ML20043G425
| ML20043G425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1990 |
| From: | Robey R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RAR-90-49, NUDOCS 9006200276 | |
| Download: ML20043G425 (24) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:' E a O Commonwealth Edison ound Cities Nuclear Power Station 22710 206 Avenue North Corcova Illinois 61242 Telephone 309/654 2241 l RAR-90-49 i 1 L June 2, 1990 L l l Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station PI-137 i Washington, D. C. 20555 l l Enclosea please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments l-completed during the month of May, 1990, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 l and 2 DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluations are being j reported in compliance with 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e). Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use. Respectfully, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION l' I I f' h-l R. A. Robey Technical Superintende,i 1 RAR/LFD/jlg Enclosure cc: R. Stols T. Hatts/J. Galligan i 9006200276 900602 PDR ADDCK 05000254 1 R PNV 0027H/0061Z o M
.a- -: e; -e ; -1 p 5o t'- .i p t r. L i Special rest i1-138 I t b . Description- . j i 1 'Special Test No.:1-13'8 was completed on March.19, 1990. ' This-test ' iprovided a. method to monitor points.in the Bus 14 transfer circuitry during a manual transfer ~1n order to determine actuation timing. The monitoring. .'oflthe circuit is to take place during n'ormal plant-conditions. -- Evalua t t'on.- [ It was determined that.no 10CFR$0.59 Safety Evaluation was required, 'T for this special test. p; L; i ( 5. .y, I L i k k { 4 [..- l l 2 s l 4 .;:p). , ll *_ La '.;. f;. ...J .... ~
n, -) . q-(} 4 t V-Procedure Change QOS 2300-1, Revision 19 j HPCI Monthly and Quarterly Test Description This procedure revision reflects modification installed during refuel-outage, additional margin of safety when verifying pump discharge pressure required by Tech Specs, and additional testing of turbine trip functions. l. Evaluation-1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident. or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report'is not increased because procedure revision provides improved testing of turbine trip functions and increases pump discharge pressure used to c verify pump flowrote. These changes should provide greater L ~ assurance of system operability and decrease the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident. 1 -2. The-possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the basic method of test operation remains unchanged. HPCI is still available for operation at any_ time during the test procedure. No new possibility for an accident or malfunction is created. L 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical I -Specification, is not reduced because increase in pump discharge pressure will increase margin of safety for Tech Spec requirement of pump:flowrate. b ( l J
L r-Safety Evaluation #90-276 Fire Detection System (Linear Heat Detection). Description This change involved replacing the spot type heat detection (necessary to actuate the HPCI Fire Deluge system) with line type (linear heat) detection. The linear _ heat detection will be located on the under side of the suppression L piping and will actuate the Fire Deluge Sprinkler System at the same design temperature as the existing detection system. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the new linear detection system is a more reliabic heat detection system and is less subject to damage than the existing detectors. The linear heat detectors will actuate the fire deluge oprinkler system at a designed temperature that will not vary due to damage from maintenance activities. 2. The possibility for an acciderc or malfunction of a different type than any previously evs'.uated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created becai.se the new detection system will perform the same function as the oxisting detection system. The linear detection will increaso '.he reliability of the HPC1' fire deluge system. actuation withou'. changing the intent of the original fire detection system. '3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because-the margin of safety is increased from replacing the detection system with a more reliable I and durable system. = f.. p
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..? ~ Safety Evaluation #90-272 . Minor Design Change 4-2-90-28 Description p This change replaced the valve body for 2-1001-185B with'a new one. i Evaluation i [ 1. The~ probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident .h p or malfunction of equipment important to safety.as previously- "l evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased
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-because the new valve body will be functionally identical-to j the old one. In addition, this valve is not specifically mentioned in the FSAR. h j 2. The possibility.for an accident or malfunction of a different. [ i. type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis- . Report la not created because the new valve is seismically [ h qualified and meets the requirements of the system. -3. The margin-of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical ll Specification, is not reduced'because this valve is not referred 0 i t' in the' Tech Specs. I 4 O .v o e P c h 5 I = ,k L' ',? b i I I ii ' (.. s I -- 5 . _J
1 0 a, s. L. Safety. Evaluation'#89-702 Minor Design' Change 4-2-90, - Description s t [ This change to the feedwater heaters consisted of the addition of-a metal reinforcement pad over croded area. m Evaluation h, -1. The probability of.an occurrence or the.consequs7ce of an accident- [ .or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously; L evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased- .because the repairs to the Feedwater Heaters ete not specifically. l addressed in the FSAR. g "l-2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis-e _ Report is not created because these repairs do not change the . original design of the heaters. g,.
