ML20005F644
| ML20005F644 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1990 |
| From: | Robey R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RAR-90-02, RAR-90-2, NUDOCS 9001170080 | |
| Download: ML20005F644 (15) | |
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.CommonweCith Edison ouad Cites Nuclear Power Staten 22710 206 Avenue North '
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Cordova, Illinois 61242-9740 Telephone 309/654 2241 I
l RAR-90-02 January 3, 1990 l
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station Pl-137 Washington, D. C.
20555 Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments:
j completed during the month of-December, 1989, for Quad-Cities Station Units-1 and 2. DPR-29 and DPR-30.. A summary of:the safety-evaluations l
are being reported-in compliance with'10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.7)(e).
1 Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use.
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' Respectfully,
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COMMONNEALTH EDISON COMPANY -
I QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION b-fy R. A. Ro ey
,i Technical Superintendent RAR/LFD/djb Enclosure cc:
R. Stols T. Hatts/J. Galligan 9001170080 900103 l
PDR ADOCK 05000254 w
R PDC Q;,
0027H/0061Z.
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I Special Test #1-122 Special Test No. 1-122 was completed on December 1, 1989. The purpose of this test was to test the High Pressure Coolant Injection System, throughout the range of reactor pressure conditions, to verify.the new HPCI booster impellerJ performs as per original design specification.
- 1. -The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident.
or malfunction of equipment important to safety _as previously evaluated-in the Final Safety Analysis Report-is not increased because this impeller is supplied by the original manufacturer and is equal to or-greater than the original impeller which will not change any of the' guidelines already set forth by the FSAR.
2.
The probability for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the replacement impeller from the original-manu-facturer is equal to or exceeds the original equipment specification, and will not create any condition different than those already evaluated by the FSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the impeller is equal to or exceeds the original impeller, as set forth by the original manufacturer, and the margin of safety, as defined in the' Technical Specifications are not reduced.
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't St Special Test l#1-133 Special Test No.-1-133.was completed on December:29,:1989. -The purpose of this test was to monitor. impurities,and determine =iffwater' quality could:
i be improved. Special' test equipment was used to periodically sample:and:
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analyze-sample streams for ionic impurities.
Equipment 1.was hooked up tofgrab; sample points in the Unit One turbinelandireactor building' sample heads.
It was determined that noL10CFR$0.59 Safety. Evaluation.was'requiredffor-
- this special test.
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- Procedure Change'QGA 400-l i
- The entry into QGA 400-1 is. based ~on a' radioactive release that. requires
^ declaration of a GSEP Alert Condition.. The reference made to the appropriate EAL number has been changed to reflect-the alphanumeric designation used in the new EAL tables.
1.-
The probability-of an occurrence or the consequencelof an accident,:
or' malfunction of equipment-important to safety:as previously evaluated-
-in the Final Safety Analysis; Report is not; increased because actions related1to QGA' are taken as result of accidents, the action level 1 for -
release-is unchanged.
' 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of.a different typ'e.
than any previously evaluated in' the: Final Safety Analysis Report is
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not created because the release-limit for this-entry; condition is-unchanged.
3.- The margin of safety, as definedrin the basis for'any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced b'ecause QGA's.are not-described in Tech Specs.'
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Procedure Change QGP l-1, 1-3 Normal Plant Startup Unit Hot Standby to Power Operation This mod was added to suppress recirculation water oxygen by means of adding hydrogen of the feedwater thus mitigating the effects of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (ICSCC).
Hydrogen will be added by injection into the recombiners, oxygen will be injected into the off-gas system. Dissolved oxygen concentration in the reactor coolant will be monitored.
Oxygen concentration in the off-gas flow will also be monitored.
System control is from a self-contained panel added in the main control room, or from local control panels.
These procedure changes provide instruction on its use.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment-important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is increased because the-additional delay introduced into the main steam isolation sequence, due to the Main Stoam Line Radiation Monitor (MSLRM) setpoint increase from 7 t9 15 times normal full power background without hydrogen addition woeld result in a small increase in the consequences of the CRDA. A licensing document for this modification was prepared and sent to the NRC for review and was subsequently approved via a January 19, 1989 SER.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Repo'et is not created because the hydrogen addition system design does not. create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.
The storage areas have been analyzed to be located at a sufficient distance to mitigate the effects j
of a hydrogen fireball or explosion, and to prevent hydrogen or oxygen rich air from entering any safety-related air pathways into the station.
Excess flow check valves are located-at the: hydrogen and oxygen storage areas and at the Turbine Building entrance: point for hydrogen to prevent large hydrogen or oxygen releases due to a pipe break. Also, hydrogen area monitors are interfaced with a hydrogen supply isolation valve I
which will terminate hydrogen flow into each units' Turbine Building if there is a high area hydrogen concentration for that unit.
