor, Elevation 639 feet.

11 5 325 A3-2

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 A3.1 FIRE AREA 6.1 (Unit 1 DC Distribution Room, Turbine Building Elevation 615 Feet, Area Bounded by G-H and 24-25).

A3.1.1 RHR EQUIPMENT Located in this fire area are 125V DC Main Bus lA and 125V DC Reserve Bus 1B. These power sources are necessary for breaker control at 4kV Bus 13 and 14 and 4kV Switchgear 13-1 and 14-1.

If necessary, manual operation oi the breakers at Bu3 13 and 14 and Switchgear 13-1 and 14-1 is possible.

A3.1.2 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES Adjacent to this area are a CO 2 hose reel, a water hose rael, and three CO2 p rtable extinguishers. Early warning fire detection is being installed in this area. The door to :he DC Distribution Room is being replaced with a Class A fire door. Considering the low fire loading in this area, the installation of detectors, and the availability of suppression equipment, a postulated fire would be detected and extinguished before reaching proportions capable of affecting redundant safety-related equipment.

1173 326 A3-3

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 A3.2 FIRE AREA 6.2 (Unit 2 DC Distribution Room, Turbine Building Elevation 615 Feet, Area Bounded by G-H and 1-2)

A3.2.1 RHR EQUIPMENT Located in this fire area are 125V DC Main Bus 2A and 125V DC Reserve Bus 28. These power sources are necessary for breaker control at 4kV Bus 23 and 24 and 4kV Switchgear 23-1 and 24-1.

If necessary, manual operation of the breakers at Bus 13 and 14 and Switchgear 13-1 and 14-1 is possible.

A3.2.2 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES Adjacent to this area are a CO2 hose reel, a water hose reel, and two CO 2 p rtable extinguishers. Early warning fire detection is being installed in this area. The door to the DC Distribution Room is being replaced with a Class A fire door. Considering the low fire loading in this area, the installation of detectors, and the availability of suppression equipment, a postulated fire would be detected and extinguished before reaching proportions capable of affecting redundant safety-related equipment.

1173 327 A3-4

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 A3.3 FIRE ZONE 8. 2. 8 (Turbine Building Main Floor, Elevation 639 Feet)

A3.3.1 RHR EQUIPMENT Located in this fire zone are 4160V Switchgear 13-1 and 14-1 (Unit 1) and 23-1 and 24-1 (Unit 2). These switchgear feed the RHR Pump motors. The switchgear for each unit are physically separated by approximately 25 feet, with a 1/2" transite shield wall located between the two divisions. The Unit 1 switchgear are physically separated from the Unit 2 switchgear by approx-imately 45 feet.

A3.3.2 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES Two C0 7 hose reels, four water hose reels, two portable CO 2 extingcishers, and two portable dry chemical extinguishers are located near the switchgear. The nearby MG sets are protected by an automatic foam suppression system, with an independent automatic water sprinkler system providing backup protection.

The MG sets are curbed and drained. An early warning fire detection system is being installed over the switchgear. A protective shield is being installed over each switchgear to prevent water damage. In addition, portable foam supprassion equipment is being provided. Considering the extensive and redundant detection and manual and automatic suppression systems provided in this area, any postulated fire would be detected and extinguished before reaching proportions capable of affecting redundant safety-related equipment.

1173 328 A3-5

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 A4.0 PLANNED MODIFICATIONS

a. Control of each Diesel Generator (DG) from the respective DG room will be provided. This modification will include a key lock transfer switch which will be capable of sepa-rating the DG electrical controlr. outside of the DG room from those in the DG room when the switch is in the " local control" position such that faults in the control room or connecting control cabling will not influence the diesel generator operation,

b. Local control to the 4kV circuit breakers for the Diesel Generators, the Residual lieat Removal Pump motors and the Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump motors will be provided at the appropriate 4kV switchgear locations.

This modification will include a key lock transfer ewitch which will separate the remote control cables from the switchgear such that faults in the remote control or cabling will not influence the local control of the circuit breakers.

c. Local flow and pressure indication for the RHR System will be provided.

i173 2,29 A4-1

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 A

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Quad-Cities 1&2 safe shutdown analysis together with this Appendix shows that with the modifications listed in Section 4.0 and Section A4.0, local control and manual valve operation, the plant has been designed such that if a fire does start and burns for a considerable length sf time, in spite of the fire preven-tion program and fire fighting activities, the plant can be shut down safely. Therefore, the safe shutdown analysis and this Appendix together with the report Information Relevant to Fire Protection Systems and Programs Part 3 Quad-Cities Units 1&2, April 1977 (Revision 1, August 1977), verify that an adequate balance of all three of the following fire protection defense-in-depth objectives has been achieved:

a. Fires will be prevented from starting.

b. Fires will be quickly detected, suppressed, and extinguished, thus limiting their damage.

c. The plant has been designed such that if a fire does start and burns for a considerable length of time, in spite of the fire prevention program and fire fighting activities, the plant can be shut down safely.

The present operation of the plant will not jeopardize the health and safety of the public. Furthermore, the safe operating margins provided by the present plant design and operating procedures will increase when the planned modifications have been completed.

1173 330 AS-1

QUAD-CITIES 1&2 A6.0 REF2RENCES

1. Quad-Cities Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis, Commonwealth Edison Ccmpany, June 1978.

2. Information Relevant to Fire Protection Systems and Pro-grams part 3, Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Commonwealth Edison Company, April 1977 (Revision 1, August 1977) (Quad-Cities Fire Protection Report) .

3. Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-254/65, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1979.

!. 33f A6-1