- 3. :The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical-Specification. is not reduced because this subject is not addressed
[ in the Technical Specifications. s a' p 1 r [- n l-4 F s h o (J g- [.; 4-f- s f. l f 4 \\
a-i Safety Evaluation #90-323 Minor Design Change 4-2-90-031 l Removal of MSIV Leak-off Lines Description d This change removed the packing leak-off lines for the Unit Two outboard MSIV's (2-203-2A thru D). i s Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the MSIV packing leak-off lines are not mentioned in any sections of the FSAR which discuss the MSIV's. The capping of the packing leak-off lines will not affect the ability of the MSIV to perform its containment isolation function and will eliminate a potential source of steam leakage. The original conditions and assumptions made in the FSAR remain unchanged. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of'a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because since the removal of the packing leak-off lines from the MSIV's will not interfere with the isola-tion function of the MSIV's this configuration does not fall outside any singic failure event or design basis accident which has already been evaluated-in the FSAR.
- 3. -The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the MSIV packing leak-off lines are not discussed in section 3.7 of the Technical Specifications which-defines the isolation function of the MSIV'n. 'The removal of the packing Icak-off lines will increase rather than decrease the margin of safety, as defined in the basis for the-Technical Specifications, by eliminating a potential steam Itakage path.
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^ 3; ; .-v. <,s ; - .4 e ._ ([ Minor Design Change.4-2-90-18 r b, I Description t: y. This change added a harger on the above line to make it seismic. p. l-Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the-consequence of an accident or malfunction-of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the' Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased g[ because the new hanger wi11' increase system reliability and it 'is seismically mounted. L . 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety. Analysis F Report is not created because a seismically mounted support does not create new hazards. 3. b; The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the margin of safety is increased because the hanger and'the line will be scismically.. qualified. b (( b 5 1 > 'i. t_(f.-' 2 r L l E', i a l- _' j.? a
--4 Minor Design Change 4-2-90-021 ( Description i zThis change provided support for pipes and conduit in the Unit 2 Regen 1 Heat Exchanger Room which had previously been supported by a concrete block j wall which has been removed.- Evaluation 1.. The probability of-an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis-Report is not11ncreased because the pipes and conduit involved are non-safety related and the support for these was not evaluated in FSAR. 4
- 2. 'The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different 3
type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this design change only replaced support for pipes and conduit which was previously done by a block wall with a structural support since the block wall has been removed. ~ i 3.- The margin of safety, as: defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. is not reduced because the pipes and conduit; involved .are non-safety related and the support for these is not addressed in Tech Specs. l .i [ s y-i r t-l ~ i + J
e n < 1; : 1 3 .t c L i Minor Design Change 4-2-90-22 i Description [ The main steam constant spring can support has damage to the' support steel which. caused the pipe support strut to eaceed 6 degree swivel limit. E s The engineering evaluation by Sargent and Lundy requires removal of the b pipe support. f Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased L because this change will no': affect seismic analysis, therefore the probability of an accidont is not increased. 2. The possioliity for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis L Report is not created because this deletion of this support will not affect the structural integrity of this line or other pipe supports on same line. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this work is not covered in the Tech Specs so margin of safety is not reduced.- C -d 1 I
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9.' p'; Minor Design Change 4-2-90-29 h Description I This change replaced existing GE/MAC recorder with Johnson-Yokogawa recorder utilizing new flush mounting detail. Seismic qualify the mounting by calculation. Utilize seismic qualification report from LaSalle Station p-to qualify recorder. Due to proximity to this recorder, replaced recorder p 2-1602-7 also, as described above. L Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or.the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety _as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the new recorder performs the.same function as the existing ) recorder it replaces. No new functions added or changed. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the_ Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the new recorder performs the same' -{ function as cbs existing recorder it replaces. No new functions 1 added or~ changed. Further, replacement recorder meets seismic criteria whereas existing did not meet that criteria. " Possibility" is reduced. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because actual margin of safety E during a postulated seismic event is increased due to new criteria incorporated in modification. t