In addition to these safety features, normal Hydrogen Water Chemistry System shutdown is performed by closure of the active train's flow control valve and each hydrogen injection solenoid isolation valve, which are located just prior to the injection point to the condensate pump discharge piping. An electronic interlock between the Hydrogen Injection Solenoid Isolation Valve and its corresponding condensate pump motor also prevents inadvertent hydrogen injection into a non-operating condensate pump.
These features should prevent spurious hydrogen addition into the condensate system.
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4 Procedure Change.QGP l-1, 1-3 (cont.)'
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the MSLRM setpoint is defined in the-Tech Spec.
Bases for the Reactor Protection System (Sec. 7.1) and the Protective Instrumentation (Sec. 7.2) as seven times normal full j
power background. This modification will increase the MSLRM setpoint to fifteen times normal full power background. This change does not reduce the margin of safety for the Reactor Protection System, however, it does promote an increase in the radiological consequences for the j
CRDA. This is because the primary purpose of the MSLRM is-to mitigate the radiological consequences.of a CRDA once the fuel damage has occurredi and not to minimize the fuel damage from the CRDA.
Therefore, a licensing document for this modification was prepared and sent to-the NRC for approval. The NRC has approved the MSLRM setpoint increase to 15 times normal full power background without hydrogen addition l
via a January 19, 1989 SER. This SER has accepted the required Tech
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Spec changes and their insignificant effect on the total activity release and resulting dose to 'the public.
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S'afety Evaluation #89-704'-
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Technical Specification MCPR Safety Limit Change The MCPR Safety Limit for Unit Two Cycle II is being changed to 1.06 because of the use of GE9B fuel.
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as-previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not' increased.because the.new MCPR Safety Limit; valve of 1.06 will provide a 95% confidence level that 99.9% of the rods will avoid transition boiling.
This 18 the same as the criteria described in the FSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety' Analysis Report is-not created because a change in the'MCPR Safety Limit valve does not increase the possibility of any accident since it provides no control over reactor operation.. It's purpose is to keep the fuel from going to transition boiling during a postulated transient.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis forfany Technical Speci-fications, is not reduced because this change is,being performed to maintain the same margin of safety to onset-of transition boiling because of the introduction of GE9B fuel. This Safety Limit has been calculated, ucing approved codes and methodclogy and the analysis and results have been accepted by the NRC.
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i Safety Evaluation #89-708 Addition-of Drywell High Radiation' Group 2 Isolation Signal This isolation was previously addressed in the FSAR.
It is now being added to the Technical Specifications-to provide completeness.
1.
The_ probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis' Report is~not increased because'since this instrumentation was installed in accordance with design requirements-and has been operating'in the plant for several years, the inclusion'of operability requirements =in the' Technical Specifications does not increase i
the probability or consequences of an. accident previously evaluated.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the addition of the operability requirements for this isolation function to the Technical Specifications does not affect i
any other accidents or transients other than primary containment isolation which is analyzed.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the additions to the Technical.Speci-fications will help to ensure operability of this isolation function when required-and thus the margin of safety is not reduced.
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Safety Evaluation #89-717 Software Change S-89-007 Installed-software to the Redundant Access Control System (RACS) computer to generate random selection lists for the Fitness for Duty program.
1.
The probability.of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as,previously evaluated in-the Final Safety Analysis Report is not-increased because the software does not change or reduce any of the security control features of-the security. Generating random lists'of employees for testing will.not compromise the security control system.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the features of RACS have not been changed.
All security provisions are maintained.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical;Speci -
fications, is not reduced because the new software maintains'all present security provisions for access monitoring and ' control.
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Modification M-4-1-79-003 Description This. modification providedL a backup method of, removing excitation from
.the main generator. A generator trip signal causes the' exciter and' main field-
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breakers to trip.
If the breakers fail to trip, the de-excitation circuit would ensure-that the generator terminal voltage would drop to zero. The installation' of the de-excitation circuit was recommended by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) (General Electric)-through TIL 818-3.
Evaluation 4
1 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the excitation system is non-safety related and is not addressed in the FSAR..The addition of' static de-excitation circuit will enhance gen-
-erator protection since the static de-excitar. ion circuit will auto-matically remove excitation from the generator field in case of exciter field breaker failure.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunct1on of'a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because although the modified systen has not been evaluated I
previously, failure of. static de-excitation will not create a new type of an accident or malfunction in any safety system.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis.for any. Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because no basis for any Tech Spec is affected by this change.