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jil" 4 s 1 i -l 1 Minor Design Change 4-1(2)-90-032 i Description r-i .This change replaced existing transmitters with Rosemount 1151 transmitters. I p There are no operational or setpoint changes required. ( i 4 b- - Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident j or malfunction of equipment important to safety _as previously i l' evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the design function of the instrument is not altered, I nor is it addressed in the FSAR, therefore it does not have an increased impact on equipment important to safety. l 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different l type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the designed function and/or operation [ of the transmitter is not altered, therefore the possibility for-3 an additional accident or malfunction is not created. l
- 3..The margin of safety, as defined in the-basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this equipment and its function L
are not addressed in Tech Specs, nor will'its design function-and operation be altered. I i t I y d m 'k t 1 4 3. I t !il 7 ( A
y '4 t-r r s F-< i l h r'.- .R h; 't ' Minor Design Change 4-2-90-033 i 5 e L l Description This change repaired line 2-3005F-18" by removing the section of damaged k pipe and welding a patch plate over the removed section. The spray holes l will be drilled in the same location with a minor change to spacing configuration to allow for proper material between the spray holes. Evaluation, r 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously l [:' ' evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased t, .because the repair docs'not alter the design function or operation L of 2-3005F-18" and does not affect the intent of the'FSAR or Tech Specs. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type,than.any previously evaluated in-the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the operation and function of E 2-3005F-18" will not change. l L 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any, Technical I Specification. is not reduced because there are no specific Tech- ' t Spec references to 2-3005F-18", and its repair does not alter .its design function or operation. L f ?' L .. k L, b 'i' o, ~ O it p J-
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Modification M-4-2-84-021A HPCI Steam Leak Detection Temperature Switches Description This modification called for a design change to the HPCI Area Steam Leak Detection / Isolation System to eliminate spurious isolations which have been. occurring due to minute steam leaks. At present, the system is comprised of 16 temperature switches in four groups of four per system. Each group is configured to form a (one-out-of-two taken twice) 1,gic and any one of the four groups are capabic of isolating the system. This modifi-cation will reduce the number of temperature switches from 16 to 4. The (one-out-of-two taken twice) logic will be maintained along with divisional separation requirements. The systems isolation response time will be maintained through a : eduction ir
- i:1 temperature switch setpoint.
Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurtrrea or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the reduction from 16 temperature switches to four will not degrade the integrity of the steam leak detection / isolation system. The system will still be totally automatic along with the capabilities for manual initiation. The (one-out-of-two taken twice) logic and divisional power sources is still maintained along with other steam leak detection devices. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction previously evaluated has not bor n increased. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this mod does not interact nor interface with other primary containment isolation systems. No single failure within the system can create a malfunction to prevent system isolation from occurring, or to cause spurious isolations. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the reduction from 16 to four temperature switches will require Technical Specification changes. However, the margin of safety is not reduced. The new steam leak detection / isolation logic continues to' satisfy the requirements for primary containment isolation as listed on Table 3.2.1 in the Technical Specification and the associated basis.
0 4 Modification M-4-2-84-021B RCIC Steam Leak Detection Temperature Switches Description This modification called for a design change to the RCIC Area Steam Leak Detection /lsolation System to eliminate spurious isolations which have been occurring due to minute steam leaks. At present, the system is comprised of 16 temperature switches in four groups of four per system. Each group is configured to form a (one-out-of-two taken twice) logic and any one of the four groups are capable of isolating the system. This modifi-cation will reduce the number of temperature switches from 16 to 4. The (one-out-of-two taken twice) logic will be maintained along with divisional separation requirements. The systems isolation response time will be maintained through a reduction in the temperature switch setpoint. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the reduction from 16 temperature switches to four will not degrade the integrity of the steam leak detection / isolation system. The system will still be totally automatic along with the capabiliti.es for manual initiation. The (one-out-of-two taken twice) logic and divisional power sources is still maintained along with other steam leak detection devices. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction other than previously evaluated has not be increased. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final-Safety Analysis Keport is not created because this mod does not interact not inter-face with other primary containment isolation systems. No single failure within the system can create a malfunction to prevent system isolation from occurring, or to cause spurious isolations. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated has not been created. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the reduction from 16 to four temperature switches will require Technical Specification changes. llowever, the margin of safety is not reduced. The new steam leak detection / isolation logic continues to satisfy the requirements for primary containment isolation as listed on Table 3.2.1 in the Technical Specification and the associated basis.
Modification M-4-2-85-005 Description This modification provided control room annunciation when the High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) Motor Gear Unit (MGU) drifts off the High Speed Stop (HSS) while in a standby condition. During operation of the HPCI system this alarm will not actuate due to flow in the system being sensed. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analyste Report is not increased because the integrity of.the HPCI system has not been decreased by the addition of a new relay. This new relay will provide MGU' annunciation only. The subject modification will not change any of the design criteria of the HPCI system as designated in the FSAR. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because failure of the new relay could occur in one of three ways: (1) Any open, short, sticking or other failure that results in an incorrect indication of "not HSS" and an incorrect "not HSS" alarm, or (2) Any open, short, sticking or other failure that results in a continuous indication of "HPCI MOV at HSS", regardless of actual new condition, and disabling of the "not HSS" alarm, or (3) Any short circuit that results in blown fuses in the 125 VDC HPCI feed. Condition (1) has no actual impact on HPCI availability or operation. It would alert the operator, who could then investigate and correct the problem. Condition (2) is bounded by (i.e., its results are identical to) the existing failure mechanism of a stick limit switch. Condition (3) is bounded by (i.e., its results are identical to) the existing failure mechanism of a short of any other relay in the same branch. Therefore, no new failure mechanism is created. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the function of the HPCI system remains unchanged by the installation of the new relay. The original design basis of the HPCI system to adequately cool the core for all pipe breaks defined in the Technical Specification 3.5.C remains unchanged. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
e, s at ?. a n Modification M-4-2-85-063A -F Description i This modification involved installation of a new High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Turbine' Motor Gear Unit (MGU) controller. 2-2386A. The previous controller had a poor maintenance history and was often responsible for system.inoperability (See Licensee Event Report 265/85-02). Many of 'the failure reports. cited the high temperature and humidity in,the HPCI ~ . room as a contributing cause of the failure rate. In addition, the components used for the? previous controller are now obsolete. The new controller is installed in the turbine building at elevation 595 feet, in order to provide.a milder environment for the electronic equipment, and wired to
- the terminations inside the previous MGU controller cabinet located in the HPCI_ pump room.' _The previous MGU controller is disconnected and will' be removed:at a'later date under partial modification M-4-2-85-63C.