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Modification M-4-2-87-051A, E Description This modification consisted of installing a Sequential Events Recorder for the annunciator system.
It is used to monitor multi-input windows in the control-room and will print out a message that will tell the operator which input alarmed. This is an NRC requirement based on a Human Factors review of the control' room.
Evaluation i
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as'previously evaluated in the F$nal Safety Analysis Report is not increased
- t beca:se the annunciator system is not discussed in the accident analysis section-of the FSAR.
This system is not required for accident mitigation.. The failure of the non-safety related annunciator system will not affect the operation of any of the plant's
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safety-related systems.
2.
The possibility for an. accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no change has been made which affects any of the bounding conditions of the FSAR accident analysis.
All bounding conditions remain,the same, no new accidents are introduced by this modification.
t 3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical,Speci-fication, is not reduced because when applicable, the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.7.C for the Secondary Containment System's penetra-tion seals and LCO'3.12.F and the Surveillance Requirements (SR) 4.12.F for the Fire Protection System's fire barriers'will be adhered to for the installation of cables. No.other LCO's, SE's or their basis will be affected by the installation, operation or failure of the' modified annunicator system.
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L Modification M-4-1-87-62D Description A merge override amplifier assembly was installed in series with the center-desk handset to allow for the control room operator to override all plant Public
. Address (PA) announcements.
This was done to insure that operating personnel can always use the PA system.
Evaluation 1.
The probability.of an occurrence or the consequenceaof an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the-plant communications systems is not required for accident mitigation and is not discussed in the accident analysis section of the FSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type-than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not. created because no change has been made which affects any of the bounding conditions in the FSAR accident analysis.- All bounding conditions remain the same, no new accidents are introduced by-this modification.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis _for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the affected components.are not required for accident mitigation, therefore they are not addressed 1
by Technical Specification Basis. All Technical Specification margins of safety will remain unchanged.
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-Modification M-4-1/2-88-008 t
i Description Mounted existing chlorine probe flow chamber installed under temporary alteration 4179 seismically, and installed permanent tubing seismically from the chamber to the toxic gas panel 1/2-9400-103.
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Evaluation I
1 1.
The probability of an occurrence, or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because this mod mounts a flow chamber which has reduced the number of C12 probe.
malfunctions. As a result, the consequences of an accident are reduced with proper operation. This mod does not affect the probability of en occurrence.
I 2.
The possibility'for an accident or malfunction of a different type
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than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis; Report is not created because a C12 spill Problem has been analyzed with appropriate-
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ramifications. The possibility for an accident or different malfunction will not be created.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication. is not reduced because measured concentration limits for C12 are not changed. These limits are defined in the Technical Speci--
l fication.
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Modification M-4-0-88-015 1
Description In response to the NRC's Amendment.to 10CFR73.55 requiring the logging of personnel in and out of Vital Areas, even when the existing Sygnetron security' computers are-out of service, a Redundant Access Control System (RACS) was added utilizing the existing Card Reader System to log Vital Area Access when the security. computers are non-functional.
RACS consist of fuse devices (monitor / keyboard, desk drive, power supply, i
fan unit, and a tape drive), and a manual switch (for transferring the comnuni-cation lines). The fuse devices operate at 120 VAC, and are connected to-the existing security system UPS.
Evaluation 1.
The reliability of the entire access control system will be enhanced by the addition of this new RACS.
However, this would have no bearing-on the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, since analyses'take no credit for this security system.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this modification does not alter the description of any equipment or systems important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR/UFSAR.
Installation of the new RACS involves non-safety '
related equipment which will be located remote from any safety-related system.,
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because this modification does not alter or affect any equipment described in the Technical Specification.
There-fore, the margin of safety will not be reduced.
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Modification M-4-1-88-101D j
Description The purpose of this modification was to comply with post accident-monitoring requirements detailedLin the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97.- partial D of this modifi-cation added seismic support to the existing 1-640-27 recorder on the 901-5 panel to comply with the Regulatory Guide 1.97 seismic requirements.
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Evaluation 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because remounting i
the existing recorders 1-640-27 on seismic mounts will retain these devices in place during seismic events, therefore, the addition of the mounts has not increased the probability of Design Basis Analysis or a Single Failure Event.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction-of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report-is not created because seismically mounting of recorders 1-640-27 mitigates component failures.
Failure of mount is mitigated by the availability of the other division's redundant system.
Such failure does not create a new accident or malfunction not previously analyzed in the FSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Spect-fication, is not reduced because the addition of seismic mounts to recorders 1-640-27 has no known impact to the existing Technical Speci-fications. The margin of safety remains unchanged, u