Operation of the new controller is-identical to the previous controller and does not change any turbine operation. Evaluation j s -1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence.of an accident. or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final-Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the only accident / malfunction impacted is the Small-Break LOCA. The initial conditions are not changed. The probability of occurrence is not changed. The consequences may decrease slightly 'due tofenhanced HPCI speed control reliability. 2. The possibility.for an accident or malfunction of a different I type than any_previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no new failure modes are created., Current redundant and/or backup systemstwill not be degraded. All failure modes impacts are bounded-by existing analyses. l 3.' The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any-Technical-Specification, is not reduced because neither Technical Specifications nor their bases require changes. There are no reductions in the . margins of safety. ) I I
r Modification M-4-2-87-61 Description This modification replaced the manually operated control rod drive (CRD) pump discharge valves 2-301-2A/2B with motor operated valves including handwheels. The controls and indications for these valves were installed on the 902-5 panel in the Control Room. Flow controller 2-340-1 was replaced with a model that displays flow measurement in gallons per minutes (GPM), output in % open, and has color coded normal or abnormal deviation ranges from the setpoint. Existing control switches and indicating lights were rearranged to provide a logical configuration for the control panel. A new spring return to center type switch was installed at 902-5 for the CRD drive water pressure control valve (2-302-8), providing easier throttling capability. The control switch and indicating lights for the CRD cooling water pressure valve (2-302-10) were removed from panel 902-5, and thie valve was disconnected electrically and locked in the open position. Instal-lation of this modification satisfied an NRC commitment as well as a Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) concern. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the CRD discharge valves are not required for accident mitigation. The addition of new motor-operated valves (MOV's) with the capabilities of control from the 902-5 panel will enhance the operation of the CRD system. The remaining changes listed in the modification description did not alter the function / logic of the CRD system operation. This modification will not change any of the design criteria of the CRD system as designated in the FSAR. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because providing new MOV's and control room control along with local manual operation of the CRD discharge valves does not change the design characteristics of the CRD system. The remaining changes listed in the modification description did not alter the function / logic of the CRD system operation. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction not evaluated in the FSAR is not created. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the CRD discharge valves are not required for accident mitigation. The remaining changes listed in the modification description did not alter the function / logic of the CRD system operation. Therefore, they are not addressed by Technical Specification basis. All Technical Specification margins of safety will remain unchanged.
Modification M-4-2-87-62A Feedwater Regulating Isolation Valves Description This mod changed control switches for the feedwater isolation valves 2-3206-A(B) to allow for seal in open, seal in close, pull to stop logic on the existing Motor Operated Valves (MOV). This mod was accomplished by replacing the actual switches with better switches. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the feedwater regulating isolation valves are not required for accident mitigation, additionally the valves have no affect on accident analysee as discussed in the FSAR. This modification will enhance the operation of the valves. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no changes have been made to the valves which affect any of the bounding conditions in the FSAR accident analysis. Because all bounding conditions remain the same no new accidents are introduced by this modification. 3.- The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specificatton, is not reduced because these valves are not required for accident mitigation, therefore they are not addressed by Technical Specification Basis. All Technical Specification margins of safety will remain unchanged.
Modification M-4-2-88-028B Head Spray Piping Description The head spray piping was removed from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) up to and including valve 2-1001-60. This included removal of motor-operated valves 2-1001-60 and 2-!001 53, control switches and indicating lights from 90X-3 panels, interlock which automatically closes the valves on a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system isolation signal and the computer input for valve position. In addition, valve stem leakoff lines were dis-connected, and all conduit, conduit supports, and cables were removed from the drywell. This partial modification included only electric.al changes associated with this modification. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because removal of the head spray line eliminates the potential for Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) in the line, thereby decreasing the probability of a line break. The head spray line is not required for normal or accident plant shutdown. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no new interfaces with safety-related equipment, systems, or structures, or new systems subject to failure have been introduced. This partial modification involves only removal of electrical components. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because removal of the head spray line and associated electrical components does not reduce any margin of safety or limiting condition of operation as defined in the basis of any technical specification. This partial modi-fication involves only the removal of electrical components.
Modification M-4-2-88-029 RWCU Outboard Valve and pipe Repairs Description Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) repairs consisted of replacement of the motor operated RWCU outboard valve, partial flued head replacement and the replacement of RWCU drywell penetration pipe with Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) resistant materials. Other short sections of the RWCU process piping adjacent to the penetration which were removed to facilitate the penetration piping replacement were also replaced. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the replaced RWCU outboard valve and penetration piping are resistant to IGSCC, thereby decreasing the probability of line break and occurrence of an accident. The replaced piping, valve, and modified flued head will be analyzed and qualified for design basis conditions. As per FSAR 10.3.3, the RWCU system is isolated on low reactor water level. This modification does not affect the existing safety margins of the RWCU system. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety. Analysis Report is not created because no change has been made that affects any of the bounding conditions stated in FSAR accident analysis. The modified piping and components in the vicinity of penetration X-14 are virtually identical to the original configuration. No-new interfaces with safety-related equipment, systems, or new accident or malfunctions are introduced by this modification. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the replacement of the RWCU outboard valve, RWCU piping sections, and the partially modified flued head has no impact on the existing basis of the technical specifications as defined in Technical Specification 3.7.D/4.7.D. The modified piping and components in the vicinity of penetration X-14 are virtually identical to the original configuration. The margins of safety are not reduced.
Modification M-4-2-88-037A HPCI Flow Controller Description This modification replaced the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump flow indicating controller (FIC). 2-2340-1, GeMac model analog controller, with a digital flow controller manufactured by Yokogawa. The pump flow range displayed on the flow indicating controller is increased from 0-6000 gallons per minute (gpm) to 0-8000 gpm to meet Human Engineering design standards. This modification upgrades the pump control system and increases the reliability of the HPCI system. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the replacement of the HPC1 flow controller and changeout of an internal resistor in the new HPCI MCU Signal Converter does not affect the safety-related functions as outlined in FSAR Section 6.2.5. The probability of occurrence of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or Single Failure Event (SFE) has not increased. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the new HPCI flow controller will be seismically qualified aiid mounted to mitigate any component f res. Failure of the HPCI system is still bounded by the aval_S;ility of the ADS system in conjunction with the LPCI mode of the RHR system and does not create any new accidents or mal-functions not previously analyzed in the FSAR. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the replacement of the HPCI flow controller and changeout of an internal resistor in the new HPCI MGU Signal Converter does not have any impact on the existing basis of the Quad Cities Technical Specifications 3.5. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications remains unchanged. i
Modification M-4-2-88-037B RCIC Flow Controllers Description This mod replaced the RCIC flow controllers on the 901(2)-4 panels with new Yokogawa programmable controllers. In addition, the existing square root extractor will be deleted, llowever, its function will be retained by replacing the existing flow transmitter with a Rosemount transmitter that includes an integral square root function. A jumper in the RCIC governor signal converter was rewired to allow it to accept a 4-20ma input. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the replacement of the RCIC flow controller and transmitter does not affect any safety-related functions since it is not classified as a safety-related system. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of a design basis accident or single failure event has not increased. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because all new components will be seismically mcanted, with the new controller being seismically qualified. This will mitigate any component failures that could affect the operation of nearby safety-related equipment. No new accidents or malfunctions not previously analyzed in the FSAR are introduced by this partial modification. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the replacement of the RCIC flow controller and transmitter does not have any impact on the existing basis of the Quad Cities Technical Specifications since the RCIC system is not a safety-related system.
Safety Evaluation #89-169 Modification M-4-2-88-ll7 0xygen Analyzer Sample Tubing Description The Station has experienced primary containment oxygen analyzer problems due to condensation. A high point between the oxygen analyzer bypass pump and drain would cause condensation to collect at the bypass pump. Eventually the condensation would find its way to the analyzer. This modification changed the discharge piping to continuously slope toward the brain. Evaluation 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because this modification will make the oxygen analyzer more reliable because moisture is less likely to mix with the sample. Operation and function of other systems are not affected by this modification. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the oxygen analyzer is non safety related and the design and operation of the oxygen analyzer is not affected by this modification. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because improved performance of the oxygen analyzer will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. - = = = = = = = - 1}}